People v. Mahnke

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0042
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 250042-U NOTICE This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0042 April 21, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Stephenson County MARY K. MAHNKE, ) No. 23CM221 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) James M. Hauser, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed where defendant forfeited her claim challenging the trial court’s award of restitution and failed to establish (1) the award constituted plain error and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely postsentencing motion challenging the restitution order.

¶2 On October 29, 2024, defendant, Mary K. Mahnke, was convicted of cruel

treatment of animals—her dogs—under section 3.01(a) of the Humane Care for Animals Act (Act)

(510 ILCS 70/3.01(a), (d) (West 2022)) (a Class A misdemeanor) and failure to properly dispose

of dead animals under section 17(a) of the Animal Mortality Act (225 ILCS 610/17(a), 19 (West

2022)) (a Class C misdemeanor). On December 17, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to,

inter alia, two years of court supervision, and ordered her to pay $15,378.16 in restitution for care

provided for her dogs by the Freeport Animal Hospital (Hospital). Defendant did not file a timely

motion challenging the sentence. On appeal, she acknowledges her forfeiture but argues, because the court lacked evidence the Hospital could properly receive restitution under section 5-5-6 of the

Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2024)), the court committed

plain error in making the award. Alternatively, she argues defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the restitution award in a timely posttrial motion. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On June 8, 2023, the State charged defendant with cruel treatment of animals (510

ILCS 70/3.01(a) (West 2022)) and failure to properly dispose of dead animals (225 ILCS 610/17(a)

(West 2022)).

¶5 Defendant’s case proceeded to bench trial on October 29, 2024. The State presented

testimony showing, in the early evening of May 14, 2023, a fire occurred in defendant’s home in

rural Stephenson County. Defendant told an emergency responder she had 25 dogs living on the

property, and the remains of approximately 20 more dogs were also present. Kristin Laue, the

warden and administrator of Stephenson County Animal Control (Animal Control), arrived to take

custody of the dogs. She took 20 dogs to the Hospital for care. Most of them had to be shaved

because they had severely matted coats.

¶6 Laue had worked at the Hospital since she was 18. She originally worked “as

reception” and had helped with the animals. At the time of trial, as well as being the Animal

Control warden and administrator, she was “on kennel staff [at the Hospital] on the weekends,”

cleaning the dog and cat cages and providing the animals with medication.

¶7 Dr. William Condie testified he was the “county veterinarian,” but he also owned

the Hospital, where his private practice was located. He agreed with the State, in his role with

Animal Control, he “assist[ed] with county cases and assist[ed] Warden Laue.” He added, “And

then we also board stray and confiscated dogs at our office.” He noted he also worked with the

-2- City of Freeport, Illinois, to evaluate dogs from the Freeport pound, but he did not board dogs for

Freeport.

¶8 Condie testified he had “a few” of defendant’s dogs at his office. More of them

were at Rockford Career College, which had a program to train veterinary technicians. Condie

agreed all the dogs were “in the care of the County” and had been so “for a little over a year.”

Condie testified the dogs had not been starved. According to Condie, the dogs primarily suffered

from insufficient grooming. They also had not received regular veterinary care or their required

rabies vaccines. No record existed of whether they had received other standard vaccinations. When

asked whether he had provided any other treatment to the dogs besides shaving and grooming,

Condie responded he had also provided deworming.

¶9 Condie was not the sole veterinarian, nor was the Hospital the sole entity that

provided care for the confiscated dogs. Dr. Laura Sweet was head of the veterinary technician

program at Rockford Career College, which, as part of its students’ training, provided free care to

animals held by Animal Control. The program vaccinated the confiscated dogs and gave them

heartworm tests. Dr. Crystal Ruter, associated with “Paws & Claws,” also provided care. Further,

some confiscated dogs were placed in foster homes.

¶ 10 The trial court found defendant guilty on both counts. It stated defendant had not

starved the dogs, but her severe failure to groom them amounted to cruelty.

¶ 11 On December 17, 2024, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing.

At the hearing, the State and defendant agreed supervision was an appropriate disposition for her

case. The primary contested issue was the amount of restitution. The State requested restitution of

$140,276.66, to be split between the Hospital and Animal Control. We note defense counsel did

not object to the requested restitution on the basis the Hospital was a private business that Animal

-3- Control hired to perform services for which it was responsible. Instead, defense counsel’s

argument focused solely on the amount of restitution. Counsel argued the amount was so high her

client, who received only Social Security income, would never be able to pay back the full amount.

¶ 12 The trial court asked the State, “So, *** the County has reimbursed all of these

businesses or individuals that provided the care and boarding for these animals, correct?” The State

responded, “I would believe so.” When the court later asked the State if the Hospital had an

“outstanding invoice *** of $215,000 and plus,” the State agreed.

¶ 13 The trial court admitted a report prepared by Laue. It consisted of eight invoices

from Animal Control totaling $140,276.66 and a cover page. The cover page attributed $15,378.16

of this total to the Hospital and $124,898.50 to Animal Control. Nothing in the invoices indicated

which services and expenses were attributable to Animal Control and which to the Hospital.

