2025 IL App (1st) 232247-U No. 1-23-2247 Order filed February 13, 2025
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 23 MC 1194542 ) EDWIN LOPEZ MIRANDA, ) Honorable ) Donald Panarese, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass to a residence is affirmed over his contentions that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed finding.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Edwin Lopez Miranda was found guilty of criminal
trespass to a residence (720 ILCS 5/19-4(a)(1) (West 2022)) and sentenced to three months’
supervision. On appeal, Miranda contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knew that he lacked authority to enter the apartment at issue. In the alternative, Miranda No. 1-23-2247
contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed finding at the close
of the State’s case. 1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 2
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Miranda was charged by misdemeanor complaint with one count of criminal trespass to a
residence following an incident on December 27, 2022.
¶5 At Miranda’s first court appearance on March 29, 2023, Miranda informed the court that
he spoke Spanish. The court asked Miranda if he needed an interpreter, and Miranda answered,
“Yes, please.” The court stated that it would call an interpreter and passed the case. When the case
was recalled, the court swore in an interpreter, who then translated that day’s proceedings. Trial
commenced on July 26, 2023, with a Spanish interpreter present.
¶6 Elaine Barker testified that she lived alone in a fourth-floor apartment in Chicago. Around
December 2022, she noticed a few things in her residence that were out of the ordinary. First, she
found a t-shirt under her air conditioning unit, clogging a leak. Because she was “hyper allergenic”
and particular about her clothing, she would not have placed the t-shirt there. Second, mints she
kept near her front door “kind of disappeared.” Third, one day she came home and found her front
door locked with its dead bolt, which she would never do herself. After making these observations,
Barker installed a security camera inside her apartment, directed at her front door. The camera
began recording when triggered by movement or sound.
1 Although the parties use the term “motion for a directed verdict,” when such a motion is made at a bench trial, it is more properly referred to as a “motion for a directed finding,” a “motion for an acquittal,” or a “motion for a finding of not guilty.” See People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 914 (2001). In this case, we refer to the motion as a “motion for a directed finding.” 2 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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¶7 Around 3 p.m. on December 27, 2022, Barker left her apartment to run errands, locking
her door behind her. As she exited the building, she saw Miranda in an apartment, the front door
of which was open, across the hall and two doors down. Barker knew Miranda as the maintenance
person for her building, as Miranda had done apartment repairs for her in the past. Barker and
Miranda had a brief conversation, which she described as follows:
“A. He said that he, liked, [sic] lived in 101. He asked me what apartment I lived
in and I pointed to my door and I said I lived right there. He remembered doing a work
order for me before. I thanked him for doing it. That was about the extent of our
conversation. Then I left.
Q. Were the keys mentioned at all in this interaction?
A. Yeah. So, I asked him, like, you know, what he does and he mentioned that he
cleans all of the apartments in the building. He cleans, like, a lot of them in the area, so he
has access to all of those things. I’m like, hey, is it just you that does all that, and he’s like,
yeah, it’s just me.”
¶8 Following the conversation, Barker left the building. While she was out, she received a
“notice indication” from her security camera that someone was in her apartment. She checked the
camera’s footage through her Google Home application and saw footage of Miranda opening her
door at approximately 3:50 p.m.
¶9 A 14-second video clip of footage captured by Barker’s camera was published in court.
Barker testified that it depicted Miranda opening her door, walking into her apartment, “gasping a
little, then closing the door.” The video depicts the inside of Barker’s front door. For approximately
the first seven seconds of the video, the camera captures the sound of one or more locks turning
while the door is closed. At the seven-second mark, the door opens approximately half-way.
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Miranda is visible in the doorway with his right hand on the outer doorknob and his left hand at
the bolt, which is approximately shoulder-height. With his mouth open, Miranda looks into the
apartment, in the general direction of the camera. At the nine-second mark, there is a breathy
sound, and then Miranda immediately closes the door.
¶ 10 Barker testified that, on December 27, 2022, she did not give her landlord permission to let
Miranda or anyone else into her apartment, and she had received no notice that anyone was coming
to her apartment. Nothing needed to be fixed, she had put in no work orders, and she had not given
Miranda a key or permission to enter her residence. She stated, “There’s no reason for anyone to
be in my apartment.”
