People v. Maxey

2025 IL App (4th) 240685-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-0685
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 240685-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 3, 2025 NOS. 4-24-0685, 4-24-0686 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County ANTWAN TERRELL MAXEY, ) No. 15CF1432 Defendant-Appellant. ) 16CF793 ) ) Honorable ) Philip J. Nicolosi, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court properly granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petition at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.

¶2 In January 2017, defendant, Antwan Terrell Maxey, was found guilty by a jury of

aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West

2016) in Winnebago County case No. 16-CF-793. In March 2017, defendant was found guilty by

a jury of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in great bodily injury (id.

§ 11-501(d)(1)(C)) in Winnebago County case No. 15-CF-1432. Defendant did not file a direct

appeal from either of his convictions. In March 2020, defendant filed a pro se postconviction

petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West

2020)) in each case. The trial court consolidated the two cases and granted the State’s motions to dismiss filed in each case. Defendant appealed in these consolidated cases. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In June 2015, in case No. 15-CF-1432, the State charged defendant by indictment

with 15 counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs resulting in great

bodily harm after a motor vehicle accident that proximately caused various injuries to passengers

Breanna Porchia and Tacoya Bell. In March 2016, in case No. 16-CF-793, the State charged

defendant by indictment with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer.

Defendant elected to represent himself in both jury trials.

¶5 A. Trial in Case No. 16-CF-793

¶6 At the January 2017 trial, the State’s evidence included the testimonies from

Rockford police officers Scott St. Vincent, Dan Stewart, and Brandon Pofelski. All three officers

were on patrol together in an unmarked police vehicle on the evening of March 16, 2016. All

three officers observed defendant, whom they recognized from previous contact, exiting a gas

station and entering a white Hyundai Santa Fe. After defendant drove from the gas station, the

officers began to follow him. St. Vincent noted defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle.

The vehicle defendant was driving was registered as a rental car. Stewart noted defendant’s

driver’s license was suspended. Upon initiating a traffic stop, all three officers indicated

defendant immediately accelerated and subsequently disregarded a stop light. St. Vincent stated

he believed defendant was driving 70 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. Stewart stated

defendant drove in excess of 70 miles per hour, and Pofelski stated defendant was driving “at

least 60” miles per hour.

¶7 Following the officers’ testimonies, the trial court admitted into evidence a

certified abstract from the Illinois Secretary of State showing defendant’s driver’s license was

-2- suspended on March 16, 2016. The State rested.

¶8 Defendant testified on March 16 he was at home with his “wife-to-be and four

kids.” He denied he was driving. Following defendant’s testimony, the trial court admitted four

certified convictions for prior felony convictions pertaining to defendant’s believability as a

witness.

¶9 The jury returned a guilty verdict for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a

peace officer and driving on a suspended driver’s license. Defendant did not file a posttrial

motion.

¶ 10 We note, from the record, defendant became increasingly hostile toward the trial

court toward the end of his jury trial. He became argumentative about what he asserted was “the

law” and accused the court of being “corrupt.” Defendant stated he was not going to

“participate” in proceedings and began to defy court orders to the point of being found in

contempt of court.

¶ 11 B. Trial in Case No. 15-CF-1432

¶ 12 In March 2017, a jury trial was held in case No. 15-CF-1432. Defendant again

chose to represent himself. Prior to the trial beginning, the State requested 5 of the 15 counts be

dismissed, which the trial court granted. We note from the record, defendant’s openly hostile

behavior with the court dissipated somewhat during this trial. Defendant, instead, refused to

verbally acknowledge the court throughout the entirety of the proceedings. It is noted multiple

times in the record that defendant was aware of the proceedings, and, at times, would smile or

laugh. However, defendant did not verbally respond to any questions asked by the court, he did

not cross-examine any witness, present any evidence, or make any argument throughout the trial

proceeding.

-3- ¶ 13 Rockford police officers Daniel Stewart and Brandon Pofelski testified they were

on patrol on June 15, 2015, at approximately 2:30 a.m. when they were dispatched to a traffic

accident. When they arrived at the accident they identified four people, one of whom was not

involved in the accident. Breanna Porchia was sitting on the curb across the street, Tacoya Bell

was hanging out of the vehicle’s rear windshield, and defendant was hanging out of the driver’s

side window. Defendant, Porchia, and Bell were all transported by ambulance to the hospital.

