People v. Mazarakis

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Mazarakis

54 A.D.3d 876, 863 N.Y.S.2d 380

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided September 16, 2008·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Adams, J.), rendered July 18, 2006, convicting him of criminal contempt in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

[877]*877Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

After subtracting the periods of delay which were due to the defendant’s pretrial motion practice (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]), the periods during which the defendant was without counsel through no fault of the Supreme Court (see CPL 30.30 [4] [f]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706 [2004]), and adjournments the defendant either requested or consented to (see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]), the total time chargeable to the People was within the permitted 90-day period (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; see generally People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985] ).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he was not entitled to a missing witness charge (see generally People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192, 196 [2003]; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] ) or any relief for the alleged failure of the People to turn over Brady material (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]). Prudenti, PJ., Ritter, Florio and McCarthy, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Adams, J.), rendered July 18, 2006, convicting him of criminal contempt in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

[877]*877Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

After subtracting the periods of delay which were due to the defendant’s pretrial motion practice (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]), the periods during which the defendant was without counsel through no fault of the Supreme Court (see CPL 30.30 [4] [f]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706 [2004]), and adjournments the defendant either requested or consented to (see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]), the total time chargeable to the People was within the permitted 90-day period (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; see generally People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985] ).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, he was not entitled to a missing witness charge (see generally People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192, 196 [2003]; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 427 [1986] ) or any relief for the alleged failure of the People to turn over Brady material (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]). Prudenti, PJ., Ritter, Florio and McCarthy, JJ., concur.

People v. Mazarakis, 54 A.D.3d 876, 863 N.Y.S.2d 380 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

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