People v. Marshall

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Marshall

158 A.D.2d 475, 551 N.Y.S.2d 61, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1276

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 5, 1990

StatusPublished

This text of 158 A.D.2d 475 (People v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Marshall, 158 A.D.2d 475, 551 N.Y.S.2d 61, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1276 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

[476]*476The defendant cannot rely upon an alleged off-the-record assertion by his counsel that if the defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge under one indictment, the promised sentence would run concurrently with a sentence that might be imposed upon an anticipated finding that he violated a condition of a sentence of probation imposed under another indictment. The claim is belied by the record and in any event is no basis for vacatur of his guilty plea (see, People v Ramos, 63 NY2d 640; People v Cataldo, 39 NY2d 578; People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227). The Supreme Court therefore did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it denied his request for that relief without a hearing (see, CPL 220.60 [3]; People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927). Moreover, there was no improvident exercise of discretion when the court directed that the sentence imposed upon vacatur of the sentence of probation run consecutively to the sentence imposed under the subsequent indictment (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.

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[476]*476The defendant cannot rely upon an alleged off-the-record assertion by his counsel that if the defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge under one indictment, the promised sentence would run concurrently with a sentence that might be imposed upon an anticipated finding that he violated a condition of a sentence of probation imposed under another indictment. The claim is belied by the record and in any event is no basis for vacatur of his guilty plea (see, People v Ramos, 63 NY2d 640; People v Cataldo, 39 NY2d 578; People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227). The Supreme Court therefore did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it denied his request for that relief without a hearing (see, CPL 220.60 [3]; People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927). Moreover, there was no improvident exercise of discretion when the court directed that the sentence imposed upon vacatur of the sentence of probation run consecutively to the sentence imposed under the subsequent indictment (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80). Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

158 A.D.2d 475, 551 N.Y.S.2d 61, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-marshall-nyappdiv-1990.

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