2025 IL App (1st) 231348-U
SECOND DIVISION March 18, 2025
No. 1-23-1348
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 7818 ) DESHUN MCGEE, ) Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s judgment. The State presented sufficient evidence to find the defendant possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute is unconstitutional under either the U.S. or Illinois Constitutions.
¶2 Defendant appeals his conviction for the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a
felon. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his possession of the weapon beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defendant further argues that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon
statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) is unconstitutional under either the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or under Article I Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.
We hold that the State introduced sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s possession of the 1-23-1348
weapon beyond a reasonable doubt and that the statute is not unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment or the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The evidence introduced at trial established that, on June 14, 2022, a black Chrysler 200
was stolen in an aggravated vehicular hijacking by a group of people. About an hour after it was
stolen, Illinois State Police troopers spotted a black Chrysler driving on a highway in Chicago.
After running a check on the license plates and confirming the vehicle was the one that was
stolen, the troopers began to follow the vehicle. The State Police activated their lights and sirens,
and the driver of the stolen car failed to stop and then fled. Approximately seven Illinois State
Police squad cars began a pursuit of the stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, the stolen vehicle was
registering speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The vehicle was swerving across all lanes of
the highway and using the shoulder of the road to weave through civilian traffic. After a police
chase of approximately seven minutes, the stolen vehicle exited the highway and crashed into a
civilian motorist at an intersection. Illinois State Police squad car cameras captured the pursuit.
¶5 After the stolen vehicle crashed, three occupants fled the vehicle on foot. One of the men
fleeing the vehicle was defendant Deshun McGee. The troopers split off to chase the three
individuals. Trooper Nicholas Whitbeck chased defendant in a foot pursuit. Trooper Whitbeck
testified that, as defendant was running, defendant was grabbing for his waistband with his left
hand. Whitbeck drew his service pistol and ordered defendant to stop running. Defendant did not
comply, so the trooper reholstered his pistol and continued the pursuit. Defendant came to a
fence and hopped over it. Whitbeck also jumped over the fence. Whitbeck then briefly lost sight
of defendant. Officers from the Chicago Police Department (CPD) caught defendant nearby in
the gangway of residential area and placed him into custody.
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¶6 CPD officers had heard the radio transmissions about the stolen vehicle and the police
chase. CPD Officers went to the location where the stolen vehicle exited the highway, and the
officers arrived on scene just after the stolen vehicle crashed. When CPD Officers arrived on
scene, Officer Dante Koeppen saw Trooper Whitbeck chasing defendant. Officer Koeppen
observed that defendant was holding his waistband with his left hand during the pursuit while his
right hand was moving freely. Officer Koeppen observed that defendant’s left hand was holding
his waistband in a manner consistent with someone who is concealing a firearm. After making
those observations, Officer Koeppen joined Trooper Whitbeck in pursuing defendant.
¶7 Officer Koeppen followed defendant through a vacant lot and then observed defendant
jump and stumble over a fence into an alleyway. Like Whitbeck, Koeppen briefly lost sight of
defendant after clearing the fence and saw him again when he was caught by other officers
nearby.
¶8 After defendant was detained, Trooper Whitbeck and CPD officers retraced the path of
the foot pursuit. They discovered a firearm laying right by the fence that defendant jumped over
while Whitbeck was in pursuit. The gun was recovered and inventoried. Koeppen accompanied
Whitbeck to retrace to path of the foot pursuit and was the one to recover the firearm from the
ground “directly to the left” of where he observed defendant stumble over the fence. Officer
Koeppen was wearing a body camera at the time of the pursuit.
¶9 On cross-examination, Trooper Whitbeck conceded that he did not write in his field
report that he observed defendant holding his waistband during the pursuit. Whitbeck also met
with a detective around the time of the arrest and did not tell the detective defendant was holding
his waistband during the pursuit. Officer Koeppen acknowledged that he never saw the gun in
defendant’s possession and did not see defendant throw anything during the foot chase. Koeppen
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acknowledged that no contraband was found on defendant’s person at the time he was taken into
custody.