¶ 14 The trial court noted defendant, a 70-year-old whose sole income source was Social

Security, would never be able to pay $140,276.66 in restitution. Based on this, the court ordered

restitution of $15,378.16 “to cover the [Hospital].” It ordered defendant to make payments of $50

per month while suggesting the money would go to Condie. It further sentenced defendant to two

years’ supervision.

¶ 15 On January 16, 2025, defendant filed both a notice of appeal and a “Motion *** for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial.” In the motion, she

claimed the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilty of cruelty to animals and failure to

properly dispose of deceased animals. On April 3, 2025, defendant filed an “Amended Motion ***

for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial.” The amended

motion was essentially identical to the original motion, except it included an assertion defendant

was indigent and could not afford to pay the ordered restitution.

-4- ¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Defendant concedes she forfeited the issue raised on appeal but argues, as a matter

of second-prong plain error, the trial court erred in awarding restitution to the Hospital because no

evidence was presented to demonstrate it was a victim entitled to restitution pursuant to section

5-5-6 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2024)). Alternatively, she argues defense

counsel was ineffective because she failed to raise the propriety of the restitution award in a

posttrial motion.

¶ 19 In response, the State asserts, “Just because Dr. Condie works with *** Animal

Control does not mean that services he rendered at his private practice are therefore government

services that are not subject to recoupment through restitution.” “The cost of services the [Hospital]

provided were not rooted in routine government functions, and therefore, it is a ‘victim’ entitled

to restitution.”

¶ 20 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 21 As an initial matter, we note defendant and the State ask us to find we have

jurisdiction despite defendant’s simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal and a posttrial motion.

For the following reasons, we find the simultaneous filing of defendant’s posttrial motion with her

notice of appeal does not affect our jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

¶ 22 To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the entry of the

final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within

30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” (Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.

606(b) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In other words, a notice of appeal is premature if a timely filed motion

directed against the judgment is pending. A posttrial motion is a timely motion directed against

-5- the judgment for purposes of Rule 606(b)—and thus delays the time in which the defendant can

file their notice of appeal—if it is filed in compliance with the deadline in section 116-1(b) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 2024)). People v. Willoughby, 362

Ill. App. 3d 480, 482 (2005); see People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 14 (stating the same principle

in more general terms). Under section 166-1(b), a defendant must file any posttrial motion within

30 days of the verdict or finding of guilt. 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b) (2024).

¶ 23 Here, the trial court found defendant guilty on October 29, 2024, but defendant did

not file her posttrial motion until January 16, 2025, long after the 30-day deadline for filing such

a motion had passed. Thus, the posttrial motion did not make the notice of appeal filed on January

16, 2025, premature. Furthermore, the April 3, 2025, “Amended Motion *** for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial” would be untimely as a

posttrial motion because, like the original motion, it was filed more than 30 days after the finding

of guilt. Moreover, even if we were to choose to treat the amended motion as a postsentencing

motion, it would be untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the December 17, 2024,

imposition of sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024); People v. Vara, 2018 IL

121823, ¶ 14 (stating the sentence is the final judgment in a criminal case).

¶ 24 B. Plain Error

¶ 25 Defendant acknowledges her restitution sentencing claim was not preserved but

urges us to consider it under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 26 “It is well settled that, to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a

contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.”

People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). However, under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing

court may address a forfeited claim of sentencing error when a “clear or obvious error” occurred

-6- and “(1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced [(first-prong plain error)], or

(2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing [(second-prong

plain error)].” Id. at 545. “Without reversible error, there can be no plain error.” People v. Jackson,

2020 IL 124112, ¶ 88. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion in establishing plain error.

Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.

¶ 27 Our supreme court “equate[s] second prong plain error with ‘structural error.’ ”

People v. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 55.

“An error is deemed structural only if it renders the criminal trial—or *** the

sentencing hearing—fundamentally unfair. [Citation.] Unlike errors reviewed

under the first prong of the plain error rule, if structural error occurs, the defendant

is not required to show that he was prejudiced by the error. [Citation.] *** This is

so because, when the error is of such gravity as to threaten the integrity of the

judicial process, courts must correct the error to protect the fairness and reputation

of the process.” Id.

Consequently, a sentencing error is structural error (and therefore second-prong plain error) only

if it affects the sentencing process at a level so fundamental as to make harmless error analysis

impossible. See id. ¶¶ 91-92 (“[B]ecause the sentencing court’s error of considering the

inapplicable aggravating factor is amenable to harmless error analysis, it follows that it is not a

structural error and may not be reviewed under the second prong of the plain error rule.”). Based

on the reasoning just described, the Johnson court reversed a line of appellate court cases (id.

