People v. Matthews

2020 IL App (4th) 170782-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 26, 2020
• Docket: 4-17-0782
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 170782-U May 26, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-17-0782 th 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Adams County EURON MATTHEWS, ) No. 17CF74 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles H.W. Burch, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion to strike defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on the basis that he lacked standing to claim fourth- amendment protections.

(2) The State presented sufficient evidence of qualifying felony offenses to support defendant’s conviction for being an armed habitual criminal.

(3) The State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

(4) Defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct had no merit.

(5) Defendant failed to establish that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.

(6) Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claims that the prosecutor made improper remarks during his opening statement and closing argument, and, forfeiture aside, defendant’s claims were without merit. ¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Euron Matthews, was found guilty of being an

armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016)) and aggravated discharge of a firearm

(id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)). The trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of 22 years and 15

years, respectively. Defendant appeals pro se, arguing (1) the court erred in failing to conduct a

hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the court erred by allowing the State to utilize his

prior criminal charges to support the armed-habitual-criminal offense, (3) the State failed to prove

him guilty of either charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) the State engaged in

prosecutorial misconduct, (5) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, and (6) the

prosecutor made improper comments during his opening statement and closing argument. We

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 25, 2017, the State brought charges against defendant based on

allegations that he possessed and knowingly discharged a firearm at or into a vehicle that he knew

or reasonably should have known was occupied. In charging defendant with being an armed

habitual criminal, the State additionally alleged defendant had previously been convicted of

(1) unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon in Will County case No. 13-CF-1670 and (2)

unlawful manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in Will County case No. 92-CF-3211.

¶5 Prior to trial, the State filed an amended information, charging defendant with the

same offenses but altering the allegations with respect to his previous criminal history.

Specifically, it alleged defendant had prior convictions for (1) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon

in Will County case No. 13-CF-1670, (2) unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent

to deliver in Will County case No. 93-CF-3211, and (3) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in

-2- Will County case No. 94-CF-2443.

¶6 On June 15, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, specifically

surveillance videos seized by the police following the execution of a search warrant at a residence

located at 523 Lind Street in Quincy, Illinois. He alleged the evidence was illegally seized, in that

the search warrant did “not name or describe the person or place to be searched with sufficient

certainty,” the affiant in the complaint for the search warrant “unknowingly used deliberate

falsehoods and recklessly disregarded the truth,” and no probable cause existed for the warrant.

To his motion, defendant attached both a November 2016 complaint for a search warrant and a

November 2016 search warrant for “[t]he premise and person of Felicia L. French, located at 523

Lind St[reet], Quincy, Adams County, Illinois,” and both a December 2016 complaint for a search

warrant and December 2016 search warrant for a “Swann Surveillance DVR” owned by French

and in the custody of the Quincy Police Department.

¶7 On July 6, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress. At the outset of the hearing, the State made an oral motion to strike the motion to suppress

based on defendant’s lack of standing. It argued that the search warrant defendant challenged, as

shown by the attachments to his motion, was for French’s premises and person, as well as a

surveillance system found at French’s residence. The State maintained defendant had “no ties” to

French’s residence and no expectation of privacy in connection with either her residence or its

surveillance system. In responding to the State’s motion, defendant’s counsel argued defendant

had standing because he had been arrested and the evidence he challenged was being used against

him. Upon inquiry by the court, counsel acknowledged that defendant had no possessory interest

in French’s 523 Lind Street residence, stating defendant “stay[ed] there sometimes,” but did not

-3- live there; own the property; or pay rent, utilities, or grocery bills associated with the property.

¶8 Ultimately, the trial court granted the State’s motion to strike. In so holding, the

court stated as follows:

“This is a search warrant that was for the premises and the person of Felicia French.

[Defendant’s] certainly not Felicia French, and he has no possessory interest in the

residence or the premises located at 523 Lind Street ***. The video which he wishes

to suppress was found as a result of a search warrant for those premises. Whether

or not the search warrant was validly given or granted is beside the point to this

defendant because he’s got no possessory interest in the premises. So[,] he cannot

object to the search or what was found, and he has what we call no standing to

contest the search warrant because it was not for a premises which he had any

interest in.”

