Filed 10/10/25 P. v. Major CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082616
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1303646)
JAMES MARCEL MAJOR, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios (Joe) Hernandez,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded.
William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen Chenelia and Daniel
Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 At a hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the court denied defendant
and appellant James Marcel Major’s request for a full resentencing hearing. On appeal,
defendant contended this court should reverse the order and remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to hold a full resentencing hearing. We affirmed.
On September 3, 2025, the California Supreme Court issued an order directing us
to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Rhodius (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). We vacated our decision and offered the parties the opportunity
to file supplemental briefs, which they waived. We reverse and remand the matter with
directions.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2014, defendant pled guilty to assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246), prohibited possession
of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)). Defendant also admitted that he personally used of a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). Defendant further admitted that he had suffered a prior a serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(e)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to its indicated 21-year prison term. The court
imposed but stayed punishment on the prior prison term enhancement.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 At a section 1172.75 hearing on November 14, 2023, the court denied defendant’s
requests to strike his prior prison term enhancement and afford him a full resentencing
hearing.
Defendant appealed. We affirmed the court’s order because defendant’s judgment
included a prior prison term upon which the court had stayed punishment; thus, we held
that since defendant was not serving a term of imprisonment for the enhancement, he was
not entitled to a full resentencing hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
“In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the
Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136),
which amended section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) to eliminate prior-prison-term
enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made this change
retroactive. It enacted Penal Code section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), later
renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.75 (section 1172.75)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), which declares: ‘Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined
in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.’
[Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
3 “A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid
enhancement is entitled to resentencing. [Citation.] To facilitate the process, the statute
directs California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to ‘identify
those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] Upon receiving that information,
the sentencing court must ‘review the judgment and verify that the current judgment
includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] ‘If the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision
(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ [Citation.] The
statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of
‘individuals . . . currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement’ and ‘all other
individuals.’ [Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing
once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies:
‘Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.’ [Citation.] The trial court must ‘apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council’ as well as ‘any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
4 promote uniformity of sentencing.’ [Citation.] In addition, the court may ‘consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’
[Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
“[S]ection 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment
includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020,
regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed. [Citation.]”
(Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
Here, defendant’s judgment included a stayed prior prison term enhancement that
was imposed before January 1, 2020. The prior prison term was not for a sexually violent
offense. At the section 1172.75 hearing, the court denied defendant’s request for a full
resentencing hearing. Thus, pursuant to Rhodius, the matter must be reversed and
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Filed 10/10/25 P. v. Major CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082616
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1303646)
JAMES MARCEL MAJOR, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios (Joe) Hernandez,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded.
William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen Chenelia and Daniel
Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 At a hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the court denied defendant
and appellant James Marcel Major’s request for a full resentencing hearing. On appeal,
defendant contended this court should reverse the order and remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to hold a full resentencing hearing. We affirmed.
On September 3, 2025, the California Supreme Court issued an order directing us
to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Rhodius (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). We vacated our decision and offered the parties the opportunity
to file supplemental briefs, which they waived. We reverse and remand the matter with
directions.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2014, defendant pled guilty to assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246), prohibited possession
of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)). Defendant also admitted that he personally used of a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). Defendant further admitted that he had suffered a prior a serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(e)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to its indicated 21-year prison term. The court
imposed but stayed punishment on the prior prison term enhancement.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 At a section 1172.75 hearing on November 14, 2023, the court denied defendant’s
requests to strike his prior prison term enhancement and afford him a full resentencing
hearing.
Defendant appealed. We affirmed the court’s order because defendant’s judgment
included a prior prison term upon which the court had stayed punishment; thus, we held
that since defendant was not serving a term of imprisonment for the enhancement, he was
not entitled to a full resentencing hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
“In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the
Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136),
which amended section 667.5[, subdivision] (b) to eliminate prior-prison-term
enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made this change
retroactive. It enacted Penal Code section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3), later
renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.75 (section 1172.75)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), which declares: ‘Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined
in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.’
[Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
3 “A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid
enhancement is entitled to resentencing. [Citation.] To facilitate the process, the statute
directs California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to ‘identify
those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] Upon receiving that information,
the sentencing court must ‘review the judgment and verify that the current judgment
includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] ‘If the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision
(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ [Citation.] The
statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of
‘individuals . . . currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement’ and ‘all other
individuals.’ [Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing
once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies:
‘Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.’ [Citation.] The trial court must ‘apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council’ as well as ‘any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
4 promote uniformity of sentencing.’ [Citation.] In addition, the court may ‘consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.’
[Citation.]” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.)
“[S]ection 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment
includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020,
regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed. [Citation.]”
(Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.)
Here, defendant’s judgment included a stayed prior prison term enhancement that
was imposed before January 1, 2020. The prior prison term was not for a sexually violent
offense. At the section 1172.75 hearing, the court denied defendant’s request for a full
resentencing hearing. Thus, pursuant to Rhodius, the matter must be reversed and
remanded with directions to the court below to hold a full resentencing hearing.2
2 The court should have stricken the enhancement in its entirety. Thus, we shall direct the court below to do so. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a) [“Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid”]; People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires . . . the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements”]; accord, People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855; People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373.)
5 III. DISPOSITION
The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a full
resentencing hearing. The trial court is directed to strike the section 667.5, subdivision
(b) enhancement in its entirety. We express no opinion on whether defendant would be
entitled to any further relief on remand.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
MENETREZ J.