.\ I
19 2
4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5
6 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF168-11 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 7 ) ) 8 ) vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER 9 ) (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second ) and Third Charges of Indictment) 10 CLAYTON NOEL MANTANONA ) DOB: 02/11/1993 ) 11 ) Defendant. ) 12 ) ) 13
14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter carne before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on August 15, 2012, for a 16
17 hearing on Clayton Noel Mantanona's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Second and Third
18 Charges of the Indictment. Assistant Alternate Public Defender Jeffrey L. Warfield, Sr.
19 appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Assistant Attorney General Brian D. Gallagher appeared 20 on behalf of the People of Guam ("the People"). Upon review of the evidence, oral and written 21 arguments, and legal authorities presented by both attorneys, the Court hereby issues this 22
23 Decision and Order DENYING Defendant's Motion.
24 BACKGROUND 25 Defendant was indicted on April 7, 2011, charged with the following: (1) First Degree 26 nd Criminal Sexual Conduct (As a 1st Degree Felony) (2) Kidnapping (As a 2 Degree Felony) (2 27 counts) and (3) Felonious Restraint (As a 3rd Degree Felony). Indictment (Apr. 7,2011). On 28
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-1l) Page I of7 Decision and Ordcr - Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment April 13, 2011, Defendant pled not guilty and waived his right to a speedy trial. Super. Ct. of 1
2 Guam Minute Entry Log No. 14903 (Apr. 13,2011) and Assertion or Waiver of Speedy Trial &
3 Request for Jury of Twelve in Felonv Case (Apr. 14,2011). On March 5,2012, Defendant filed 4 a Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Charges of the Indictment. Subsequently, an Ex 5 Parte Motion to Withdraw was filed by Public Defender Services Corporation on March 21, 6
2012. As a result, jury selection initially set for April 9, 2012, was vacated. Alternate Public 7
8 Defender now represents the Defendant.
9 Criminal Trial Settings were set on May 7, 2012, June 4, 2012, and July 9, 2012. At the 10 July 9, 2012, Criminal Trial Setting, it was represented to the Court that the motion to dismiss 11 filed by previous defense counsel would be adopted. Accordingly, the Court set the motion 12
13 hearing for August 15,2012 at 9:30 a.m.
14 DISCUSSION 15 I. Second Charge in Indictment 16 Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the second and third charges in the Indictment. 17 He argues that the "second charge of kidnapping must be dismissed because alleged victim was 18
19 not carried a 'substantial distance from the vicinity where she was found' within the meaning of
20 the kidnapping statute." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 21 Second & Third Charges of the Indictment at 2 (Mar. 5, 2012).1 The People oppose 22 Defendant's motion arguing that Defendant "has misrepresented New Jersey law to the 23
[C]ourt." People's Brief in Opposition to Defs Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Apr. 2, 2012). Further, 24
25 the People contend that the New Jersey statute defines kidnapping in part by using the words
26 "unlawfully removing a person from where he/she is found." Id. 27
28 I The Court notes for consistency that Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities references another Defendant in its footnote on P. 4.
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-11) Page 2 of7 Decision and Order Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment The second charge of the Indictment allege as follows: 1
2 SECOND CHARGE
3 On or about March 29, 2011, in Guam, CLAYTON NOEL MANTANONA did commit the offense of Kidnapping, in that he intentionally and unlawfully 4 removed another, namely CM.A. (DOB: 0612411994), a substantial distance from 5 the vicinity where she was found, to facilitate the commission of a felony, that is First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, in violation of 9 GCA § 22.20(a)(2) and 6 (b), as amended. 7 Guam law defines kidnapping as follows: 8 (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his 9 place of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found; or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial 10 period, with any of the following purposes: 11 (1) to hold for ransom or reward; (2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; 12 (3) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or (4) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. 13
14 9 GCA § 22.20 (a) (2005) (emphasis added). 15 Guam law further provides that removal or confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished by 16 force, threat or deception. See 9 GCA § 22.20(c) (2005). 17 Defendant and the People agree that since Guam's kidnapping statutes were adopted 18
19 from New Jersey, that state's law controls. Defendant primarily cites to State v. Masino, 466
20 A.2d 955 (N.l 1983), a case decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In Masino, the 21 Supreme Court of New Jersey held that one is transported a "substantial distance" for purposes 22 of kidnapping statute if that asportation is criminally significant in sense of being more than 23 merely incidental to the underlying crime, and the jury could have properly determined that 24
25 defendant removed victim a substantial distance, so that he was properly convicted of
26 kidnapping. In adopting the kidnapping statute, Masino points out that the New Jersey 27
People ofGuarn v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-ll) Page 3 of7 Decision and Order Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment Legislature intended to exclude from kidnapping incidental movement of victim during 1
2 commission of crime which does not substantially increase risk of harm to victim.
