2025 IL App (1st) 232488-U
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
FIRST DIVISION June 16, 2025 No. 1-23-2488 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff/Respondent-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 02-CR-9220 ) ROBERTO MATA, ) The Honorable ) Laura Ayala-Gonzalez, Defendant/Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Petitioner’s appointed counsel did not fail to act with due diligence by continuing to assert his claim, which was that his warrantless arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional, in the context of a petition for relief from judgment instead of reframing it for presentation through a successive postconviction petition.
¶2 Petitioner Roberto Mata appeals from the denial of his petition for relief from judgment under
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)) (hereinafter
section 2-1401). By that petition, petitioner sought to have his convictions for first degree murder
and aggravated battery with a firearm vacated on the grounds that they were based in part upon his
statement to police made after his warrantless arrest pursuant to an “investigative alert.” Petitioner No. 1-23-2488
contends on appeal that the attorney who was appointed to represent him in presenting the 2-1401
petition failed to exercise due diligence by not seeking to reformulate his claims for presentation
through a second successive petition for postconviction relief. We reject petitioner’s argument and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Petitioner is serving a natural life sentence imposed in 2005 on convictions for two counts of
first degree murder and a concurrent 10-year sentence for aggravated battery with a firearm. These
convictions arose from a gang-related shooting incident that occurred in the early morning hours
of March 16, 2002, which resulted in the deaths of Sandar Mosqueda and Adrian Padilla and in
injury to Edwin Delgado.
¶5 At approximately 7 p.m. on March 16, 2002, officers from the Chicago Police Department
(CPD) went to petitioner’s residence, knocked on the door, and petitioner answered it. After
petitioner identified himself, the officers placed him under arrest. This was done without an arrest
warrant. 1 At a later suppression hearing, petitioner’s counsel acknowledged that probable cause to
arrest him existed at the time. The trial court also later made a specific finding “that [petitioner’s]
arrest was lawful, that there was probable cause for his arrest and consequently taking him into
custody was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”
¶6 The day after his arrest, petitioner gave a videotaped statement. In that statement, petitioner
explained that he had attended a party on the night at issue with his girlfriend Esmeralda Herrera
and other friends. After leaving the party, he heard his friend Reynaldo Mares shouting his name.
Turning around, he saw two men holding Mares by his arms while two other men were also
1 We find no affirmative indication in the record that CPD issued an investigative alert in this case. However, we accept that this occurred for purposes of deciding this appeal.
-2- No. 1-23-2488
surrounding him. In response, petitioner fired a gunshot in the direction of the men. This caused
the men to back away, but petitioner saw one man reach into his pocket. Fearing that the man was
reaching for a gun, petitioner reacted by firing five more gunshots in the direction of the men. The
men’s backs were to petitioner, and they were walking away at the time he fired the shots.
Petitioner and his friends then ran to their car and drove away.
¶7 Prior to trial, petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to suppress all statements by petitioner and
to suppress other evidence seized from his home at the time of arrest. Petitioner’s argument was
that his statement was not made voluntarily, because the police had subjected him to various forms
of physical and mental abuse over a period of two days and had not given him Miranda warnings.
The trial court severed the two aspects of this motion for hearing. It ultimately granted that part of
the motion to suppress dealing with evidence seized from petitioner’s home. However, petitioner’s
counsel apparently never pursued a further hearing or ruling from the trial court on the aspect of
petitioner’s motion involving suppression of his statements to police.
¶8 At petitioner’s trial, the State’s evidence consisted largely of petitioner’s videotaped
statement and the testimony of Delgado. Delgado testified that he became engaged in a gang-
related altercation with Mares, during which Mares called to petitioner after Delgado had pinned
Mares to the ground. In response, petitioner pointed a gun at Delgado, and Delgado let go of Mares.
