2021 IL App (1st) 190408-U No. 1-19-0408 Order filed April 6, 2021 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 13 CR 15605 ) JOSE MARTINEZ, ) Honorable ) Michael B. McHale, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Jose Martinez was convicted of first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2009)) and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter
because there was some evidence that he acted recklessly rather than intentionally. We affirm. No. 1-19-0408
¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder. Count I
charged defendant with intentionally or knowingly strangling and killing Bozena Staggs with his
hands (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West Supp. 2009)), and count II charged defendant with strangling
and killing Staggs knowing that the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West Supp. 2009)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a notice of alibi defense,
providing that he was driving his then-wife to work at the time of Staggs’s death.
¶4 At trial, Daniel Kobylanski testified that he was Staggs’s brother. Around Thanksgiving in
2010, Staggs abused crack cocaine and worked as a prostitute.
¶5 David Mathews testified that he walked his dog down an alley near West Homer Street and
Kedzie Avenue, in Chicago, around 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 27, 2010. Mathews saw a
body in the alley, and approached to see if the person was breathing; she was not, and Mathews
did not touch her. Her pants were around her ankles, her neck was discolored, and her eyes were
open. Mathews went home and called 911. An ambulance arrived, which he directed to the alley.
He then spoke to the police. Mathews identified People’s Exhibit No. 4 as a photograph of the
body in the alley. The photograph, which is included in the record on appeal, depicts the alley,
with Staggs’s body lying in the middle of the photograph, evidence markers, and crime scene tape.
Ice is visible towards the left of the photograph.
¶6 On cross-examination, Mathews testified that the body was a few minutes’ walk from his
home. Mathews did not remember the temperature, but stated it was cold. Defense counsel showed
Mathews People’s Exhibit No. 4 and asked if he saw ice in the alley. Mathews responded
“[p]ossibly here,” and defense counsel noted that Mathews pointed to the middle left of the
photograph.
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¶7 Chicago police officer Donna Tarala testified that she and her partner were dispatched to
the 3100 block of Homer and arrived at 7:40 a.m. Tarala observed a deceased woman lying in the
alley with her pants down. Tarala spoke with Mathews, and she and her partner generated a report,
notified their supervisor, detectives, and the medical examiner’s office, and guarded the scene.
¶8 Chicago police detective John Valkner testified that he arrived at the alley between 8:15
and 9 a.m. The body had already been pronounced deceased via telemetry and covered with a
blanket. Valkner inspected the scene while another detective interviewed Mathews. The
temperature was in the upper twenties and there was ice on the ground.
¶9 Valkner observed bruises and redness around the front of the woman’s neck and behind
her right ear. She wore a green long-sleeved shirt under a tan T-shirt, her jeans and underwear
were down to her knees, and she wore dirty socks without shoes. There were no shoes or jackets
in the area. The woman had long, natural, intact fingernails, and forensic investigators placed bags
or protectors over her hands to protect any evidence potentially under her nails. Valkner turned the
woman over and observed lividity—a purplish internal pooling of blood—on the back of her
midsection and buttocks, and gravel stuck to her body. Valkner identified crime scene
photographs, some of which he agreed showed the injuries he described, lividity, and gravel
pressed or embedded in her body. Valkner confirmed that ice was depicted in People’s Exhibit
Nos. 4 and 6, another photograph, from a different angle, of Staggs’s body in the alley. Ice is
visible towards the upper left corner of People’s Exhibit No. 6.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Valkner testified that no jacket, shoes, purse, phone, keys, hat, or
other personal items were recovered. The woman was not wearing a bra.
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¶ 11 Dr. Michael Eckhardt, an assistant Cook County medical examiner, testified that he did not
autopsy Staggs’s body, but reviewed the case file and photographs after the pathologist who
performed the autopsy left the office. Staggs’s body was examined at 8 a.m. on November 28,
2010, almost a full day after it was brought to the office.
¶ 12 When Staggs’s body arrived at the office, she was unclothed from the waist down. Staggs’s
rigidity, or rigor mortis, and lividity were fixed, which generally take 8 to 12 hours or 6 to 12
hours, respectively, but Eckhardt confirmed both may appear in as little as 30 minutes.
¶ 13 Staggs had petechiae, or small hemorrhages, in blood vessels in her eyes and eyelids, which
occur when blood rises but cannot return down because the venous system is occluded by force.
