People v. Masone

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Masone

111 A.D.2d 189

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 6, 1985

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 111 A.D.2d 189 (People v. Masone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Masone, 111 A.D.2d 189 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mclnerney, J.), rendered May 7, 1984, convicting him of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Evidence concerning defendant’s possession of stolen property not charged in the instant indictment was properly admitted at trial on the issue of defendant’s intent. In contrast to crimes such as assault and robbery, the mere act of possessing stolen property is equivocal, and the underlying intent to benefit the [190]*190defendant “or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner” is not easily inferred (Penal Law §§ 165.45, 165.50; cf. People v Dales, 309 NY 97, 101; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 297-298). The intent to commit criminal possession of stolen property is “presumed” from knowing possession (Penal Law § 165.55 [1]), and, therefore, a defendant’s knowledge that the property is stolen is directly probative of his intent. Here the defendant was charged in the indictment with possession of five electric mobile radios from a larger group stolen from the New York City Department of Transportation, as well as various items stolen from Buckingham Leather, Ltd. His taped conversations concerning disposition of the radios remaining after sale of the five mentioned in the indictment were probative of his knowledge that the entire group of radios, including those five, were stolen. The degree of probativeness of this evidence outweighed any potential for prejudice (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 359-360). Defendant’s statement to an undercover investigator that the coat he was wearing was not from the Buckingham Leather burglary was also admissible on the same ground, to show that he knew the various items from Buckingham Leather, Ltd., were stolen.

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions, and find them to be without merit. Titone, J. P., Mangano, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mclnerney, J.), rendered May 7, 1984, convicting him of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

Evidence concerning defendant’s possession of stolen property not charged in the instant indictment was properly admitted at trial on the issue of defendant’s intent. In contrast to crimes such as assault and robbery, the mere act of possessing stolen property is equivocal, and the underlying intent to benefit the [190]*190defendant “or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner” is not easily inferred (Penal Law §§ 165.45, 165.50; cf. People v Dales, 309 NY 97, 101; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 297-298). The intent to commit criminal possession of stolen property is “presumed” from knowing possession (Penal Law § 165.55 [1]), and, therefore, a defendant’s knowledge that the property is stolen is directly probative of his intent. Here the defendant was charged in the indictment with possession of five electric mobile radios from a larger group stolen from the New York City Department of Transportation, as well as various items stolen from Buckingham Leather, Ltd. His taped conversations concerning disposition of the radios remaining after sale of the five mentioned in the indictment were probative of his knowledge that the entire group of radios, including those five, were stolen. The degree of probativeness of this evidence outweighed any potential for prejudice (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 359-360). Defendant’s statement to an undercover investigator that the coat he was wearing was not from the Buckingham Leather burglary was also admissible on the same ground, to show that he knew the various items from Buckingham Leather, Ltd., were stolen.

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions, and find them to be without merit. Titone, J. P., Mangano, Weinstein and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

111 A.D.2d 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-masone-nyappdiv-1985.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack