People v. Mendoza

2024 IL App (3d) 220363-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 3, 2024
• Docket: 3-22-0363
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2024 IL App (3d) 220363-U

Order filed May 3, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-22-0363 v. ) Circuit No. 21-CM-1361 ) RAYMOND MENDOZA, ) Honorable ) Robert A. Miller, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Albrecht concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence presented was sufficient to establish defendant’s scooter was a motor vehicle.

¶2 Defendant, Raymond Mendoza, was convicted of two traffic violations. On appeal,

defendant argues he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State’s

evidence failed to demonstrate that the scooter he was operating was a motor vehicle. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Defendant was charged by complaint with crossing the designated median (625 ILCS

5/11-708(d) (West 2020)) and improper lighting -- head or tail lamps (id. § 12-201(b)) in

violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (id. § 1-100 et seq.). The State alleged that

defendant was operating a motor vehicle, identified as an electric kick scooter, while committing

the offenses. Defendant was also charged with obstructing identification (720 ILCS 5/31-4.5(a)

(West 2020)) and driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2020)).

¶5 At a bench trial, Woodridge Police Sergeant Daniel Murray testified that on September

28, 2021, at approximately 3:48 a.m., he observed defendant cross the center median of a four-

lane public highway while riding on a self-propelled, battery-powered electric kick scooter.

Murray described the scooter as having a bright forward-facing headlight and a platform for the

rider to stand. After passing defendant in his squad car, Murray observed through his rearview

mirror that defendant had turned off the scooter’s headlight and was travelling northbound in the

southbound traffic lane. As a result of his observations, Murray initiated a traffic stop and

advised defendant he was being detained. Despite Murray’s repeated requests, defendant refused

to identify himself and was eventually placed under arrest. Murray searched defendant incident

to arrest and recovered a wallet containing defendant’s state identification card. Murray then

discovered defendant’s driver’s license was revoked.

¶6 In addition to Murray’s testimony, the State introduced police body camera footage of the

traffic stop and defendant’s driving abstract showing that his license was revoked. Defendant’s

scooter was also entered into evidence. At the close of the State’s case, the court granted

defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the obstructing identification charge. The court

declined to rule on the remaining three counts and took the matter under advisement as to

whether the scooter was a motor vehicle.

2 ¶7 When the court reconvened several days later, the State argued that defendant’s scooter

qualified as a motor vehicle, in part, because there was a 16-digit number listed on the scooter’s

label. The State asserted the number appeared to be an identification number. Defense counsel

countered that no evidence or witness testimony had been presented regarding the number on the

scooter’s label and asserted that the scooter fell under the low-speed electric bicycle exception to

the definition of motor vehicle under the Code. The court, relying on its own research, reasoned

that the scooter could have been titled and registered under the Illinois Secretary of State rules if

the scooter was labeled with a federal safety certification label and a vehicle identification

number. The court found that there was a federal number on the scooter and based on its use by

defendant on the roadway, the scooter qualified as a motor vehicle.

¶8 The court entered guilty verdicts for crossing the designated median and improper

lighting. However, the court found defendant not guilty of driving while his license was revoked

and acknowledged that the acquittal was inconsistent with the other verdicts based upon the

finding that defendant was operating a motor vehicle. The court reasoned that it would not be in

the interest of justice to convict defendant because he was likely operating the scooter instead of

an automobile to avoid violations for driving without a valid license. Defendant was sentenced to

one year of court supervision for crossing a designated median and one year of conditional

discharge for improper lighting.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because

the evidence was insufficient to determine that the electric kick scooter he was operating was a

motor vehicle. Specifically, defendant contends the State failed to demonstrate that the scooter

3 did not qualify as a low-speed electric bicycle. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence as to any other elements of the offenses.

¶ 11 Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt.” People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 16. “A criminal conviction will not be overturned

unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable

doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.

¶ 12 At the onset, we observe that the offense of crossing a designated median applies to all

vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/11-708(d) (West 2020). The Code defines a “vehicle,” in pertinent part, as

“[e]very device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn

upon a highway ***.” Id. § 1-217. There is no dispute that defendant’s scooter is a “vehicle” as

defined by the Code. Therefore, whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove

that defendant’s scooter met the statutory definition of a “motor vehicle” has no bearing on his

conviction for crossing a designated median.

¶ 13 Conversely, to sustain a conviction for improper lighting under section 12-201(b) of the

Code, the State was required to prove that the vehicle defendant was operating qualified as a

“motor vehicle.” Id. § 12-201(b). Under the Code, a “motor vehicle” is defined as “[e]very

vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained

from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by

human power, motorized wheelchairs, low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles.”