Erythematous patches on her neck indicated force had been applied there, and Eckhardt stated that,
had Staggs lived, the patches may have become a contusion or abrasion. Staggs also had a
superficial scratch on her left forehead, an abrasion to her left temple, and two contusions on her
left chin, all of which denoted force. Further, there was a contusion on her left distal lateral arm,
an abrasion on her medial left elbow, a horizontal abrasion on her right dorsal ring finger, a
contusion on her right anterior leg, and an abrasion on her left knee. Internally, there was
hemorrhaging in the muscles and cartilage in Staggs’s neck, indicating that applied force burst the
blood vessel within the muscle. Staggs’s toxicology report was positive for cocaine. Eckhardt
determined that Staggs died by homicide strangulation. Eckhardt identified People’s Exhibit Nos.
20 through 28 as the photographs he reviewed, which depicted the injuries described. Clippings of
Staggs’s fingernails, samples of her hair, and vaginal and rectal swabs were collected and sealed.
¶ 14 Eckhardt explained that strangulation is the constriction of blood vessels in the neck, which
causes loss of consciousness and then death. On average, a person loses consciousness after being
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strangled for 5 to 11 seconds. Death will occur in minutes. Eckhardt confirmed that, once a person
loses consciousness, continued force is necessary to cause death; if the strangulating force is
removed, the unconscious person will not die because the blood vessels are open again.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Eckhardt testified that death by strangulation may not occur until
continuous pressure has been applied for up to five minutes. Rigor mortis can set in quicker if the
decedent is in an excited state, or slower in cold temperatures. The rigor mortis process is not
immediately observable. The time of Staggs’s death was not estimated. The abrasion to Staggs’s
forehead and the contusions were evidence of blunt trauma.
¶ 16 No medical examiner went to the scene where Staggs’s body was found on November 27,
2010, although general protocol is for a body not to be disturbed until a medical examiner arrives.
Although he did not receive the report, Eckhardt identified a Chicago Fire Department report of
the state of the body at the crime scene, showing that paramedics arrived at 7:37 a.m. and
performed the telemetry at 7:42 a.m. The report further noted, inter alia, that lividity and rigor
mortis were present, Staggs was unresponsive and not breathing, and her airway was not obstructed
by any material.
¶ 17 On redirect examination, Eckhardt agreed that without personally seeing the body on the
scene, he could not determine how long it took for rigor mortis to set in. At the medical examiner’s
office, bodies are refrigerated until autopsy, which complicates determining the time of death.
¶ 18 On recross examination, Eckhardt confirmed that refrigeration is used to keep the body as
close to its state at the time of death as possible and that paramedics must consult with a physician
to have someone declared dead, which they did for Staggs.
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¶ 19 Rufus Burks Jr. testified that he dated Staggs for nearly six years preceding November
2010 and they had a child together. Burks confirmed that, in November 2010, Staggs used cocaine
and sold sex for money.
¶ 20 On November 26, 2010, Burks worked an afternoon and night shift at a pizzeria until 2
a.m. and arrived home around 3 a.m. on November 27. Staggs was there, but left within an hour.
Staggs then returned but left a second time. When Staggs returned a second time, Burks was asleep,
but he woke when she brushed against the bed. Staggs left a third time as Burks fell back asleep,
around 5 or 6 a.m.
¶ 21 Burks awoke around 10 or 11 a.m. He called and texted Staggs but did not reach her, and
worked the same shift at the pizzeria. He never heard from Staggs, and continued to contact her
cell phone when he was able. It was not unusual for Staggs to leave for extended periods, but Burks
was usually able to contact her through her cell phone. Burks worked again on November 28, 2010.
¶ 22 While Burks was at work on November 28, 2010, police detectives arrived and informed
him that Staggs had died. On November 30, Burks went to the police station, was interviewed, and
agreed to submit a DNA sample. Burks told the detectives that Staggs used his phone to contact
clients “a couple of times.”
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Burks testified that he and Staggs argued the last time he saw her.
When Staggs left after Burks arrived home in the early morning of November 27, 2010, he assumed
she was leaving to work as a prostitute. Burks did not know if Staggs was dressed the final time
she left because he was half-asleep. When asked whether Staggs was sometimes picked up by men
on the street, Burks responded, “That’s an assumption, yes.”
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¶ 24 Defense counsel asked Burks if he had called Staggs approximately 40 times on November
27 and 28, 2010, and Burks responded that he was not sure. Burks normally worked evenings, but
arrived at work around 10 a.m. on November 28. The detectives arrived around 11 a.m. or noon.
Defense counsel asked if, when the detectives informed Burks that Staggs had been found dead,
Burks asked if she had been found in an alley; Burks noted it had been nearly 10 years since then,
but was “pretty sure” his response to the detectives was to ask where she had been found.
¶ 25 Burks gave the detectives Staggs’s cell phone number and showed them the phone numbers
of the clients Staggs had contacted through his phone. Burks worked the remainder of his shift and
arranged to go to the police station on November 29, 2010, but did not do so, and went the
following day. Burks continued to call Staggs after he learned she was dead out of doubt or
disbelief.
