People v. Magee

116 A.D.2d 742, 498 N.Y.S.2d 38, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51597
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 27, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 116 A.D.2d 742 (People v. Magee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Magee, 116 A.D.2d 742, 498 N.Y.S.2d 38, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51597 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

— Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Patsalos, J.), rendered August 29, 1984, convicting him of sodomy in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 2Vs to 7 years’ imprisonment.

Judgment affirmed.

In the instant case, the court initially granted defendant youthful offender treatment, but, after a conference at the Bench, revoked that adjudication.

The court has inherent power to correct errors made at the time of sentencing. This power " 'extends to a statement or even formal pronouncement made by a court which may create "apparent ambiguity” but "which is, plainly, the result of some inadvertence on his [the Judge’s] part, and which our reason tells us is a mere mistake” ’ ” (People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 614, quoting from People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 365, cert denied 455 US 1024, quoting Bohlen v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 121 NY 546, 550). Here, the court could not adjudicate defendant a youthful offender and still sentence him to 2V3 to 7 years in jail, as previously promised. CPL 720.20 and Penal Law § 60.02, when read together, provide that a youthful offender may not receive a sentence of more than four years (see, People v David "H”, 70 AD2d 205). Therefore, it was within the court’s power to correct its sentence, which was illegal as it stood, by immediately revoking the youthful offender adjudication.

It was not an abuse of the court’s discretion to sentence defendant to a maximum prison term of seven years, thereby precluding the granting of youthful offender treatment. Defendant committed a particularly violent offense and there was ample evidence adduced to establish that defendant showed no remorse for his crime and remained a continued threat to the community. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Brown and Lawrence, JJ., concur.

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Related

People v. Boswell
193 A.D.2d 690 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)
People v. White
191 A.D.2d 604 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)
People v. Jenkins
184 A.D.2d 585 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
People v. DiLorenzo
153 Misc. 2d 1021 (Criminal Court of the City of New York, 1992)
People v. Calderon
167 A.D.2d 651 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)
People v. Robinson
145 A.D.2d 949 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)
People v. Larmond
139 A.D.2d 668 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
116 A.D.2d 742, 498 N.Y.S.2d 38, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51597, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-magee-nyappdiv-1986.