¶ 10 The trial court heard testimony of the above events and found defendant guilty of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court noted that the video from the officer’s
body-worn camera corroborated the police’s description of the chase. The trial court highlighted
that it observed on the video that the weapon was found “within an arm’s length” of where
defendant went over the fence. The trial court explained that it could be reasonably inferred from
the evidence that defendant tossed the gun while running from the police. The trial court found,
“based on the circumstances here[,] that this was [defendant’s] gun” and found him guilty.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. The trial court sentenced defendant to
the minimum sentence of three years in prison. Defendant now appeals his conviction.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 13 Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. See 720
ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2022). To prove defendant guilty of the relevant offense, the State had to
submit evidence that: (1) defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) after being convicted of a
felony. Id. Defendant concedes he was previously convicted of a qualifying felony. He, however,
argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was “in possession” of the
firearm that the officers recovered in this case.
¶ 14 The State must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 9. In assessing whether the evidence against a defendant
is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court must determine whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could
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have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Taylor, 186
Ill. 2d 439, 445 (1999).
¶ 15 It is not the reviewing court's function to retry the defendant. People v. Ware, 2019 IL
App (1st) 160989, ¶ 45. The trier of fact assesses the credibility of the witnesses, determines the
appropriate weight of the testimony and resolves conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 123249, ¶ 21. A reviewing court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact and will not reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence unless the evidence admitted is so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. People v. Betance–
Lopez, 2015 IL App (2d) 130521, ¶ 40. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be
drawn in favor of the prosecution. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24.
¶ 16 Defendant argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
possessed the recovered firearm. Defendant points out that neither of the State’s two
eyewitnesses ever affirmatively saw him with a gun nor did they see him drop or throw anything.
No fingerprints, DNA, or inculpatory statements tied defendant to the firearm. Instead, according
to defendant, he was found guilty of possessing a weapon that was found in a vacant lot that
anyone could have accessed, and he was arrested hundreds of feet away from where the gun was
recovered.
¶ 17 Defendant contends that the insufficiency of the evidence is highlighted by the fact that,
during closing argument, the State argued to the trial court that the gun fell out of defendant’s
waistband when defendant stumbled over the fence during the pursuit. The State argued at trial
that the gun was recovered from “exactly where [defendant] fell.” On appeal, defendant contends
that the gun was not recovered where he fell over the fence but instead was found in the back
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corner of a sunken cavity on the property a “notable distance” away from the portion of the fence
that defendant jumped. Defendant points out that the portion of the fence that was near where the
gun was recovered was an area of the fence that could not be jumped. Defendant concludes that
the area of the fence he climbed was “simply not close enough to where the gun was recovered”
for it to have just fallen out while he went over the fence.
¶ 18 In finding defendant guilty, the trial court did not mention the portion of the State’s
closing argument where the State opined that the gun fell out of defendant’s waistband during
the pursuit. Instead, the trial court found that it was reasonable to infer that defendant tossed the
gun away while he was fleeing the police. Defendant argues that the difference between the
State’s argument and the trial court’s findings on this point is telling. Defendant contends that the
trial court’s finding cannot be reconciled with the evidence because neither officer testified that
they observed defendant toss any object. Defendant argues that the trial court’s assumption that
he tossed the gun during the pursuit was not based on any testimony and is mere speculation
which cannot sustain his conviction.
¶ 19 Defendant acknowledges that possession of a weapon may be proved by circumstantial
evidence alone. He, however, argues that there was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to
even circumstantially prove he was in possession of the recovered weapon. Defendant contends
that there was no evidence to show that the weapon was not already there before defendant was
in the area, as the gun was found in a vacant lot that could be accessed by anyone. He suggests
that it is not enough that the officers testified he was holding his waistband during the pursuit
because holding one’s waistband is equally consistent with innocuous conduct like trying to hold
up one’s pants while running.
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¶ 20 We find that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s possession of the firearm.
Two different officers, one from the CPD and one from the State Police, testified they observed
defendant was holding his waistband while running from the stolen vehicle. After Trooper
Whitbeck saw defendant grabbing for his waist during the pursuit, the Trooper drew his service
weapon and ordered defendant to stop fleeing. Officer Koeppen testified that while defendant
was fleeing, he was holding his waistband in a manner consistent with someone who was
concealing a firearm. Both officers testified they saw defendant going over the fence and they
both lost sight of him momentarily until he was arrested by other officers a short time later.
Whitbeck and Koeppen immediately set out to retrace the path of the foot pursuit where they
found the weapon in plain view.