3 Defendant argues that "[t]he evidence clearly does not meet the substantial distance 4 component." He contends that First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct already contains an 5 element of force and coercion and thus the carrying of the alleged victim from the front door to 6
the bedroom which involves force and used to prove "substantial distance" under the 7
8 kidnapping statute is only incidental to the underlying crime of First Degree Criminal Sexual
9 Conduct." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Second & Third 10 Charges of the Indictment at 3 (Mar. 5, 2012). In addition, Defendant argues that there was no 11 removal from the vicinity of the home as the alleged victim only moved from one room of the 12
13 house to another room of the house. Id.
14 Masino cites to the Model Penal Code recalling that the removal of the victim from the 15 protection of his friends and his sovereign was kidnapping's prime danger. Masino, 466 A.2d 16 955, 957 (N.J. 1983). Further, the Model Penal Code as cited in Masino, suggested that 17 "experience had demonstrated that 'distance and isolation could be achieved within the realm, 18
19 and that even distance was not essential to isolating a victim from the law and his friends.'" Id.
20 The requirement of asportation in the context of a prosecution of kidnapping is satisfied if there 21 is movement of the victim, however slight. Griffin v. State, 282 Ga. 647 (2007). In the instant 22 case, it is alleged that the victim "ran from [Defendant] towards the front door." Magistrate's 23
Complaint at Declaration (Mar. 30,2012). The element of the charge was that [Defendant] had 24
25 allegedly carried the alleged victim from the front door of the home to the bedroom where the
26 sexual act occurred." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
.\ I
19 2
4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5
6 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF168-11 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 7 ) ) 8 ) vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER 9 ) (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second ) and Third Charges of Indictment) 10 CLAYTON NOEL MANTANONA ) DOB: 02/11/1993 ) 11 ) Defendant. ) 12 ) ) 13
14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter carne before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on August 15, 2012, for a 16
17 hearing on Clayton Noel Mantanona's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Second and Third
18 Charges of the Indictment. Assistant Alternate Public Defender Jeffrey L. Warfield, Sr.
19 appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Assistant Attorney General Brian D. Gallagher appeared 20 on behalf of the People of Guam ("the People"). Upon review of the evidence, oral and written 21 arguments, and legal authorities presented by both attorneys, the Court hereby issues this 22
23 Decision and Order DENYING Defendant's Motion.
24 BACKGROUND 25 Defendant was indicted on April 7, 2011, charged with the following: (1) First Degree 26 nd Criminal Sexual Conduct (As a 1st Degree Felony) (2) Kidnapping (As a 2 Degree Felony) (2 27 counts) and (3) Felonious Restraint (As a 3rd Degree Felony). Indictment (Apr. 7,2011). On 28
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-1l) Page I of7 Decision and Ordcr - Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment April 13, 2011, Defendant pled not guilty and waived his right to a speedy trial. Super. Ct. of 1
2 Guam Minute Entry Log No. 14903 (Apr. 13,2011) and Assertion or Waiver of Speedy Trial &
3 Request for Jury of Twelve in Felonv Case (Apr. 14,2011). On March 5,2012, Defendant filed 4 a Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Charges of the Indictment. Subsequently, an Ex 5 Parte Motion to Withdraw was filed by Public Defender Services Corporation on March 21, 6
2012. As a result, jury selection initially set for April 9, 2012, was vacated. Alternate Public 7
8 Defender now represents the Defendant.
9 Criminal Trial Settings were set on May 7, 2012, June 4, 2012, and July 9, 2012. At the 10 July 9, 2012, Criminal Trial Setting, it was represented to the Court that the motion to dismiss 11 filed by previous defense counsel would be adopted. Accordingly, the Court set the motion 12
13 hearing for August 15,2012 at 9:30 a.m.