¶9 On July 17 and 18, 2017, defendant’s jury trial was conducted. The State presented

evidence that at approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 12, 2016, the police were called to the

scene of a traffic crash at the intersection of “6th and Lind” Streets in Quincy, Illinois. Officer

David Distin testified he responded to the scene and observed two damaged vehicles. One of the

vehicles was parked “along the curb.” The second, a Chevrolet Malibu (Malibu), was “overturned”

and in the middle of the street. The State’s evidence further showed the Malibu had damage

consistent with being struck by bullets, including a single bullet hole in the front driver’s side door,

an indentation to the front driver’s side fender, and an indentation “in the front driver’s side wheel

or the rim.”

¶ 10 Chris Billingsley, a detective with the Quincy Police Department, testified he

-4- investigated the November 2016 vehicle crash. In connection with that investigation, search

warrants were executed at the 523 Lind Street residence. Approximately 80 hours of surveillance

video recordings were obtained from five different surveillance cameras that were attached to the

outside of the residence. The recordings included video from the date and time of the November

2016 crash. Billingsley testified those specific videos depicted an individual in the yard of 523

Lind Street with a gun in his hand. The same individual began shooting toward a vehicle as it drove

past on Lind Street, and a muzzle flash could be seen coming from the gun. The video also showed

the vehicle as it crashed into a parked car and overturned. Billingsley described the individual with

the gun as an African American male with a shaved head, goatee, and a “[s]tockier build.” The

individual also appeared to be wearing a dark-colored jacket with “a white inlay or *** pinstripe”

and some type of hands-free, Bluetooth device around his neck.

¶ 11 Billingsley further testified that he assisted the State’s Attorney’s office with

combining the 80 hours of videos into shorter clips. He denied that anything was “altered or

changed” in the videos when that occurred or that anything was “cut out *** where that suspect

would have done something.” Billingsley identified a compact disc (CD), which he testified

contained the combined clips. The CD was admitted into evidence and shown to the jury over

defendant’s objection.

¶ 12 The State’s evidence also showed that Billingsley did not initially know the identity

of the shooter depicted in the surveillance videos. However, he showed the video and still

photographs from the video to two other law enforcement officers, both of whom identified

defendant as the shooter. Specifically, Mark Folkenroth, a patrol sergeant with the Quincy Police

Department, testified he was familiar with defendant prior to November 2016, having “seen him

-5- well over [100] times.” In January 2017, Billingsley showed him the video of the shooting and

Folkenroth recognized defendant as the shooter. Adam Gibson, a detective with the Quincy Police

Department, testified he had contact with defendant “[n]umerous times” over his nearly 20-year

career in law enforcement. Gibson stated he viewed still photographs and video from the

surveillance footage. He also recognized defendant as the shooter.

¶ 13 After speaking with the other officers about the case, Billingsley began

investigating defendant and obtained a photograph from a Facebook page under defendant’s name,

which had been posted on Facebook approximately 13 days after the shooting. Over defendant’s

objection, the Facebook photograph was shown to the jury. Over defendant’s objection, the jury

was also shown a photograph of defendant taken at the time of his arrest and still frames of the

shooter taken from the surveillance footage. Billingsley testified the individual in the Facebook

photograph had no hair; had a goatee; was wearing a darker-colored jacket with white “trim or

ribbing”; and had a hands-free, Bluetooth device around his neck. When defendant was arrested,

he had a similar hands-free, Bluetooth device in his possession.

¶ 14 Finally, over defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the State to present three

exhibits containing certified copies of defendant’s convictions for criminal offenses in three Will

County cases. The first, People’s exhibit No. 33, showed a conviction in case No. 92-CF-3211 for

unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The second, People’s exhibit

No. 34, showed a conviction in case No. 94-CF-2443 for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

Finally, the third, People’s exhibit No. 35, showed a conviction in case No. 13-CF-1670 for

unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

¶ 15 Defendant elected not to testify on his own behalf but presented the testimony of

-6- two witnesses. Terance McKenzie testified he was driving the Malibu at the time of the shooting

incident. While driving, he noticed “some people out in the street,” including French. McKenzie

stated he saw French run across the street and go into what appeared to be an alley. Next, he saw

“flashes of gunfire.” McKenzie also testified that he observed French with a gun in her hand. He

denied seeing anyone else with a gun. He also denied knowing defendant.