Delgado then turned and backed away, but petitioner fired six shots in his direction, one of which
hit Delgado in the buttocks. Padilla was also shot at that time. As Delgado and Padilla were
attempting to flee, petitioner shot in their direction again. One of the shots hit Padilla, who fell to
the ground. Petitioner also shot in a different direction, and Delgado saw Mosqueda stagger and
fall onto the sidewalk. Petitioner then ran away.
¶9 The medical examiner’s testimony confirmed that Padilla had suffered from gunshot wounds
-3- No. 1-23-2488
to his middle back and chest, the paths of which were consistent with his running away from the
shooter. Mosqueda had suffered a gunshot wound to his right shoulder.
¶ 10 Petitioner advanced a defense of second degree murder, contending that he believed he was
justified in the need to use deadly force for the protection of Mares. Petitioner testified in his
defense that he saw the men beating Mares and fired a warning shot into the air. As he helped
Mares up, he saw one of the men reach toward his waist. Although petitioner never saw a gun, he
feared for his life and reacted by firing additional shots. He did not recall how many shots or that
anyone was hit. He also testified that as he was running to his car, he saw a man running down the
street shooting a gun. Mares and Herrera similarly testified to seeing an unknown man with a gun
running down the street, and Mares testified that he saw that man shooting the gun.
¶ 11 The jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder as to Padilla and Mosqueda and of
aggravated battery with a firearm as to the shooting of Delgado. The trial court sentenced him to
two terms of natural life imprisonment for the murders and 10 years for aggravated battery with a
firearm, to be served consecutively.
¶ 12 Petitioner filed a direct appeal, in which he argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to impeach Delgado with prior inconsistent statements and that the imposition of consecutive
sentences was improper. This court affirmed his conviction, but it corrected the mittimus to reflect
that his sentences run concurrently. People v. Mata, No. 1-05-0527 (2007) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 13 In 2008, petitioner filed his initial postconviction petition. He argued, inter alia, that his trial
counsel had been ineffective for failing to pursue a ruling on that aspect of his motion to suppress
that dealt with the involuntariness of his videotaped statement. He also argued that his appellate
counsel had been ineffective for failing to make an argument on direct appeal as to trial counsel’s
-4- No. 1-23-2488
ineffectiveness in this regard. This court affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the
petition as frivolous and patently without merit. People v. Mata, 1-09-0657, 2011 WL 9684766,
*4-5 (2011) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 14 Initially, this court found that petitioner’s claim involving his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
for not pursuing the motion to suppress his statement had been forfeited, because it was a claim
that could have been raised on direct appeal. Id. at *4. However, this court also addressed the
merits of petitioner’s argument and held that the trial record showed that petitioner had given his
statement freely and voluntarily, that he had been given Miranda warnings, and that he
acknowledged that police had treated him well and fairly while in custody. Id. Accordingly, this
court presumed that trial counsel’s abandonment of that part of the motion to suppress had been a
matter of sound trial strategy and that appellate counsel likewise could not be faulted for failing to
argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Id. at *5. The supreme court thereafter denied
a petition for leave to appeal.
¶ 15 In 2012, petitioner filed a successive postconviction petition. He alleged that his trial counsel
had been ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a witness named William Rivera, who
had given testimony before the grand jury supportive of petitioner’s theory that he had fired
gunshots only in defense of Mares. This court affirmed the trial court’s determination that
petitioner had failed to demonstrate the cause and prejudice required for the filing of a successive
postconviction petition, as petitioner had provided no explanation as to why these claims, which
stemmed from Rivera’s grand jury testimony, could not have been raised in his initial
postconviction petition. People v. Mata, 2016 IL App (1st) 122408-U, ¶ 18.