¶ 26 Burks did not recall telling detectives at the police station on November 30, 2010, that he
had seen on television or the Internet how Staggs’s body was found in the alley or stating that he
did not know if she had been left like that to make it appear she had been raped. Burks did not
recall seeing Staggs’s clients or describing two of them to the detectives. Burks denied telling the
detectives Staggs left for the last time after 6 a.m. on November 27, stating that he told them it was
¶ 27 On redirect examination, Burks clarified that he argued with Staggs on the morning of
November 26, 2010, but last saw Staggs when he briefly awoke after she bumped the bed around
5 or 6 a.m. on November 27. Burks did not know if she was wearing clean clothes at that time.
Prior to going to the police station on November 30, he had seen something on the Internet or
television which may have involved Staggs’s death, but did not recall what that was. About 30 of
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the approximately 40 phone calls Burks made to Staggs happened after the morning of November
27, through the beginning of his shift on November 28.
¶ 28 On recross examination, Burks agreed that he did not see what Staggs was wearing when
she left on November 27, 2010. Burks did not recall whether Staggs normally wore a coat. Burks
never called the police because it was not unusual for her to be gone for extended periods, although
he could usually contact her.
¶ 29 Chicago police detective Ruben Weber testified that he received Staggs’s name from the
medical examiner’s office after her body was examined the morning of November 28, 2010. The
medical examiner’s office reported that Staggs died by homicide strangulation. Weber and a
partner went to the pizzeria where Burks worked, informed him that Staggs had died, and
questioned him. Burks agreed to go to the police station and provide a DNA sample the next day,
November 29. Burks did not go to the police station on November 29, but went on November 30,
when he provided a buccal swab DNA sample.
¶ 30 Weber learned from Burks and Staggs’s family what she did for money. Staggs’s cell phone
had not been located. Weber received her phone number, subpoenaed the phone company for her
call logs, and attempted to contact every person who had contacted Staggs around the time of her
murder. Many men went to the police station for interviews and provided DNA samples. No
evidence connected the men to the crime scene or Staggs’s death, and Weber ran out of leads in
April 2011.
¶ 31 The case went cold until June 2013, when Weber learned that defendant’s DNA was
associated with DNA found under Staggs’s right fingernails. Weber met defendant, whom he
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identified in court, at the police station on July 15, 2013. Defendant consented to provide a DNA
sample.
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Weber confirmed that he did not visit the scene on November 27,
2010, because he was assigned to the case the next day. Weber confirmed that, when he told Burks
that Staggs had died, Burks asked if she had been found in an alley, and at the police station on
November 30, Burks stated that he did not know if the person who killed Staggs attempted to make
it appear she had been raped.
¶ 33 On redirect examination, Weber stated that, before Burks stated he did not know whether
Staggs had been left in a way to make the police believe she was raped, Burks indicated to Weber
that he had learned how Staggs’s body was found on the Internet.
¶ 34 Veronica Jackson, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, testified as an expert
in forensic biology. Jackson collected cellular material from underneath fragments of Staggs’s
fingernails and preserved it, along with a sample of Staggs’s blood and DNA samples Weber
collected, for future DNA analysis.
¶ 35 The State entered several stipulations. First, an evidence technician would testify that he
collected a buccal swab from defendant and the swab was submitted for DNA analysis. Second, a
Chicago police officer would testify that he collected Staggs’s clothing, fingernail clippings,
swabs, and blood card from the medical examiner’s office and transported them to the police
department’s forensic services division. Third, a forensic scientist would testify that she received
and preserved one of the buccal swab standards collected by Weber. Fourth, a different forensic
scientist would testify that she conducted DNA analysis on Staggs’s blood sample, some of the
buccal swabs collected by Weber, and the material collected from under Staggs’s fingernails, and
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found a partial male DNA profile from that material. The men whose buccal swabs the scientist
analyzed, including Burks, were excluded as possible donors of the male DNA profile. Lastly, a
different forensic scientist would testify that, in May 2013, a DNA database detected an association
between the partial male DNA profile identified from Staggs’s right-hand fingernails and
defendant, and the scientist requested an additional standard from defendant for confirmatory
analysis.
¶ 36 Cynara Anderson, a forensic science administrator with the Illinois State Police, testified
as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. Anderson compared the DNA data generated from the
material under Staggs’s fingernails with a standard collected from defendant, and determined that
defendant could not be excluded from contributing to a mixture of DNA found under Staggs’s
fingernails. Approximately 1 in 448 billion black, 1 in 270 billion white, and 1 in 11 billion
Hispanic individuals could not be excluded from contributing to the DNA profile identified in the
sample from the fingernails on Staggs’s right hand. Approximately 1 in 8 black, 1 in 17 white, or
1 in 3 Hispanic individuals could not be excluded from contributing to the sample from Staggs’s
left hand. Anderson explained that the profile from the left hand was more common because more
DNA information was present in the sample from Staggs’s right hand. On cross-examination,
Anderson confirmed that DNA analysis does not show the DNA’s age.
