People v. McLaurin

2025 IL App (1st) 230791-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-0791
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 230791-U No. 1-23-0791 Order filed March 21, 2025 Sixth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18 CR 3684 02 ) KENYATTA MCLAURIN ) The Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Tailor and Justice Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. The record rebutted petitioner’s postconviction claims that he pleaded guilty to a void offense and that counsel intimidated him into waiving the right to a jury trial.

¶2 Kenyatta McLaurin asserts that he pleaded guilty to a void offense. He also asserts that he

did not voluntarily waive the right to a jury trial. But he misapprehends transcripts showing that

he pleaded guilty to a valid offense and confirmed that no threats led him to waive the jury-trial

right. The trial court properly dismissed his postconviction petition, so we affirm. No. 1-23-0791

¶3 Background

¶4 Kenyatta McLaurin petitioned for postconviction relief, raising four claims attacking his

conviction as an armed habitual criminal. On appeal from the summary dismissal of his petition,

he pursues two. One arises from an earlier guilty plea: That prior conviction was an element of the

offense of being an armed habitual criminal, a conviction McLaurin contends is void. The other

claim arises from the trial for being an armed habitual criminal: McLaurin contests the validity of

his jury-trial waiver.

¶5 Guilty Plea

¶6 A four-count indictment charged McLaurin and a codefendant with unlawful use of a

weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2006)) and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id.

§ 24-1.6(a)(1),(a)(3)(A)).

¶7 Before accepting the pleas, the trial court confirmed the counts in the joint indictment to

which each defendant would plead guilty. The court asked: “Which count? They have different

counts?” Counsel for the State replied: “Count 1 each defendant.” The court then corrected her:

“No, Count 1 on [codefendant], Count 2 on [] McLaurin.” Counts one and two, naming

codefendant and McLaurin respectively, charged unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

¶8 The trial court then admonished co-defendant that he was charged with unlawful use of a

weapon by a felon by reading from count one to him. Likewise, the court admonished McLaurin

by reading from count two: “[Y]ou’re also charged with on or about November 8, 2007, that you

possessed on or about your person a firearm, after having been previously convicted of * * *

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon[.]”

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¶9 The trial court accepted both pleas. But the court stated, “[A] finding of guilty on the charge

of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon as charged in [co-defendant’s] Count 1 and Mr.

McLaurin’s Count 2, which is his Count 1.” The joint indictment lists “Count 02” as

“UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON BY A FELON,” and it is the first count to name McLaurin.

The mittimus, written after the trial court made its oral pronouncement, states McLaurin pleaded

guilty to “Count 002,” “AGG UUW/VEH/PREV CONVICTION.”

¶ 10 Bench Trial and Appeal

¶ 11 Years later, a new indictment charged McLaurin and another with weapons and narcotics

offenses. It accused McLaurin of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West

2018)). It listed as one of his prior convictions: “AGGRAVATED UNLAWFUL USE OF A

WEAPON UNDER CASE NUMBER 07CR2447502[,]” which tracked the mittimus of the guilty

plea.

¶ 12 Before trial, the court found McLaurin knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to have

a jury hear his case. The trial court explained that, although counsel could advise McLaurin

whether to proceed by bench or jury trial, the choice belonged to McLaurin alone. McLaurin

confirmed he understood. The court asked if McLaurin chose to waive this right. McLaurin said

he did. McLaurin also said that no one had influenced his decision with force, threats, or “any

promise of any sort.”

¶ 13 The trial court then noted that recent caselaw obligated it to vacate void convictions. The

court passed the case for the State to investigate whether that caselaw applied to McLaurin’s prior

conviction. When the trial court recalled the case, the State conveyed that caselaw did not apply.

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¶ 14 At the bench trial, the court heard evidence that McLaurin had constructively possessed a

firearm. The court also received certified copies of McLaurin’s conviction for aggravated battery

in no. 07 CR 25080 01, and “aggravated unlawful use of a weapon with a prior conviction” in no.