¶ 21 Despite defendant’s contentions about discrepancies regarding the location in which the
weapon was recovered, the testimony at trial is consistent with the bodycam video. In the video,
Officer Koeppen shows the area where defendant went over the fence. The gun was located
immediately adjacent to that spot and corroborates the officers’ testimony. The trial court
credited the officers’ testimony. Defendant’s hypothesis that the gun could have been put in the
lot by someone else at some other time before defendant was present in that location is not very
compelling as the gun was found out in the open and was directly in the path defendant had just
taken during his flight from the officers. Whether the gun was accidentally dropped or
intentionally discarded by defendant was not a matter that the State needed to prove. The firearm
was found a very short distance from the spot defendant had just jumped over the fence during
his flight from police after police had reason to believe defendant was concealing a firearm
during the foot pursuit. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing
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all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor, a rational trier of fact could have found defendant
possessed the weapon beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 22 Defendant argues that People v. Wright, 2013 IL App (1st) 111803, is instructive. In
Wright, the defendant was in his uncle’s home when a search warrant was executed. Id. at ¶ 14.
The police chased the defendant and another man down the stairs. Id. at ¶ 7. The men fell while
running from the police. Id. The defendant landed on his stomach on the floor and the other man
fell on top of him. Id. Under the defendant’s body, the officers observed a gun. Id. at ¶ 12. The
defendant did not own or live at the residence and none of the officers saw a gun in the
defendant’s hands or noticed him making any actions indicating he was discarding a gun. Id. at
¶ 20. We reversed the defendant’s conviction, concluding that the mere presence of the gun
under the defendant’s body was insufficient to prove possession. Id. at ¶ 26.
¶ 23 In Wright, the State did not argue the defendant had actual possession of a gun. See id. at
¶ 21. Instead, the State argued for constructive possession based on the fact that the gun was
recovered in such close proximity to the defendant when he was arrested. Id. In this case,
however, the State has not attempted to prove that defendant constructively possessed a weapon,
but rather that he actually possessed it. The State presented evidence that defendant had the gun
in his waistband at the beginning of the foot pursuit before later dropping or discarding the gun.
Moreover, in Wright, the only evidence of the defendant’s alleged possession of the weapon was
his proximity to the weapon when it was seen by police. Here, there is a far more detailed
eyewitness account of defendant actually possessing a weapon that was later recovered from the
exact path of his flight. We do not find Wright to be persuasive in support of defendant’s
arguments.
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¶ 24 Defendant also points to People v. Bell, 2024 IL App (1st) 200460-U as supportive of his
arguments on appeal. However, in Bell, we noted that “there was no evidence that Bell ever
possessed a weapon, actually or constructively.” Id. at ¶ 27. The officers in Bell encountered the
defendant and another man in a vacant area who both fled. One officer said he saw defendant
reach for his waistband and toss an object. Id. at ¶ 28. However, another officer admitted that the
object he saw in the defendant’s hand was a beverage bottle, not a gun. Id. The officers later
found a gun in the lot, but there was no evidence defendant ever possessed it. The officers
themselves were not convinced defendant ever possessed the gun and could be heard on the
body-worn camera video saying that, “because [the defendant] ‘was in the lot, we'll put it on
him.’ ” Id. We recognized in Bell that the gun could have come from defendant, the other man,
or neither, but the only possible link between the defendant and the gun was based on
speculation. Id.
¶ 25 In this case, we do not have confusion or uncertainty on behalf of the eyewitness officers.
Instead, the officers testified consistently that they saw defendant running while grabbing at his
waistband in a manner consistent with a suspect concealing a weapon there. The officers, from
different agencies, both testified that they believed defendant was fleeing from them while in
possession of a gun and they quickly retraced the path of defendant’s flight and discovered the
gun as they expected. The officers’ testimony was not impeached, contradicted, or otherwise
called into question by the defense and, more importantly, was found to be credible by the trial
court. The testimony was corroborated by the body camera video unlike in Bell where the body
camera video disproved the link between the defendant and the weapon. The evidence in this
case is superior, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the evidence admitted in Bell.
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¶ 26 Based on the foregoing, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence of
defendant’s possession of the weapon to sustain his conviction for unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon.
¶ 27 II. Constitutionality of the Unlawful Possession of a Weapon by a Felon Statute
¶ 28 Defendant argues that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional. The
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute makes it a crime for a person who has
previously been convicted of a felony to knowingly possess a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West
2022). Defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution or under Article I, Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 29 A. Second Amendment Challenge
¶ 30 We first address defendant’s argument that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a
felon statute is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Illinois courts review a
constitutional challenge to a statute or ordinance de novo because it presents a question of law.
See Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 28. In a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute, such as the challenge presented here, a court examines whether the statute or ordinance at
issue contains “an inescapable flaw” that makes the statute “unconstitutional under every
circumstance.” Accel Entertainment Gaming, LLC v. Village of Elmwood Park, 2015 IL App
(1st) 143822, ¶ 29. The burden of demonstrating a statute’s unconstitutionality is on the party
challenging the ordinance’s validity, and the challenging party must clearly demonstrate a
constitutional violation. Blanchard v. Berrios, 2016 IL 120315, ¶ 14.
¶ 31 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. U.S. Const. Amend. II (West 2020). In New York State
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Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court of the United
States set out the applicable test for determining whether a statute or regulation is compatible
with the Second Amendment.
¶ 32 In Bruen, the Supreme Court held that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. Id. at 17. To
justify a firearm regulation when the individual’s conduct is protected, the government must
demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation. Id. The applicable test for scrutinizing a regulation under the Second Amendment
“requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second
Amendment’s text and historical understanding.” Id. at 26. If the regulated conduct is protected
by the Second Amendment, the burden then falls to the government to show that the regulation
of the protected conduct is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” Id. at 33-34.
¶ 33 Defendant argues that, in Illinois, the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute
(720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) bars any person convicted of a felony from possessing any
firearm, for any purpose, for all time. He contends that the statute’s text and its prohibitions
implicate the Second Amendment, so the burden is on the government to demonstrate that the
statute is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Defendant argues
that the test from Bruen “requires this Court to determine whether permanently banning a person
with a history of felony convictions – a ban that carries criminal consequences – is ‘consistent
with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.’ ” (Quoting Id. at 26).
According to defendant, “no firearm regulations from the historical periods that Bruen relied on
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justify Section 24-1.1(a), which places a permanent ban on gun possession based on nothing
more than the fact of a previous felony conviction.”
¶ 34 Turning to the test set forth in Bruen, we must first determine whether the regulated
conduct falls within the textual scope of the Second Amendment and, if so, we look to whether
the government has met its burden of showing that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at 17.
¶ 35 Under the Second Amendment, the right of “the people” to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed. U.S. Const. Amend. II (West 2022). Defendant contends that he is part of “the
people” to whom the Second Amendment refers despite him being a convicted felon. Defendant
relies on, among other sources, the Supreme Court’s statement in Heller that there is “a strong
presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all
Americans.” (Quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (emphasis added)).
¶ 36 The State argues that the Second Amendment’s protections do not extend to convicted
felons like defendant and therefore defendant is not part of “the people” for purposes of the
Second Amendment. The State also relies on, among other sources, the Supreme Court’s
statement in Heller that “nothing in [this] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” (Quoting Heller, 554
U.S. at 626-27 (emphasis added)).
¶ 37 In just the last few months, different circuit courts of the United States Court of Appeals
have reached opposing conclusions when deciding whether Second Amendment protections
extend to felons. In United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2024), the Eighth
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Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Supreme Court has given repeated assurances that the
longstanding laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms pass constitutional muster. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that a categorical ban on felons possessing firearms was not unconstitutional.
Id.; see also United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 705 (4th Cir. 2024) (the right enshrined in the
Second Amendment “protects firearms possession by the law-abiding, not by felons.”). In Range
v. Attorney General United States, No. 21-2835, 2024 WL 5199447, at **3-5 (3d Cir. Dec. 23,
2024), however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. The Third
Circuit “reject[ed] the Government’s contention that felons are not among ‘the people’ protected
by the Second Amendment.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 38 The issue appears to be destined for Supreme Court review in the near future.
Nevertheless, we find that the better reasoned decisions are those in which the courts have found
prohibitions on felons possessing firearms are not unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment. The Supreme Court’s statement in Heller that it was not casting any doubt on the
longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is telling. The Supreme Court
recently reiterated that position in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 682 (2024) when it
stated that “[i]ndeed, Heller stated that many such prohibitions, like those on the possession of
firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’ ” We agree with the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the possession of firearms by felons falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment right as originally understood. Hunt, 123 F.4th at 705.