¶ 11 On cross-examination, Barker agreed that, when she talked to Miranda on the day in
question, they spoke about work he had done in her apartment. She acknowledged in court that she
was grateful for the work he had done and agreed that she had given him a cash tip. During their
conversation, he asked where she lived and she pointed to her apartment. She knew that he spoke
multiple languages but denied that their conversation was “somewhat in English and somewhat in
Spanish,” as she does not speak Spanish. She stated, “[T]he entire conversation that we had was
very understandable. He understood me. I understood him.”
¶ 12 On further cross-examination, Barker testified that she had not spoken to the property
manager about her unit on December 27, 2022. However, she was unsure if she had spoken to him
about anything else that day. When asked whether, during the previous occasion when Miranda
worked in her apartment, she knew the property manager had given him a key, Barker answered
that she “was unsure what the exact setup was.” When she would “talk to maintenance,” sometimes
the building manager would send Miranda or someone else to address her concern. She did not
know who gave Miranda access to the keys.
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¶ 13 On redirect examination, Barker stated that, to the best of her knowledge, Miranda was an
agent of her landlord. She did not give the landlord permission for Miranda to enter her apartment
on December 27, 2022, and did not personally give Miranda permission to enter.
¶ 14 Miranda testified through an interpreter that on the date in question, he was employed as a
maintenance worker for the building. His responsibilities included general cleaning and repairs in
apartments. When asked whether, as part of his job, the property manager gave him keys to access
different units, he answered, “Yes, I was authorized.”
¶ 15 About two weeks prior to December 27, 2022, Miranda had performed some work in
Barker’s apartment. Specifically, he installed two screws because her window was loose and he
“brought down” an air conditioning unit. He was not given a work order for that job; rather, the
“one in charge” called him and told him to go to Barker’s apartment.
¶ 16 On December 27, 2022, Miranda was painting in a fourth-floor apartment when Barker
knocked on the door. She began talking to him in English, and he told her he could not understand
much of what she was saying. In court, he stated that he speaks some English, but “[n]ot well, a
little bit. Only a few words.” When asked whether he understood a few words here and there, he
answered, “A little, but it’s hard for me to understand.”
¶ 17 Miranda recognized some of the words Barker was using. He testified, “I understood that
she said that because I had set two screws, that her apartment was hot.” Barker gave him a $13 tip
and pointed out her apartment, which was also on the fourth floor. Miranda described what
happened next:
“She said that her apartment was too hot, and because she spoke in English, I did
not understand. So, then I wanted to go and remove one of the screws so her apartment
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wouldn’t be so hot. And then when I noticed that I didn’t remember her apartment very
well, when she pointed out, then I went back to do my job.”
¶ 18 Miranda specified that he went to the apartment he thought Barker pointed at and knocked
on the door. He unlocked and opened the door, “saw that that was not the apartment,” and went
back to painting. When asked if he thought the apartment was the one he was supposed to enter,
he answered, “I was not sure, that’s why I didn’t want to go in.” He agreed that he used keys his
boss had provided him to open the door, saying, “I was authorized with the keys.” He also agreed
that he left after he realized it was the wrong apartment.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Miranda denied that he saw Barker leaving her apartment. The
following dialogue ensued:
“Q. Ms. Barker never gave you permission to enter her apartment?
A. I did not understand it because she spoke in English.
THE COURT: Let the record reflect the defendant has been answering in English
to English questions from his attorney. Go ahead.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They’ve been translated by madam interpreter.
THE COURT: Oh, no. He’s been answering your questions in English, your
questions. Oh, yes, oh, yes. Go ahead.
BY [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]:
Q. My question for you is that you entered her apartment without her permission,
not that you misunderstood her?
A. (Speaking Spanish).
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. It was a yes or no question.
THE COURT: Overruled. He may answer.
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THE WITNESS: No.
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Could we translate what he said?
THE INTERPRETER: I cannot—I cannot do it because he was just going on and
on and I was waiting for somebody to direct him.
Q. You did not have permission to enter this apartment?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, no further questions of this
witness.”
¶ 20 On redirect examination, Miranda agreed that, during his conversation with Barker, she
spoke in English. He stated that he understood only “some words” that she said.