¶ 14 Porchia testified that on June 15, defendant was driving her and Bell when they

were involved in the accident. Porchia stated it was raining that evening, and she was unsure if

defendant was speeding. Defendant missed a turn and, when he nearly missed another turn, the

vehicle lost traction and crashed. After the accident, she recalled she was bleeding and had neck

pain. She learned at the hospital she had fractured her neck and received six staples to her head

and 21 stitches to her left hand.

¶ 15 Traffic investigator Stacy Beaman testified she arrived at the accident and

recovered two empty alcohol containers from the driver’s side floorboard of the vehicle.

¶ 16 Dr. John Peter Strotkamp testified he was the senior attending physician at

Swedish American Hospital and treated Porchia. Porchia had lacerations to her head, left arm,

and left hand. She also had an “orbital blowout fracture” to her right eye and two fractures of

vertebrae in her neck.

¶ 17 Dr. Todd Alexander testified he was a neurosurgeon who treated Bell following

the accident. Bell had two fractures in her neck, five fractures to her thoracic spine, and rib

fractures. Dr. Alexander stated one of Bell’s thoracic fractures was “unstable,” which required a

“fairly significant operation to stabilize.”

¶ 18 Forensic scientist Shelly Chase testified she tested defendant’s blood which

-4- contained “ethanol at .131 grams per deciliter.” Chase stated ethanol is what is commonly

referred to as “drinking alcohol” and that the .131 measurement was defendant’s blood-alcohol

concentration.

¶ 19 The State rested. As noted earlier, defendant did not present any evidence.

¶ 20 The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Defendant did not file a posttrial

¶ 21 C. Sentencing and Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 22 A combined sentencing hearing was held in May 2017. Defendant continued his

behavior from the second trial and chose not to verbally acknowledge the trial court. In case No.

15-CF-1432, the court entered judgments of conviction to two counts for aggravated driving

under the influence involving great bodily harm, which pertained to the injuries sustained to Bell

and Porchia, respectively. The court sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment. In case No.

16-CF-793, the court entered a judgment of conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to

elude a peace officer and sentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment to run consecutive to

his sentence in case No. 15-CF-1432.

¶ 23 Defendant did not file a postsentencing motion or an appeal.

¶ 24 On May 19, 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion for “ ‘Dismissal ‘McGraw.’ ”

The trial court denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 25 In March 2020, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in each case. In

case No. 15-CF-1432, defendant alleged his due process rights were violated because (1) the

evidence was insufficient to show Bell suffered great bodily harm, (2) there was a violation of

the one-act, one-crime doctrine pertaining to his aggravated driving under the influence

convictions, and (3) the trial court used “outdated [Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions].” In case

-5- No. 16-CF-793, defendant alleged his due process rights were violated because (1) the evidence

was insufficient to show he eluded police, (2) the evidence was insufficient to show the vehicle

traveled at least 21 miles per hour over the speed limit, and (3) there was no probable cause to

initiate the traffic stop.

¶ 26 The matter proceeded to the second stage of postconviction proceedings, and the

trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. The State filed a motion to dismiss both of

defendant’s petitions. A combined hearing on the State’s motions was held in November 2023.

¶ 27 At the hearing, defendant’s counsel stated he was moving to withdraw. Defendant

did not object and requested to proceed pro se. The State argued defendant forfeited all of his

arguments in his petitions because they could have been raised on direct appeal. However, the

State conceded the one-act, one-crime issue.

¶ 28 The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s petitions stating

the issues could have been raised on direct appeal and were, thus, “procedurally defaulted.” The

court, however, granted defendant’s claim regarding the one-act, one-crime doctrine pertaining

to case No. 15-CF-1432. The State submitted an amended sentencing order dismissing the count

pertaining to Bell.

¶ 29 This appeal followed.

¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 31 “The [Act] provides a procedural mechanism through which criminal defendants

can assert that their federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in their

original trials or sentencing hearings.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12. A postconviction

petition must clearly set forth the ways in which a defendant claims his constitutional rights were

violated. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020). “The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits,

-6- records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not

attached.” Id.

¶ 32 “The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction

petitions.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 45. Once a postconviction petition moves from the first to

the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant, and the State

may file responsive pleadings. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17. During the second stage,

the court determines “whether the postconviction petition and any accompanying documentation

make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Id. If a defendant fails to make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation, his postconviction claims are subject to

dismissal. Id.

“A postconviction proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal but rather is a

collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. The purpose of the

proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original

conviction and sentence that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated

previously on direct appeal.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 12.

The trial court’s dismissal of a defendant’s claims at the second stage of postconviction

proceedings is subject to de novo review. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.