¶ 16 On cross-examination, McKenzie acknowledged that he did not see French point a

gun and shoot at his vehicle. He clarified that he did not know who shot at him, but he assumed it

was French because he saw her with a gun. He further stated that he saw the “flashes” of gunfire

coming from the area of 523 Lind Street, where he testified French “was staying.” McKenzie

identified a photograph of French that was also shown to the jury. Additionally, after being shown

portions of the surveillance video, McKenzie agreed that “based on the video,” it was not French

who shot the gun at his vehicle.

¶ 17 Ebony Lee testified that on November 12, 2016, she lived in the neighborhood

where the November 2016 incident occurred. Around 3 or 3:15 a.m., she was watching television

and heard a gunshot. Lee testified she “wait[ed] for a minute” and then looked out of her bedroom

window, which faced French’s residence. She then saw “a female shooting” and observed “sparks

from a gun in front of [French’s] house.” Lee identified the “female” she saw as French and

asserted that French was shooting at a car as it drove past. She stated she went outside and saw a

“car flipped over.” Lee also denied knowing defendant.

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Lee agreed that it was dark outside at the time of the

shooting and that she was “looking [from] across the street.” She identified a photograph of French

and agreed that French was a slender African American woman. The State also showed Lee

-7- portions of the surveillance video. Lee agreed the video depicted a person, who was not French,

holding and shooting a gun at a car.

¶ 19 The record reflects the jury found defendant guilty of both charged offenses. On

July 31, 2017, defendant, with the aid of counsel, filed a motion for a new trial. He argued (1) the

credibility and weight of the State’s witnesses did not support the jury’s guilty verdicts; (2) “the

jury may have relied too heavily on the testimony of” police officers Billingsley, Folkenroth, and

Gibson; (3) he should have been permitted to “bring up the fact that *** French” had also been

charged in connection with the November 2016 incident but that charges against her were later

dismissed; (4) the trial court erred in sustaining his objections to “pictures and tapes” submitted

by the State; and (5) the State improperly referred to defendant “changing his appearance” during

its closing argument. The same date, defendant, with the aid of counsel, filed a motion to set aside

one of his guilty verdicts, arguing it was “repetitive and redundant” for him to be sentenced to two

accompanying felony charges.

¶ 20 In August 2017, defendant filed a series of pro se posttrial motions. First, he filed

a pro se motion for a new trial and dismissal, arguing (1) the State did not prove him guilty of

being an armed habitual criminal because one of the predicate felonies it relied upon for that

offense—unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in Will County case

No. 92-CF-3211—was based on a dismissed charge, (2) he was prejudiced by the jury being

informed of “all [of his] past [criminal] charges,” (3) the State’s presentation of certain video

recordings and pictures denied him a fair trial, and (4) his due process rights were violated by the

State’s presentation of the surveillance video and the trial court’s failure to hear his motion to

suppress that video. To his motion, defendant attached a certified copy of docket sheets from Will

-8- County case No. 92-CF-3211, indicating that although he was initially charged with unlawful

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, he pleaded guilty in that case to an

amended charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony.

¶ 21 Defendant’s second pro se filing was a “Motion to Amend Motion for a New Trial

and Motion to Dismiss,” wherein he reiterated his claim that the State’s evidence was insufficient

with respect to the armed-habitual-criminal charge. Finally, defendant also filed a pro se “Motion

to Substitute Counsel.” He alleged his trial counsel, Randall Prizy, did not “put up a defense for

[him] at trial” and did not listen to his assertion that he “could have helped” during the trial.

Defendant asserted he no longer trusted Prizy and wanted to continue in the proceedings pro se.

