Filed 10/17/23 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E079991
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1700495)
DANNY MANZO, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge.
Reversed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Gary S. Rogh, and Kristen J. Allison, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
1 I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant, The Riverside County District Attorney appeals the trial
court’s dismissal of three felony charges against defendant and respondent Danny Manzo
due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after
filing charges against defendant. Because there is no evidence that the loss of evidence
prejudiced defendant, we reverse the order dismissing the complaint.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 1, 2017, defendant was pulled over for using his cell phone while
driving. After learning that defendant was driving with a suspended license, the officer
ordered him out of the car. According to the officer, defendant admitted there was a gun
in the car. The officer searched the car and found a gun and a methamphetamine pipe
with drug residue. The officer then learned that defendant was a convicted felon and
arrested him.
While defendant was out on bail, he was arrested a few weeks later in San
Bernardino County for armed robbery and booked into San Bernardino County jail,
where he remained until May 2017, when he was sentenced to eight years in prison for
the robbery.
In February 2017, however, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a
complaint charging defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,
2 § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 2),
and possessing a loaded firearm while under the influence of a controlled substance
(Health & Safety Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 3). Defendant did not appear at his
arraignment on February 15, 2017, so his bail was forfeited, and a warrant for his arrest
issued.
Five years later, after defendant completed his sentence in the San Bernardino
robbery case, he was arrested and arraigned on the outstanding charges in Riverside
County in April 2022. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the
delay in prosecuting him violated his due process rights under article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution. Defendant claimed that the delay between the filing of charges
against him and his arraignment prejudiced him for several reasons, including that video
footage of his arrest from the officer’s dashcam was no longer available. In opposition,
the District Attorney’s only argument was that defendant suffered no actual prejudice
from the delay.
The trial court found that the missing dashcam footage caused defendant
prejudice. The court reasoned: “The existence of the dashcam is problematic. I tend to
agree with the prosecution that the loss of any dashcam footage can be prejudicial to
prosecution of the case just as much as it might be prejudicial to defense. But I think that
that doesn’t obviate the fact that there is some prejudice that ensued to the defense from
the unavailability of such evidence, which could possibly substantiate defense claims that
the circumstances of the arrest were not as claimed by the law enforcement agency
3 performing the arrest. I think to some extent that that does constitute prejudice.” The
court therefore granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The District
Attorney timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
The District Attorney argues the trial court erred in dismissing the case because
defendant suffered no prejudice from the delay. We agree.
Under article I, section 15 California constitution, an unreasonable post-complaint
delay constitutes a denial of the right to a speedy trial. (Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 734, 739-740.) To warrant dismissal on such grounds, the defendant must first
show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. (Id. at p. 740.) The showing of actual
prejudice must be made on competent evidence and “must be supported by particular
facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.” (Crockett v. Superior Court (1975)
14 Cal.3d 433, 442.) Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice.
(See, e.g., People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 923; People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th
891, 909; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 875-876 (Alexander).) Instead, the
defendant must affirmatively demonstrate having suffered actual prejudice as a result of
the delay, not just the possibility of prejudice. (People v. Abel, supra, at p. 909.)
If—and only if—the defendant shows actual prejudice from a delayed prosecution,
“the prosecution must show justification for the delay. If the prosecution does that, the
trial court must balance the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay against the
4 prosecution’s justification for the delay. [Citation.]” (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th
937, 942.) “[T]he more reasonable the delay, the more prejudice the defense would have
to show to require dismissal.” (Ibarra v. Municipal Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 853,
858.) But if the defendant fails to satisfy the initial burden of showing actual prejudice,
“there is no need to determine whether the delay was justified.” (People v. Jones, supra,
57 Cal.4th at 921.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial delay for an
abuse of discretion and defer to any underlying factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431.) Whether a delay is
prejudicial is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence. (Alexander,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 874.)
There is no evidence that the missing dashcam footage prejudiced defendant in
any way. He offered only unsupported speculation that the footage had exculpatory value
in that it might have contradicted the arresting officer’s version of events. But “‘[t]he
showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be presumed.’” (People v.
Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37, italics added.) Speculation is not enough. (People v.
Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 909.)
For instance, in People v. Lewis (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 203, the defendant argued
“that he was prejudiced by the loss of the child welfare agency, police, prosecution, and
court records.” He claimed that “the lost records might have contained information he
could have used to impeach” the victim. (Id. at p. 212.) The Lewis court rejected the
5 defendant’s argument that the loss of the records prejudiced him because it was “wholly
speculative.” Like defendant here, the defendant in Lewis failed to make any showing
that the lost records had exculpatory value, so it was “entirely speculative” that he was
prejudiced by their disappearance. (Id. at p. 213.)
Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th 846 is also instructive. There, the defendant claimed
that he was prejudiced by the loss of witness interview audio tapes. He argued that the
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Filed 10/17/23 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E079991
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1700495)
DANNY MANZO, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge.
Reversed.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Gary S. Rogh, and Kristen J. Allison, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Respondent.
1 I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant, The Riverside County District Attorney appeals the trial
court’s dismissal of three felony charges against defendant and respondent Danny Manzo
due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after
filing charges against defendant. Because there is no evidence that the loss of evidence
prejudiced defendant, we reverse the order dismissing the complaint.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 1, 2017, defendant was pulled over for using his cell phone while
driving. After learning that defendant was driving with a suspended license, the officer
ordered him out of the car. According to the officer, defendant admitted there was a gun
in the car. The officer searched the car and found a gun and a methamphetamine pipe
with drug residue. The officer then learned that defendant was a convicted felon and
arrested him.
While defendant was out on bail, he was arrested a few weeks later in San
Bernardino County for armed robbery and booked into San Bernardino County jail,
where he remained until May 2017, when he was sentenced to eight years in prison for
the robbery.