¶ 21 On re-cross examination, he agreed that he did not have a work order from the landlord to
enter the apartment, explaining, “[t]hey would not give me orders. *** When I get the orders, the
job orders, he would only call.” He agreed that his boss did not call him to enter the apartment on
the day in question.
¶ 22 Finally, Miranda reiterated that he does not speak English but could understand “a little
from school.” He denied that he could understand his attorney, stating, “All the time, I use an
interpreter.”
¶ 23 In closing, the State reviewed Barker’s testimony and highlighted the video footage. The
State argued, among other things, “The defendant knowingly entered the apartment. Even if there
was a miscommunication, mistake is not an excuse for trespassing to a residence. And even if
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there’s still a misunderstanding, the defendant clearly entered the apartment knowingly and
without permission from Ms. Barker.”
¶ 24 Defense counsel began his closing by remarking that the State was arguing there was a
misunderstanding. The court interjected, “There’s no misunderstanding. [Miranda] testified he had
no authority to enter this place.” Counsel continued, asserting that the State had not met its burden
of proving that Miranda had knowledge that he did not have authority. In rebuttal, the State asserted
that it had met its burden.
¶ 25 The trial court found Miranda guilty, stating, in total, “The defendant testified he had [sic]
not have authority. Not only was [Miranda] not truthful with this Court, he lied. The State has met
their burden to find him guilty.”
¶ 26 Miranda filed a motion to reconsider and for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the State
failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Miranda also contended that the trial court
erred in finding that he testified without the use of the interpreter in response to his attorney’s
questions, which were in English, “and that such testimony constituted a lie or misrepresentation
to the court.”
¶ 27 At the hearing on the motion, Miranda called Demeris Ramos, the trial interpreter. Counsel
asked Ramos whether she remembered Miranda responding in English to his attorney’s questions.
Ramos answered that she did not.
¶ 28 Counsel argued that the State failed to prove Miranda’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
where the evidence supported a reasonable hypothesis that he did not know his entry into the
apartment was without Barker’s authority. Counsel further claimed that the court’s finding that
Miranda lied during cross-examination was not borne out by the record. The court responded:
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“Okay. I’m not saying that he lied because he understood English versus Spanish.
I’m questioning his truthfulness during his testimony. Just because—just because the
testimony was that he understands some English because Miss Parker [sic] testified that
she spoke to him in English and he understood some according to her.”
¶ 29 Following this statement, counsel resumed his argument that the State did not disprove the
reasonable hypothesis that Miranda believed Barker asked him to undo some of his prior work in
her apartment because the unit had become too hot. In response, the State reviewed portions of the
trial testimony and argued Miranda was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 30 The trial court denied Miranda’s motion, explaining:
“Well, Miss Parker [sic] wouldn’t have been able to explain to [Miranda] her
apartment was hot because she does not speak Spanish. So for him to understand or believe
that he had authority to go into that apartment, when [the State] asked him, point blank:
You did not have permission to enter this apartment. His answer was no. And he testified
when I get the orders, the job orders, he would only call. Your boss did not call you to enter
this apartment on the day in question? No. Do you speak English? No. Do you understand
English? No.
And he said he understands a little from school. I mean, and then he testifies that
Miss Parker [sic] needed two screws adjusted on December 27th, I am correct, December
27 because it was hot.
[Defense counsel], try as you may, and you have done a great job, your motion is
denied.”
¶ 31 The trial court subsequently sentenced Miranda to three months’ supervision. Miranda filed
a timely notice of appeal.
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¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Miranda first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.
¶ 34 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). “A reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the
record in favor of the State” (People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)), and the positive
and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict (People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235
Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009)).
¶ 35 It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony, to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trier of fact on these matters. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. Reversal is justified only
where the evidence is “so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible” that it raises a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt (People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989)) or where proof of an
element of a crime is wholly lacking (People v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 180543, ¶ 56).
¶ 36 As charged, a person commits criminal trespass to a residence “when, without authority,
he or she knowingly enters or remains within any residence *** that is the dwelling place of
another.” 720 ILCS 5/19-4(a)(1) (West 2022).