¶ 22 On August 30, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing in the matter and addressed

allegations in defendant’s pro se filings that it found could liberally be construed as raising an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Stating that the allegations necessitated “a preliminary

inquiry under Krankel” (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)), the court

questioned defendant regarding his allegations. Defendant asserted Prizy had not provided

effective representation, complaining Prizy (1) did not “put *** to use” things he and defendant

had discussed prior to trial, (2) was not “trial ready” because “he was going through” French’s

discovery at the beginning of the trial rather than defendant’s, (3) objected to Billingsley’s trial

testimony on the basis that it differed from his preliminary hearing testimony but did not have

copies of the preliminary hearing transcripts with him, (4) referenced ethical concerns regarding

the questioning of witnesses but did not remove himself from defendant’s case, and (5) failed to

challenge the manner in which the surveillance video clips were “put *** together” for trial.

Following further questioning of both defendant and Prizy, the court determined defendant’s

-9- claims lacked merit and related to matters of trial strategy.

¶ 23 During a further hearing on September 6, 2017, defendant reiterated that he no

longer wanted Prizy to represent him and that he wished to proceed in the matter pro se. The trial

court determined defendant’s decision to represent himself was knowingly and voluntarily made

and defendant signed a written waiver of counsel. Defendant also adopted the posttrial motions

filed with Prizy’s aid, asking the court to consider them in addition to his own pro se motions.

¶ 24 On September 14, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s posttrial

motions and denied each of them. With respect to defendant’s contention that he did not have a

prior felony conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in

Will County case No. 92-Cf-3211, the court determined as follows:

“And the Court did receive the certified copy of conviction, which indicated

that [defendant was], in fact, convicted of that charge ***.

Even still, the State did—even assuming that that was not the charge to [sic]

which you were convicted in that case, which I’m relying on the record that I have

before me here, I believe that you were, and it was received for the purpose of the

State proving up that—or one of the elements of the offense of armed habitual

criminal, but even still, the State introduced certified record[s] of conviction for the

offenses of unlawful use of [a] weapon by a felon [in two other cases], which those

in and of themselves *** would have been sufficient for the State to prove up the

elements of the offense and to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

with respect to the charge of armed habitual criminal.”

¶ 25 The matter then proceeded with sentencing and the trial court sentenced defendant

- 10 - to consecutive prison terms of 22 years for being an armed habitual criminal and 15 years for

aggravated discharge of a firearm. On September 20, 2017, defendant filed a motion to reconsider,

arguing his sentences were excessive, which the court also denied.

¶ 26 This appeal followed. We note the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD)

was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. However, on July 15, 2019, OSAD filed a motion

to withdraw as appellate counsel on the basis that defendant wanted to proceed pro se. The same

month, this court allowed OSAD’s motion.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 A. Motion to Suppress

¶ 29 On appeal, defendant first challenges the trial court’s ruling in connection with his

motion to suppress the surveillance video, i.e., the court’s grant of the State’s motion to strike

defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that he lacked standing. Defendant argues the court

erred by denying him a hearing on the motion, thereby depriving him of the right to a fair and

impartial trial. He maintains that, had his motion been heard, he could have shown that the

surveillance video was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment, rendering it

inadmissible at his trial.

¶ 30 “The fourth[-]amendment protection against unreasonable government search and

seizure extends only to individuals who have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place

searched or property seized.” People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1364

(1986). In other words, “[f]ourth-amendment rights are personal, and the government violates a

defendant’s fourth-amendment rights by invading the defendant’s own legitimate expectation of

privacy.” People v. Ferris, 2014 IL App (4th) 130657, ¶ 43, 9 N.E.3d 1126 (citing United States

- 11 - v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980)). “If all the government does is invade someone else’s

legitimate expectation of privacy, the defendant lacks standing to invoke the exclusionary rule of

fourth-amendment jurisprudence.” Id.

¶ 31 Factors relevant to determining whether a defendant possesses a reasonable

expectation of privacy include:

“(1) ownership of the property searched; (2) whether the defendant was legitimately

present in the area searched; (3) whether defendant has a possessory interest in the

area or property seized; (4) prior use of the area searched or property seized; (5) the

ability to control or exclude others from the use of the property; and (6) whether

the defendant himself had a subjective expectation of privacy in the property.”