Id. § 1-146. Further, section 1-140.10 of the Code defines a low-speed electric bicycle as, “[a]

4 bicycle with fully operable pedals and an electric motor of less than 750 watts ***.” Id. § 1-

140.10.

¶ 14 Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate defendant’s scooter was a

motor vehicle. Defendant’s scooter was entered into evidence, was viewable on the police body

camera footage, and Murray testified that it was a self-propelled electric kick scooter. Despite

defendant’s assertion that the scooter falls under the low-speed electric bicycle exception to the

statutory definition of motor vehicle, the plain language of section 1-140.10 dictates that only

bicycles with fully operable pedals can be defined as a low-speed electric bicycle for the

purposes of that exception. See id.; People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 382 (2006) (“When

possible, the court should interpret the language of a statute according to its plain and ordinary

meaning. *** A court should not depart from the language of the statute by reading into it

exceptions *** that conflict with the intent of the legislature.”).

¶ 15 The evidence clearly established that defendant was operating a scooter, not a bicycle.

Defendant does not even contend that he was operating a bicycle with fully operable pedals. In

viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State, the court could have

reasonably concluded that defendant’s scooter was a motor vehicle and that the exception for

low-speed electric bicycles did not apply based solely on the plain language of the statutory

definitions. See People v. Frazier, 2016 IL App (1st) 140911, ¶ 15 (finding a motor scooter was

not a bicycle under the statutory exception to the definition of motor vehicle, in part, based on

witness testimony describing the vehicle as a “motor scooter” and not a bicycle). Accordingly,

we affirm defendant’s conviction for improper lighting.

¶ 16 In coming to this conclusion, we find defendant’s assertion that section 12-201(b) cannot

apply to his scooter because it is equipped with only one headlamp unpersuasive. Defendant’s

5 contention relies on a portion of the section’s first sentence stating that all motor vehicles other

than motorcycles shall exhibit at least two lighted headlamps. See 625 ILCS 5/12-201(b) (West

2020). However, it is evident from its title that the purpose of section 12-201 is to establish when

lighted lamps are required while operating a motorcycle or motor vehicle on any highway (id.

§ 12-201), not the number of lighted headlights. The entirety of the first sentence of section 12-

201(b) states:

“(b) All other motor vehicles shall exhibit at least 2 lighted head

lamps, with at least one on each side of the front of the vehicle, which

satisfy United States Department of Transportation requirements, showing

white lights, including that emitted by high intensity discharge (HID)

lamps, or lights of a yellow or amber tint, during the period from sunset to

sunrise, at times when rain, snow, fog, or other atmospheric conditions

require the use of windshield wipers, and at any other times when, due to

insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric conditions, persons and

vehicles on the highway are not clearly discernible at a distance of 1000

feet.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 12-201(b).

Notably, the number of driving lamps required for motor vehicles is prescribed in a separate

section of the Code (id. § 12-211), which defendant was not charged with violating.

¶ 17 Here, the complaint regarding the improper lighting charge alleged defendant operated

the electric kick scooter without the headlamp activated at approximately 3:48 a.m., a time

during the period from sunset to sunrise. It is clear that defendant was charged with violating the

substantive portion of the statute for turning off the headlamp on his vehicle during a time when

lighting was required, not because his scooter was equipped with only one headlamp instead of

6 two. Although we acknowledge that a scooter, like the one operated by defendant, is

manufactured with only a single headlamp, making it more akin to a motorcycle exhibiting at

least one lighted lamp under section 12-201(a), the definition of a “motorcycle” under the Code

excludes motor vehicles that do not have a seat or saddle. Id. §§ 12-201(a), 1-147. As

defendant’s scooter has a platform rather than a seat or saddle, it cannot be classified as a

motorcycle. Until the legislature creates a specific designation for electric kick scooters similar

to defendant’s, we conclude that scooters qualifying as motor vehicles under the Code are

subject to the circumstances when lighting is required as delineated in section 12-201(b).

¶ 18 Finally, we note that defendant’s emphasis on the court’s inconsistent verdicts is

irrelevant, as his convictions cannot be challenged on the basis that they are inconsistent with an

acquittal on another charge. See People v. McCoy, 207 Ill. 2d 352, 356-57 (2003) (trial judges

are presumed to know the law and may exercise lenity in what they perceive as the interests of

justice).

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.