People v. Melsior

Opinion

Fi LED

CLERK OF COURT I .

2 2026~PR 20 PM.· 3:·2fl_{)

SUi..,ERiOR COURJ ~

4 OF GUAM

5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0310-21 7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) GPD Report No. 21-15165 )

8 vs. )

)

9 ) DECISION & ORDER ) RE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION 10 TARVIS KERMAN MELSIOR, TO DISMISS )

DOB: 04/29/1993 11 )

12 Defendant. )

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13 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino on February 5, 2026, for a 14

15 Motion Hearing. Defendant Tarvis Kerman Melsior ("Defendant") was present with counsel

16 Public Defender Earl Espiritu. Assistant Attorney General Samuel Alexander was present for the 17 People of Guam ("People"). At the hearing, the court addressed the parties' arguments regarding 18 the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on December 11, 2025. Following the 19 hearing, the court took the matter under advisement pursuant to Supreme Court of Guam 20

21 Administrative Rule 06-001, CVR 7.l(e)(6)(A) and CRl.1 of the Local Rules of the Superior

22 Court of Guam. Having duly considered the parties' briefings, oral arguments, and the applicable 23 law, the court now issues this Decision and Order DENYING the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

24 BACKGROUND

25 Based on events that occurred on or about June 24, 2021, the Defendant was charged with 26

27 VEHICULAR NEGLIGENCE (As a 3rd Degree Felony) and DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED

28 (As a Misdemeanor). See Indictment (July 13, 2021).

Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21

The court originally scheduled Jury Selection and Trial for December 1, 2021, pursuant to

2 the Defendant's assertion of speedy trial. See Criminal Trial Scheduling Order (Oct. 21, 2021). 1

3 When the Defendant filed his written waiver of speedy trial, the court vacated the Pre-Trial 4 Conference and Jury Selection and Trial dates. See Waiver (Nov. 4, 2021); see also Mot. Hr'g 5 Mins. at 10:17:08AM (Nov. 9, 2021).

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7 After setting the second trial date for April 27, 2022, the court continued the December

8 trial date after the parties filed a Stipulation to Continue Jury Selection and Trial. See Amended

9 Criminal Trial Scheduling Order (Nov. 17, 2021); see also Stipulation (Apr. 26, 2022). In light of 10 this, the court issued a third date for Jury Selection and Trial to commence on September 28, 2022.

11 See Amended Criminal Trial Scheduling Order (May 13, 2022). At a later Further Proceedings, 12

13 the court vacated the September trial date after the parties represented to the court that negotiations

14 were underway. See Further Proceedings Mins. at 9:20:13AM (Sep. 13, 2022). 15 The parties were before the court on April 14, 2023, after the Probation Services Division 16 filed a violation against the Defendant. See Further Proceedings Mins. at 2:44:20PM (Apr. 14, 17 2023). After addressing this violation, the next hearing in this case was a Further Proceedings on 18

19 September 10, 2025. The Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss on December 11, 2025, which

20 led the People to file its Opposition on December 29, 2025. 21 Upon receipt of the pleadings, the court scheduled a Motion Hearing on February 5, 2026, 22 to address the parties' arguments on the Motion to Dismiss. After hearing arguments, the court 23

24 took the matter under advisement.

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1 28 In accordance with the forty-five (45) day period to assert speedy trial under 8 GCA § 80.60(a), the last day to bring the Defendant to trial was November 29, 2021.

Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21

DISCUSSION

2 Although the Defendant waived his right to statutory speedy trial, he argues that his case

3 "laid dormant for over two (2) years without hearing." Def. 's Mot. Dismiss (Dec. 11, 2025). 4 Because of the delay, the Defendant now seeks the dismissal of his case under 8 GCA § 80.70(b).

5 "If there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court, on its own motion, may 6

7 dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." 8 GCA § 80. 70(b ). Before the court can dismiss

8 this case under 8 GCA § 80. 70(b), it must first determine whether the delay in this case was

9 unnecessary enough to find a constitutional violation of the Defendant's right to speedy trial.