People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 520-21, 813 N.E.2d 93, 105 (2004).

“[W]hether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or in the items

seized must be answered in light of the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.” People

v. Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d 92, 136, 687 N.E.2d 945, 966 (1997).

¶ 32 Additionally, “[i]t is the defendant’s burden to establish that he had a legitimate

expectation of privacy that was violated by the challenged search.” People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill.

2d 69, 78, 820 N.E.2d 440, 446 (2004). “[W]hether a defendant has established a legitimate

expectation of privacy sufficient to permit him to contest a search or seizure is a question of law

and our review is de novo.” Id. at 77.

¶ 33 Here, defendant moved to suppress the surveillance videos by challenging the

search warrant for French’s 523 Lind Street residence. However, before the trial court, defendant

did not claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to either that residence

- 12 - or the surveillance videos. Instead, when arguing the issue of standing before the court, defendant

asserted only that he had standing based on his arrest and the use of the surveillance video as

evidence against him. He also acknowledged that he did not live at the 523 Lind Street residence,

he did not own the property, and he did not pay any bills associated with the residence. See People

v. Stachelek, 145 Ill. App. 3d 391, 401, 495 N.E.2d 984, 990 (1986) (finding the defendant failed

to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in another’s apartment where he “failed to

establish *** a right to exclude others from the apartment, a right to use the apartment in [the]

absence [of the person who resided there], the possession of a key, the presence of his personal

belongings, or anything which might create a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment”).

¶ 34 On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary

hearing and allowed him the opportunity to establish the illegality of the search and seizure.

However, as noted by the court, such issues are “beside the point” when the defendant cannot show

an invasion of his own reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that was searched or the

property that was seized. Again, defendant did not present any argument to the court that would

advance a claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in either the 523 Lind Street

residence or its surveillance system. Following the State’s motion to strike, he also did not ask for

the opportunity to present such evidence. Given these circumstances, we find no error by the court

in granting the State’s motion and striking defendant’s motion to suppress the surveillance videos.

¶ 35 B. Evidence of Prior Convictions

¶ 36 On appeal, defendant next argues his due process rights were violated by the State’s

presentation of evidence, i.e., People’s exhibit No. 33, showing he had a prior conviction in case

No. 92-CF-3211 for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class

- 13 - 1 felony. Defendant notes the fact of that prior conviction was used to support a finding that he

was an armed habitual criminal. However, he maintains he was never convicted of unlawful

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and, instead, the charge “was nollied

[sic] down to” possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony offense. As a result, he asserts

he was not proven guilty of being an armed habitual criminal beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 37 “A person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he ***

possesses *** any firearm after having been convicted a total of [two] or more times of any

combination of” certain enumerated offenses, including “unlawful use of a weapon by a felon”

and “any violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act that is

punishable as a Class 3 felony or higher.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016).

¶ 38 “In Illinois, the traditional method of proving a prior conviction is by the certified

record of the prior conviction or an authenticated copy of the conviction, and proof of identity

between the name on the record and the defendant on trial.” People v. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d 374,

380, 724 N.E.2d 572, 577 (2000) (citing People v. Davis, 65 Ill.2d 157, 164, 357 N.E.2d 792, 795

(1976)). “If the name on the record is identical to the name of the defendant, a rebuttable

presumption of identity arises.” Id.

¶ 39 Here, the State charged defendant by amended information with being an armed

habitual criminal, alleging he possessed a firearm after having been previously convicted of three

qualifying felony offenses—unlawful use of a weapon by a felon in Will County case Nos. 13-CF-

1670 and 94-CF-2443, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a

Class 1 felony, in Will County case No. 92-CF-3211. At trial, the State presented evidence that

defendant possessed a firearm. It also presented evidence of defendant’s prior convictions through

- 14 - certified copies of conviction in the three Will County cases.

