NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 190494-U
Order filed August 17, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0494 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CM-152 ) INDEYA M. MARSHALL, ) Honorable ) Clark E. Erickson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lytton and Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of property.
¶2 Defendant, Indeya M. Marshall, appeals her conviction for battery. She argues that the
evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
she did not act in self-defense or defense of property. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The State charged defendant with battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2018)) and
criminal damage to property (id. § 21-1(a)(1)). It alleged that defendant, without legal
justification, knowingly caused bodily injury to Melody Corbett by spraying her in the face with
pepper spray. The State also alleged that defendant damaged Corbett’s television.
¶5 Evidence at defendant’s bench trial established that Corbett had a child with defendant’s
boyfriend, Jared Mosely. On the date of the incident, Mosley brought diapers to Corbett’s
apartment and defendant accompanied him. Defendant and Corbett presented different versions
of what happened next.
¶6 Corbett testified that after receiving the diapers, she began to leave her apartment. At that
time, defendant was standing at the door. When Corbett walked by the door, defendant said
“bitch” and pepper sprayed her. Defendant also knocked over a television that was in Corbett’s
apartment near the door.
¶7 Defendant testified that she remained in the passenger seat of Mosley’s car when Mosley
went to bring the diapers into Corbett’s apartment. Corbett exited the apartment and approached
the car, passing Mosley on the way. Corbett began pulling on the door handles, which were
locked, and “banging on” the passenger window. Defendant believed that Corbett was trying to
get her out of the car to fight her. Defendant stated she was afraid and, because she was afraid,
she partially rolled the window down and pepper sprayed Corbett.
¶8 Defendant also stated that, in a previous incident, Corbett followed defendant while
defendant was driving Mosley’s car. After defendant parked, Corbett began pulling on the door
handles and banging on the windows in an attempt to get her out of the car to fight. When
defendant refused, Corbett kicked and broke a mirror on the car.
2 ¶9 Mosley was called to testify by the defense. He stated that when he went to Corbett’s
apartment to drop off the diapers, defendant stayed in the car. As he was approaching the
apartment, Corbett walked past him and went to Mosley’s car. Corbett “was a little aggressive as
far as like in her speaking. And then she had grabbed the door handle a few times.” When asked
if Corbett did anything else to the car, Mosley replied that “she probably made a few like hand
gestures at the door. But she—for the most part, she was just pulling on the door handle try[ing]
to see if it was open or snatch the door open.”
¶ 10 The court found defendant guilty of battery, specifically noting that there was not an
imminent threat, she did not have a duty to protect Mosely’s car, and that she used excessive
force. While the court did not make a determination as to defendant’s credibility, it indicated that
its verdict was supported even if it accepted defendant’s testimony as true. The court found
defendant not guilty of criminal damage to property. It then sentenced her to 12 months of
probation. Defendant appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she did not act in self-
defense or defense of property because her testimony showed that she pepper sprayed Corbett
only after Corbett accosted her.
¶ 13 Because defendant presented evidence supporting the affirmative defenses of self-defense
and defense of property, “the State was required to disprove the affirmative defense[s] in
addition to proving the elements of the charged offense.” People v. Bausch, 2019 IL App (3d)
170001, ¶ 22. “The relevant standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant did not act in self-defense” or defense of property. People v. Lee, 213 Ill.
3 2d 218, 225 (2004). Witness credibility and the weight given to testimony are determinations left
to the trier of fact. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1991).
¶ 14 As charged in this case, to obtain a conviction for battery, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant “knowingly without legal justification” caused bodily harm to
Corbett. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2018). The only element at issue is whether
defendant’s act of pepper spraying Corbett was legally justified.
¶ 15 “A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such
other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” Id. § 7-1(a). For a defendant’s acts to constitute self-
defense, “the danger of harm [must be] imminent.” Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225. If the State negates
any element of self-defense, the claim fails. Id.
¶ 16 Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could easily find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense because
there was no imminent danger of harm. Specifically, defendant was in a locked vehicle. She had
to remove a barrier—the window—in order to pepper spray Corbett. Further, defendant’s own
witness, Mosley, testified that Corbett was merely “pulling on the door handle.”
¶ 17 Turning to defense of property, “[a] person is justified in the use of force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or
terminate such other’s trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with” property in his
possession or the possession of an immediate family or household member. 720 ILCS 5/7-3(a)
(West 2018).
¶ 18 Here, as noted above, defendant’s own witness, Mosley, testified that Corbett was simply
pulling on the door handle, trying to open the door. Further, Mosley was the owner of the car and
4 he walked past Corbett knowing she was approaching the vehicle and was angry at seeing
defendant in the vehicle. Defendant knew Mosley would return shortly as he was simply
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 190494-U
Order filed August 17, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0494 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CM-152 ) INDEYA M. MARSHALL, ) Honorable ) Clark E. Erickson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lytton and Wright concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of property.
¶2 Defendant, Indeya M. Marshall, appeals her conviction for battery. She argues that the
evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
she did not act in self-defense or defense of property. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The State charged defendant with battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2018)) and
criminal damage to property (id. § 21-1(a)(1)). It alleged that defendant, without legal
justification, knowingly caused bodily injury to Melody Corbett by spraying her in the face with
pepper spray. The State also alleged that defendant damaged Corbett’s television.
