NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250336-U NOTICE Decision filed 05/04/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0336 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-1039 ) GERRIN L. MASSIE, ) Honorable ) Neil T. Schroeder, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. Because no argument to the contrary would have arguable merit, defendant’s appellate counsel is granted leave to withdraw, and the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.
¶2 Defendant, Gerrin L. Massie, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County
that summarily dismissed his pro se postconviction petition. The Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) was appointed as defendant’s appellate counsel. OSAD has concluded that this
appeal lacks arguable merit and, on that basis, has filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel,
pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), along with a supporting memorandum
of law. OSAD properly served defendant with notice. This court gave defendant the opportunity
to file a response to OSAD’s motion. Defendant did not file a response. We have reviewed OSAD’s
1 Finley motion and memorandum, and the entire record on appeal. We agree with OSAD’s
assessment of this appeal. We therefore grant OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw, and affirm
the judgment of the circuit court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 27, 2022, defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of first degree murder.
In exchange for defendant’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss other felony charges—including
another count of first degree murder—in this case, felony charges in two additional cases, and
misdemeanor and traffic charges in four additional cases. The State also agreed “to remove any
reference to a firearm” from the first degree murder charge to which defendant was pleading guilty,
“replacing that with the word bludgeon.” The State further “would agree to forego any prosecution
that resulted from any of defendant’s conduct while he was incarcerated” on the present charges,
which included “things such as witness tampering, solicitation of witness tampering, solicitation
of murder of a witness for hire, [and] obstructing justice.” Defendant’s plea counsel added that the
State agreed to cap the recommended sentence at 40 years.
¶5 The circuit court stated that it had reviewed defendant’s criminal history and agreed to bind
itself to the agreement. The circuit court admonished defendant as to the charges he faced, the
possible penalties for those charges, the complete terms of the plea agreement, and the rights
defendant was foregoing by pleading guilty. The State provided a factual basis for the plea, which
included the testimony of Tahjae Simms and Illinois State Police investigators. The State asserted
that Simms would testify that she and defendant were driving through Venice, at which point
defendant saw a parked vehicle with several individuals inside, including the victim. The State
further asserted that Illinois State Police investigators would testify that they discovered two Ring
doorbell camera videos that captured the events surrounding the murder, and showed defendant’s
2 involvement in it. Specifically, officers would testify that the videos showed defendant get out of
Simms’ car, walk down to the back of the car with the victim in it, and “bludgeon [the victim] to
death.” The videos would then show defendant running down to the end of the block and getting
back in the car driven by Simms, who drove away. Defendant’s plea counsel agreed that the State’s
recitation of the factual basis was “substantially *** the evidence the State could prove should the
matter proceed to trial.”
¶6 The circuit court further admonished defendant to ensure defendant’s plea was
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made. The circuit court then accepted defendant’s plea,
entered a finding of guilt, and entered judgment on that finding. Defendant thereafter filed a pro se
document in which he expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of plea counsel. New
counsel was appointed, and on June 22, 2023, defendant’s sentencing hearing was held. Prior to
taking evidence, the circuit court advised defendant of his appeal rights, including that if defendant
was not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, defendant would have to file a written
motion to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days of the date of the sentencing hearing.
¶7 In aggravation, the State’s evidence included the two Ring doorbell camera videos
discussed above. An investigator described some of the events in the videos as the videos were
played, then paused, for the circuit court. The investigator testified that defendant admitted he was
the individual seen in a zoomed-in still image captured from one of the videos. In argument, the
State asked for a sentence of 40 years, describing the killing as “an execution-style murder in a
residential neighborhood in the middle of the day.” Defense counsel asked for a sentence of 20
years. The circuit court discussed the factors in aggravation and mitigation, then stated “the most
disturbing thing about this *** is the recordings and the fact that [defendant] fired off 15 rounds
in a matter of seconds at an occupied vehicle,” which caused the death of the victim. The circuit
3 court sentenced defendant to 32 years in prison, to be served at 100% and to be followed by 3
years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
Following a hearing, defendant’s motion was denied.
¶8 Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Massie,
2025 IL App (5th) 240444-U, ¶¶ 2, 48, 49. In that appeal, OSAD filed a motion for leave to
withdraw as counsel in which it contended there was no reasonably meritorious argument that
reversible error occurred in the denial of defendant’s motion. Id. ¶ 23. This court noted that
defendant’s plea of guilty waived his claims regarding alleged violations of his speedy trial rights
and an alleged conflict of interest on the part of plea counsel, then explained why those claims
would be without merit even if they were not waived. Id. ¶¶ 26-35. This court agreed with OSAD
that no other potentially meritorious claims were raised by defendant in his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, or on appeal from the denial of that motion. Id. ¶¶ 36-40. We further found that
additional claims raised by defendant in his response to OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as
counsel were waived by defendant’s guilty plea, and would be without merit even if they were not
waived. Id. ¶¶ 41-46.
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NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250336-U NOTICE Decision filed 05/04/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0336 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-1039 ) GERRIN L. MASSIE, ) Honorable ) Neil T. Schroeder, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. Because no argument to the contrary would have arguable merit, defendant’s appellate counsel is granted leave to withdraw, and the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.
¶2 Defendant, Gerrin L. Massie, appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County
that summarily dismissed his pro se postconviction petition. The Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) was appointed as defendant’s appellate counsel. OSAD has concluded that this
appeal lacks arguable merit and, on that basis, has filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel,
pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), along with a supporting memorandum
of law. OSAD properly served defendant with notice. This court gave defendant the opportunity
to file a response to OSAD’s motion. Defendant did not file a response. We have reviewed OSAD’s
1 Finley motion and memorandum, and the entire record on appeal. We agree with OSAD’s
assessment of this appeal. We therefore grant OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw, and affirm
the judgment of the circuit court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 27, 2022, defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of first degree murder.
In exchange for defendant’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss other felony charges—including
another count of first degree murder—in this case, felony charges in two additional cases, and
misdemeanor and traffic charges in four additional cases. The State also agreed “to remove any
reference to a firearm” from the first degree murder charge to which defendant was pleading guilty,
“replacing that with the word bludgeon.” The State further “would agree to forego any prosecution
that resulted from any of defendant’s conduct while he was incarcerated” on the present charges,
which included “things such as witness tampering, solicitation of witness tampering, solicitation
of murder of a witness for hire, [and] obstructing justice.” Defendant’s plea counsel added that the
State agreed to cap the recommended sentence at 40 years.
¶5 The circuit court stated that it had reviewed defendant’s criminal history and agreed to bind
itself to the agreement. The circuit court admonished defendant as to the charges he faced, the
possible penalties for those charges, the complete terms of the plea agreement, and the rights
defendant was foregoing by pleading guilty. The State provided a factual basis for the plea, which
included the testimony of Tahjae Simms and Illinois State Police investigators. The State asserted
that Simms would testify that she and defendant were driving through Venice, at which point
defendant saw a parked vehicle with several individuals inside, including the victim. The State
further asserted that Illinois State Police investigators would testify that they discovered two Ring
doorbell camera videos that captured the events surrounding the murder, and showed defendant’s
2 involvement in it. Specifically, officers would testify that the videos showed defendant get out of
Simms’ car, walk down to the back of the car with the victim in it, and “bludgeon [the victim] to
death.” The videos would then show defendant running down to the end of the block and getting
back in the car driven by Simms, who drove away. Defendant’s plea counsel agreed that the State’s
recitation of the factual basis was “substantially *** the evidence the State could prove should the
matter proceed to trial.”
¶6 The circuit court further admonished defendant to ensure defendant’s plea was
intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made. The circuit court then accepted defendant’s plea,
entered a finding of guilt, and entered judgment on that finding. Defendant thereafter filed a pro se
document in which he expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of plea counsel. New
counsel was appointed, and on June 22, 2023, defendant’s sentencing hearing was held. Prior to
taking evidence, the circuit court advised defendant of his appeal rights, including that if defendant
was not satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, defendant would have to file a written
motion to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days of the date of the sentencing hearing.
¶7 In aggravation, the State’s evidence included the two Ring doorbell camera videos
discussed above. An investigator described some of the events in the videos as the videos were
played, then paused, for the circuit court. The investigator testified that defendant admitted he was
the individual seen in a zoomed-in still image captured from one of the videos. In argument, the
State asked for a sentence of 40 years, describing the killing as “an execution-style murder in a
residential neighborhood in the middle of the day.” Defense counsel asked for a sentence of 20
years. The circuit court discussed the factors in aggravation and mitigation, then stated “the most
disturbing thing about this *** is the recordings and the fact that [defendant] fired off 15 rounds
in a matter of seconds at an occupied vehicle,” which caused the death of the victim. The circuit
3 court sentenced defendant to 32 years in prison, to be served at 100% and to be followed by 3
years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
Following a hearing, defendant’s motion was denied.