¶ 33 On appeal, defendant solely challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his

insufficiency of the evidence claims. He argues the court erred when it dismissed his claims as

procedurally defaulted. He contends the State’s failure to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt is a constitutional claim. He argues his insufficiency of the evidence claims have merit and

requests this court remand the matter for further proceedings under the Act. Defendant primarily

cites Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and People v. Weger, 154 Ill. App. 3d 706

-7- (1987), to argue his sufficiency of the evidence claims are constitutional questions that are

permitted to be raised for the first time under the Act.

¶ 34 The State argues the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s petitions. The

State relies on People v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 2d 400 (1972), for the proposition that arguments

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence do not present a constitutional question as it pertains to

postconviction proceedings and People v. Frank, 48 Ill. 2d 500 (1971), for the proposition that

the Act only provides a mechanism to review sufficiency of the evidence claims where a

defendant has been denied his right to appeal or suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 35 In Jackson, the defendant was convicted of murder following a bench trial.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 309. The question before the Supreme Court was the standard by which the

appellate courts review a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at 313. The court noted failure to

prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt “in a state trial *** cannot constitutionally

stand.” Id. at 318. The court subsequently set the standard for sufficiency of the evidence claims

to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 319. The court abandoned the “no evidence” rule as

“simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 320.

¶ 36 In Weger, the defendant was convicted of burglary and armed violence following

a bench trial. Weger, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 707. The defendant filed a postconviction petition

alleging he had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he had received

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The Weger court found the defendant had intended to file a

direct appeal in the matter, but his trial counsel had failed to perfect the appeal. Id. at 708. The

-8- court concluded counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable and assessed the merits of the

defendant’s claims to determine if he had been prejudiced by counsel’s error. Id. The court found

the trial court’s finding that a straight-blade razor was a per se dangerous weapon was error and

concluded the defendant had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed

violence. Id. at 714. Therefore, the defendant had been prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to

perfect a direct appeal as it pertained to the armed violence conviction. Id.

¶ 37 We are unpersuaded by defendant’s arguments on appeal. See Insurance Benefit

Group, Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44 (noting the

appellant bears the burden of persuasion as to his or her claims of error). In Dunn, our supreme

court stated plainly “[q]uestions as to the sufficiency of the evidence have been held not to

present a constitutional question and therefore are not properly considered in post-conviction

proceedings.” Dunn, 52 Ill. 2d at 402. In Frank, our supreme court clarified “the Act provides a

proper vehicle for review of those issues as to which review by direct appeal has been

unconstitutionally denied by deprivation of the right to appeal, the right to competent counsel on

appeal, or the concept of fundamental fairness.” Frank, 48 Ill. 2d at 504.

¶ 38 Defendant’s reliance on Jackson is misplaced. As our supreme court stated:

“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States Constitution [(U.S. Const., amend. XIV)] requires that a person

may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.’ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 *** (1970). When

a court reviews a conviction to determine whether the constitutional right

recognized in Winship was violated, it must ask ‘whether the record

-9- evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ [Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318]. In other words, the question is

‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Id. at 319.]” People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004).

¶ 39 Jackson set a standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims. It did not,

however, require that proceedings under the Act usurp the appeals process to permit a defendant

to raise, for the first time, a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a postconviction petition. As we

noted earlier, proceedings under the Act are not a substitute for a direct appeal, but, rather, they

are an independent, collateral attack on a prior conviction. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122237, ¶ 12.

Courts of review have repeatedly held firm to Dunn and Frank after Jackson. See People v.

Flores, 2022 IL App (2d) 210757, ¶ 26 (noting a postconviction petition as “[a] collateral attack

is not designed to relitigate guilt or innocence [citation]—which is precisely what [the] defendant

would have us do by reevaluating the sufficiency of the factual basis.”); see also People v.

Creater, 2022 IL App (4th) 200431-U, ¶ 53 (“Questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence

have been held not to present a constitutional question and therefore are not properly considered

in post-conviction proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

¶ 40 Defendant’s reliance on Weger is also misplaced. Weger follows precisely from

Frank that the Act permits a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence where the

constitutional right to a direct appeal was denied. In the case sub judice, defendant’s right to a

direct appeal was not denied, he simply chose not to timely file a direct appeal. Furthermore,

defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel because he chose to represent himself.

- 10 - Defendant identifies no fundamental fairness issue that would permit us to review his

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for the first time under the Act. For that matter, we find it

would be fundamentally unfair to all other criminal defendants to permit defendant in this case to

sit idly by, not filing any posttrial motions and bypassing the direct appeal process through no

fault but his own, only to claim years later the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

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