NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250397-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/01/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0397 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Crawford County. ) v. ) No. 23-CF-21 ) LISA L. McCOY, ) Honorable ) Christoper L. Weber, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Hackett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant is entitled to remand for (1) a preliminary Krankel inquiry and (2) the opportunity to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. Feb. 1, 2024).
¶2 This direct appeal arises from the sentencing of defendant, Lisa L. McCoy, following the
revocation of her probation after her plea of guilty in this case. For the reasons that follow, we
remand for a preliminary Krankel inquiry, and for defendant to have the opportunity to file a
motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. Feb. 1, 2024).
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On February 21, 2023, defendant was charged, by information, with one count of unlawful
possession of methamphetamine, a Class 3 felony (count I), and one count of criminal trespass to
real property, a Class B misdemeanor (count II). Count I alleged that on or about January 31, 2023, 1 defendant committed unlawful possession of methamphetamine, in that she “knowingly possessed
less than 5 grams of [m]ethamphetamine.” Count II alleged that on or about January 31, 2023,
defendant committed criminal trespass to real property, in that she “knowingly and without
authority entered [the Walmart store in Robinson] after receiving, prior to the entry, notice from
the owner that the entry is forbidden.”
¶5 At the outset of a hearing held on May 24, 2023, the circuit court stated that defendant had
filed an application for waiver of criminal court assessments, the court had reviewed the
application, and the court would enter an order approving the waiver requested in the application.
The circuit court asked the State to proceed, and the State announced the terms of a guilty plea
agreement. Defendant would enter a plea of guilty to count I, in exchange for count II being
dismissed, and defendant receiving “First Offender Probation” for a period of 24 months. The State
added that “[a]ll of the standard terms of felony probation” would apply, “including having to
complete 30 hours of public service work and undergo an alcohol and drug assessment by a
licensed agency and complete any recommended counseling.”
¶6 The State continued that defendant would “pay a fine of $500,” would “be assessed a $250
DNA fee” that would be waived, and would “pay probation fees of $600 and $10 Crime Stopper’s
fee.” The State added that defendant’s bond would “be applied,” and defendant would “also receive
$30 credit for two days served[,] for $60,” which meant defendant would “end up owing a balance
of $824 after her court costs [were] waived.” The State further added that “because it is First
Offender Probation, if she successfully complies with all the terms, the Court will enter a judgment
dismissing the case.”
¶7 Defendant’s counsel agreed that the foregoing terms were the terms of the plea agreement.
Defendant’s counsel also waived the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). The
2 State provided a factual basis for the plea agreement, to which defendant’s counsel responded, “So
stipulated.” The circuit court inquired about defendant’s criminal history, to which the State
responded that defendant had “[n]o previous felonies.”
¶8 When asked, defendant stated that she had fully discussed her case with her attorney and
that she was satisfied with her attorney’s representation. After defendant stated that she did not
have any questions about the plea agreement she was entering, the circuit court admonished
defendant as to the charges and potential penalties she faced, and the rights she was giving up by
pleading guilty. The circuit court further questioned defendant to ensure defendant’s plea was
defendant’s “own free and voluntary act”; that defendant was not forced, threatened, or coerced
into pleading guilty; and that defendant was not promised anything other than the previously stated
terms of the agreement. Thereafter, the circuit court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
defendant in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
¶9 The circuit court recounted the financial terms of the agreement, stating that (1) defendant
was assessed a fine of $500; (2) a felony drug offense criminal assessment of $2,215 was assessed
but was waived in full; (3) a DNA analysis fee of $250 was assessed but was waived in full;
(4) probation fees totaling $600 were assessed, as was a $10 Crime Stoppers fee; and (5) defendant
would receive credit for two days served in the county jail at the rate of $30 per day. The circuit
court reiterated that “[a]fter application of bond, there is a balance due of $824.” The circuit court
also admonished defendant of her appeal rights.
¶ 10 On October 22, 2024, the State filed a “Petition Charging Violation Of Conditions Of
Probation,” in which it alleged that defendant (1) failed to report as directed for probation
appointments, (2) refused, on October 9, 2024, to submit to drug and alcohol testing, (3) failed to
3 complete “any public service work,” and (4) failed to complete a drug and alcohol assessment. The
petition alleged that, as a result, defendant was “in violation of her probation.”
¶ 11 On December 31, 2024, the State filed an amended petition in which it alleged that, in
addition to the allegations in the original petition, (1) “[o]n October 23, 2024, [defendant] tested
positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, marijuana, benzodiazepine, and buprenorphine”;
and (2) defendant “did obtain a drug and alcohol assessment after the initial petition was filed,
however, on December 19, 2024, the probation office received a letter from Lawrence County
Health Department that [defendant’s] chart was being closed unsuccessfully due to non-
compliance.”
