People v. Maestas CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 7/13/23 P. v. Maestas CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E078601

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1702492)

RONALD MAESTAS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Bernard Schwartz, Judge.

Affirmed.

Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Seth M.

Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Ronald Maestas of 12 counts arising

from his sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, and the trial court sentenced him to 127 years

to life in prison. Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that his sentence is

unconstitutional. We affirm.

II. 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jane Doe was two years old when her mother married defendant. She thought of

him as her father.

When she was around five years old, defendant began sexually abusing her. The

abuse continued for years and got progressively worse. Defendant penetrated her

digitally and with his penis, and made her masturbate him. Doe estimated that defendant

had intercourse with her about 100 times between the ages of nine and 12. When she got

her first period at age 12, however, defendant stopped the abuse and it never happened

again.

When she was 13, Doe finally reported defendant’s abuse to her mother. Doe and

her mother confronted defendant, and he became cagey. Eventually, however, he said it

1 Given that defendant’s only argument on appeal is that his sentence is unconstitutional, our recitation of the facts and procedural history is truncated.

2 was an “isolated event,” got down on his knees, began crying, and repeatedly said he was

sorry.

Defendant moved out, but moved back in a few weeks later. About three years

later, Doe’s mother and defendant began having marital problems and decided to

separate. Doe, who was 16 at the time, decided to report defendant’s abuse to the police.

A jury convicted defendant of one count of committing a lewd act on a child under 2 14 years old in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (count 1) , eight

counts of committing a forcible lewd act on a child under 14 years old in violation of

section 288, subdivision (b)(1) (counts 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, & 12), and three counts of

engaging in sexual intercourse with a child aged 10 or younger in violation of section

288.7, subdivision (a) (counts 5, 7, & 9). The trial court sentenced defendant to 52 years

plus 75 years to life in prison.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s only argument is that his 127-years-to-life sentence is excessive in

violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitutional and article I, sections 6

and 17 of the California Constitution because it is effectively a sentence of life without 3 the possibility of parole (LWOP). We disagree.

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Although defendant forfeited the argument by failing to object to his sentence (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720), we will address it on the merits “to [footnote continued on next page]

3 Our colleagues in the First District, Division Four, recently rejected the same

argument on similar facts after thoroughly considering the applicable state and federal

precedent. (See People v. Johnson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 487 (Johnson).) The

defendant in Johnson was convicted of 13 counts for sexually abusing his nine-year-old

daughter and was sentenced to 32 years plus 135 years to life. (Id. at p. 492.) He

challenged this “‘de facto [LWOP] sentence’” as grossly disproportionate and excessive

in violation of the California and federal constitutions. (Id. at p. 506.) Noting that at

least two other California courts had found sentences of 129 years and 135 years to life

were constitutional under both state and federal law, the Johnson court concluded that

“precedent does not enable us to say that defendant’s cumulative sentence of 32 years

plus 135 years to life shocks the conscience and is grossly disproportionate to the 13

crimes of which he was convicted and sentence was imposed.” (Id. at p. 507, citing

People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 523, 528-530, and People v. Retanan

(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230-1231.)

Defendant does not argue that Johnson is distinguishable. He instead points to

Justice Streeter’s concurrence in Johnson expressing his view that the defendant’s

sentence may be unconstitutional under the California constitution. (Johnson, supra, 88

Cal.App.5th at p. 507 (conc. opn. of Streeter, J.).) Justice Streeter acknowledged,

however, that binding precedent did not allow him to reach that conclusion. (Id. at pp.

507-509). He concluded his concurrence by urging the California Supreme Court to

avert [defendant’s] claim of inadequate assistance of counsel.” (People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310.)

4 reconsider the issue and to adopt Justice Mosk’s minority position that “‘[a] sentence . . .

that cannot possibly be completed in the defendant’s lifetime, makes a mockery of the

law and amounts to cruel or unusual punishment.’” (Id. at p. 507, quoting People v.

Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 797 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)

We express no view on the issue other than recognizing that, as in Johnson,

“precedent does not enable us to say that defendant’s cumulative sentence” of 52 years

plus 75 years to life in prison violates the California or federal constitution. (Johnson,

supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.) We therefore must affirm defendant’s sentence. (See

id. at p. 510 [“Unfortunately, however, this court is bound by existing precedents to

affirm the judgment.”] (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).)

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL J.

MENETREZ J.