People v. McMath

2026 IL App (5th) 241266-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: 5-24-1266
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 241266-U NOTICE Decision filed 02/23/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-1266 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 06-CF-731 ) LAQUIZE McMATH, ) Honorable ) Leah A. Captain, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing the defendant’s motion for preservation of evidence for lack of jurisdiction. Because any argument to the contrary would lack merit, this court grants appointed appellate counsel leave to withdraw and affirms the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 The defendant, Laquize McMath, is serving a 32-year prison sentence for the first degree

murder of Larry Townsend Jr. The instant appeal is the defendant’s seventh appeal in connection

with that murder. Here, he appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing, for lack of personal and

subject-matter jurisdiction, his motion for preservation of evidence. The defendant’s appointed

counsel on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this

appeal lacks merit and, on that basis, has filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel, along

with a supporting memorandum of law. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). OSAD

1 properly served the defendant with copies of its motion and memorandum. This court granted the

defendant ample opportunity to file a pro se brief, memorandum, or other document explaining

why OSAD should not be allowed to withdraw as counsel or why this appeal has merit. However,

he has not filed any response. This court has examined OSAD’s Finley motion and memorandum,

the record on appeal, and this court’s decisions in the defendant’s prior appeals stemming from

this case. This court has concluded that the appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, OSAD is granted

leave to withdraw as counsel, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 8, 2006, the defendant shot and killed Townsend at the Private Mathison Manor

public-housing complex in Centreville, Illinois. At a jury trial held in June 2007, the defendant

testified that he was not even in Centreville the day Townsend was shot; he was in St. Louis,

Missouri, visiting his brother. At the request of defense counsel, the jury was instructed on the

offense of involuntary manslaughter, in addition to the charged offense of first degree murder.

Defense counsel requested an involuntary-manslaughter instruction due to the testimony of a

State’s occurrence witness, Terrance Wells, that the defendant did not intend to kill Townsend.

The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder.

¶5 On July 17, 2007, the trial court sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for 32 years, to

be followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. The defendant filed a timely motion to

reduce sentence, but the court denied that motion on August 30, 2007. That same day, the clerk of

the trial court, at the defendant’s request, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.

¶6 On direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction of first degree murder on

April 25, 2008. This court rejected the defendant’s claim that his trial attorney had provided him

with constitutionally ineffective assistance. People v. McMath, No. 5-07-0496 (2008)

2 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). This court issued its mandate on June

4, 2008.

¶7 On February 10, 2009, the defendant filed a pro se motion for forensic testing. On July 13,

2009, the defendant filed, through an appointed attorney, an amended motion for forensic testing,

pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West

2008)). He requested that fingerprint and DNA testing be performed on a mug found near the

decedent. The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended motion for forensic testing. On October

1, 2009, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The court stated, inter alia, “The potential

test requested does not significantly advance the defendant’s claim of actual innocence.” The

defendant filed a notice of appeal, thus perfecting the appeal in App. Ct. No. 5-09-0546.

¶8 On May 22, 2009, the defendant filed his first pro se petition for postconviction relief. The

defendant asserted that he was actually innocent of the crime, that three State’s occurrence

witnesses presented perjured testimony against him, and that his trial counsel failed to call

exculpatory witnesses. An affidavit from the defendant’s mother accompanied the postconviction

petition; it was intended as support for an alibi defense. On June 1, 2009, the trial court found the

postconviction petition to be frivolous or patently without merit and it summarily dismissed the

petition. The defendant filed a notice of appeal, thus perfecting the appeal in App. Ct. No. 5-09-

0296.

¶9 This court consolidated the appeals in Nos. 5-09-0296 and 5-09-0546. This court affirmed

both the trial court’s summary dismissal of the defendant’s initial postconviction petition and the

court’s order denying the amended motion for forensic testing. People v. McMath, No. 5-09-0296

(2010) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). These consolidated appeals

were the defendant’s second and third appeals stemming from the murder case.

3 ¶ 10 On July 5, 2012, the defendant filed a pro se motion for leave of court to file a successive

postconviction petition, his first such motion. The defendant sought to file a postconviction petition

alleging that the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury on what to consider when weighing

a witness’s identification testimony. On August 24, 2012, the trial court denied the defendant’s

motion for leave to file. The defendant appealed from the denial order. On appeal, his appointed

appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Finley. In May 2014, this court

granted counsel’s Finley motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. This court

determined that the defendant had failed to show cause for not raising the issue in his initial

postconviction petition and had failed to show prejudice resulting from the erroneous jury

instruction. People v. McMath, 2014 IL App (5th) 120398-U. This appeal was the defendant’s

fourth appeal stemming from the murder case.

¶ 11 On January 14, 2019, the defendant filed another pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, his second such motion. In his attached proposed successive petition, he

again sought to raise the issue of the erroneous jury instruction concerning factors to consider

when weighing identification testimony. On January 16, 2019, the trial court denied the

defendant’s second motion for leave to file. The court stated, inter alia, that the defendant had

failed to provide a credible explanation for his failure to raise the jury-instruction issue in his initial

postconviction petition filed in 2009, and that the issue was res judicata. The defendant appealed

from the denial order. On appeal, the defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a Finley motion

to withdraw. On December 6, 2021, this court granted counsel’s Finley motion and affirmed the

trial court’s judgment. People v. McMath, 2021 IL App (5th) 190123-U. This was the defendant’s

fifth appeal.