¶ 39 Although the law is evolving rapidly in this area, Illinois courts have previously
addressed this issue and found that the subject statute passes constitutional muster under the
Second Amendment. In People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, we explained that “[t]he
Bruen Court could not have been more clear that its newly announced test applied only to laws
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that attempted to regulate the gun possession of ‘law-abiding citizens,’ and not felons like
defendant.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37; see also People v. Mobley, 2023 IL App
(1st) 221264, ¶ 28; People v. Hatcher, 2024 IL App (1st) 220455, ¶ 57; People v. Kelley, 2024
IL App (1st) 230569, ¶¶ 16-17; People v. Gardner, 2024 IL App (4th) 230443, ¶ 68. We
conclude that defendant cannot show Second Amendment protection from the relevant statute
and, thus, he has failed to demonstrate that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon
statute is facially unconstitutional.
¶ 40 B. Illinois Constitution Challenge
¶ 41 Defendant argues that, even if the statute passes muster under the Second Amendment,
the statute is unconstitutional under Article I Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution. Illinois
courts review a constitutional challenge to a statute or ordinance de novo because it presents a
question of law. Caulkins, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 28. In a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute, such as the challenge presented here, a court examines whether the statute or ordinance at
issue contains “an inescapable flaw” that makes the statute “unconstitutional under every
circumstance.” Accel Entertainment, 2015 IL App (1st) 143822, ¶ 29. The burden of
demonstrating a statute’s unconstitutionality is on the party challenging the ordinance’s validity,
and the challenging party must clearly demonstrate a constitutional violation. Blanchard, 2016
IL 120315, ¶ 14.
¶ 42 The Illinois Constitution provides that, “[s]ubject only to the police power, the right of
the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §22
(West 2022). Defendant argues that the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than the
Second Amendment as it expands the protection from “the people” to “the individual citizen.”
He suggests that “the people” in the U.S. Constitution speaks to a group while the Illinois
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Constitution provides protection for individuals. Thus, according to defendant, “the text of the
Illinois Constitution confers a broader, more explicit, and more specific personal right than does
the Second Amendment.”
¶ 43 We have addressed the same arguments defendant makes here in other cases. In
addressing whether the Illinois Constitution forbids the General Assembly from passing a law
prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, we have repeatedly answered the question in the
negative. See People v. Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828, ¶¶ 40-45; Kelly, 2024 IL App (1st)
230569, ¶¶ 23-28; People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 38-44.
¶ 44 Our supreme court has explained that, in adding the prefatory phrase “subject only to the
police power,” the Illinois Constitution was intended to provide the State with an “extraordinary
degree of control over the possession of firearms.” Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103
Ill. 2d 483, 491-92 (1984). We find no reason to depart from our consistent position on this issue,
and we agree with the correctness of our previous holding that “the Illinois Constitution’s
prohibition of the possession of firearms by felons is a proper exercise of police power.”
Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828, ¶ 44.
¶ 45 As noted in the dissent in Kalodimos, the committee report for the 1970 Constitutional
Convention states that “certain individuals, such as minors, incompetents and convicted felons,
could be prohibited from possessing firearms” under the State’s police power discussed in Art. I
Sec. 22 of the constitution. Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 524 (Moran, J., dissenting) (citing
Committee Report, 6 Proceedings 89) (emphasis added). The legislative purpose in enacting the
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute “was to protect the health and safety of the
public by denying legal possession of firearms to certain classes of persons that the legislature
determined presented a higher risk of danger to the public, and to themselves, when in
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possession of a firearm.” Rawlings v. Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, 73 Ill. App. 3d
267, 274 (1979). “We have no difficulty in finding that such a purpose is within the purview of
the police power possessed by the legislature.” Id.
¶ 46 Defendant maintains that the Illinois Constitution demands an individualized finding of
dangerousness on a case by case basis before a citizen can be disarmed in this State. We do not
believe the Illinois Constitution mandates such a finding or prohibits the legislature from
enacting a law that categorically forbids convicted felons from possessing firearms. Defendant
has failed to clearly demonstrate a constitutional violation (Blanchard, 2016 IL 120315, ¶ 14) or
show that the challenged statute is unconstitutional under every circumstance (Accel
Entertainment, 2015 IL App (1st) 143822, ¶ 29). As such, his challenges to the constitutionality
of the statute must fail.
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
¶ 48 Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 49 Affirmed.
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