¶ 37 Detective Jacinto Gonzalez testified that, on November 27, 2010, he assisted Valkner in
the alley where Staggs was found. Two and a half years later, Gonzalez learned from Weber that
a DNA association had been made between Staggs’s fingernails and defendant.
¶ 38 At the police station on July 15, 2013, Gonzalez and Weber interviewed defendant, whom
Gonzalez identified in court. The entire interview, which lasted over an hour, was videotaped, and
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the video is in the record on appeal. They did not tell defendant why he was at the police station
prior to the interview. Gonzalez described portions of the interview and corresponding video clips
were played for the jury.
¶ 39 In the video, Gonzalez advises defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and defendant indicates he understands each right. Defendant denies knowing
why he is at the station, and the detectives state that his name arose in an investigation from
November 27, 2010. Weber asks if Staggs’s name is familiar to defendant and shows him a picture,
and defendant denies recognizing her name and states he has never seen her. Weber states that
Staggs is a prostitute. Defendant denies having sex with her, but discusses another prostitute he
had sex with one time following a fight with his wife, two years prior to the interview. Defendant
also discusses his history of anger issues, stating he gets mad quickly. Defendant again denies ever
seeing Staggs and states he has no idea why somebody would associate him with Staggs in
November 2010. Weber shows defendant two additional photos of Staggs and defendant again
denies recognizing her.
¶ 40 However, after first stating that he “might” have seen her before, defendant then states that
at least two years earlier, in the summertime, he once saw Staggs on the street near Armitage
Avenue and Sacramento Avenue or Humboldt Boulevard. She asked him for a cigarette, and he
gave her one. Weber informs defendant that Staggs was found dead on November 27, 2010, near
the area he stated he gave her a cigarette, and later states that the detectives had indisputable
evidence defendant was with Staggs on that date.
¶ 41 Defendant ultimately admits that he had sex with Staggs three times. Each time, he picked
her up from Armitage and Sacramento. Defendant and Staggs never exchanged names or phone
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numbers. The third occasion was sometime in August and not on November 27, 2010. Staggs
instructed him to pull into an alley. After they had sex in the backseat, defendant paid her and was
about to enter the front seat of the vehicle, when they argued because Staggs wanted more money.
The first two times, defendant paid her $25, but the third time he only paid her $20. Staggs
scratched defendant, who pushed her with the door to his vehicle and may have punched her.
Defendant then entered the vehicle and left. Staggs had fallen, but was getting up when defendant
left. Weber asks if defendant choked her and defendant replies, “No, sir.”
¶ 42 Defendant then admits that Staggs had not gotten up when he left, that he did not know he
had hurt her, and thought she was alive. Staggs scratched his back, head, and face. Gonzalez states
that defendant held Staggs down, and motions slightly with his hands. Defendant confirms that he
grabbed her and demonstrates a choking motion with his hands. Gonzalez performs the same
gesture, which defendant repeats while stating he grabbed Staggs and she stopped moving. He
thought she fainted, and he left in his vehicle. He repeats that he did not think he hurt her and states
he is sorry. Defendant states he did not use all his strength and makes a choking motion again.
Gonzalez asks if it was “a rage thing” and whether defendant “snapped,” and defendant agrees. He
then states he is pretty sure the incident occurred on November 27, 2010, because November 26 is
his daughter’s birthday. The fight occurred around midnight. Defendant agrees that he gave the
detectives the absolute truth.
¶ 43 Everyone stands, and defendant states he does not remember whether he punched Staggs
or hit her with the vehicle door. She hit a garage and then fell. Defendant states “that’s when I,”
and kneels, makes a choking motion, and says he did that until Staggs stopped moving. Defendant
states he did not know he killed Staggs and thought she fainted or entered a coma, because of how
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she felt. When asked if she felt “lifeless,” defendant agrees, stating that she moved slightly and he
jumped on her and grabbed her; defendant again makes a choking motion and states that Staggs
stopped moving. Defendant repeats that he is pretty sure he did not use all his strength. The next
morning, defendant told his wife that scratches he had sustained were from boxes falling on him
at work.