4 ¶ 12 On March 1, 2022, the defendant filed another pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, his third such motion. He also submitted his proposed successive petition.

The defendant sought to raise a Brady violation claim. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87

(1963) (defendant’s constitutional right to due process is violated where prosecution withholds

evidence that is favorable to the defendant and is “material either to guilt or to punishment”).

Specifically, he sought to raise a claim that the State withheld from the defense a DVD of a

surveillance video taken at or near the crime scene at the time of the shooting.

¶ 13 According to the defendant, he had not viewed the actual surveillance video, but he had

read about the video’s contents in police reports, and he learned from those reports that the video

showed people fleeing from the scene. If the video did not show the defendant fleeing the scene,

the defendant asserted, such evidence surely would support his defense that he was not at the scene

at the time of Townsend’s shooting. The surveillance video could have been used to impeach the

State’s three occurrence witnesses, and it would have supported the defendant’s defense that he

was not present at the crime scene at the time of the incident. Therefore he could not have been

the one who committed the crime. For cause, the defendant stated that he could not have raised

this claim in his initial postconviction proceeding because he was unaware at that time of the

surveillance video’s existence, and he only became aware of the DVD after submitting multiple

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the St. Clair County Housing Authority and the

Centreville Police Department.

¶ 14 Attached to the defendant’s motion for leave was an investigative report from the Illinois

State Police (ISP), written by Special Agent D. Fort and dated May 10, 2006, two days after

Townsend’s murder. The ISP report stated that a Centreville police detective, Kiwan Guyton, had

viewed the video surveillance tape, and the tape showed a vehicle, with a particular license plate

5 number, leaving the area after the shooting. Detective Guyton reported that the car’s owner was

Terrance Wells. (This court notes that Terrance Wells was one of the State’s occurrence witnesses

at the defendant’s trial.)

¶ 15 Also attached to the motion for leave was a letter, dated July 22, 2021, from the St. Clair

County Housing Authority to the defendant, in response to the defendant’s FOIA request. The

letter stated that the housing authority’s records contained correspondence, dated May 10, 2006,

from the housing authority’s law enforcement liaison officer, T. E. Delaney, to ISP Special Agent

Dave Fort, which stated that “a camera video disc from the Private Mathison Manor pertaining to

the homicide investigation *** was delivered to the Centreville police detective Kiwan Guyton on

May 9, 2006.” The housing authority’s letter to the defendant also stated that the housing

authority’s records “contain a computer disc purportedly containing recordings related to the

homicide. However, the files were created in DBX format, and we are unable to view the content

of the disc.”

¶ 16 On May 31, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the defendant’s motion for leave

to file a successive petition. The court found the defendant’s contention as to cause was not

credible. “It is unfathomable,” the court stated, “that [trial counsel] would not have obtained a copy

of the police report at the time of the original prosecution in this case.” The court also determined

that prejudice was not shown because “[the defendant] cannot claim that the video surveillance

footage is favorable to his case because he has never reviewed it.” The defendant appealed from

the denial order.

¶ 17 On appeal, appointed appellate counsel filed a Finley motion to withdraw. On May 1, 2024,

this court granted the Finley motion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. People v.

McMath, 2024 IL App (5th) 230448-U. This court concluded, inter alia, that the defendant’s

6 inability to attach the video to his petition, or to accurately summarize its contents, was fatal to his

claim that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to turn over the allegedly exculpatory

video. Id. ¶ 13. Also, the defendant had failed to show cause or prejudice from failing to raise the

claim in his initial postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 20. As to prejudice, the court found, “there is no

reasonable likelihood that the video would have been material to defendant’s guilt or innocence.

*** At best, it might have offered some partial corroboration of his testimony but would not have

conclusively proved that he was not at the scene.” Id. ¶ 22. This appeal was the defendant’s sixth

appeal stemming from the case involving Townsend’s murder.

¶ 18 On September 22, 2021, the trial clerk file-stamped the motion that is the subject of the

instant appeal—the defendant’s “Motion for Production and Preservation of Evidence for

Viewing” (motion for preservation of evidence). The trial court did not rule on the motion for

preservation until October 28, 2024.

¶ 19 The motion for preservation of evidence concerned the same video evidence that was the

subject of the defendant’s third motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. In his

motion, the defendant stated that the motion was being brought pursuant to section 116-4 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-4 (West 2020) (“Preservation of evidence

for forensic testing”)). Attached to the motion were two of the same exhibits that had been attached

to the third motion for leave to file—the ISP investigative report, dated May 10, 2006, written by

ISP Special Agent D. Fort, and the letter from the St. Clair County Housing Authority, dated July

22, 2021, in response to the defendant’s FOIA request. For relief, the defendant asked that the trial

court order the St. Clair County Housing Authority (1) to preserve the surveillance tape that it had

provided to Centreville police detective Kiwan Guyton on May 9, 2006, and (2) to preserve the

7 correspondence, dated May 10, 2006, from the housing authority’s T. E. Delaney to the ISP’s Dave

Fort.