07 CR 24475 02, the prior guilty plea. The court found McLaurin guilty of being an armed habitual

criminal.

¶ 15 On appeal, this court affirmed, rejecting McLaurin’s sole contention that the State failed to

prove the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. McLaurin, 2021 IL App

(1st) 192203-U, ¶¶ 36-37.

¶ 16 Post-Conviction Petition

¶ 17 McLaurin petitioned for postconviction relief, raising four claims. McLaurin abandons two

of them on appeal: that new evidence showed his actual innocence and that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to investigate McLaurin’s codefendant.

¶ 18 At issue is (i) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by threatening to

withdraw unless McLaurin waived his jury-trial right and (ii) whether counsel at trial and on appeal

provided ineffective assistance by permitting the State to use as evidence McLaurin’s conviction

in no. 07 CR 24475 02, which he claims is void.

¶ 19 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 20 Analysis

¶ 21 Post-conviction proceedings have three distinct stages. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89,

99 (2002). At each stage, petitioners bear the burden of showing they qualify for relief. People v.

Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶¶ 21-22.

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¶ 22 At the first stage, petitioners need only allege facts showing “the gist of a constitutional

claim.” Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24. This is a low standard; the trial court considers a petitioner’s

allegations true and construes them liberally unless the record positively rebuts them. Id. ¶ 25

(citing People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001)).

¶ 23 The trial court will summarily dismiss a petition whose claims lack an arguable basis either

in law or fact. “No arguable basis either in law or in fact” means it “is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009).

“Fanciful factual allegations include those which are fantastic or delusional.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d

at 17. If the record contradicts petitioner’s legal theory, that theory becomes meritless. Id. at 16.

¶ 24 This court reviews the summary dismissal de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s

ruling. Id. at 9.

¶ 25 No Void Predicate

¶ 26 McLaurin sets aside the ineffectiveness claim to focus on the “heart of the matter,”

contending that the trial court improperly considered a void conviction, aggravated unlawful use

of a weapon, as a qualifying predicate offense in finding him guilty of being an armed habitual

criminal. See People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 25 (holding section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of

AUUW statute “facially unconstitutional, without limitation”). The State responds that, no matter

how that conviction was described at the bench trial, the transcript of the plea hearing shows that

McLaurin pleaded guilty to, and was found guilty of, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, a valid

conviction. We agree with the State.

¶ 27 To convict McLaurin of being an armed habitual criminal, the State had to prove that

McLaurin possessed a firearm after being convicted of two or more qualifying offenses. 720 ILCS

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5/24-1.7(a) (West 2018). Qualifying offenses include aggravated battery and unlawful use of a

weapon by a felon. Id. § 24-1.7(a)(2). McLaurin challenges only one of the two predicates. He

claims that the State improperly used his conviction in no. 07 CR 24475 02, which he contends

was not the qualifying offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon but something else.

¶ 28 McLaurin contends that the trial court’s admonishment at the plea hearing “mirror[ed]” the

statutory language of the void offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-

1.6(a)(1),(a)(3)(A)). In his view, “the guilty plea transcript makes clear that [he] was charged with

‘possession on or about [his] person a firearm, after having been previously convicted of a felony

offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon under case number 01 CR 3702.’ ”

¶ 29 To the contrary, the trial court did not ad-lib a void offense on the State’s behalf. The court

read from count two of the indictment before it, where the State alleged McLaurin committed the

offense of “unlawful use of a weapon by a felon” (emphasis omitted) because he had “possessed

on or about his person, a firearm, after having been previously convicted of the felony offense of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, under case number 01CR-03702[.]”

¶ 30 In his reply brief, McLaurin acknowledges this context, noting the State offers “helpful”

background. Still, he provides a new reason, that he pleaded guilty to “his count 2,” not count two

in the indictment, and that the trial court “confirmed” as much in its oral pronouncement. This

argument, however, misreads the record. While finding McLaurin entered a valid plea of guilt, the

trial court said, “There will be a finding of guilty * * * as charged in * * count 2, which is his count

1.”