¶ 12 On March 7, 2025, a hearing was held on the amended petition, at which defendant was
represented by counsel. Olivia Lingafelter testified that she was a probation officer for Crawford
County. She testified that she became responsible for defendant’s case in September of 2024, and
that previously defendant’s case had been handled by Mary Miller. Because defendant “initially
scored out as a low-risk offender,” the case was also handled by an administrative assistant.
Lingafelter testified that defendant missed appointments and that when defendant appeared at an
appointment on October 9, 2024, defendant refused to take a drug test. She testified that defendant
reported to an appointment on October 23, 2024, at which she took a drug test that returned positive
results for methamphetamine, amphetamine, marijuana, benzodiazepine, and buprenorphine. She
testified that she asked defendant to bring in any prescriptions she had, but that as of the date of
the hearing, defendant “still refused to bring in any prescriptions, medication bottles, anything like
that to be verified.”
¶ 13 Lingafelter testified that, to her knowledge, defendant had not completed her required
public service work. She testified that defendant “did go to” a drug and alcohol assessment, but
4 that defendant “was unsuccessfully discharged December 19, 2024, due to noncompliance.” She
testified that defendant failed to communicate with the health department, and did not “respond to
phone calls for over 30 days,” so the department “had to close her out.” Lingafelter testified that
she was told that defendant “was very argumentative,” and defendant “stated she did not think she
needed counseling and would like a second opinion.” She testified that defendant stated that in
February of 2025, she arranged a drug and alcohol assessment with the Jasper County Health
Department, but was on a waiting list and had not completed the assessment. On cross-
examination, Lingafelter testified that defendant had “made all of her appointments with”
Lingafelter since September of 2024, except that defendant failed to report for a drug test on
January 29, 2025. She agreed that defendant had an appointment with Lingafelter “next week,”
and that defendant could bring “documentation and her prescriptions and community service” to
that appointment.
¶ 14 Following Lingafelter’s testimony, the State rested. The defense called defendant as its sole
witness. With regard to the State’s assertion that she “missed appointments,” defendant testified
that “could be correct,” because she had “short-term memory loss” following “a brain bleed” after
a car accident in November of 2023. She testified that she did not receive notice of some
appointments, because after the accident, she stayed at times with her mother, and at times with
her husband, and her mail did not always reach her. She testified that her short-term memory was
“still whacked out” from the accident.
¶ 15 With regard to her alleged refusal to take a drug test on October 9, 2024, defendant testified
that she attended the appointment, but she had urinated just before leaving her house, and when
she got to the appointment, she “couldn’t go.” She testified that she could not remain at the
appointment because she had a commitment to take her elderly mother to a doctor’s appointment.
5 With regard to the positive drug test on October 23, 2024, defendant testified, “I had been out with
a friend, and I had partied with a friend, and she is no longer my friend.” She testified, “that was
wrong,” and that “whatever I smoked with her was laced with stuff.”
¶ 16 With regard to her public service work, defendant testified that she had completed 16 of
her required 30 hours, and would provide documentation of the hours at her next probation
appointment. With regard to a drug and alcohol assessment, defendant testified that she was
evaluated at the Lawrence County Health Department and “was supposed to *** do online
counseling *** once a week.” She testified that the counselor was ill with the flu and unavailable
“both times” she attempted to sign on. She later became ill with the flu as well and missed her
follow-up appointment in person, which led to her being terminated. Defendant testified that she
“attempted to reengage in counseling,” but was told it would take 90 days, and that “it might be
quicker *** to try to sign up at Jasper County,” which she did. She testified that she was on a
waiting list and believed she would be able to begin the program in “three more weeks.” She
testified that she had been making payments on her “fines and court costs,” and that because she
had not “worked enough hours” recently, she planned on paying them off when she got her income
tax refund.
¶ 17 Following argument from the parties, the circuit court found that the State had “met its
burden with regard to [defendant’s] probation violations, specifically, refusal of drug tests, testing
positive for methamphetamine and other prohibited substances, no proof of completion of any
public service work, and her not being in compliance with counseling.” The court set a sentencing
hearing for April 11, 2025. The court also entered a written order for a PSI. The PSI was filed on
March 31, 2025.