10 The Sixth Amendment protects the right to a speedy and public trial in all criminal 11 prosecutions against the accused. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. For U.S. citizens residing in Guam, 12

13 "[t]he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, incorporated by the Organic Act of

14 Guam, guarantees the accused the 'right to a speedy and public trial."' People v. Mendiola, 2023 15 Guam 12 ,J 21 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(g); 8 GCA § 1.1 l(a) (2005)).

16 The Guam Supreme Court has previously determined whether a person's constitutional 17 right to speedy trial was violated when considering the following factors under Barker v. Wingo:

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19 (1) the length of the delay; (2) the cause of the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to

20 a speedy trial; and (4) the presence or absence of prejudice resulting from the delay. People v. 21 Mendiola, 2015 Guam 26 ,i 13 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972)). This 22 court will now review the Barker factors to determine whether the Defendant's constitutional right 23 to a speedy trial was violated.

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25 A. The Length of the Delay

26 The first Barker factor to review is the length of delay in this case. "The length of the delay 27 is measured from the point of arrest or indictment until trial." People v. Naich, 2013 Guam 7 ,i 50 28

Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF03 l 0-21

(citing People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22, 43). Until there is delay that is presumptively prejudicial,

2 there is no need for inquiry into or balancing of the other Barker factors. See Barker, 407 U.S. at

3 530. The more serious or complex the charge, the greater the length of delay that will be tolerated. 4 Id. at 530-31.

5 While there is no exact amount of time that constitutes as prejudicial, the Guam Supreme 6

7 Court has previously found delays of four (4) and six (6) years to be prejudicial enough to warrant

8 examination of the other Barker factors. See Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,, 43-44; see also People v.

9 Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 , 24. However, the Court has also held that an eighteen-month delay did

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation when much of that time was attributable to the 11 defendant. See Naich, 2013 Guam 7, 57.

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13 The Defendant argued that there was a delay of more than two (2) years, during which the

14 Government made no attempts to either bring this matter to trial or resolve without trial. See Def. 's 15 Mot. Dismiss at 3. In this case, the Defendant was arrested on June 24, 2021, and charged via 16 Magistrate's Complaint the following day. See Magistrate's Compl. (June 25, 2021). The court 17 set the matter for trial on three separate dates before the parties eventually agreed to vacating each 18

19 date: December 1, 2021; April 27, 2022; and September 28, 2022. Because this case has not gone

20 to trial, the court notes that it has been almost five (5) years between the time he was arrested and 21 the filing of his Motion to Dismiss. Although the Defendant was released at his first appearance 22 before the court on June 25, 2021, the court finds that the length of this delay is presumptively 23

24 prejudicial enough to warrant further review of the other Barker factors.

25 B. The Cause of the Delay 26 Under the second Barker factor, the court must review the People's reasons for the delay 27 in bringing the Defendant to trial. In comparison to "[a] deliberate attempt to delay trial in order 28

Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21 to hamper the defense," a more neutral reason for the People's delay is weighed less heavily but

2 still requires consideration. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ,r 61 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

3 In his Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant argues that there was no legitimate reason for this 4 delay when it made no attempt to bring this case to trial or resolve without trial. See Def. 's Mot.

5 Dismiss at 3. In regards to any causes of delay, the People argue the Defendant does not address 6

7 "the practicalities of moving forward on the case while Defendant is deployed to the middle east,

8 and now that the case is back on calendar Defendant did not make it to their September hearing,

9 further delaying resolution." Ppl.'s Opp'n (Dec. 29, 2025). However, the Defendant argued that 10 his deployment between 2023 and 2024 was not the reason for this case's delay when there was a 11 two-year delay between the last hearing in 2023 and the next hearing in 2025. See Mot. Hr'g Mins.

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13 at 11 :04:38 - 11 :04AM (Feb. 5, 2026); see also Def. 's Mot. Dismiss at 3.

14 When reviewing the parties' arguments and the record of this case, the court does not 15 believe that the Defendant's deployment was the sole reason for the delay. Although his 16 deployment contributed to one year's worth of the delay, the court also vacated each trial date in 17 this case without objection from either side. For instance, the court vacated the first trial date after 18

19 the Defendant waived his right to speedy trial. See Mot. Hr'g Mins. at 10:17:0SAM (Nov. 9, 2021).