¶ 40 On appeal, defendant does not argue that he was not the named defendant in any of

the Will County cases. Rather, he asserts that, in case No. 92-CF-3211, he was not convicted of

unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant accurately points

out that he objected to the admission of People’s exhibit No. 33, containing the certified copy of

conviction in that case. Following his trial, defendant also raised the issue in his pro se posttrial

motion and submitted certified copies of docket sheets in Will County case No 92-CF-3211 that

conflicted with the information presented by the State. However, even assuming defendant is

correct, the erroneous admission of evidence showing he had a prior conviction for unlawful

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver was, at most, harmless error.

¶ 41 “An evidentiary issue is harmless when no reasonable probability exists that the

jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error.” People v. Pelo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 839,

865, 942 N.E.2d 463, 486 (2010). In connection with the armed-habitual-criminal offense, the

State was required to submit evidence that defendant had previously been convicted of two or more

qualifying felonies. As the trial court found, in this case, the State actually presented evidence that

defendant had three qualifying prior felony convictions. Thus, there is no reasonable probability

that, absent the admission of People’s exhibit No. 33, containing the certified copy of conviction

in case No. 92-CF-3211, defendant would have been acquitted of being an armed habitual criminal.

Accordingly, defendant’s claim on appeal is without merit.

¶ 42 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 43 Defendant next argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of either charged offense. He asserts the State’s evidence was insufficient because it did not

- 15 - include any physical evidence, such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence or weapons.

Defendant also argues he presented “credible eyewitness testimony” that another individual was

the perpetrator.

¶ 44 “The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of

an offense.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35, 91 N.E.3d 876. “When a defendant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence, a court of review must determine whether, [after] viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. It is the trier-of-fact’s responsibility “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence,

and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.” Id. “It is not the role of the reviewing court to retry

the defendant.” Id.

¶ 45 Further, “[a] conviction will not be reversed simply because the evidence is

contradictory or because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible.” Id. ¶ 36. Rather,

reversal is only warranted where “the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory

that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. ¶ 35.

¶ 46 As discussed, a person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal by

possessing a firearm and having a criminal history that includes two or more convictions for certain

qualifying offenses, including unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and “any violation of the

Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act that is punishable as a Class 3

felony or higher.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016). Additionally, a person commits aggravated

discharge of a firearm when he knowingly or intentionally “[d]ischarges a firearm in the direction

of *** a vehicle he *** knows or reasonably should know to be occupied by a person.” Id. § 24-

- 16 - 1.2(a)(2).

¶ 47 Here, the State’s evidence was sufficient to establish each element of the charged

offenses. At trial, the State presented three certified copies of conviction, one more than necessary,

to establish defendant’s prior qualifying felony convictions. It also presented surveillance footage

of the shooting incident and the vehicle crash. The video depicted a male subject with a gun who

shot several times toward a moving vehicle, which then overturned. Testimony also showed that

two police officers, both of whom had previous familiarity with defendant, identified him as the

shooter after observing either the surveillance video or still photographs from that video. Finally,

the jury had the opportunity to observe defendant’s appearance along with the surveillance video

and other photographic evidence submitted by the State.

¶ 48 Although defendant presented the testimony of two witnesses who asserted they

observed French either in possession of a gun or shooting a gun, both witnesses agreed that the

State’s surveillance footage did not depict French. We find the testimony from defendant’s

witnesses was not necessarily in conflict with the State’s evidence; however, even to the extent

that it was, it was within the province of the jury to resolve those conflicts. Ultimately, more than

sufficient evidence was presented from which any rational trier of fact could have found defendant

guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s contentions otherwise are

without merit.

¶ 49 D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 50 On appeal, defendant further raises allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. First,

he argues that aggravated discharge of a firearm requires “a victim or victims for prosecution to

commence.” He also contends the prosecutor made contradictory statements by informing the trial

- 17 - court that there was no victim in the case but then stating during his opening statement and closing

argument “that victims were involved.”