¶5 Evidence at defendant’s bench trial established that Corbett had a child with defendant’s
boyfriend, Jared Mosely. On the date of the incident, Mosley brought diapers to Corbett’s
apartment and defendant accompanied him. Defendant and Corbett presented different versions
of what happened next.
¶6 Corbett testified that after receiving the diapers, she began to leave her apartment. At that
time, defendant was standing at the door. When Corbett walked by the door, defendant said
“bitch” and pepper sprayed her. Defendant also knocked over a television that was in Corbett’s
apartment near the door.
¶7 Defendant testified that she remained in the passenger seat of Mosley’s car when Mosley
went to bring the diapers into Corbett’s apartment. Corbett exited the apartment and approached
the car, passing Mosley on the way. Corbett began pulling on the door handles, which were
locked, and “banging on” the passenger window. Defendant believed that Corbett was trying to
get her out of the car to fight her. Defendant stated she was afraid and, because she was afraid,
she partially rolled the window down and pepper sprayed Corbett.
¶8 Defendant also stated that, in a previous incident, Corbett followed defendant while
defendant was driving Mosley’s car. After defendant parked, Corbett began pulling on the door
handles and banging on the windows in an attempt to get her out of the car to fight. When
defendant refused, Corbett kicked and broke a mirror on the car.
2 ¶9 Mosley was called to testify by the defense. He stated that when he went to Corbett’s
apartment to drop off the diapers, defendant stayed in the car. As he was approaching the
apartment, Corbett walked past him and went to Mosley’s car. Corbett “was a little aggressive as
far as like in her speaking. And then she had grabbed the door handle a few times.” When asked
if Corbett did anything else to the car, Mosley replied that “she probably made a few like hand
gestures at the door. But she—for the most part, she was just pulling on the door handle try[ing]
to see if it was open or snatch the door open.”
¶ 10 The court found defendant guilty of battery, specifically noting that there was not an
imminent threat, she did not have a duty to protect Mosely’s car, and that she used excessive
force. While the court did not make a determination as to defendant’s credibility, it indicated that
its verdict was supported even if it accepted defendant’s testimony as true. The court found
defendant not guilty of criminal damage to property. It then sentenced her to 12 months of
probation. Defendant appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she did not act in self-
defense or defense of property because her testimony showed that she pepper sprayed Corbett
only after Corbett accosted her.
¶ 13 Because defendant presented evidence supporting the affirmative defenses of self-defense
and defense of property, “the State was required to disprove the affirmative defense[s] in
addition to proving the elements of the charged offense.” People v. Bausch, 2019 IL App (3d)
170001, ¶ 22. “The relevant standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant did not act in self-defense” or defense of property. People v. Lee, 213 Ill.
3 2d 218, 225 (2004). Witness credibility and the weight given to testimony are determinations left
to the trier of fact. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1991).
¶ 14 As charged in this case, to obtain a conviction for battery, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant “knowingly without legal justification” caused bodily harm to
Corbett. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2018). The only element at issue is whether
defendant’s act of pepper spraying Corbett was legally justified.
¶ 15 “A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such
other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” Id. § 7-1(a). For a defendant’s acts to constitute self-
defense, “the danger of harm [must be] imminent.” Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225. If the State negates
any element of self-defense, the claim fails. Id.
¶ 16 Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could easily find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense because
there was no imminent danger of harm. Specifically, defendant was in a locked vehicle. She had
to remove a barrier—the window—in order to pepper spray Corbett. Further, defendant’s own
witness, Mosley, testified that Corbett was merely “pulling on the door handle.”
¶ 17 Turning to defense of property, “[a] person is justified in the use of force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or
terminate such other’s trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with” property in his
possession or the possession of an immediate family or household member. 720 ILCS 5/7-3(a)
(West 2018).
¶ 18 Here, as noted above, defendant’s own witness, Mosley, testified that Corbett was simply
pulling on the door handle, trying to open the door. Further, Mosley was the owner of the car and
4 he walked past Corbett knowing she was approaching the vehicle and was angry at seeing
defendant in the vehicle. Defendant knew Mosley would return shortly as he was simply
dropping diapers off at Corbett’s apartment. Moreover, there was no evidence presented that
defendant actually had any belief that she needed to pepper spray Corbett to protect the car. In
fact, her own testimony was that she pepper sprayed Corbett because she was afraid. She never
stated that she did so to protect the car. Based on these facts, a rational trier of fact could
determine that defendant did not reasonably believe her conduct was necessary to protect the
vehicle from Corbett.
¶ 19 Alternatively, we note that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and
accepting Corbett’s testimony that defendant attacked her completely unprovoked as true, the
evidence is patently sufficient to disprove both affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, defendant argues that the circuit court found Corbett at least partially incredible by
finding defendant not guilty of criminal damage to property. Thus, we predominantly rely on
defendant’s and Mosely’s testimony and discount Corbett’s testimony—as the circuit court
apparently did in reaching its ruling. See Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 95.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
¶ 22 Affirmed.