People v. Martin CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: E085099
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Martin CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E085099

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV24002759)

JOHN CEDUANE MARTIN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Richard V. Peel,

Judge. Affirmed.

John Ceduane Martin, in pro. per.; Leslie Ann Rose, under appointment by the

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant John Ceduane Martin pled guilty to assault with a firearm

(Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(2), count 1), admitted he had suffered a prior strike

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and admitted an aggravating

factor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for

eight years.

Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d

436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of

the facts, a statement of the case, and identifying three potentially arguable issues:

(1) whether defendant’s plea was constitutionally valid; (2) whether defendant’s waiver

of his right to appeal was valid; (3) and whether there was a factual basis for the plea.

We offered defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which

he has done. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. He

asserts that he should have been sentenced to double the midterm of three years, i.e., six

years, instead of double the upper term of four years. Defendant finally maintains he

took the plea under duress because his prior convictions were improperly used against

him because they were over 10 years old. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By felony complaint filed August 15, 2024, the People charged defendant with

assault with a firearm. The People further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior

strike convictions.

On September 9, 2024, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the

count 1 offense, admitted one of the prior strike convictions, and admitted an aggravating

factor. As part of the plea agreement, defendant initialed a provision reading, “I waive

2 and give up any right to appeal from any motion I may have brought or could bring and

from the conviction and judgment in my case since I am getting the benefit of my plea

bargain.” The parties stipulated that the police reports would provide the factual basis for

the plea.

The court expressed to defendant that pursuant to the plea agreement, the court

would sentence defendant “to the upper term of four years on Count 1. That will then be

doubled for the prior strike, for a total of eight years in state prison.” “By way of this

paperwork, you’re admitting an aggravating factor. That’s Number 14 in the Felony

Complaint—you have some prior convictions—and that allows the Court to impose that

upper term of four years, and then double it, for eight.”

The court asked if that was defendant’s understanding of the plea; defendant

responded, “Yes.” The court asked defendant whether he was entering the plea pursuant

to his own free will, to which defendant answered, “Yes.”

On October 8, 2014, the court noted that it had “read and reviewed the sentencing

report. This was an agreed upon resolution of this case between the parties. The Court

will follow the agreement, . . .”

The court “sentenced [defendant] to the upper term of four years in state prison.

[¶] Now, based on the admission of a prior strike under Penal Code Section 1170.12, that

four-year sentence will be doubled, for a total of eight years in state prison.” Defendant

appealed “based on the sentence or other matters that occurred after the plea and do not

affect its validity.”

3 II. DISCUSSION

First, defendant’s plea and admission, in and of themselves, constitute substantial

evidence that he committed the offense to which he pled. (People v. McGuire (1993)

14 Cal.App.4th 687, 697, fn. 12 [guilty plea concedes all elements of offense,

establishing sufficiency of the evidence of guilt]; People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th

296, 304-305, fn. 6.) Second, defendant forfeited any challenge to the plea by failing to

file a motion to withdraw it. (People v. Turner (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1412-1413.)

Third, any challenge to the plea requires issuance of a certificate of probable cause,

which defendant failed to request from the court below. (People v. Espinoza (2018)

22 Cal.App.5th 794, 803.)

Fourth, defendant expressly admitted an aggravating factor as part of his plea

agreement. Thus, the court properly sentenced defendant to double the upper term of

four years as contemplated by the plea agreement.

Fifth, the underlying conviction supporting a prior strike conviction allegation is

subject to no inherent age limit. (See People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 371-

372 [Appellate court affirmed trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss 31-

year-old strike conviction.].) Here, the People alleged two prior strike convictions, one

from 1991 and the other from 2012. Defendant admitted the prior strike conviction from

2012. He did not seek to dismiss either prior strike conviction allegation.

Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have

independently reviewed the record for potential error and find no arguable issues.

4 III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS J.

RAPHAEL J.