¶ 51 As discussed, to prove defendant guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm, the

State had to show defendant knowingly or intentionally discharged a firearm in the direction of a

vehicle he knew or reasonably should have known was occupied. Id. § 24-1.2(a)(2). The State was

not required to name or produce a victim of that offense to successfully prosecute defendant, nor

did it do so when setting forth the allegations against defendant in the charging instrument.

¶ 52 The record reflects that prior to trial, the prosecutor did object to comments Prizy

made regarding McKenzie as the “victim in th[e] case.” The prosecutor asserted McKenzie was

not the victim and that it did not need him “to proceed with th[e] case.” He also pointed out that

there was “no victim listed” for either charged offense. The prosecutor’s comments were neither

improper nor inaccurate. Additionally, although defendant argues the prosecutor made conflicting

comments to the jury during his opening and closing argument, defendant does not cite to any

portion of the appellate record to support his claim and our own review of the record reveals no

such contradictory statements. Accordingly, we find no prosecutorial misconduct on this asserted

basis.

¶ 53 Second, defendant argues the prosecutor misstated facts regarding the possibility

that French also possessed a gun. He points to arguments the State made outside the presence of

the jury when seeking to exclude testimony from defendant’s witnesses at trial. Specifically, the

record reflects the State argued that although it was possible French also had a gun at the time of

the shooting, such a possibility was not relevant evidence in defendant’s case. Defendant asserts it

was improper for the prosecutor to make those statements but then argue to the jury that “no one

- 18 - else” besides defendant “could have had or shot a gun.”

¶ 54 Here, defendant mischaracterizes the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury. Both

before the trial court and when presenting its arguments to the jury, the prosecutor consistently

asserted that French’s possible possession of a gun at the time of the alleged offense was irrelevant

to the ultimate issue of whether defendant was shown on the surveillance video discharging a

firearm at a moving vehicle. The prosecutor’s argument was not improper, and the record does not

reflect any misstatement of the facts presented in the case.

¶ 55 Third, defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct based on the State’s action in

combining the surveillance footage from different cameras. However, defendant offers no factual

basis or legal authority upon which to find the State’s action constituted misconduct. Moreover,

the record reflects no impermissible action. At trial, Billingsley testified he worked with the State

to combine 80 hours of surveillance video footage into shorter clips. He denied that “anything was

altered or change[d]” when that occurred. Billingsley also denied that any portion of the footage

was “cut out *** where the defendant would have done something.” Under these facts, we find no

error.

¶ 56 E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 57 On appeal, defendant also argues that Prizy provided him with ineffective

assistance of counsel. He contends Prizy was unprepared for trial because he did not bring

preliminary hearing transcripts to the trial to assist in his cross-examination of Billingsley, he did

not adequately cross examine any of the police officers who testified, and he failed to give

“adequate opening and closing remarks.”

¶ 58 A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated under the two-

- 19 - prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People

v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11, 989 N.E.2d 192. “Under this test, a defendant must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a

reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A defendant’s failure to establish either prong of the

Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.

¶ 59 Here, defendant has failed to establish that Prizy was ineffective. First, defendant

claims that, had Prizy brought the preliminary hearing transcripts to defendant’s trial, he would

have been able to establish that Billingsley was untruthful and that he previously testified he “was

unable to identify the person” in the surveillance video as defendant. However, the record reflects

that, at trial, Billingsley testified on direct examination that he did not know the identity of the

shooter after watching the surveillance video and he did not begin investigating defendant until

after speaking with other police officers who viewed the surveillance footage. Given that

Billingsley testified consistently at trial with what defendant claims his preliminary hearing

testimony was, defendant cannot establish any prejudice from Prizy’s failure to confront

Billingsley with the preliminary hearing transcripts.

¶ 60 Second, defendant argues both that Prizy was ineffective in his cross-examination

of the State’s witnesses and that his opening statement and closing argument were inadequate.

However, defendant has presented only bare assertions of error without any reasoned argument,

factual support from the record, or citation to relevant legal authority supporting his claims. Under

such circumstances, his claims have been forfeited and we decline to further consider them. See

Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (providing that an appellant’s brief must contain “the

- 20 - contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages

of the record relied on” and that “[p]oints not argued are forfeited”); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d

472, 499-500, 662 N.E.2d 1199, 1213 (1996) (finding the defendant’s claims did not warrant

further consideration where he failed “to support [his] allegations with any argument or

authority”).