14 DISCUSSION 15 I. Second Charge in Indictment 16 Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the second and third charges in the Indictment. 17 He argues that the "second charge of kidnapping must be dismissed because alleged victim was 18
19 not carried a 'substantial distance from the vicinity where she was found' within the meaning of
20 the kidnapping statute." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 21 Second & Third Charges of the Indictment at 2 (Mar. 5, 2012).1 The People oppose 22 Defendant's motion arguing that Defendant "has misrepresented New Jersey law to the 23
[C]ourt." People's Brief in Opposition to Defs Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Apr. 2, 2012). Further, 24
25 the People contend that the New Jersey statute defines kidnapping in part by using the words
26 "unlawfully removing a person from where he/she is found." Id. 27
28 I The Court notes for consistency that Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities references another Defendant in its footnote on P. 4.
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-11) Page 2 of7 Decision and Order Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment The second charge of the Indictment allege as follows: 1
2 SECOND CHARGE
3 On or about March 29, 2011, in Guam, CLAYTON NOEL MANTANONA did commit the offense of Kidnapping, in that he intentionally and unlawfully 4 removed another, namely CM.A. (DOB: 0612411994), a substantial distance from 5 the vicinity where she was found, to facilitate the commission of a felony, that is First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, in violation of 9 GCA § 22.20(a)(2) and 6 (b), as amended. 7 Guam law defines kidnapping as follows: 8 (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his 9 place of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found; or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial 10 period, with any of the following purposes: 11 (1) to hold for ransom or reward; (2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; 12 (3) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or (4) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. 13
14 9 GCA § 22.20 (a) (2005) (emphasis added). 15 Guam law further provides that removal or confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished by 16 force, threat or deception. See 9 GCA § 22.20(c) (2005). 17 Defendant and the People agree that since Guam's kidnapping statutes were adopted 18
19 from New Jersey, that state's law controls. Defendant primarily cites to State v. Masino, 466
20 A.2d 955 (N.l 1983), a case decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In Masino, the 21 Supreme Court of New Jersey held that one is transported a "substantial distance" for purposes 22 of kidnapping statute if that asportation is criminally significant in sense of being more than 23 merely incidental to the underlying crime, and the jury could have properly determined that 24
25 defendant removed victim a substantial distance, so that he was properly convicted of
26 kidnapping. In adopting the kidnapping statute, Masino points out that the New Jersey 27
People ofGuarn v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-ll) Page 3 of7 Decision and Order Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment Legislature intended to exclude from kidnapping incidental movement of victim during 1
2 commission of crime which does not substantially increase risk of harm to victim.
3 Defendant argues that "[t]he evidence clearly does not meet the substantial distance 4 component." He contends that First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct already contains an 5 element of force and coercion and thus the carrying of the alleged victim from the front door to 6
the bedroom which involves force and used to prove "substantial distance" under the 7
8 kidnapping statute is only incidental to the underlying crime of First Degree Criminal Sexual
9 Conduct." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Second & Third 10 Charges of the Indictment at 3 (Mar. 5, 2012). In addition, Defendant argues that there was no 11 removal from the vicinity of the home as the alleged victim only moved from one room of the 12
13 house to another room of the house. Id.
14 Masino cites to the Model Penal Code recalling that the removal of the victim from the 15 protection of his friends and his sovereign was kidnapping's prime danger. Masino, 466 A.2d 16 955, 957 (N.J. 1983). Further, the Model Penal Code as cited in Masino, suggested that 17 "experience had demonstrated that 'distance and isolation could be achieved within the realm, 18
19 and that even distance was not essential to isolating a victim from the law and his friends.'" Id.
20 The requirement of asportation in the context of a prosecution of kidnapping is satisfied if there 21 is movement of the victim, however slight. Griffin v. State, 282 Ga. 647 (2007). In the instant 22 case, it is alleged that the victim "ran from [Defendant] towards the front door." Magistrate's 23
Complaint at Declaration (Mar. 30,2012). The element of the charge was that [Defendant] had 24
25 allegedly carried the alleged victim from the front door of the home to the bedroom where the
26 sexual act occurred." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 27 Second & Third Charges of the Indictment at 2 (Mar. 5, 2012). "Once in the room, [victim] 28
People ofGumn v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-11) Page 4 of7 Decision and Order Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment attempted to flee again. [Defendant] stopped her, shut the door, and locked it." Magistrate's 1
2 Complaint at Declaration (Mar. 30, 2012). The Supreme Court of California "repeatedly stated
3 no minimum distance is required to satisfy asportation requirement and actual distance must be 4 considered in context, including the nature of the crime and its environment." People v. 5 Robertson, 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 986 (2012). 6
In effect, after considering New Jersey law and California's interpretation of "substantial 7
8 distance," the Court agrees with the People that these are matters to be determined by a jury.