20 The court vacated the April trial date, because the parties stipulated to continue Jury Selection and 21 Trial. See Stipulation (Apr. 26, 2022). Lastly, the court vacated the September trial date after the 22 parties represented to the court that negotiations were underway. See Further Proceedings Mins.

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24 at 9:20: 13AM (Sep. 13, 2022). Therefore, the court finds that this factor weighs against the

25 Defendant.

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Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21

C. The Defendant's Assertion of his Right to a Speedy Trial

2 This next factor calls this court to consider the Defendant's assertion of speedy trial. In

3 order to successfully argue that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred, a defendant bears the 4 responsibility to proactively assert a speedy trial claim. See Mendiola, 1999 Guam 1 29 (citing 5 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529). "[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to 6

7 prove that he was denied a speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Although a defendant's assertion

8 of speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight, the court must exercise its judicial 9 discretion, viewing that assertion in light of that defendant's other conduct. See Flores, 2009 10 Guam 147 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,314 (1986)).

11 The People argued that the Defendant's absence of eagerness to assert speedy trial should 12

13 be weighed against him when considering this third factor. See Ppl. 's Opp'n at 3. Although the

14 Defendant asserted his statutory right to speedy trial at arraignment on October 13, 2021, he filed 15 his written waiver of speedy trial less than one month later. See Arraignment Hr'g Mins. at 16 11:36:40AM (Oct. 13, 2021); see also Waiver (Nov. 4, 2021). The court acknowledges the 17 Defendant's references to his several requests for an offer in this case. Since his waiver at 18

19 arraignment, the Defendant has had the opportunity to assert his right to speedy trial again if that

20 was how he intended his case to move forward. 2 In light of the Defendant's other conduct, the 21 court finds that this factor weighs against him.

22 D. The Presence or Absence of Prejudice Resulting from the Delay 23

24 The last factor for the court to review is whether the Defendant suffered any prejudice due

25 to the delay in this case. An "[i]nordinate delay between public charge and trial" may (1) prejudice

26 "a defense on the merits"-such as through the deterioration of crucial evidence, unavailability of 27

2 28 It is noteworthy that the Defendant waived his right to speedy trial after twenty out of his forty-five days to bring trial lapsed.

Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21 witnesses, or subversion of the defendant's ability to prepare for trial-or (2) seriously prejudice

2 "defendant's liberty, . . . disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his

3 associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." 4 People v. Corpuz, 2019 Guam 1 ,r 25; United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir. 2016)

5 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 340-41 (1988)) (explaining prejudice to defendant 6

7 may come in trial prejudice or non-trial prejudice); People v. Aromin, 2014 Guam 3 ,r 24. Because

8 this case did not go to trial, the court will examine the existence of any non-trial prejudice against

9 the Defendant. 10 Despite the four-year age of this case, the Defendant cites his many accomplishments 11 within this period, including completion of Substance Abuse Prevention Program and Driving 12

13 With Care Program, and graduation from the University of Guam with a Bachelor's Degree in

14 Criminal Justice in 2022. See Def. 's Mot. Dismiss at 3-4. At the Motion Hearing, the Defendant 15 also vocalized these accomplishments in spite of the amount of time that has passed in this case.

16 See Mot. Hr'g Mins. at 11:04:38- 11:04AM.

17 Without more, the court is not convinced that the Defendant has been so prejudiced by the 18

19 delay to warrant his case's dismissal. Therefore, the court finds that this factor weighs against the

20 Defendant. Because majority of the factors under Barker weigh against the Defendant, the court 21 finds that there was no violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial. Therefore, the court 22 finds that the delay in this case does not warrant dismissal at this time.

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Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-2 l

I CONCLUSION

2 For reasons stated above, the court hereby DENIES the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

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5 A Further Proceedings is scheduled before this court on May 29, 2026, at 2:00PM.

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8 SO ORDERED APR 2 0 2026 -------,------

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13 HONORABLE ALBERTO E. TOLENTINO Judge, Superior Court of Guam 14

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23 St::IT1flf8e'.:~ 'UUA E-M&TI!L 24 I acknowledge that an electronic copy of the original was e-mailed to:

25 (t{k r Pll5C, 26 -- Date:

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Decision & Order Re. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss People v. Melsior, CF0310-21