¶¶ 64-81) to hold, although the defendant established that a sentencing error affected a substantial

right (id. ¶ 88), nevertheless, because he failed to demonstrate the presence of structural error, he

had necessarily failed to demonstrate the existence of second-prong plain error (id. ¶ 85). The

-7- Johnson court held, for defendants to establish structural error at sentencing, and thus second-

prong plain error, they must show how the error comports with the structural error analysis the

court has developed in its prior decisions, most notably People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959. Johnson,

2024 IL 130191, ¶ 90.

¶ 28 Defendant argues it was plain error for the trial court to award restitution to the

Hospital because “restitution cannot *** pay for costs incurred for government performing its

services.” She contends, “[R]estitution will not lie where the state seeks simply to recoup funds

expended while performing its official duties.” She asserts this principle applies here because the

restitution award was for “the county veterinarian’s invoice.” She argues no evidence was

presented to show the “Hospital was a separate entity that incurred costs above and beyond the

county’s governmental functions.” To support her argument, defendant relies on cases holding it

is improper for a trial court to award restitution under section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code to

government agencies for expenditures that are part of their regular duties.

¶ 29 Nothing in defendant’s claim of error precludes harmless error review. Therefore,

her claim is not reviewable as second-prong plain error.

¶ 30 Further, defendant has not established a clear or obvious error. Defendant presumes

the trial court imposed restitution under section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West

2024)), but we find nothing in the record to support this contention. The award of restitution in

this case is more consistent with an award of restitution under section 3.06(a) of the Act (510 ILCS

70/3.06(a) (West 2024)) than under section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code.

¶ 31 Section 3.06(a) of the Act provides for restitution to an “impounding facility for

boarding and treating the animals [confiscated pursuant to the Act]” for “outstanding costs incurred

*** pending the disposition of the case” when the defendant is convicted of an offense under the

-8- Act. Id. Accordingly, because the Animal Hospital cared for the dogs confiscated by Stephenson

County pending the defendant’s trial for offenses under the Act, it was entitled to receive restitution

for the cost of the dogs’ care under section 3.06(a). Moreover, even if the Animal Hospital was

determined to be acting at the direction of, or on behalf of, Stephenson County, it would constitute

a “treating facility” as defined in the Act and thus entitled to restitution under section 3.06(a). Id.

¶ 32 While we are not citing People v. Adcock, 2014 IL App (2d) 130003-U as precedent

because of the limitations contained in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025),

we would be remiss if we did not note that case involved the same trial judge as the present case.

This increases the likelihood the trial court here imposed restitution under section 3.06(a) of the

Act, not section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code. The court was aware section 3.06(a) provides for

restitution to certain facilities from those convicted of offenses under the Act. Further, the court

was aware an award it made under section 3.06(a), which was similar to the award it made here,

was upheld on appeal.

¶ 33 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 34 Alternatively, defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the restitution award in a timely posttrial motion.

¶ 35 Under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984), to establish the ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must show:

“(1) the attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and (2) the attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in that, absent

counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of

the proceeding would have been different. [Citation.] Because the defendant must

satisfy both prongs of this test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the claim.”

-9- People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90.

¶ 36 We review de novo a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when a defendant

raises it for the first time on appeal. People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88.

¶ 37 Here, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails because she cannot establish

prejudice. Defendant argues restitution awards to government agencies are improper. However,

she has not established the Hospital was a government agency. In contrast, the evidence strongly

suggests it was a private business.

¶ 38 Condie testified he owned the Hospital and ran his private practice from it, thus

implying the Hospital was a private business. Although Condie testified the Hospital boarded and

provided care to dogs from Animal Control, this does not suggest the Hospital was part of Animal

Control. Private businesses routinely provide services to government agencies. Here, Condie

testified to services the Hospital provided to both Animal Control and the City of Freeport. That

testimony allows a strong inference that a portion of the Hospital’s business was providing services

to these government bodies.

¶ 39 Defendant suggests the Hospital provided services to Animal Control as part of

Condie’s role as “county veterinarian.” This suggestion would make sense only if the role of

“county veterinarian” is not a position within Animal Control but a service for which Animal

Control contracts. (We note “county veterinarian” is a title formerly found in the Illinois Diseased

Animals Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 8, § 187a).) Condie’s use of the term thus does not explain

his relationship to Animal Control.) Animal Control could not hire the Hospital as an employee;

as Laue testified, the Hospital is a business with its own employees, including Laue herself as a

weekend kennel worker. Thus, again, the evidence strongly indicates the Hospital provided

- 10 - services to Animal Control, not that Animal Control had contracted away its duties to a third party

in a particular area.

¶ 40 Given this evidence, the inclusion of a restitution argument in her motion based on

the premise the Hospital was a government agency would not have had a reasonable probability

of causing the trial court to vacate or reduce the award. Thus, defendant has failed to show she was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to include it, and her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

therefore necessarily insufficient (see Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90).

¶ 41 Further, as we discussed (supra ¶¶ 30-32), it is likely the trial court made the award

of restitution to the Animal Hospital under section 3.06 of the Act. Defendant’s failure to address

the propriety of restitution under section 3.06 is a further reason to conclude no “reasonable

probability [existed] that the result of the proceeding would have been different” (Jackson, 2020

IL 124112, ¶ 90) had counsel made an argument challenging the propriety of the restitution under

section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code. This is a further basis for concluding defendant was not

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file an effective postsentencing motion.

¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

- 11 -