People v. Madeus & Rugante

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6

7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, 8 CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF 0023-14 vs.

9 FRANCIS CHARLIE MADEUS, 10 MINORICHY NISAR T. RUGANTE, DECISION AND ORDER

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12 Defendants. 13

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15 INTRODUCTION 16 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on the 18th day of February, 17 2015, upon the Defendants' oral motions for judgment of acquittal. Assistant Attorney General 18 Matthew Heibel and Assistant Attorney General Basil O'Mallan represented the People of 19

20 Guam, Attorney Douglas B. Moylan represented Defendant Madeus, and Attorney William Pole

21 represented Defendant Rugante. The Court ruled from the bench on February 20, and hereby 22 enters the following Decision and Order setting forth the reasons for its ruling.

23 BACKGROUND

24 After the close of the People's case-in-chief, both Defendants moved for judgment of 25

26 acquittal. Defendant Rugante argued that he could not be guilty of kidnapping because: ten

27 minutes was too short, as a matter of law, for the "substantial time" element to be met; and the 28 kidnapping charge was multiplicitous with the force and coercion element of the first degree

ORIGINAL

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Decision and Order CF 0023-14; People v. Rugante & Madeus

criminal sexual conduct charge. Defendant Rugante also argued that there was insufficient

2 evidence to find him guilty of criminal sexual conduct, because the DNA evidence did not point

3 to him, or for that matter to Defendant Madeus. 4 Defendant Madeus adopted Defendant Rugante' s arguments, and further added that the 5 victim's testimony cleared Defendant Madeus and the victim instead accused other individuals 6 of having committed the crime. Defendant Madeus also argued that he could not be liable on an 7

8 aiding and abetting theory.

9 DISCUSSION IO In adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must review the evidence II presented in the light most favorable to the Government to determine whether "any rational trier I2

13 of fact could [find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v.

I4 Cruz, 1998 Guam 18 ~ 9. I5 Guam's kidnapping statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:

I6 A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place I7 of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found; or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period, with any of I8 the following purposes:

I9 (1) to hold for ransom or reward;

(2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter;

20 (3) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or (4) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.

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22 9 GCA § 22.20(a). A person is guilty of kidnapping if he performs any one ofthe three acts in

23 the introductory clause of subsection (a), with any of the four purposes in subsection (a)(1)-(4). 24 ld. The Defendants were indicted with kidnapping in accordance with the People's theory that 25 the victim S.R. (24 years old) had been unlawfully confined "for a substantial period." Second 26 Am. Indict. 2, 3, Feb. 16, 2015; see also Jury Instr. 64, 70, Feb. 21, 2015.

Decision and Order CF 0023-14; People v. Rugante & Madeus

The Defendants argue that the testimony was only sufficient to show that the incident

2 lasted for ten minutes, and so there was no evidence that the confinement of the victim lasted

3 for "a substantial period." However, other evidence was presented that the events in question 4 elapsed over the course of two hours, and Jose White Longa in particular testified that they took 5 place over a "long time." It is up to the jury to assess the credibility and weight to give to such 6 evidence. The evidence submitted to the jury is sufficient, if believed, to establish the 7

8 "substantial period" element of the kidnapping charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

9 With regard to the Defendants' arguments that the charges are multiplicitous, it is true 10 that under 9 GCA § 25.1 O(a)(2)(C), one of the ways for the force and coercion element of first II degree criminal sexual conduct to be established is through a threat of retaliation, including a I2

13 threat of kidnapping. See 9 GCA § 25.10(a)(2)(C). Arguably, the presented evidence that a

I4 kidnapping took place would also meet § 25.10(a)(2)(A), wherein force and coercion is I5 established when the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force I6 or physical violence. See 9 GCA § 25.10(a)(2)(A). However, first degree criminal sexual I7 conduct and kidnapping have other, non-duplicating, essential elements, such that the People's I8

I9 decisions to charge the Defendants with both crimes do not present any double jeopardy

20 concern. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 ("[t]he applicable rule is 2I that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 22 provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is 23 whether each provision required proof of a fact which the other does not.")

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25 9 GCA § 4.60, named "Guilt Established by Complicity," reads as follows: "A person is

26 guilty of an offense if, with the intention of promoting or assisting in the commission of the 27 offense, he induces or aids another person to commit the offense. If the definition of the offense 28

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Decision and Order CF 0023-14; People v. Rugante & Madeus

includes lesser offenses, the offense of which each person shall be guilty shall be determined

2 according to his own culpable mental state and to those aggravating or mitigating factors which

3 apply to him." 9 GCA § 4.60. Sufficient evidence has been introduced to put this alternate 4 theory of Defendant Madeus's liability before the jury. In particular, Jose White Longa testified 5 that Defendant Madeus physically restrained the victim, S.R. (24 years old). Moreover, it is 6 well-settled that the indictment of a defendant as a principal is sufficient to put that defendant 7

8 on notice that he may be convicted on proof of being an accomplice. See Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d

9 406, 407 (6th Cir. 1986); see Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1980). When viewed 10 in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence of first degree criminal sexual conduct 11 and the lesser included offense of third degree criminal sexual conduct was sufficient to present 12

13 to the jury a theory that Defendant Madeus aided or abetted, or was complicit, in the crimes of

14 others. 15 Testimony by FBI forensic examiner Shane Hoffman showed that it was inconclusive 16 whether the DNA recovered from the victim included either Defendant Rugante's or Defendant 17 Madeus's DNA. However, other evidence presented was sufficient to put the charges of first 18

19 and third degree criminal sexual conduct before the jury with regard to both Defendants. The

20 victim S.R. (24 years old) testified that Defendant Rugante sexually penetrated her. While the 21 victim recanted her previous statement to the police regarding Defendant Madeus's involvement 22 in the crime, the recantation was contradicted by her prior inconsistent statement and by Jose 23 White Longa and Mackson Saret's testimony. It is the jury's responsibility to weigh the 24

25 credibility of the victim's live testimony against the credibility of her previous statement and the

26 credibility of other witnesses. 27 CONCLUSION

Decision and Order CF 0023-14; People v. Rugante & Madeus

Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was sufficient for a

2 reasonable jury to find the Defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes they were

3 charged with. For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal 4 are DENIED.

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9 IT IS SO ORDERED this day of----'~'-'-1A----'-'R-'--'-0_3_2_0_15_ _ 10

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13 Judge, Superior Court of Guam

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