¶ 16 Also in 2012, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. His grounds
for relief in that petition again focused on arguments concerning the suppression of his videotaped
-5- No. 1-23-2488
statement, his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call Rivera as a trial witness, and whether
he should have been convicted only of second degree murder. See Mata v. Brannon, No. 12-cv-
1376, 2020 WL 5630433, *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020). The district court ultimately found that all
of petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted, with the exception of a claim that his direct
appellate counsel had been ineffective for not arguing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in abandoning
the motion to suppress the videotaped statement. Id. at *5-8. However, the district court found that
petitioner was not entitled to federal habeas relief on that claim because this court’s determination
as to the merits of that issue was not unreasonable. Id. at *8-11. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but
it did so in part on the basis that petitioner’s claim as to his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness had
also been procedurally defaulted because it had not been included in his petition for leave to appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court. Mata v. Baker, 74 F.4th 480, 488-89 (7th Cir. 2023).
¶ 17 In 2019, petitioner initiated the present action by filing pro se a petition for relief from
judgment under section 2-1401. He later amended that petition pro se prior to the appointment of
counsel. While the allegations of these pro se petitions are somewhat unfocused, the crux of
petitioner’s argument was that his convictions were void and should be vacated on the basis that
he had been arrested pursuant to an “investigative alert” issued by CPD instead of an arrest warrant
based upon a judge’s finding of probable cause. 2 He relied upon this court’s then-recent decision
in People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434. In
Bass, this court held for the first time that “arrests based solely on investigative alerts, even those
supported by probable cause, are unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution.” Id. ¶ 43.
2 An “investigative alert” is the name of a method used within the CPD to communicate that an individual is wanted for a specific crime if an officer happens to come into contact with that individual. See Sanders v. Cruz, No. 08 C 3318, 2010 WL 3004636, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2010). Generally, arrests are made when an investigative alert provides that probable cause exists to arrest the person, even though no arrest warrant has been issued by a neutral magistrate. See id. The method was formerly referred to as a “stop order.”
-6- No. 1-23-2488
Petitioner also raised the exclusionary rule and asserted that prosecutors had engaged in
misconduct for charging him following an illegal arrest. He also argued ineffective assistance of
counsel on the part of his trial, appellate, and postconviction counsel stemming from the failure to
move to quash his arrest, failure to file a motion under the fifth amendment, failure to contest
probable cause, conceding the existence of probable cause, and failure to engage in meaningful
adversarial testing of the testimony linking petitioner to the murders.
¶ 18 The trial court thereafter appointed the public defender of Cook County to represent petitioner
in his petition under section 2-1401.
¶ 19 On July 12, 2021, appointed counsel for petitioner filed a supplemental petition for relief
under section 2-1401. This supplemental petition incorporated the entirety of petitioner’s original
and amended pro se petitions, and it set forth the procedural history of petitioner’s case. It also
acknowledged that on April 15, 2021, the supreme court had vacated the portion of this court’s
opinion in Bass upon which petitioner’s principal claim was based. See People v. Bass, 2021 IL
125434, ¶ 31. However, counsel pointed out that the supreme court had not reached a decision as
to the constitutionality of arrests made pursuant to investigative alerts. Counsel thus went on to
argue that the Illinois constitution’s requirement that “[n]o warrant shall issue without probable
cause, supported by affidavit” supported petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest pursuant to
an investigative alert had been unconstitutional. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Counsel explained
that on the night of March 16, 2002, CPD detectives had gone to petitioner’s residence and arrested
him without a warrant issued by a judge, instead seizing him based on an investigative alert issued
by CPD. Counsel argued that the trial court’s basis for suppressing evidence seized from
petitioner’s home—that police had plenty of time to obtain a warrant because judges were assigned
to the same building where the detectives worked—applied equally to the suppression of
-7- No. 1-23-2488
petitioner’s statement. Counsel argued that petitioner’s post-arrest statement was the product of an
unconstitutional arrest and should have been suppressed for that reason.
¶ 20 On July 28, 2022, counsel for petitioner filed an amended supplemental petition under section
2-1401. Counsel attached this court’s opinion in People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691, which
had been issued on July 18, 2022, and he argued that it provided support for petitioner’s argument
that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional. The Smith majority’s holding
was that a defendant’s arrest pursuant to an investigative alert violated the Illinois constitution,
despite the fact that probable cause existed for arrest, where the police did not obtain a warrant
despite having had six months to do so. Id. ¶¶ 66, 98-99.