¶ 31 To be sure, McLaurin “concedes that the [trial court] did misspeak in some capacity.” And

the State notes the trial court “misspoke” at one point. We agree.

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¶ 32 But only the State offers a reasonable reading. The trial court admonished McLaurin as to

unlawful use of a weapon by a felon as charged. Neither the court nor the parties addressed the

other charges during plea proceedings. And the court repeatedly referred to count two of the

indictment, including in its oral pronouncement.

¶ 33 Although the trial court misspoke by using the phrase “aggravated unlawful use of a

weapon,” it cross-referenced counts one and two of the indictment in the same breath. In full, the

trial court stated: “[A] finding of guilty on the charge of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon as

charged in [co-defendant’s] Count 1 and Mr. McLaurin’s Count 2, which is his Count 1.” This was

a finding that McLaurin pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, unlawful use of a weapon by a

felon. Thus, neither the trial court’s flub nor the mittimus arguably supports McLaurin’s claim that

he pleaded guilty to a void offense. People v. Profit, 2021 IL App (1st) 170744, ¶ 38 (quoting

People v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 395 (1st Dist. 2007) (“When the oral pronouncement of the

court and the written order are in conflict, the oral pronouncement controls.”)).

¶ 34 For similar reasons, we reject as misplaced McLaurin’s contentions in reply that the

doctrines of estoppel or forfeiture somehow work to convert his valid conviction into a void one.

McLaurin asks this Court to “judicially estop the State’s transparent effort to simplify its case on

appeal and to avoid the consequence of charging McLaurin for conduct that cannot be

constitutionally prosecuted.” Likewise, he contends that the State “has forfeited the argument that

the court can use another conviction, not discussed in the [] indictment, to sustain his []

conviction.”

¶ 35 Essentially, McLaurin’s invocations of these doctrines stem from the same mistaken

premise: his guilty plea to a so-called void offense. The record refutes that idea, as we explained.

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Furthermore, even if the parties believed McLaurin pleaded guilty to a void offense, the law

prohibits this court from giving that false belief effect. See In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 37

(“where, as here, the statute on which a criminal conviction is based has been declared facially

invalid under the United States Constitution, the conviction must be vacated and cannot be given

any force or effect”). To employ those doctrines “would seem to suggest that we condone a kind

of mix-and-match, ad hoc justice, where the specific convictions of record do not matter.” See

People v. Clark, 2016 IL 118845, ¶ 44. That would be error. See Clark, 2016 IL 118845, ¶ 47

(noting “any conviction ultimately entered should be based upon the evidence, not judicial fiat”).

¶ 36 McLaurin pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in no. 07 CR 24475 02, a

predicate offense underlying his indictment for, and conviction of, armed habitual criminal

conviction in no. 18 CR 3864 02. Because McLaurin’s claim lacks an arguable basis in fact, the

trial court properly rejected it as meritless. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16.

¶ 37 No Threat from Counsel

¶ 38 McLaurin alleges counsel provided ineffective assistance by threatening to withdraw from

the case if McLaurin did not waive the right to a jury trial. The State contends the record rebuts

this claim because it shows McLaurin validly waiving that right, affirming that he received no

threats, and the decision was his alone. We agree with the State.

¶ 39 Any person accused of a crime has a fundamental choice—to exercise or waive the

constitutional right to a jury trial. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54 (1992). That decision belongs

solely to the defendant. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54. But counsel has a role—providing effective

assistance when advising their client about this fundamental decision. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (adopting test for effective assistance of counsel).

