People v. Medelez

2 Cal. App. 5th 659, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 692
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 17, 2016
Docket2d Crim. B262429
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 2 Cal. App. 5th 659 (People v. Medelez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Medelez, 2 Cal. App. 5th 659, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

TANGEMAN, J.

*661 Angel Medelez contacted a minor with intent to engage in oral sex (Pen. Code, 1 § 288.3, "luring"), and then took a direct but ineffectual act toward his goal (§§ 664, 288a, subd. (b)(1), "attempt"). Here we decide he may be convicted of both crimes because luring is not a special statute intended to preclude prosecution for attempt, *404 and neither crime is the lesser included offense of the other.

Medelez appeals judgment after conviction by jury of three sex offenses against his adult roommate and two sex offenses against a minor. (§§ 288a, subds. (f) & (i), 243.4, subd. (e)(1), 288.3, subd. (a), 664, 288a, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced Medelez to six years eight months in prison, including two consecutive sentences of four months each for attempt to orally copulate a minor (§§ 664, 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and luring the minor with intent to orally copulate (§ 288.3, subd. (a) ).

We stay the four-month sentence for attempted oral copulation (§ 654), correct the abstract of judgment to delete a dismissed count, and otherwise affirm.

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we consider and reject Medelez's contention that all his convictions must be reversed because the trial court dismissed a juror during trial without good cause. (§ 1089.)

BACKGROUND

In August 2013, Medelez drugged and orally copulated his unconscious adult male roommate. (§§ 288a, subds. (f) & (i), 243.4, subd. (e)(1).)

*662 Two months later, he tried to orally copulate a minor. Medelez met 16-year-old A.P. at work. Medelez offered him a job, and A.P. returned that evening to learn more about it. Medelez drove A.P. to a remote place and offered him money in exchange for oral sex. When A.P. refused, Medelez told A.P. to take off his pants. A.P. did because he was afraid. Medelez showed A.P. pornographic pictures. Medelez "was about to lean in," but A.P. pulled up his pants and stopped Medelez.

[[/]] **

DISCUSSION

Special vs. General Doctrine

Medelez contends he cannot be convicted of both attempted oral copulation of a minor (§§ 664, 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and luring a minor with intent to orally copulate (§ 288.3 ) because the Legislature intended the luring statute to supplant attempted oral copulation with a minor. ( In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 , 654, 276 P.2d 593 ( Williamson ).) His argument lacks merit because the statutes cover different conduct.

If a general statute covers the same conduct as a specific ("special") statute, courts generally infer that the Legislature intended the conduct to be prosecuted only under the special statute. ( People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81 , 86, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 ; Williamson , supra , 43 Cal.2d at p. 654, 276 P.2d 593 .) This rule applies if "(1) 'each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute' or (2) ... 'it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Murphy , supra , at p. 86, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .) It does not apply "if the more general statute contains an element that is not contained in the special statute and that element would not commonly occur in the context of a violation of the special statute." ( Id . at p. 87, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 78 , 253 P.3d 1216 .)

Here, the "general" statute (attempt) contains an element that is not contained on the face of the more recently enacted "special" statute (luring). Attempt requires a direct but ineffectual act that goes beyond *405 mere preparation. (§ 21a; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856 , 948, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 , 261 P.3d 243 .) Luring does not. *663 Luring may be committed by a "contact or communication" that is preparatory or indirect. (§ 288.3, subd. (b) ["communication" includes "indirect contact or communication ... by use of an agent or agency"]; see, e.g., People v. Sigur (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 656 , 659, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 [luring by means of Internet chat]; People v. Keister (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 442 , 445, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 566

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Zuccolillo CA3
California Court of Appeal, 2025
People v. Hancock CA3
California Court of Appeal, 2024
People v. Miravete CA4/1
California Court of Appeal, 2024
People v. Clayton CA6
California Court of Appeal, 2024
People v. Andorfer CA1/1
California Court of Appeal, 2024
People v. Hawkyard CA3
California Court of Appeal, 2023
People v. McKenzie CA2/6
California Court of Appeal, 2023
People v. Tyler CA3
California Court of Appeal, 2021
People v. Santos CA1/2
California Court of Appeal, 2021
People v. Clotfelter CA1/2
California Court of Appeal, 2021
People v. Ramirez
California Court of Appeal, 2019
People v. Acosta
California Court of Appeal, 2018
People v. Cruz Villagran
5 Cal. App. 5th 880 (California Court of Appeal, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 Cal. App. 5th 659, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-medelez-calctapp-2016.