¶ 44 Gonzalez further testified that the location from which defendant stated he picked up
Staggs was approximately five blocks from where Staggs’s body was found. No one had told
defendant that Staggs was killed by strangulation, another person’s DNA had been found under
her fingernails, or that her body was found in an alley. After the interview, defendant consented to
give a buccal swab DNA sample. Gonzalez confirmed that the timestamp on the video was accurate
and defendant was taken to the hospital for a diabetes pill shortly after 6 p.m.
¶ 45 On cross-examination, Gonzalez agreed that the first time anyone mentioned choking was
when Weber asked defendant if he had choked Staggs. Gonzalez confirmed that he motioned in
front of his body before defendant made a choking motion, but that defendant made that motion
previously, when he stated that he pushed Staggs. The clip was played again.
¶ 46 Gonzalez confirmed that he and Weber told defendant they knew he was with Staggs on
the date she died and that he had been seen with her, but that was a lie because the conclusion was
based on DNA evidence which did not actually establish he was with her on that date.
¶ 47 The defense called Nathan Tomlinson, who testified that he lived on the 3100 block of
Homer and let his dog out between 5 and 5:15 a.m. on November 27, 2010. Tomlinson did not
hear anything or see anybody in the alley. Although his view of the alley was obstructed, his dog
would have alerted him to anyone in the alley. Tomlinson saw Staggs’s body “[in] the morning
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when the detectives woke me up and ordered me to it.” There was a streetlight approximately 20
feet from Staggs’s body.
¶ 48 On cross-examination, Tomlinson testified that he likely stayed in his doorway and let his
dog into his fenced backyard. Tomlinson agreed he did not pay attention to the alley. On redirect
examination, Tomlinson confirmed that the body was found in the alley between his and his
neighbor’s properties.
¶ 49 Alexander Caraballo, an ambulance commander with the Chicago Fire Department,
testified that around 7:32 a.m. on November 27, 2010, he and a partner were dispatched to the
3100 block of Homer for an unresponsive person. Caraballo arrived to the alley and noticed a
woman on her back, with her pants around her ankles. Caraballo checked for signs of rigor mortis
and lividity, which generally set in after a couple of hours and 20 minutes, respectively. However,
Caraballo explained that the timing of rigor mortis was not specified in his training and that every
individual might differ. Caraballo reported the situation to a hospital, after which the woman was
pronounced dead, and he had no more contact with the body.
¶ 50 On cross-examination, Caraballo stated that he remembered the case despite that it was
eight years prior because of the “shocking” position of the body. Caraballo confirmed that his
testimony regarding how he examined the body was “basically” an explanation of what he had
been trained to do. The woman’s pupils were dilated, which could happen immediately upon death,
but Caraballo agreed that he did not have the training of a medical examiner to determine time of
death or when rigor mortis or lividity would set in. Caraballo agreed that his focus is to determine
whether a patient can be resuscitated and he found no signs of life. A doctor at a hospital
pronounced Staggs dead after Caraballo relayed her negative vital signs via telemetry.
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¶ 51 Susana Sanchez testified that she was married to defendant for nearly 10 years, but they
were divorced at the time of trial. Their oldest daughter, whose birthday was November 26, had
died, and every year on that date the family would visit her grave, unless they had to work, in
which case they would go later or on another day.
¶ 52 Sanchez worked on November 27, 2010, and defendant always drove her. Sanchez’s place
of employment had offices in East Dundee, Elgin, Arlington Heights, and Elk Grove Village, but
Sanchez mostly worked in East Dundee. 1 She and defendant would wake around 5:30 a.m., and
the drive from their home on the 2700 block of West Melrose Street, in Chicago, took 1½ to 2½
hours, depending on traffic. Defendant was always home when Sanchez awoke. Sanchez recalled
seeing scratches on defendant once, but did not remember when.
¶ 53 On cross-examination, Sanchez testified that she and defendant stopped at McDonald’s
for breakfast every day while he drove her to work. She worked on November 26, 2010. She did
not recall if they went to the cemetery that day. Sanchez did not recall whether defendant was
present when she awoke on November 27, but stated that he was always there when she awoke.
Sanchez spoke with an investigator on March 1, 2018, but denied stating that she did not remember
whether defendant was in bed when she awoke on November 27, 2010.
¶ 54 The scratches Sanchez once saw on defendant were on his upper arm. The State and the
court noted that Sanchez pointed to the back of her left shoulder. The scratches resembled paper
cuts or box cuts. Sanchez asked where he got them and defendant stated that boxes fell on him at
work. Sanchez denied telling the investigator that they resembled fingernail scratches.
1 In her testimony, Sanchez did not specify where she worked on November 26 or 27, 2010.
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¶ 55 On redirect examination, Sanchez identified her work schedule and stated that it showed
no record of her working November 26, 2010. On November 27, 2010, she punched in at 7:40 a.m.
and punched out at 12:49 p.m.