¶8 Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Massie,
2025 IL App (5th) 240444-U, ¶¶ 2, 48, 49. In that appeal, OSAD filed a motion for leave to
withdraw as counsel in which it contended there was no reasonably meritorious argument that
reversible error occurred in the denial of defendant’s motion. Id. ¶ 23. This court noted that
defendant’s plea of guilty waived his claims regarding alleged violations of his speedy trial rights
and an alleged conflict of interest on the part of plea counsel, then explained why those claims
would be without merit even if they were not waived. Id. ¶¶ 26-35. This court agreed with OSAD
that no other potentially meritorious claims were raised by defendant in his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, or on appeal from the denial of that motion. Id. ¶¶ 36-40. We further found that
additional claims raised by defendant in his response to OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as
counsel were waived by defendant’s guilty plea, and would be without merit even if they were not
waived. Id. ¶¶ 41-46.
¶9 On February 21, 2025, defendant filed a pro se verified petition (petition) pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Therein, defendant
alleged a “claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence.” In support of his claim,
defendant contended that “[s]ubsequent to the trial and post-trial motions *** Nicholas Rickman
III *** signed a sworn affidavit regarding” the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim.
¶ 10 The petition was accompanied by Rickman’s handwritten affidavit, which was sworn but
not notarized. In the affidavit, which was dated August 20, 2024, Rickman averred that on the date
of the killing, May 12, 2020, he was waiting in a car for defendant to bring him “some weed.”
4 Rickman averred that defendant “said he was about to leave Granite City.” He averred that when
defendant arrived on foot, defendant approached the passenger side of Rickman’s car. Rickman
averred that when he told defendant the passenger door was broken, defendant told Rickman to
hurry, then defendant “came around to the driver side” of Rickman’s car. Rickman averred that
“in the middle of the exchange a red laser appeared and it was coming from” a white truck that
had parked in the area while Rickman was waiting for defendant. Rickman averred that “[i]n self-
defense and defense of myself,” defendant “fired over 10 shots at the truck[,] causing it to speed
off towards Madison.”
¶ 11 In the petition, defendant claimed Rickman’s affidavit showed that defendant “simply shot
in the direction of” the men in the white vehicle, “with the intent to startle them” so that defendant
and Rickman could flee. In the affidavit, Rickman averred that he did not come forward earlier
because Rickman feared for himself and his family, based upon threats that he alleged had been
made against anyone who supported defendant. Defendant filed his own affidavit, which was
notarized but not sworn. Defendant’s affidavit was dated October 15, 2024, and was consistent
with the allegations in Rickman’s affidavit with regard to the phone conversation setting up the
drug transaction, the broken passenger door, defendant’s movement around the car to the driver
side, the “red laser” during the drug transaction, and the shooting that followed. In the petition,
defendant made the additional claim that Rickman’s affidavit, along with defendant’s affidavit,
demonstrated that there was “no factual basis to support [defendant’s] guilty plea to the offense of
first degree murder.”
¶ 12 On April 4, 2025, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition in a four-page order.
The circuit court concluded that defendant’s claim that there was no factual basis for his guilty
plea was frivolous and patently without merit. The circuit court stated that the claim was positively
5 rebutted by the record, and was waived because it was known to defendant at the time of
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and at the time of his direct appeal, but was not
raised in either proceeding. The circuit court also rejected defendant’s actual innocence claim,
concluding that Rickman’s statement “could have been discovered earlier through the exercise of
due diligence,” because assuming the information in the affidavit was true, defendant “was well
aware of the identity of Rickman prior to pleading guilty.” Moreover, the circuit court reasoned,
because defendant “had been communicating with Rickman by phone prior to the shooting,
[defendant] was also aware of how to contact Rickman.”
¶ 13 The circuit court added that, “more importantly, the claim of actual innocence [was]
overwhelmingly rebutted by the record.” The circuit court recounted the information in the
affidavits, then stated that the court had “once again viewed” the two Ring doorbell camera videos.
