People v Milton
2026 NY Slip Op 04584
July 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
RILEY F. MILTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on July 24, 2026
313 KA 25-00010
Present: Lindley, J.P., Bannister, Montour, Greenwood, And Hannah, JJ.
DAVID P. ELKOVITCH, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BRITTANY GROME ANTONACCI, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), rendered October 24, 2024. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of aggravated criminal contempt.
[*1]
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of aggravated criminal contempt (Penal Law
§ 215.52 [3]). Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that County Court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to the police because, contrary to the court's determination, the police questioning did not fall within the pedigree exception to the Miranda requirement. We conclude that defendant's contention lacks merit, and we therefore affirm.
According to a police officer's testimony at the suppression hearing, the police officer, accompanied by two other members of the police department, responded to a residence after receiving a complaint that there were unwanted guests there. Upon their arrival, the complainant reported to the police that there were two unwanted guests in the residence: a female guest identified by name and a male guest supposedly named "Rodney." The police identified the female guest by name and she agreed to leave without argument.
The police located the male guest—later identified as defendant—in the closet of a back bedroom underneath some clothes and other items. The police asked defendant to identify himself by name and date of birth. Defendant provided the police with the false name "Rodney Miller" and a purported date of birth. The police gave defendant multiple warnings that it was illegal to lie to them about his name, but defendant continued to provide the false name. The officer testified that defendant was not free to leave during the interaction until the police identified him. The officer explained, among other things, that the police did not provide defendant with Miranda warnings prior to asking for his name and date of birth because they were merely attempting to obtain defendant's pedigree information as a routine matter for any such encounter. The officer further testified that the police then informed defendant that he was going to be detained and, upon being detained, defendant provided his real name. Thereafter, the police ultimately determined that there was an order of protection in place against defendant and in favor of the female guest. The police then arrested defendant for violating the order of protection and for providing false pedigree information.
The court, which credited the officer's testimony, determined that while there was no dispute that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, the police were not required to provide Miranda warnings because the pedigree exception applied. The court concluded in particular that the questions regarding defendant's name and date of birth constituted a normal part of police procedure for such an encounter under the circumstances and that the questions [*2]were not a disguised attempt at an investigatory interrogation. The court thus denied that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to suppress his statements to the police.
"Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) are required before a person in custody is subjected to interrogation by the police" (People v Wortham, 37 NY3d 407, 412-413 [2021], cert denied — US —, 143 S Ct 122 [2022]; see Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 297-302 [1980]; People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005]). " 'The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' " (Paulman, 5 NY3d at 129, quoting People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]; see Innis, 446 US at 300-302; Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413).
"Pedigree questions, also sometimes referred to as 'booking questions,' typically ask a suspect for identifying information such as name, date of birth, and address" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413). "These questions constitute custodial interrogation when they are posed to a suspect in custody" (id.; see People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292 [1995]). "Nevertheless, [the Court of Appeals] ha[s] recognized an exception to Miranda for pedigree questions" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413; see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292; People v Rodriquez, 39 NY2d 976, 978 [1976]; People v Rivera, 26 NY2d 304, 309 [1970]). "The exception derives from the essential purpose of Miranda—to protect defendants from self-incrimination in response to questions posed as part of the investigation of a crime, as distinguished from noninvestigative inquiries" (Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292; see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413). "Pedigree questions are an exception to Miranda—that is, a defendant's response to such questions is not suppressible even when obtained in violation of Miranda—when the questions are reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292).