¶ 37 In this court, Miranda does not contest that he entered Barker’s residence or that he was
without authority to do so. He only contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knew he lacked authority to enter the apartment.
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¶ 38 A defendant enters the dwelling place of another “without authority” when the occupant
has not granted him consent to enter. People v. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 25. In
Witherspoon, which involved a home invasion statute with nearly identical language to the statute
at issue here, our supreme court held that the “without authority” element must include the mental
state of knowledge. Id. ¶ 31. In general, knowledge refers to an awareness of the existence of the
facts which make a person’s conduct unlawful. Id. ¶ 33. By statute, a person acts knowingly when,
inter alia, he is consciously aware of the nature of his conduct. See 720 ILCS 5/4-5(a) (West 2022).
In addition, “[k]nowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that
the fact exists.” Id.
¶ 39 Knowledge is often proven by circumstantial evidence because it is the mental element of
an offense and, as such, is rarely proven by direct evidence. People v. Leib, 2022 IL 126645, ¶ 37.
Whether a defendant had the requisite mental state to support his conviction is a question for the
trier of fact that will not be disturbed on review unless a reasonable doubt exists as to the
defendant’s guilt. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 354 (2001).
¶ 40 Miranda contends that the State failed to prove that he knew he lacked authority to enter
Barker’s apartment, since she spoke to him about his prior repair work, gave him cash, and pointed
to her unit. He argues that he does not speak English well, that his job allowed him to enter
apartments to make repairs and clean, and that the property manager had given him keys to do so.
Given these circumstances, he argues that nothing suggested he knew he lacked authority to enter
Barker’s apartment and nothing demonstrated that the situation differed from any other work he
had performed in tenants’ units.
¶ 41 Miranda acknowledges that he did not receive a work order in this instance. However, he
asserts that it is of no moment, as he never testified that his employer only told him to enter a unit
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after receiving a work order. Moreover, he maintains that, based on his conversation with Barker,
he reasonably believed that there was something inside her apartment that she wanted him to repair,
so he believed that she was allowing him to enter. He acknowledges Barker’s testimony that she
did not give him permission to enter but argues that Barker’s testimony did not establish that he
understood her.
¶ 42 After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the
circumstances under which Miranda entered Barker’s apartment were sufficient for the trial court
to conclude that Miranda knew he lacked authority to do so.
¶ 43 First, as mentioned, Miranda concedes that he did not receive a work order authorizing him
to enter the apartment. Barker testified that when she spoke to Miranda on the day in question,
their conversation was not “somewhat in English and somewhat in Spanish,” as she did not speak
Spanish. She stated that they understood each other during their entire conversation. Miranda told
her, among other things, which apartment he lived in, that he had completed a work order for her
before, and that he cleaned apartments in the building. She thanked him for his prior work and
gave him a cash tip. After Miranda asked where she lived, she pointed to her unit.
¶ 44 Second, the video footage depicts Miranda opening Barker’s front door halfway and
looking into the unit, in the general direction of the camera. Following a breathy sound, Miranda
immediately closes the door.
¶ 45 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to, and taking all reasonable inferences
in favor of, the State, this evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Miranda knew
he was entering Barker’s residence without authority. Stated differently, we are unable to say it
would be impossible for any rational trier of fact to find the elements of criminal trespass to a
residence to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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¶ 46 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by Miranda’s argument that his
conversation with Barker would have led him to reasonably believe that she wanted a repair made
inside her apartment and, therefore, believe that she was allowing him to enter. While this
conclusion is not outside the realm of possibility, Miranda’s argument harkens back to the obsolete
“reasonable hypothesis of innocence” standard. Under that standard, the trier of fact was required
to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence before finding a defendant guilty in cases
involving circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., People v. Branion, 47 Ill. 2d 70, 77 (1970). However,
the reasonable hypothesis of innocence standard of review is no longer viable in Illinois; rather,
the reasonable doubt test, as set forth above, applies in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
in all criminal cases. People v. Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d 286, 291 (1989); People v. Walker, 2020 IL App
(4th) 180774, ¶¶ 82-83.