¶ 56 Defense counsel entered a stipulation that a records custodian for Sanchez’s employer
would testify that Sanchez worked at the employer’s facility in Elgin, Illinois. On November 27,
2010, Sanchez punched in at 7:40 a.m., punched out at 12:49 p.m., and did not clock in again until
November 30.
¶ 57 Kevin Foster testified that he worked for the Illinois Tollway. When a person drives
through a toll plaza with an I-PASS transponder, the transponder logs the transaction in a database.
Foster identified an account history report in defendant’s name which showed transactions on
November 27, 2010. The report showed that an I-PASS registered to the account went west on
Interstate 90 through the Devon Avenue toll plaza at 6:52 a.m., west on Interstate 90 through the
Route 25 toll plaza at 7:20 a.m., east on Interstate 90 through the Route 25 toll plaza at 7:44 a.m.,
and east on Interstate 90 through the River Road toll plaza at 8:06 a.m. The tollway photographs
each vehicle and license plate when it passes through a toll plaza, but the images are discarded
unless the driver does not pay the toll.
¶ 58 On cross-examination, Foster testified that the tollway data shows only that a certain I-
PASS transponder passed through a toll plaza, not a vehicle or person. Foster clarified that when
a transponder passes through a toll plaza, a photograph is taken but discarded if there are sufficient
funds in the I-PASS account. There were sufficient funds in defendant’s account, so no
photographs existed of the vehicle which passed through the toll plazas using defendant’s
transponder on November 27, 2010.
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¶ 59 Defendant testified that in 2010, he had worked at UPS for approximately four years. To
earn extra money, he and his father retrieved scrap metal. He drove Sanchez to work every day,
five or six days a week, and the drive would take 1 to 1½ hours. He then drove back, scrapped,
and worked from 6 p.m. until 11 p.m. After work he drove straight home.
¶ 60 Defendant did not work on November 26, 2010, when he and Sanchez went to the cemetery
with their daughter and his father and sister. Afterwards, defendant lied to Sanchez and told her he
had to work. Defendant drove to Armitage and Sacramento, where he saw Staggs. Staggs was
dressed nicely and wore a jean skirt, dress shoes without socks, and a half-length jacket. Defendant
told Staggs he only had $20, but Staggs entered his vehicle and told him to drive into an alley
around the corner. Defendant had seen Staggs approximately twice before, and paid her $25 on
those occasions. Defendant parked near a loading dock in the middle of the alley. There was no
light. It was approximately midnight.
¶ 61 Staggs and defendant had sex in the vehicle’s backseat. Staggs wore a bra and makeup.
Afterwards, they both exited the vehicle, Staggs put on her coat, and defendant paid her with
money from his wallet. Defendant had more than $20 in his wallet, and Staggs told him she needed
more money and attempted to take his wallet. At one point, Staggs scratched defendant with her
nails, and the State and court noted that he indicated below his right ear.
¶ 62 As Staggs grabbed at him, defendant attempted to enter the vehicle. Defendant opened the
door and accidentally struck her with it, and Staggs hit the garage door of the loading dock.
Defendant confirmed he may also have hit her with his hand or arm, and the court noted that he
put his left hand near his chest and swung it backward. Defendant then confirmed he hit her with
the back of his arm, but denied punching her. Staggs fell after she hit the garage, and defendant
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entered his vehicle to leave. In his mirror, defendant saw Staggs getting up as he drove away.
Defendant went home. The next morning, November 27, defendant awoke around 5 a.m. and took
Sanchez to work. He went to work that night. He never went back to look for Staggs and did not
know what happened to her.
¶ 63 In July 2013, defendant was interrogated by detectives at the police station. He admitted
that he was with Staggs on November 27, 2010, but did not know he was accused of killing her
and denied believing that he had killed Staggs. Towards the end of the interview, Gonzalez
discussed choking, and demonstrated a choking motion which defendant repeated in the interview
and in court. The court stated that defendant’s hands were outstretched and his thumbs and index
fingers were touching. Defendant testified that he demonstrated the choking motion in the
interview because he had woken at 4 a.m. that morning, was tired, stressed, wanted to leave, and
needed his diabetes medicine, which he received at a hospital after the interview. Defendant denied
actually choking Staggs.
¶ 64 On cross-examination, defendant testified that, if traffic was light, it took 30 or 35 minutes
to travel from defendant’s and Sanchez’s home to the first toll plaza. Defendant agreed that he
would argue with Sanchez about her refusal to drive, would become angry, and had a short temper.
On November 26, 2010, the family arrived home at 4 or 5 p.m. after visiting the cemetery.
Defendant denied that he fought with Sanchez that day, but admitted he lied to her that he had to
work.