"As a threshold matter, pedigree questions must be reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns for the pedigree exception to Miranda to apply" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413). "The exception may not apply in certain situations, however, even if the question is reasonably related to police administrative concerns" (id.). In that regard, given the essential purpose of Miranda (see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292) and the principle that the police are "entitled to make a reasonable inquiry as to the identity of the person they have taken into custody" (Rivera, 26 NY2d at 309), "when a defendant challenges the application of the pedigree exception, the proper inquiry for the . . . court is whether the police used pedigree questions as a guise for improperly conducting an investigative inquiry without first providing Miranda warnings" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415). In performing that inquiry, the court must bear in mind that " '[w]hether the information gathered turns out to be incriminating in some respect does not, by itself, alter the general rule that pedigree questioning' does not require Miranda warnings" (id. at 414). "If the biographical questions are reasonably related to police administrative concerns, and thereby meet the threshold requirement for the pedigree exception to apply, the fact that the response given by the defendant may ultimately turn out to be incriminating at trial does not alter the analysis" (id.). The court, in addition, "may consider the subjective intent of the officer in assessing whether the pedigree exception applies, but the inquiry itself must be objective" (id.). Ultimately, "the pedigree exception will not apply even if the pedigree question is reasonably related to police administrative concerns where, under the circumstances of the case, a reasonable person would conclude based on an objective analysis that the pedigree question was a 'disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation' " (id. at 415, quoting Rodney, 85 NY2d at 294).
Applying those principles here, we conclude that the court properly determined that the pedigree exception applied and thus properly denied that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to suppress his statements to the police. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that the purpose of asking pedigree questions of both the female guest and defendant was "[t]o identify who they were and advise them they were no longer welcome there," and that requesting general information such as names and dates of birth was routine for any such encounter. The officer's testimony thus established the administrative purpose for seeking pedigree information during an encounter of that nature: the police must know with whom they are speaking in a residence (see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415; Rivera, 26 NY2d at 309; People v Myles, 216 AD3d 1419, 1420-1421 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 936 [2023]). The People "thereby established the threshold basis for the pedigree exception to apply, i.e., the questions were [*3]reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415; see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292).
We further conclude that the court properly determined that the pedigree questions were not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation (see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415; Rodney, 85 NY2d at 294). Notably, the police asked defendant his name and date of birth immediately upon encountering him hiding in the bedroom closet, which was before the police ultimately determined that there was an order of protection in place against defendant and in favor of the female guest (see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415). The officer further testified that it was routine practice to ask anyone those pedigree questions during such an encounter and, indeed, the police asked the same questions of the female guest, who was identified by name and agreed to leave without objection (see id. at 415-416). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the fact that his "response[s] ultimately turned out to be incriminating does not alter the conclusion that, at the time [they were] asked, the question[s were] not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation by the police" (id. at 416). The fact that the police warned defendant of the legal consequences of giving a false name, which warning is required under the false personation statute (Penal Law § 190.23), does not warrant a different conclusion (see People v Ligon, 66 AD3d 516, 517 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 889 [2010]). Defendant "had already incriminated himself by giving a false name, and the warning[s] gave him an opportunity to retract his prior incriminating response[s]" (id.). Under the circumstances of this case, the pedigree questions posed by the police to defendant were not a disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation (see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 415).
As the Court of Appeals has cautioned, "[a]lthough there may be some circumstances where asking a suspect for core identifying information such as name, date of birth, and address will not qualify for the pedigree exception to Miranda, those circumstances will be rare" (id. at 416). We conclude for all of the foregoing reasons that, contrary to the assertions of defendant and the dissent, this is not one of those rare cases (see id.). Inasmuch as the pedigree exception to Miranda applied and thus no Miranda warnings were required before the police asked defendant for his name and date of birth, the court properly denied that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to suppress his statements to the police (see id.).
All concur except Bannister and Hannah, JJ., who dissent and vote to reverse in accordance with the following memorandum: We respectfully dissent. Defendant's conviction arose after a complainant called police because two individuals, a female and a male, refused to leave his home. The complainant identified the female by name and provided the name "Rodney" for the male. An order of protection existed against defendant and in favor of the female. Upon the police officer's arrival, the female gave no objection to leaving. Defendant, however, was discovered by police officers as he was hiding underneath some clothes in the closet of a back bedroom of the home. Defendant was immediately placed in custody. Prior to advising defendant of his Miranda rights, the officer asked defendant for his name and date of birth. When defendant responded with the name "Rodney," which matched the name given by the complainant, the officer continued to question defendant regarding his name, giving defendant multiple warnings about providing the officer false information. Defendant was ultimately charged with aggravated criminal contempt (Penal Law § 215.52 [3]) for violating the order of protection and false personation (§ 190.23) for providing the police officer with a false name, and he satisfied both charges with his plea of guilty to the count of aggravated criminal contempt. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, we conclude that County Court erred in refusing to suppress defendant's statements to the police on the ground that pre-Miranda questions by the police officer fell within the pedigree exception to the Miranda requirement.