¶ 21 On November 28, 2022, the State filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s action for relief from
judgment. It argued that petitioner’s claims were not cognizable as grounds for relief from
judgment under section 2-1401. It also argued that petitioner’s claims were untimely under that
statute and failed to establish a void judgment such that the untimeliness could be excused.
¶ 22 No additional briefing appears to have occurred. The trial court conducted oral argument on
August 21, 2023. At that hearing, petitioner’s counsel argued that Smith provided support for the
argument that petitioner’s arrest had been unconstitutional and that the evidence subsequently
obtained should have been suppressed. Counsel further urged the court to give weight to the
deterrent effect that granting the petition would have on CPD’s practice of noncompliance with
the constitutional requirement of obtaining a warrant from a judge.
¶ 23 On December 13, 2023, the trial court entered a written order denying relief to petitioner
under section 2-1401. The trial court first reasoned that the petition was untimely and that the
petitioner was not challenging the voidness of his conviction in a way that would overcome the
two-year limitation period for seeking relief.
-8- No. 1-23-2488
¶ 24 However, the trial court then went on to address the merits of petitioner’s arguments that his
arrest violated the Illinois constitution and that the exclusionary rule should be applied to invalidate
his conviction. In doing so, the trial court stated that a claim of this form could not be brought
under section 2-1401 but instead was a constitutional argument that should be brought in a petition
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). Again, though,
the trial court went on to analyze that even if section 2-1401 allowed for consideration of this
claim, it nevertheless failed on its merits. The trial court reasoned that petitioner’s claim of illegal
arrest went ultimately to the issue of whether his statement should be suppressed, and the appellate
court had previously held that the trial record rebutted petitioner’s contentions that his statement
was made involuntarily. See Mata, 2011 WL 9684766, *4-5. The trial court stated, “Because the
appellate court found that [petitioner’s] statements were voluntary, he cannot now re-litigate that
issue in the context of investigative alerts.” The trial court found that even if the use of investigative
alerts violated the state constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply
to the statements that petitioner made after his arrest and would not require their suppression. See
People v. Erwin, 2023 IL App (1st) 200936, ¶¶ 22-49. The trial court similarly rejected petitioner’s
claims as to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court found that this was a constitutional
issue that should have been raised in a postconviction proceeding, not a section 2-1401 petition,
but because the underlying issue had no merit, no prejudice could be shown based upon any of his
previous attorneys’ failure to raise the issue of his unconstitutional arrest. This appeal followed.
¶ 25 ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, petitioner does not argue that the trial court erred in denying him relief from
judgment under section 2-1401. Instead, his argument is that the attorney who was appointed to
represent him with respect to that section 2-1401 petition failed to exercise “due diligence” by
-9- No. 1-23-2488
continuing to pursue his claims in the context of a section 2-1401 petition instead of seeking to
reframe them for presentation through a second successive postconviction petition. Petitioner
contends that his claims (i.e., that his conviction was void because his arrest pursuant to an
investigative alert was unconstitutional and because his prior attorneys were ineffective for failing
to raise that issue) were not cognizable as bases for relief under section 2-1401, but they would
have been cognizable in a successive postconviction petition. He argues that his counsel should
have recognized this defect and corrected it, particularly after the State argued in its motion to
dismiss that postconviction proceedings provided the only procedural method for pursuing the
claims raised.
¶ 27 Section 2-1401 is a comprehensive statutory procedure, applicable in both civil and criminal
proceedings, that authorizes a trial court to vacate or modify a final order or judgment. People v.
Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 28. Ordinarily, a petition seeking relief under section 2-1401 must
be filed more than 30 days from the entry of a final judgment or order but not later than 2 years
thereafter. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a), (c) (West 2018). However, an exception to this 2-year
deadline applies when the petition challenges a “void” order or judgment. Thompson, 2015 IL
118151, ¶ 29. Only two circumstances exist in which a judgment will be considered void for
purposes of this exception to the two-year deadline: (1) when the judgment is entered by a court
that lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) when the judgment is based on a statute
that is facially unconstitutional and thus void ab initio. People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 28.