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¶ 40 McLaurin contends counsel arguably provided ineffective assistance by undermining the

voluntary nature of his waiver of the right to a jury trial. See People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214,

¶¶ 19-20 (adapting Strickland to first stage of postconviction proceedings). He alleges that, counsel

threatened to withdraw sometime before trial if he did not waive the jury-trial right. (“I informed

my attorney [] I wanted a jury trial, but he said, ‘we taking a vebch [sic] trial or he was unable to

represent me in this case.[’] So I agreed to waive to a jury trial because I needed my attorney for

trial.”) Thus, he “predicate[s]” his claim “on an out-of-court conversation between him and his

trial attorney,” contending “that conversation, taken as true, necessarily impacted the voluntariness

of his jury waiver.”

¶ 41 Put differently, the decision to waive a jury trial was not his alone. Nevertheless, McLaurin

ignores People v. Knapp, 2020 IL 124992, to advance this claim, which appears in the State’s

response but not addressed in either McLaurin’s opening or reply briefs. Knapp forecloses his

claim.

¶ 42 In Knapp, a petitioner alleged that counsel’s off-record advice before trial undermined the

voluntary nature of his decision to waive the fundamental right to testify. Knapp, 2020 IL 124992,

¶¶ 39, 52. The Illinois Supreme Court held that, even taking the claims as true, and construing it

liberally, the record rebutted it because the alleged advice “occurred before the circuit court’s

admonishments” and “[a]fter the court’s admonishments, petitioner confirmed on the record that

the decision not to testify was his alone.” Id. ¶ 54. The petitioner’s “responses during the trial

court’s admonishments unequivocally rebut[ted] his allegations that his decision not to testify was

involuntary or based on allegedly erroneous advice from counsel[.]” Id.

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¶ 43 Like the petitioner in Knapp, McLaurin fails to grapple with the record’s long colloquy in

which McLaurin, after allegedly receiving a threat, confirmed that no threats had forced his jury-

trial waiver and the decision to waive was his alone.

THE COURT: You’re charged in Case number 18-CR-3684 with armed habitual criminal, weapons violations by a felon. You have a constitutional right to a trial by a jury of 12 people on those charges. You understand that?

McLAURIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Since the trial like that by a jury is your constitutional right, you have that right if you want to [] have me hear the case myself which has commonly become known as a bench trial. Do you understand that?

THE COURT: Is this your signature?

THE COURT: Did you understand when you signed that form you were giving up in writing your constitutional right to a trial by a jury in this case?

THE COURT: Is that what you meant to do when you signed the form?

McLAURIN: Yeah.

THE COURT: By giving up your right to a trial by a jury I’ll hear the case myself, on or about the date of February 12 of this year (unintelligible) against you at this time; do you understand that?

THE COURT: Your lawyer is a good lawyer; he can give you advice. He can give you suggestions, telling you his thoughts, try by me or try by a jury. Whether you’re tried by me or tried by a jury it’s solely and entirely up to you; do you understand that?

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McLAURIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Is it your decision you want to be tried by me instead of a jury?

THE COURT: Did anybody use any force or threat or any other way to cause you to give up your right to a trial by a jury?

McLAURIN: No, sir.

THE COURT: Has anybody made you any promise of any sort that would cause you to give up your right to a trial by a jury?

McLAURIN: No.

THE COURT: Giving up that right freely and voluntarily on your part?

¶ 44 The record rebuts McLaurin’s allegations regarding his counsel’s off-record advice before

trial. E.g., People v. Fox, 2023 IL App (1st) 210844-U, ¶ 26 (holding “defendant’s own words at

the time that he acknowledged that he was voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial, together

with his signature on his jury waiver, contradict his postconviction allegations that he waived his

right to a jury trial in reliance upon his trial counsel’s threat to only represent him if he chose a

bench trial”).

¶ 45 Furthermore, “Nothing in our postconviction jurisprudence allows, let alone requires, a

reviewing court to ignore the record.” Knapp, 2020 IL 124992, ¶ 54. The trial court properly

rejected McLaurin’s allegations as meritless. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16.

¶ 46 Affirmed.

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