The circuit court stated that in contravention of the assertions in the affidavits, the video evidence
“clearly” showed defendant “without delay, walking down the sidewalk *** crossing the street,
standing behind a parked car *** and immediately shooting fifteen times in the direction of a white
vehicle with headlights on which was parked directly in front of the parked car [defendant] was
standing behind.” The circuit court stated that defendant “never approached any other car and
certainly never approached the passenger side of a car alleged to be occupied by Rickman, and
was never directed to walk around to the driver’s side of the same car.” The circuit court ruled
that, as a result, the actual innocence claim was “clearly frivolous or patently without merit.” The
circuit court therefore summarily dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant appeals the circuit court’s judgment that summarily dismissed the petition. As
noted above, OSAD has filed a Finley motion to withdraw as counsel. In the legal memorandum
6 that accompanies its motion, OSAD raises one potential issue: whether the circuit court erred when
it summarily dismissed the petition. However, OSAD concludes there is no merit to that issue. For
the reasons that follow, we agree with OSAD.
¶ 16 The Act provides a means by which a criminal defendant may assert that, in the proceedings
that resulted in the defendant’s conviction, there occurred a substantial denial of the defendant’s
rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. People v. Evans,
2013 IL 113471, ¶ 10 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2008)). A proceeding under the Act
is not a substitute for a direct appeal; rather, it is a collateral proceeding which attacks a final
judgment. People v. Munz, 2021 IL App (2d) 180873, ¶ 11. The purpose of a proceeding under the
Act is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues related to the conviction or sentence that were not,
and could not have been, determined on direct appeal. Id. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata
bars a defendant from raising in a postconviction petition issues that were actually decided in the
defendant’s direct appeal. People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 41. Issues that could have been
raised in the defendant’s direct appeal, but were not, are barred by the doctrine of forfeiture. Munz,
2021 IL App (2d) 180873, ¶ 28.
¶ 17 At the first stage of proceedings under the Act, the circuit court must determine whether
the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. Id. ¶ 12. The petition may present only a limited
amount of detail, and its allegations are to be liberally construed and taken as true so long as they
are not affirmatively rebutted by the record. Id. The petition need not set forth the claims in their
entirety or include legal arguments or citations to legal authority. Id. The threshold that a
postconviction petition must meet to survive the first stage of review is low because most
postconviction petitions are drafted by pro se petitioners. Id. Nevertheless, res judicata and
forfeiture are well-established reasons to summarily dismiss a petition at the first stage of
7 proceedings. Id. ¶ 28. A petition also is frivolous and patently without merit, and therefore must
be dismissed at the first stage of proceedings, if the petition has no arguable basis in either law or
fact, such as when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or fanciful factual
allegations. Id. ¶ 13. An indisputably meritless legal theory is one that is completely contradicted
by the record, whereas fanciful factual allegations may be fantastic or delusional. Id. We review
de novo the first-stage dismissal of a petition. Id. ¶ 14. In so doing, we review the circuit court’s
judgment, not the reasons cited, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record if the
judgment is correct. Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 18 In this case, our de novo review leads us to reach the same conclusion reached by the circuit
court: defendant’s actual innocence claim is affirmatively rebutted by the record, and is therefore
frivolous and patently without merit. See id. ¶¶ 12-13. We have reviewed the video evidence,
which is included in the record on appeal, and have found that it completely rebuts the allegations
made by Rickman and defendant in their affidavits. As the circuit court aptly noted, both videos
show defendant quickly walking down the sidewalk, crossing the street, stopping behind a parked
car, and immediately firing into the white vehicle that was occupied by the victim and two other
people. Defendant does not, at any point, approach any other car, stop to converse with anyone in
any car, or walk around any car from the passenger side to the driver’s side. Defendant does not
appear to be carrying a bag of any kind, and does not at any point stop to attempt to withdraw
“weed” from a bag or from anywhere else. In short, the assertions made by Rickman and defendant
in their affidavits are fanciful factual allegations, because they are inconsistent with the reality
depicted by the video evidence. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition
on the basis that it was frivolous and patently without merit.
8 ¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 20 This court’s examination of the entire record establishes that this appeal does not present
any issues of arguable merit. Therefore, the motion of appointed counsel to withdraw is granted,
and the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.
¶ 21 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.