People v. Martinez

2026 IL App (3d) 250094-U

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250094-U

Order filed January 30, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, ) La Salle County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0094 v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-410 ) FERNANDO J. MARTINEZ, ) Honorable ) Howard C. Ryan Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Brennan concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The statute under which defendant was convicted is constitutional on its face.

¶2 Defendant, Fernando J. Martinez, appeals his unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon

(UPWF) conviction, arguing the UPWF statute criminalizing the possession of weapons by felons

is facially unconstitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(4)

(West 2022)) and UPWF (id. § 24-1.1(a)). For the UPWF offense, the State alleged defendant

possessed a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony and he was on mandatory

supervised release at the time. The evidence established defendant and another individual broke

into a residence, defendant pointed a firearm at the victim and demanded the code to the safe, and

when the victim said she did not know the code, defendant hit her on the head with the firearm and

absconded with various property. The La Salle County circuit court sentenced defendant to

concurrent terms of 28 and 5 years’ imprisonment for home invasion and UPWF, respectively.

Defendant appeals.

¶5 II. ANALYSIS

¶6 On appeal, defendant argues the UPWF statute is facially unconstitutional under both the

United States and Illinois Constitutions. Specifically, defendant challenges the lifetime prohibition

of possessing a firearm for felons.All statutes are presumed constitutional and we must uphold

their constitutionality whenever reasonably possible. People v. Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292,

¶ 19. A facial challenge to a statute can only overcome this presumption by showing that the statute

is unconstitutional under any set of circumstances. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21. We

review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶ 19.

¶7 In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2022), the United

States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged analysis for evaluating the constitutionality of

statutory firearm regulations. 1 First, we must determine whether the conduct at issue is protected

under the plain text of the second amendment. Id. If so, we then consider whether the regulation

The Court emphasized regulations prohibiting felons from possessing firearms remain 1

presumptively lawful post-Bruen. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024). 2 justifiably comports with history and tradition. Id.; People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113,

¶ 24. Applying this framework, we upheld the facial constitutionality of the unlawful use of a

weapon by a felon (UUWF) statute in Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 33. 2

¶8 We resolved Bruen’s first step by concluding that disarming felons falls within the plain

text of the second amendment. Id. ¶ 25. The amendment’s plain language guaranteeing the “right

of the people to keep and bear Arms” covers the possession of firearms and does not exclude felons

from “the people” to whom it applies. U.S. Const., amend II; Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113,

¶ 25. Considering Bruen’s second prong, our historical analysis in Travis demonstrated that the

UUWF statute is consistent with this country’s history and tradition of disarming individuals that

violate the law or are deemed dangerous. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 27-33. The

twentieth century laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms evolved from comparable

status-based restrictions dating back to the founding era. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. Bruen’s historical inquiry

only requires that the challenged regulation have “a well-established and representative historical

analogue, not a historical twin.” (Emphases in original.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30. Analogous modern

and historical regulations are determined by their relative similarities, which include, inter alia,

“ ‘how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.’ ”

Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 24 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). The disarmament of felons

based on their criminal convictions is consistent with a longstanding history and tradition of similar

firearm prohibitions disarming individuals that engaged in criminal conduct or posed a danger to

society. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. Like its historical antecedents, the UUWF statute imposes practically no

burden on the second amendment rights of law-abiding citizens. Id. ¶ 33.

2 Travis alternatively refers to the same singular offense codified under section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2020)) as UUWF. See People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (3d) 230433-U, ¶ 12 (“Whether the offense is labeled UUWF or UPWF is a distinction without a difference.”). 3 ¶9 While defendant contends these historical predecessors cannot provide a proper analogue

for the permanent disarmament of felons, the UPWF statute does not provide an indissoluble ban

as a felon can be exempt from its provisions by successfully obtaining relief under section 10 of

the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2022)). See 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.1(a) (West 2022).

¶ 10 Last, we address defendant’s argument that the UPWF statute is facially invalid under

article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution. As discussed in Travis, we reject defendant’s claim

that by extending the right to bear arms to “the individual citizen” the Illinois Constitution provides

greater protection than the right granted to “the people” under the second amendment. Travis, 2024

IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 42. While the use of the phrase “individual citizen” broadens the scope of

the type of arms covered by expanding it beyond weapons only traditionally used by a regulated

militia (id. ¶ 40), article I, section 22 also provides the state with an immense degree of control

over firearms by explicitly limiting the right to bear arms subject to the police power. Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 22. The disarmament of felons under the UPWF statute is a proper exercise of this

power, which contemplates legislation intended to prohibit or restrict anything that presents a

danger to the welfare of the people. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 41, 43.

¶ 11 Accordingly, we find that the UPWF statute is facially constitutional under both the United

States and Illinois Constitutions.

¶ 12 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County.

¶ 14 Affirmed.