¶ 47 It is well-settled that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient
to convict. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228. Here, Barker’s testimony is not the only evidence
that belies Miranda’s theory. In addition to her testimony, the video footage depicts behavior that
is not consistent with a person who believed he had just been granted authority by a tenant to enter
her apartment to make some sort of repair. The footage shows Miranda unlocking and opening
Barker’s front door. Instead of continuing inside the unit to assess whether any work is necessary,
Miranda takes a two-second glance through the half-open door and immediately closes it. We
agree with the State that Miranda’s quick retreat supports a determination that he knowingly
entered the apartment without authorization. We reject Miranda’s argument that no reasonable fact
finder could conclude that he knew he lacked authority to enter Barker’s apartment. His challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
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¶ 48 Miranda next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
directed finding after the State failed to prove in its case-in-chief. He argues that Barker’s
testimony failed to demonstrate that, beyond Barker granting direct permission to enter, there were
no other means that authorized him to enter the apartment or that he did not enter while performing
his work duties. As such, he asserts, it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to have failed
to move for a directed finding at the close of the State’s case. He maintains that he was prejudiced
by counsel’s failure because (1) there was a reasonable probability that he would have been
acquitted at that point, and (2) counsel called Miranda to testify, which allowed the State to use
his testimony to support their theory that he lacked authority and knew it.
¶ 49 Claims of ineffectiveness are governed by the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984). See People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687. More specifically, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms (id. at 694), overcome a “strong
presumption” that counsel’s alleged error was part of a “sound trial strategy” (People v. Houston,
226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007)), and establish that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”
(Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
¶ 50 In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance, appellate courts “use a bifurcated standard of
review, wherein we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, but make a de novo assessment of the ultimate legal issue of whether
counsel’s actions support an ineffective assistance claim.” People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill. App. 3d 53,
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81 (2008). In this case, where Miranda’s challenge does not involve findings of fact made by the
trial court, we consider de novo whether Miranda has stated a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. See People v. Ortega, 2020 IL App (1st) 162516, ¶ 24. A reviewing court need not address
both prongs of the Strickland inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing as to one
prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
¶ 51 We find that Miranda has failed to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland where there
is not a reasonable probability that, had counsel moved for a directed finding, such a motion would
have been granted.
¶ 52 A motion for a directed finding or verdict asserts that, as a matter of law, the State’s
evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 915.
When ruling on such a motion, the trial court does not pass upon the weight of the evidence or the
credibility of the witnesses and must consider the State’s evidence in the light most favorable to
the State. Id. “In other words, a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty asks whether the State’s
evidence could support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether the evidence
does in fact support that verdict.” (Emphases in original.) Id.
¶ 53 Here, the State presented evidence both that Miranda lacked authority to enter Barker’s
apartment and that he knew he lacked that authority. Barker testified that, on the day in question,
she did not give her landlord permission to let Miranda or anyone else into her apartment. She
further testified that nothing in her unit needed repair, she had put in no work orders, and she had
not personally given Miranda a key or permission to enter her residence.
¶ 54 Miranda argues that landlords have independent authority to enter premises for repairs and
maintenance, which does not hinge on a tenant’s permission. Miranda therefore submits that his
employer, the property manager, could have authorized him to enter Barker’s apartment, and the
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State presented no evidence to rebut that possibility. However, Barker testified that nothing in her
apartment needed to be fixed. Barker testified that she “was unsure what the exact setup was”
between the property manager and Miranda, but noted that when she needed a repair, she would
“talk to maintenance.” In response, sometimes the property manager would send Miranda or
someone else to address her concern, instead of taking care of it himself. We agree with the State
that this testimony provided some evidence that, for Miranda to gain authorization via the property
manager to enter Barker’s apartment, the initial communication had to have come from her.
¶ 55 Regarding whether Miranda knew that he lacked authority to enter, we have already
determined that the State proved that element beyond a reasonable doubt based on Barker’s
testimony and the video evidence.
¶ 56 In summary, we find that the evidence adduced by, and viewed in the light most favorable
to, the State could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 918. As such,
there is no reasonable probability that, had counsel moved for a directed finding at the close of the
State’s case, the motion would have been granted. Where Miranda suffered no prejudice as a result
of counsel’s inaction, we need not consider the performance prong of the Strickland test. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 59 Affirmed.
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