¶ 20 The defendant’s motion for preservation of evidence languished until March 26, 2024,

when the defendant filed a “motion to call for hearing.” In that motion, he requested a hearing on

his motion for preservation of evidence.

¶ 21 On April 5, 2024, the State filed a “motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject

matter jurisdiction.” The State stated, “solely for the purpose of objecting to the [c]ourt’s

jurisdiction and for no other purpose,” that the defendant “ha[d] failed to identify the statutory

provision under which [his motion for preservation of evidence] ha[d] been filed, such as post-

conviction petition, petition for relief from judgment, petition for habeas corpus, etc.” According

to the State, “[f]ailure to designate the statute under which defendant is proceeding” deprived the

trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction because “a freestanding motion does not vest the trial court

with jurisdiction to consider same.” Also, this failure to designate the statutory scheme under

which he was proceeding rendered the State incapable of determining whether personal service

had been properly obtained against it, and also rendered the court incapable of determining whether

it had personal jurisdiction over the State in this matter.

¶ 22 On October 28, 2024, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss “for the reasons

stated therein.” The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court appointed OSAD to

represent the defendant on appeal.

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 As previously stated, the defendant’s attorney on appeal, OSAD, has filed a Finley motion

to withdraw as counsel, on the grounds that the instant appeal lacks merit. In the memorandum of

law filed in support of its Finley motion, OSAD raises the potential issue of whether the trial court

8 properly dismissed the defendant’s motion for preservation of evidence due to a lack of jurisdiction

to decide the motion on its merits. OSAD concludes that the dismissal was proper, and this court

agrees.

¶ 25 Preliminarily, this court notes that it has jurisdiction to decide whether the trial court had

jurisdiction. In general, where a trial court lacked jurisdiction, this court still has limited

jurisdiction to consider the issue of jurisdiction below. People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 29.

Jurisdictional questions are legal matters subject to review de novo. People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d

158, 162 (2009). This court considers the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning,

and this court may affirm the trial court’s order on any ground apparent in the record. People v.

Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 129 (2003).

¶ 26 Jurisdiction is composed of two elements—subject-matter jurisdiction and personal

jurisdiction. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 414 (2009). A court must have both subject-matter and

personal jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment. If either element is missing, any order entered in

the matter is void ab initio. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority “to hear and

determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville

Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). “Personal jurisdiction

is the court’s power ʻto bring a person into its adjudicative process.ʼ ” M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 415

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004)).

¶ 27 Subject-matter jurisdiction flows from the Illinois Constitution. Trial courts have “original

jurisdiction of all justiciable matters” with very few exceptions, none applicable here. Ill. Const.

1970, art. VI, § 9. A decision issued without subject-matter jurisdiction is void. People v. Arriaga,

2023 IL App (5th) 220076, ¶ 12. Absent subject-matter jurisdiction, a trial court is limited to

dismissing the motion. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 306-07 (2003).

9 ¶ 28 Here, the defendant was sentenced on July 17, 2007. His timely motion to reconsider

sentence was denied on August 30, 2007. After 30 days have elapsed following the denial of a

motion to reconsider sentence, the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is lost. See id. at 303.

Also on August 30, 2007, a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction was filed on the

defendant’s behalf. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). With the filing of the notice of appeal,

the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to enter additional orders of substance in the case

(People v. Scheurich, 2019 IL App (4th) 160441, ¶ 17), and jurisdiction attached instanter to this

appellate court (People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998)). More than 14 years had elapsed by the

time the defendant filed his motion for preservation of evidence. Due to the lateness of the filing,

the trial court no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction. All that the trial court could properly do,

at that late date, was to dismiss the defendant’s motion.

¶ 29 In its Finley memorandum, OSAD suggests that the trial court could have treated the

defendant’s motion for preservation of evidence in a way that would have provided it with

jurisdiction, e.g., the court could have treated the motion as a pleading under the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)). However, OSAD notes that under

section 122-1(d) of the Act, a trial court need not evaluate a petition that does not specify it is filed

under the Act to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under

the Act. Id. § 122-1(d). Therefore, as OSAD concludes, it was not error for the trial court to fail to

treat the motion for preservation of evidence as a successive postconviction petition, citing People

v. Stoffel, 239 Ill. 2d 314, 324 (2010) (a trial court is not obligated to recharacterize a pleading as

a postconviction petition, and therefore the court’s failure to do so cannot be error). Also, as OSAD

states, the content of the motion for preservation of evidence does not permit it to be treated as any

other type of motion or pleading that would permit a collateral challenge.

10 ¶ 30 The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion for

preservation of evidence. Because we have determined that the trial court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, this court finds it unnecessary to consider the issue of personal jurisdiction. See M.W.,

232 Ill. 2d at 414.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 The trial court did not err in dismissing the defendant’s motion for preservation of evidence

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Any argument to the contrary would lack merit.

Accordingly, this court grants OSAD leave to withdraw as the defendant’s appellate counsel and

affirms the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 33 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.