¶ 65 Defendant confirmed that he first met Staggs in the summer of 2010. He was driving and
she asked him for a cigarette. He later returned to the area, picked her up, and drove to an alley
where they had sex. Defendant paid her $25. He confirmed he did the same thing a couple of
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months later, and again on November 26, 2010. On that date, they drove to a different alley. They
agreed defendant would pay her $20.
¶ 66 After they had sex, Staggs saw that defendant had more money in his wallet and tried to
take his wallet. Defendant turned around and Staggs tried to hold him. Defendant confirmed that
Staggs gave him “attitude,” but denied being angry. Defendant agreed that he pulled away from
Staggs as she grabbed his right shoulder and ear and that she scratched him. The State confirmed
for the record that he meant his right shoulder and under his right ear. Staggs stopped when he hit
her in the chin with his elbow or the vehicle door as he attempted to enter his vehicle.
¶ 67 Defendant denied choking Staggs but admitted that he told the detectives he got on top of
her after she fell and put his hands around her throat. Defendant stated that he “followed” Gonzalez
in making the choking gesture after Gonzalez did it first. While defendant kneeled and
demonstrated the choking motion, the detective stated he would not get on the ground. Defendant
denied kneeling in the alley, and stated he was tired and went along with what the detectives said.
Defendant admitted that he told the detectives that Staggs fainted and that he put his hands around
Staggs’s throat until she entered a coma and did not move, and that the detectives had not told him
to say those things, but testified that those statements were not true. Defendant denied putting his
hands around Staggs’s throat and holding her down until she died.
¶ 68 Defendant agreed that, during the interview, the detectives asked if he wanted food and
repeatedly asked if he was okay or needed anything, and that he responded each time that he did
not need anything because he was fine. Defendant stated that the time stamp on the video was
incorrect and that the interview did not end until after 6 p.m., when he was scheduled to take his
diabetes medication, and that he received his medication at a hospital around 7:30 or 8 p.m.
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Defendant confirmed that he told the detectives his diabetes was not “that bad” as long as he was
careful of what he ate, and he was tired but not hungry or thirsty during the interview.
¶ 69 In rebuttal, the State called Joseph Thomas, an investigator with the State’s Attorney’s
Office. On March 1, 2018, Thomas interviewed Sanchez. Thomas asked if she remembered
whether defendant was home when she awoke on November 27, 2010, and Sanchez answered that
she was “pretty sure” he was but could not be certain because it had been so long. Thomas also
asked if defendant had ever come home with scratches, and Sanchez stated that she once saw
scratches on his back which defendant told her were from boxes falling on him at UPS. Sanchez
told Thomas that the injuries did not appear as if boxes had fallen on him, and Thomas confirmed
that she stated they resembled paper cuts.
¶ 70 Thomas also drove from the 3100 block of Homer to defendant’s and Sanchez’s address
on the 2700 block of Melrose, which was 2.2 miles away and took seven minutes. Thomas then
drove from the home to the Devon toll plaza, which was 11.4 miles away and took approximately
14 minutes. Thomas completed the drives on a Saturday around 6:30 a.m. Thomas then returned
to the 3100 block of Homer and repeated the drives around 7:30 a.m. The drives took the same
amount of time.
¶ 71 On cross-examination, Thomas stated that he began the drive from Homer on the street,
not from the alley. Thomas never stopped or picked anyone up.
¶ 72 After an off-the-record informal jury instructions conference, the court heard argument on
the record regarding defense counsel’s proposed jury instructions concerning involuntary
manslaughter. Defense counsel argued that the alibi defense did not preclude involuntary
manslaughter instructions, and that defendant’s statements in the video confession that he held
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Staggs down until she stopped moving and thought she fainted was evidence that defendant acted
recklessly rather than knowingly or intentionally. The court denied the involuntary manslaughter
instructions, finding no credible evidence of recklessness.
¶ 73 Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty.2 Defendant filed an
amended posttrial motion arguing in relevant part that the court erred in declining to issue jury
instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The court denied the motion, and after a hearing,
sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence was
denied.
¶ 74 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter where there was evidence he acted recklessly, rather than intentionally
or knowingly, in his videotaped statement that he “snapped,” choked Staggs in “rage,” and did not
believe he had killed her.
¶ 75 Whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense depends
on whether the record contains some evidence which, if believed by the jury, would reduce the
crime from the charged offense to a lesser offense. People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25. It
is not for the trial court to weigh the evidence or assess its credibility when determining whether
to issue a lesser-included offense jury instruction, and indeed, the evidence need not be credible.
People v. Himber, 2020 IL App (1st) 162182, ¶ 30. Where a trial court finds insufficient evidence
to issue a requested jury instruction, that determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42. “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision
2 The jury issued only one verdict, but the electronic docket, half-sheet, and mittimus reflect that defendant was found guilty of both counts and that the two counts were merged.