¶ 28 In this case, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s section 2-1401 petition because it was filed
14 years after his 2005 conviction and thus long after expiration of the statutory 2-year deadline.
See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018). The trial court found that petitioner’s claim failed to
qualify as a challenge to a void judgment because he was not alleging that the court lacked personal
- 10 - No. 1-23-2488
or subject matter jurisdiction, and he was not making a facial constitutional challenge to any
specific statute. The trial court also stated that petitioner’s claim was a constitutional argument
that should have been brought through a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
¶ 29 As stated above, petitioner’s argument is that his appointed counsel failed to exercise “due
diligence” by not anticipating an adverse ruling based upon these obvious infirmities and therefore
seeking to present his claims in the context of a successive postconviction petition. An action under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act would not require establishing that a statute was facially
unconstitutional and void ab initio, but rather it would allow for broader consideration of the effect
of constitutional deprivations that occurred in the proceedings that resulted in petitioner’s
conviction. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018).
¶ 30 “Due diligence” refers to the standard of performance that the supreme court has held is
required of an attorney appointed to represent an individual who has filed a petition challenging a
conviction under section 2-1401. See Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 42. A petitioner who files a
petition under section 2-1401 seeking to collaterally attack a judgment of conviction has no
constitutional or statutory right to counsel. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. The appointment of counsel in such
proceedings is a matter of the trial court’s discretion. Id. ¶ 36. When this occurs, appointed
counsel’s duty in a section 2-1401 proceeding is to provide “the same due diligence as any lawyer
would be required to perform in assisting his or her client.” Id. ¶ 42. To that end, counsel has an
obligation, to the best of his or her legal ability, to make a cogent argument in support of the
petitioner’s section 2-1401 claims and to overcome any procedural hurdles where that can legally
and ethically be done. Id. Counsel’s obligations might also include amending a petition,
responding to motions to dismiss, standing on the petition, or alternatively withdrawing as counsel.
Id. ¶ 43. However, a claim of lack of due diligence sufficient to warrant remand depends on an
- 11 - No. 1-23-2488
arguably meritorious claim. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45. Under any standard of due diligence, unless counsel’s
deficient performance could have reasonably affected the outcome of the proceedings, there is no
reason to remand the matter for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 31 We reject petitioner’s argument that this case should be remanded for further proceedings
due to the purported lack of due diligence by his appointed counsel. Our principal basis for this
holding is the fact that, after petitioner filed his opening brief on appeal, the supreme court issued
its decision in People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838. In that case, the supreme court rejected the
rationale that the appellate court had employed in Bass and Smith to reach the conclusion that
warrantless arrests pursuant to investigative alerts violate the Illinois constitution even where
probable cause exists. Id. ¶¶ 55-63. Instead, the supreme court held that the Illinois constitution is
not violated by the use of investigative alerts to make warrantless arrests for felonies based upon
probable cause. Id. ¶ 63. Given this holding by our supreme court, we have no basis to believe that
petitioner continues to have an arguably meritorious claim that his arrest was unconstitutional
because it involved an investigative alert or that his counsel’s failure to seek to reframe his claims
for presentation in a supplemental postconviction petition affected the outcome of the proceedings
at issue. 3
¶ 32 In his reply brief, petitioner contends that because Clark was not issued until a year after the
conclusion of appointed counsel’s representation of him, we should evaluate counsel’s conduct
without regard to Clark. Petitioner argues that during the time of representation, support existed
in the case law for his claim of unconstitutional arrest, and counsel thus failed to exercise due
diligence by not seeking to pursue his claims through a successive postconviction petition.
3 The fact that probable cause existed for petitioner’s arrest was conceded by his trial counsel at the suppression hearing, and the trial court also made a specific finding that probable cause existed for arrest.