6 ¶ 18 At the April 11, 2025, sentencing hearing, the circuit court asked the parties if they had
been given a chance to review the PSI. Defendant’s counsel stated that she had, and that she had
no objection to the PSI being admitted into evidence, but that she wanted to ensure the circuit court
had seen defendant’s “handwritten attached statement.” The circuit court stated that it had not seen
the statement, which the court attributed to a recent change in policy regarding pro se
correspondence from defendants. Defendant’s counsel asked the circuit court to consider the
statement. The court then admitted the PSI into evidence, noting that it did not contain “those
statements,” which the court stated “can be added to the record later today.”
¶ 19 The State presented the testimony of Morgan Kelly, a Crawford County probation officer.
Kelly testified that since the March 7, 2025, hearing, defendant had met with Kelly and completed
an interview, but had “failed to report for a drug screen this past Wednesday.” Kelly testified that
defendant had “just provided us with a copy of her public service work completion today.” On
cross-examination, Kelly agreed that defendant’s public service work was “now completed.”
¶ 20 The defense presented the testimony of Beverly Dart, who testified that she was
defendant’s mother. Dart testified that she was 81 years old and that she relied upon defendant to
help take care of her. She testified that following defendant’s car accident, defendant had problems
with her short-term memory that had “not improved.” She testified to defendant’s physical and
mental health struggles.
¶ 21 In argument, the State asked for a sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The State added
that it was “not asking for any additional fine.” Defense counsel argued that defendant’s car
accident, which happened while she was on probation, caused many of the compliance problems
in this case, and that defendant was “really trying” to comply. Defendant’s counsel argued that
despite some early problems, defendant now had “completed all her public service work,” was
7 “engaging in counseling,” and had accrued “a substantial period of compliance of probation since
October [of 2024,] which would be a good five, six months now of compliance.” Counsel asked
the circuit court to give defendant “another opportunity” at probation, and to consider factors in
mitigation. Counsel thereafter stated she “would also ask the court to take into consideration
[defendant’s] written statement she would like the court to read.”
¶ 22 After ensuring the State did not object, the circuit court admitted defendant’s statement
into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 1, and stated that it had considered the statement. The circuit
court did not comment further on the contents of Defendant’s Exhibit 1. Because it is directly
relevant to this appeal, we note that the exhibit is mostly a narrative of defendant’s experiences
with the probation office, her car accident, and the complications that followed, and that she
believed impacted her ability to comply with probation, as well as other issues that she stated
impacted her ability to comply. Near the end of the handwritten statement, defendant stated that
she believed she was “a productive member of society,” that this was her “first time in trouble,”
and that she was “still shocked that [her] public defender did not defend [her] at all.”
¶ 23 Defendant offered a verbal statement in allocution that was in many ways similar to her
handwritten statement, although the verbal statement did not mention her counsel at all. Thereafter,
the circuit court stated that it had considered the PSI, the witness testimony, the “written and
verbal” statements of defendant, and the arguments of counsel. The circuit court discussed factors
in mitigation, and in aggravation, and sentenced defendant “to two years [of] probation.” The
circuit court stated that defendant would “have to pay additional probation fees.” The court added,
“I assume that’s 22 months, although I’ll let counsel discuss that because her term should have
been about up. There will be no additional fines, costs or assessments other than those probation
fees.” The court further added that it also was “sentencing defendant to 20 consecutive weekends
8 in the county jail,” which would allow defendant to work, and to help care for her mother, “five of
seven days a week.”
¶ 24 Also on April 11, 2025, the circuit court entered a written financial sentencing order. The
order indicated that defendant was responsible for a probation fee of $25 per month, for 22 months,
for a total probation fee amount of $550, and a total balance due of $550. This timely appeal
followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, defendant contends this court must remand to the circuit court for (1) a
preliminary Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)) into defendant’s claim,
in her handwritten correspondence, that she was “still shocked that [her] public defender did not
defend [her] at all,” and (2) defendant to be given the opportunity in the circuit court “to file a
motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 for a correct calculation of the amount she
owes in fines.” With regard to defendant’s first contention, the State has filed a confession of error,
in which the State agrees with defendant that her handwritten assertion that she was “still shocked
that [her] public defender did not defend [her] at all,” was sufficient to trigger a preliminary
Krankel inquiry. The State notes that under longstanding Illinois precedent, a defendant may bring
a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the circuit court’s attention orally, or in
writing, and is not required to provide a factual basis for the claim. See, e.g., People v. Bates, 2019
IL 124143, ¶ 15.