¶ 61 F. The State’s Opening Statement and Closing Argument

¶ 62 Finally, on appeal, defendant challenges comments the prosecutor made during his

opening statement and closing argument. He argues the prosecutor (1) made remarks about his

changing appearance that were inflammatory and an improper expression of the prosecutor’s

personal opinions, (2) improperly stated his opinion that defendant “was the shooter,”

(3) referenced circumstantial evidence and spoke “to the strength of the case” and defendant’s

guilt, and (4) improperly referenced his prior convictions.

¶ 63 Initially, we note that defendant has failed to preserve these issues for appellate

review. See People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 47, 23 N.E.3d 325 (providing issues are forfeited

on appeal where the defendant did not object during the underlying proceedings or include the

issue in a posttrial motion). The record fails to reflect that defendant raised any objections to the

challenged comments during either the prosecution’s opening statement or its closing argument.

Further, defendant included only his challenge to the prosecutor’s comments on his appearance in

a posttrial motion. Accordingly, the issues have been forfeited.

¶ 64 Notwithstanding that forfeiture, however, we find no merit to defendant’s claims

of error. “The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what each party expects

the evidence to prove.” People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127, 705 N.E.2d 850, 874 (1998). “An

- 21 - opening statement may include a discussion of the expected evidence and reasonable inferences

from the evidence.” Id. “Reversible error occurs only where the prosecutor’s opening comments

are attributable to deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor and result in substantial prejudice to the

defendant.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

¶ 65 Additionally, prosecutors are “accorded wide latitude in the content of their closing

arguments.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 142, 917 N.E.2d 940, 982 (2009). “They may

comment on the evidence and on any fair and reasonable inference the evidence may yield.” Id.

On review, we “consider the closing argument as a whole, rather than focusing on selected phrases

or remarks, and will find reversible error only if the defendant demonstrates that the improper

remarks were so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the verdict resulted from the error.”

Id.

¶ 66 In this case, a review of the record reflects both the prosecution’s opening statement

and closing argument fell within the bounds of appropriate commentary and argument. During his

opening statement, the prosecutor properly commented on what the State’s evidence was expected

to show and, during his closing, commented on the evidence that had been presented at trial,

including the fair and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.

¶ 67 As indicated, defendant claims it was error for the prosecutor to comment on

changes in his appearance. We note that during his opening statement, the prosecutor described

defendant’s appearance in photographs that were submitted into evidence and commented only

that the photographs showed “[n]ot how he looks now but [with] a shaved head [and] with a

goatee.” During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued defendant had grown his hair out and

grew his beard long to confuse the jury.

- 22 - ¶ 68 Contrary to defendant’s assertions, we do not find these remarks were improper.

Rather, the prosecutor commented on what was legitimately shown by the evidence presented and

what the jury could observe at trial—that defendant’s appearance changed from the time of the

November 2016 incident and the date of his arrest—and a reasonable inference to be drawn from

that evidence—that defendant was attempting to prevent his identification. See People v. Clark,

335 Ill. App. 3d 758, 767, 781 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (2002) (holding the State’s comment that

defendant had changed is appearance “was legitimate and based on the evidence,” and “relevant,

in that it arguably indicated a consciousness of guilt on defendant’s part”). Additionally, we note

the challenged comments were only a small part of the State’s argument to the jury in a case where

substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt was presented. Thus, assuming the remarks were

improper, they were not substantially prejudicial. See People v. Byron, 164 Ill.2d 279, 296-97, 647

N.E.2d 946, 955 (1995) (finding comments by the prosecutor during closing argument that the

defendant changed his appearance for trial did not substantially prejudice the defendant and

reversal was unwarranted). Accordingly, forfeiture aside, we would find no reversible error from

the prosecutor’s comments during either his opening statement or his closing argument.

¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 70 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 71 Affirmed.

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