People v. Marcio

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Marcio

240 A.D.2d 594, 659 N.Y.S.2d 983, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6912

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 16, 1997

StatusPublished

This text of 240 A.D.2d 594 (People v. Marcio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Marcio, 240 A.D.2d 594, 659 N.Y.S.2d 983, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6912 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.), rendered October 6, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of petit larceny, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; and as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

As correctly conceded by the People, petit larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery in the second degree and, under the circumstances, the former count should have been dismissed pursuant to CPL 300.40 (3) (b) (see, Matter of Jamal M., 187 AD2d 654).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Thompson and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.), rendered October 6, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of petit larceny, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; and as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

As correctly conceded by the People, petit larceny is a lesser-included offense of robbery in the second degree and, under the circumstances, the former count should have been dismissed pursuant to CPL 300.40 (3) (b) (see, Matter of Jamal M., 187 AD2d 654).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Thompson and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

240 A.D.2d 594, 659 N.Y.S.2d 983, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6912, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-marcio-nyappdiv-1997.

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