People v. Mayo

Opinion

People v Mayo

2026 NY Slip Op 04961

August 12, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Maurice Mayo, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 12, 2026

2022-05467, (Ind. No. 126/20)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

Helen Voutsinas

Donna-Marie E. Golia

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Robert C. Langdon of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Thomas B. Litsky and Rhys Johnson of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mario F. Mattei, J.), rendered June 24, 2022, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and menacing in the second degree (two counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and two counts of menacing in the second degree in connection with his pointing a gun at and threatening a group of people on August 29, 2020.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not deprived of his right to self-representation. "A defendant in a criminal case may invoke the right to defend pro se provided: (1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues" (People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17). Here, the defendant's statement, "I'd like to be counsel and let counsel be co-counsel," was not an unequivocal request to defend pro se, but rather was a request for hybrid representation (see People v Silburn, 31 NY3d 144, 150; People v Price, 197 AD3d 1182, 1183; People v Lundquist, 180 AD3d 806, 807). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in failing to inquire further regarding the request (see People v Silburn, 31 NY3d at 151-152).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of menacing in the second degree under counts 6 and 7 of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644).

The defendant's contention that Penal Law § 265.03(3), formerly Penal Law § 265.02(4), is unconstitutional in light of the decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen (597 US 1) is unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant failed to raise a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court (see People v Manners, 217 AD3d 683; People v McDowell, 214 AD3d 1437). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. The ruling in Bruen had no impact on the constitutionality of New York State's criminal possession of a weapon statutes (see People v Manners, 217 AD3d at 686).

The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the indictment was legally insufficient to establish that a crime was committed is not reviewable on this appeal from the ensuing judgment of conviction (see CPL 210.30[6]; People v Hengjun Chao, 217 AD3d 777, 778).

The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the Supreme Court was deprived of jurisdiction because the defendant did not sign a waiver of his right to an indictment is without merit. Here, the defendant was tried on an indictment, not a superior court information (see CPL 195.20).

The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he was denied his constitutional right to testify before the grand jury is without merit. The right to testify before the grand jury is statutory and not constitutional (see People v Smith, 87 NY2d 715, 719). Furthermore, "[t]he various risks and benefits that must be considered render the decision of whether to exercise this statutory right an appropriate one for the lawyer, not the client" (People v Hogan, 26 NY3d 779, 786 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and defense counsel properly withdrew the cross grand jury notice.

The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit.

IANNACCI, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court