¶ 27 Once the claim is raised, the circuit court examines the factual basis of the claim. People
v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. If the circuit court thereafter determines that the claim lacks merit
or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the circuit court need not appoint new counsel and
may deny the defendant’s claim. Id. If, on the other hand, the pro se allegations show possible
9 neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. Id. In this case, we agree with the parties
that defendant’s assertion that she was “still shocked that [her] public defender did not defend [her]
at all,” was sufficient to trigger a preliminary Krankel inquiry, and that the circuit court erred when
it did not conduct such an inquiry. Accordingly, we remand for a preliminary Krankel inquiry.
See, e.g., People v. Roberson, 2021 IL App (3d) 190212, ¶ 22 (proper remedy when circuit court
fails to conduct an adequate preliminary inquiry into defendant’s posttrial claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel is remand to allow the court to make that inquiry).
¶ 28 With regard to her second contention on appeal, defendant contends that it appears from
the documents in the common law record that she “is responsible for the $550 in probation fees
ordered on April 11, 2025, and the previously ordered $600 in probation fees, without credit for
the fines she paid in accordance to the now vacated May 24, 2023, financial sentencing order.”
Defendant contends this is erroneous “because when a court revokes a defendant’s probation, an
entirely new sentence is imposed,” which means that the “defendant is no longer subject to the
original conditions of probation, including any monetary assessments.” Defendant contends that
although she would “be obligated to pay the fines and fees in question if the circuit court reimposed
them at sentencing upon revocation of probation,” in this case the circuit court “specifically stated,
‘[t]here will be no additional fines, costs or assessments other than those probation fees.’ ” She
therefore seeks a remand “to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 in order to
correct the calculation of [her] fines, fees, assessments, and costs.”
¶ 29 The State responds by contending that “the circuit clerk’s calculation of defendant’s
financial sentence is in accord with the trial court’s sentence, so remand is not necessary.” The
State first posits that defendant’s claim is forfeited, because her updated financial obligations were
filed in the record “prior to the 30-day time limit for defendant to have filed a motion to reconsider
10 sentence,” and because she never filed such a motion. With regard to the merits of defendant’s
claim, the State argues that the circuit court’s statements—that defendant would “have to pay
additional probation fees,” and that “[t]here will be no additional fines, costs or assessments other
than those probation fees”—expressed the circuit court’s intention “that the new probation fees
would be in addition to, or joined with, those outstanding from defendant’s original sentence of
probation.”
¶ 30 The State argues that the circuit court’s language meant that “defendant would have to pay
more probation fees because she was receiving more probation,” and that such a ruling was
reasonable and was consistent with the new financial sentencing order, which imposed additional
probation fees for only 22 months—2 months less than the full term of defendant’s new probation
sentence—because defendant was assessed costs for 24 months as part of her original sentence,
but served only 22 months before her new term of probation was imposed, which left her with a
credit for 2 months that were assessed but not served. The State adds that it believes “defendant’s
interpretation of the [circuit] court’s sentencing order would create an absurdity: that, despite
having supervised defendant on probation for 22 months as a result of her original sentence, the
probation department was not entitled to the fees for their services during that time period.” The
State further adds that the circuit court’s “use of the word ‘additional’ when referring to
defendant’s financial obligations,” meant that defendant’s new probation sentence was “to also
include the previously imposed fines, fees, assessments, and probation fees from her original
probation sentence.” The State posits that, accordingly, “it is unnecessary to remand this case for
purposes of allowing defendant to file a Rule 472 motion in the [circuit] court when the record
clearly establishes no error exists from which she can seek a remedy.”
11 ¶ 31 In her reply brief, defendant contends forfeiture does not apply in this case, because the
plain language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) states that “[i]n all
criminal cases pending on appeal as of March 1, 2019, or appeals filed thereafter in which a party
has attempted to raise sentencing errors covered by this rule for the first time on appeal, the
reviewing court shall remand to the circuit court to allow the party to file a motion pursuant to this
rule.” Defendant also disputes the State’s assertion that the circuit court’s intent is clear from its
order, pointing out that the circuit court never made a specific reference to the original sentencing
order. Defendant adds that because the circuit court specifically stated that there would be no
additional fines, costs, or assessments other than the new probation fees, the circuit court
“indicated that it intended for [defendant] to not pay any additional fees, other than the specifically
imposed probation fees,” which means that the circuit “court explicitly did not reimpose the fines,
fees, and assessments at resentencing.”
¶ 32 We agree with defendant that Rule 472 precludes forfeiture in this case. In fact, Rule 472
requires that we remand to the circuit court to allow defendant to file a motion pursuant to the rule.
See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (1st) 163417, ¶¶ 93-94 (holding Rule 472 requires
remand and recognizing prior cases holding same).
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we remand for a preliminary Krankel inquiry, and to allow
defendant to file her Rule 472 motion.
¶ 35 Cause remanded.