In February 2017, however, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a
complaint charging defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,
2 § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 2),
and possessing a loaded firearm while under the influence of a controlled substance
(Health & Safety Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 3). Defendant did not appear at his
arraignment on February 15, 2017, so his bail was forfeited, and a warrant for his arrest
issued.
Five years later, after defendant completed his sentence in the San Bernardino
robbery case, he was arrested and arraigned on the outstanding charges in Riverside
County in April 2022. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the
delay in prosecuting him violated his due process rights under article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution. Defendant claimed that the delay between the filing of charges
against him and his arraignment prejudiced him for several reasons, including that video
footage of his arrest from the officer’s dashcam was no longer available. In opposition,
the District Attorney’s only argument was that defendant suffered no actual prejudice
from the delay.
The trial court found that the missing dashcam footage caused defendant
prejudice. The court reasoned: “The existence of the dashcam is problematic. I tend to
agree with the prosecution that the loss of any dashcam footage can be prejudicial to
prosecution of the case just as much as it might be prejudicial to defense. But I think that
that doesn’t obviate the fact that there is some prejudice that ensued to the defense from
the unavailability of such evidence, which could possibly substantiate defense claims that
the circumstances of the arrest were not as claimed by the law enforcement agency
3 performing the arrest. I think to some extent that that does constitute prejudice.” The
court therefore granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The District
Attorney timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
The District Attorney argues the trial court erred in dismissing the case because
defendant suffered no prejudice from the delay. We agree.
Under article I, section 15 California constitution, an unreasonable post-complaint
delay constitutes a denial of the right to a speedy trial. (Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 734, 739-740.) To warrant dismissal on such grounds, the defendant must first
show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. (Id. at p. 740.) The showing of actual
prejudice must be made on competent evidence and “must be supported by particular
facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.” (Crockett v. Superior Court (1975)
14 Cal.3d 433, 442.) Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice.
(See, e.g., People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 923; People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th
891, 909; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 875-876 (Alexander).) Instead, the
defendant must affirmatively demonstrate having suffered actual prejudice as a result of
the delay, not just the possibility of prejudice. (People v. Abel, supra, at p. 909.)
If—and only if—the defendant shows actual prejudice from a delayed prosecution,
“the prosecution must show justification for the delay. If the prosecution does that, the
trial court must balance the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay against the
4 prosecution’s justification for the delay. [Citation.]” (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th
937, 942.) “[T]he more reasonable the delay, the more prejudice the defense would have
to show to require dismissal.” (Ibarra v. Municipal Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 853,
858.) But if the defendant fails to satisfy the initial burden of showing actual prejudice,
“there is no need to determine whether the delay was justified.” (People v. Jones, supra,
57 Cal.4th at 921.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial delay for an
abuse of discretion and defer to any underlying factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431.) Whether a delay is
prejudicial is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence. (Alexander,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 874.)
There is no evidence that the missing dashcam footage prejudiced defendant in
any way. He offered only unsupported speculation that the footage had exculpatory value
in that it might have contradicted the arresting officer’s version of events. But “‘[t]he
showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be presumed.’” (People v.
Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37, italics added.) Speculation is not enough. (People v.
Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 909.)
For instance, in People v. Lewis (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 203, the defendant argued
“that he was prejudiced by the loss of the child welfare agency, police, prosecution, and
court records.” He claimed that “the lost records might have contained information he
could have used to impeach” the victim. (Id. at p. 212.) The Lewis court rejected the
5 defendant’s argument that the loss of the records prejudiced him because it was “wholly
speculative.” Like defendant here, the defendant in Lewis failed to make any showing
that the lost records had exculpatory value, so it was “entirely speculative” that he was
prejudiced by their disappearance. (Id. at p. 213.)
Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th 846 is also instructive. There, the defendant claimed
that he was prejudiced by the loss of witness interview audio tapes. He argued that the
tapes “may have included statements not contained in, or that contradicted, the
investigators’ reports or witnesses’ testimony.” (Id. at p. 875.) Our Supreme Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the loss of the tapes prejudiced him because it was
“based on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.” (Ibid.)
So too here. As the trial court acknowledged, the missing dashcam footage might
help defendant’s case, but it is entirely possible that it could help the prosecution’s case.
Although the footage could have contradicted the officer’s version of events, it also could
have confirmed it. As it stands, nothing in the record suggests that the footage had any
exculpatory value. Defendant’s claim of prejudice is therefore based wholly “on
speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.” (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 875.)
Defendant argues otherwise, relying on People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1313 (Mirenda), and People v. Cave (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 957 (Cave), but both cases are
distinguishable. In Mirenda, the defendant was actually prejudiced by the 26-year delay
between the filing of charges and the actual prosecution of the case, the death of a key
witness, and “the irreparable fading of memory,” all of which resulted in “the complete
6 inability to mount a defense.” (Mirenda, supra, at p. 1333.) The defendant in Cave was
also actually prejudiced by the prosecution’s “‘purposeful’” delay, which resulted in the
disappearance of a “material witness”—an informant who was the only witness to an
undercover operation where the defendant sold heroin to an undercover officer. (Cave,
supra, at p. 965; see also People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 430 [“Prejudice may
be shown by [the] ‘“loss of material witnesses”’ . . .”].) But here the only lost evidence is
the dashcam footage, which could be immaterial or even harmful to defendant’s case.
Because nothing in the record shows that the loss of this evidence hurts defendant’s case,
defendant failed to meet his burden of showing its disappearance actually prejudiced him.
In short, there is no substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that
defendant was prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting him and the resultant loss of the
dashcam footage. We therefore reverse the order dismissing the complaint.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing the complaint is reversed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.