It is well settled that Miranda warnings are required before a person in custody is subject to interrogation by the police (see People v Wortham, 37 NY3d 407, 412-413 [2021], cert denied — US —, 143 S Ct 122 [2022]). " 'The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' " (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005], quoting People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]; see Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413).
The Court of Appeals has "recognized an exception to Miranda for pedigree questions," also sometimes referred to as " 'booking questions,' " which "typically ask a suspect for identifying information such as name, date of birth, and address," despite the fact that even those questions "constitute custodial interrogation when they are posed to a suspect in custody" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413). " 'The exception derives from the essential purpose of Miranda—to protect defendants from self-incrimination in response to questions posed as part of the investigation of a crime, as distinguished from noninvestigative inquiries' " (id., quoting People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292 [1995]). Thus, "[p]edigree questions are an exception to Miranda—that is, a defendant's response to such questions is not suppressible even when obtained in violation of Miranda—when the questions are reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 292-293).
Thus, "[a]s a threshold matter, pedigree questions must be reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns for the pedigree exception to Miranda to apply" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 413). The exception may not apply in some situations, however, even if the question is reasonably related to police administrative concerns (see id.), such as when "the questions, though facially appropriate, are likely to elicit incriminating admissions because of the circumstances of the particular case, or, stated another way, if the question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from [the] defendant" (id. at 414 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rodney, 85 NY2d at 293).
"[T]he subjective intent of the officer may be relevant but is not dispositive . . . The . . . court may consider the subjective intent of the officer in assessing whether the pedigree exception applies, but the inquiry itself must be objective" (Wortham, 37 NY3d at 414). Thus, "the pedigree exception will not apply even if the pedigree question is reasonably related to police administrative concerns where, under the circumstances of the case, a reasonable person would conclude based on an objective analysis that the pedigree question was a 'disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation' " (id. at 415). Further, the situations where asking a suspect for identification information such as name, date of birth and address will not qualify for the pedigree exception to Miranda "will be rare" (id. at 416).
We conclude that this case is one of the rare exceptions. At the suppression hearing, the People had the burden of establishing the threshold basis for the pedigree exception to apply, i.e., that the questions were reasonably related to police administrative concerns (see generally id. at 415). The police officer testified at the hearing that the reason he asked defendant, who was hiding under a pile of clothes in the back bedroom, his name was to identify defendant and advise him that he was no longer welcome. Notably, the officer did not identify any administrative concerns that required asking pedigree questions and failed to explain why he continued to ask defendant for his name, despite defendant's initial response matching the name given by the complainant. We further conclude that the circumstances support the conclusion that the officer's continuing questioning for defendant's name was likely to elicit an incriminating response and constituted interrogation under the guise of obtaining pedigree information (see People v Walker, 129 AD3d 1590, 1591 [4th Dept 2015]; cf. Rodney, 85 NY2d at 294). Thus, even if we were to accept that the officer was asking routine booking questions of defendant when he asked, inter alia, his name, the question was likely to elicit an incriminating response, considering the officer continuously pressed defendant and warned him regarding giving a false name (see People v Slade, 133 AD3d 1203, 1206-1207 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1150 [2016]).
We therefore would reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, and grant that part of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress the pre-
Miranda statements made by defendant, and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings on the indictment (see generally People v Sullivan, 239 AD3d 1371, 1373 [4th Dept 2025]).
Entered: July 24, 2026
Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court