9 There is sufficient evidence to establish the enhanced risk of harm resulting from asportation 10 and isolation of the victim. Likewise, because Guam's kidnapping statute further provides for 11 such removal or confinement to be unlawful if accomplished by force, the Court is convinced 12
13 that the elements of the alleged offense of kidnapping was criminally significant in sense of
14 being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime of First Degree Criminal Sexual 15 Conduct. The unlawful removal by force after the Victim attempted to flee is enough to satisfy 16 the requisite elements of kidnapping as charged in the Indictment. 17 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Charge 18
19 of the Indictment.
20 II. Third Charge of Indictment 21 Defendant also moves to dismiss the third charge in the Indictment. Defendant argues 22 that the "third charge of felonious restraint must be dismissed because there was no evidence 23
before the grand jury of serious bodily injury." Defs Memo of Points & Authorities in Support 24
25 of Mot. to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of the Indictment at 4 (Mar. 5, 2012). Defendant
26 specifically contends that "[t]here is no evidence of exposure of risks of serious bodily injury as 27 that term is defined in 9 GCA § 16.10 (c)." !d. The People oppose dismissal of the third charge 28
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-11) Page 5 of7 Decision and Ordcr Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment arguing that "the victim surely suffered, and she was injured. Whether this rises to the level of 1
2 serious bodily injury is a question of fact, not of law." People's Brief in Opposition to Def's
3 Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Apr. 2, 2012). Defendant refutes that the issue relative to felonious is not 4 an issue for the jury. Transcript JDAASCRA at 10:12:39 (Aug. 15,2012). He further contends 5 that "at this point there are no facts that meet the lawful definition of serious bodily injury." Id. 6
at 10: 12:46. 7
8 The third charge of the Indictment allege as follows:
9 THIRD CHARGE 10 On or about March 29,2011, in Guam, CLAYTON NOEL MANTANONA did 11 commit the offense of Felonious Restraint, in that he did knowingly restrain another, that is C.M.A. (DOB: 0612411994), unlawfully in circumstances exposing 12 C.M.A. (DOB: 0612411994) to risk of serious bodily injury, in violation of9 GCA 13 §§ 22.30(a) and 80.30.
14 Guam law defines felonious restraint as follows:
15 A person commits a felony of the third degree ifhe knowingly: 16 (a) restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or 17 (b) holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 18 9 GCA § 22.30 (2005). 19 The People argue that "whether the victim was exposed to a risk of serious bodily injury, 20 and whether the psychological trauma she suffered as a result of being sexually assaulted 21
22 amounts to a bodily injury." People's Brief in Opposition to Def's Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Apr. 2,
23 2012). "[T]he terms bodily injury and serious bodily injury have the meanings provided by § 24 16.10." 9 GCA § 22.10 (2005). 25 (c) Serious Bodily Injury means bodily injury which creates: serious permanent 26 disfigurement; a substantial risk or death or serious, permanent disfigurement, severe or intense physical pain or protracted loss or impairment of consciousness 27 or of the function of any bodily member or organ; 28
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CFI68-1l) Pagc 6 of7 Decision and Ordcr - Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment 9 GCA § 16.10 (c) (2005). 1
2 Notwithstanding the People's response centered on psychological trauma, severe or
3 intense physical pain also qualify as a basis for the Victim's exposure to risk of serious bodily 4 injury as defined by statute. Based on the third charge of the Indictment and the surrounding 5 allegations therein, there is sufficient information to consider the circumstances of such serious 6
bodily injury to sustain the charge of felonious restraint. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 7
8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Third Charge of the Indictment.
9 CONCLUSION 10 By preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing reasons, the Court 11 DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second and Third Charges ofIndictment. 12
This matter is set for Trial Setting on October 22,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 13
14 SO ORDERED this liday of OCTOBER, 2012.
20 /HONORAB~E ANITA A. SU~ Judge, Superior Court of Guam 21
People of Guam v. Clayton N. Mantanona (CF168-1l) Page 70[7 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss Second & Third Charges of Indictment