- 12 - No. 1-23-2488
¶ 33 We reject this argument also. But we observe that, even prior to Clark and during the
timeframe of the representation at issue, it does not appear to us that the ultimate merit of
petitioner’s claims would have been any greater if counsel had presented them in a successive
postconviction petition. To obtain leave to do so, petitioner would have had to show both “cause”
for failing to raise his claim in earlier proceedings and “prejudice” resulting from that failure. See
725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Although the decisions in Bass and Smith could arguably have
allowed petitioner to show “cause,” we do not believe that petitioner could have shown “prejudice”
because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would allow for the admission of his
videotaped statement at trial even if it was taken following an arrest pursuant to an investigative
alert. See Erwin, 2023 IL App (1st) 200936, ¶ 6.
¶ 34 Even if, prior to Clark, support existed for the argument that petitioner’s arrest pursuant to
an investigative alert was unconstitutional, this fact would not have automatically entitled
petitioner to any relief. Id. ¶ 22. Instead, it would have resulted in an inquiry to determine whether
that unconstitutional arrest warranted the suppression of his statement under the exclusionary rule,
and that inquiry would have entailed consideration of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. Id. ¶¶ 23-24 (citing People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶¶ 22-25). As this court has
explained:
“There is no constitutional right to the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search or seizure. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22. The exclusionary rule is a judicially
created remedy whose sole purpose is to deter future constitutional violations; thus, it is to
be applied only where its deterrence benefits outweigh the substantial social costs of
excluding reliable, probative evidence of guilt. Id. ¶ 23. When the police conduct a search or
seizure based on an ‘objectively reasonable good-faith belief’ that it is lawful, the rule’s
- 13 - No. 1-23-2488
deterrence rationale has little or no force, and the exclusion of evidence is not warranted.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 24.” Erwin, 2023 IL App (1st) 200936, ¶ 28.
¶ 35 In cases that involved challenges to arrests pursuant to investigate alerts, courts have
recognized that as of the 2002 timeframe (i.e., when petitioner’s arrest occurred), the legal
landscape was such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have been acting under the
good-faith belief that warrantless arrests pursuant to investigative alerts were lawful as long as
probable cause existed. See, e.g., id. ¶ 48 (arrest occurred in 2003); People v. Mathis, 2024 IL App
(1st) 211102, ¶ 76 (arrest occurred in 2011); People v. Spencer, 2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U, ¶¶
94-96 (arrest occurred in 2013). It was not until 2019, when this court issued its decision in Bass,
that the constitutionality of CPD’s longstanding use of stop orders or investigative alerts was called
into question by Illinois courts that had been long aware of the practice. See Erwin, 2023 IL App
(1st) 200936, ¶¶ 35-41. Because of this, courts have relied upon the good faith exception and
concluded that suppression of evidence was not warranted merely because a defendant’s arrest was
pursuant to an investigative alert. See, e.g., id. ¶ 49; Mathis, 2024 IL App (1st) 211102, ¶¶ 76-77;
Spencer, 2023 IL App (1st) 200646-U, ¶ 94.
¶ 36 We have no reason to think that any different conclusion would have been reached in this
case if petitioner’s counsel had sought to file a successive postconviction petition on his behalf. In
fact, the trial court below reached the merits of this argument, found that the good faith exception
was applicable in petitioner’s case, and ruled that petitioner would not have been entitled to
suppression of the videotaped statements that he made following his arrest. It found that
suppression was also not warranted due to the appellate court’s prior holding that petitioner’s
statement had not been made involuntarily. For these reasons, we conclude that appointed
counsel’s decision to continue pursuing petitioner’s claims in the context of a section 2-1401 action
- 14 - No. 1-23-2488
instead of seeking to reformulate them for presentation through a successive postconviction
petition had no effect on the ultimate outcome of these proceedings.
¶ 37 CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court denying petitioner relief from
judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018))
is affirmed.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
- 15 -