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is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.”
Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 76 The difference between involuntary manslaughter and first degree murder lies in the
culpable mental state of each offense. Id. ¶ 51. As charged in this case, a person commits first
degree murder where he commits an act which causes death while intending to kill or do great
bodily harm to another, knowing it will cause death, or knowing it creates a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2009). A person acts knowingly
when he is consciously aware that the result of his conduct is practically certain to be caused by
his conduct. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 2010).
¶ 77 Conversely, a person commits involuntary manslaughter where he recklessly commits an
act likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Himber, 2020 IL App (1st) 162182, ¶ 31; see also
720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2010). In general, a person acts recklessly where he “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow,
*** and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2010). However, when a defendant
intentionally commits an act directed at the victim, such conduct is not reckless and does not
warrant an involuntary manslaughter instruction, despite the defendant’s claim that he did not
intend to kill the victim. See, e.g., People v. Eason, 326 Ill. App. 3d 197, 210 (2001) (“Illinois
courts have consistently held that when the defendant intends to fire a gun, points it in the general
direction of his or her intended victim, and shoots, such conduct is not reckless, regardless of the
defendant’s assertion that he or she did not intend to kill anyone.”).
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¶ 78 Factors relevant to whether a defendant acted recklessly and which support an involuntary
manslaughter jury instruction include “(1) the disparity of size and strength between the defendant
and the victim, (2) the duration of the altercation and the severity of the victim’s injuries, (3)
whether the defendant used a weapon, (4) whether the defendant inflicted multiple wounds, and
(5) whether the victim was defenseless.” McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 52. However, whether an
involuntary manslaughter instruction should be issued depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Himber, 2020 IL App (1st) 162182, ¶ 31. Generally, the instruction is not warranted
where the nature of the killing demonstrates that the defendant did not act recklessly, as shown by
multiple wounds or the victim’s defenselessness. Id.
¶ 79 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury
on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant confessed at trial to hitting Staggs with his arm or vehicle
door, causing her to fall to the ground. In his videotaped interrogation, he further explains that,
while she was on the ground, he jumped on her, and he demonstrates kneeling and performing a
choking motion which he did until Staggs stopped moving. He ceased when he thought Staggs had
fainted or entered a coma and agrees that she felt “lifeless.” He agrees with the detectives that
strangling Staggs was a “rage thing” and that he “snapped.” He further states that he did not believe
he had hurt Staggs and did not use all his strength.
¶ 80 While there is no evidence of the disparity in size between Staggs and defendant or that
defendant used a weapon, Eckhardt testified that a person loses consciousness from strangulation
after 5 to 11 seconds. Death will not occur unless, after the person loses consciousness, continuous
pressure is applied for up to five minutes. Eckhardt further testified that Staggs died of homicide
strangulation, blood vessels in her eyes and eyelids had burst because her venous system was
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occluded, erythematous patches on her neck indicated the application of force, she had
hemorrhages in the muscles and cartilage in her neck, and scratches, abrasions, or contusions to
her forehead, temple, chin, arm, elbow, finger, leg, and knee.
¶ 81 Defendant’s placing his hands around Staggs’s neck and choking her until she died is
evidence that he knowingly or intentionally killed her, or committed an act knowing there was a
strong probability it would result in her death or great bodily harm. See People v. Leach, 405 Ill.
App. 3d 297, 311-13 (2010) (finding sufficient evidence of murder and rejecting defendant’s
argument that he acted recklessly in strangling victim to death with hands where defendant
knowingly placed hands on victim’s neck and doctor testified that death results only after three to
six minutes of continued pressure), aff’d 2012 IL 111534 (2012). Defendant’s confirmation in his
videotaped confession that he “snapped” and it was a “rage thing” is unavailing to show that he
did not act intentionally or knowingly where Eckhardt testified that, when a strangled person loses
consciousness, they will not die unless continuous pressure is applied for minutes. See McDonald,
2016 IL 118882, ¶ 52 (factors to be considered in determining whether defendant acted recklessly
include duration of altercation, severity of injuries, and defenselessness of victim); see also
Himber, 2020 IL App (1st) 162182, ¶ 31 (involuntary manslaughter instruction not warranted
where nature of killing, as shown by multiple wounds or defenselessness of victim, shows
defendant did not act recklessly). Consequently, even taking as true that defendant “snapped” and
acted in a rage, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue the requested jury
instruction where Eckhardt’s testimony established that defendant must have strangled Staggs for
minutes while she was unconscious and defenseless.
¶ 82 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
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¶ 83 Affirmed.
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