People v. Mader

145 N.E. 137, 313 Ill. 277
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 28, 1924
DocketNo. 15749
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 145 N.E. 137 (People v. Mader) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Mader, 145 N.E. 137, 313 Ill. 277 (Ill. 1924).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Duncan

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error, Fred Mader, (herein called defendant,) and Orrington C. Foster, were, “with other persons to the grand jury unknown,” indicted by the grand jury of Cook county for conspiracy. The indictment contained six counts charging various conspiracies, as follows: First count, to defraud the Woman’s Exchange of Chicago of $1400 by means of a confidence game; second count, to defraud the Woman’s Exchange of Chicago of $1400 by false pretenses; third count, to cause certain laborers to boycott the Whitestone Company unless the Woman’s Exchange of Chicago paid them $1400; fourth count, to deprive the Whitestone Company of the lawful use of its building by means of boycott; fifth count, to injure and destroy the business of the Whitestone Company by means of boycott. The defendant alone was tried, there being a severance for the purpose of trial, and was found guilty as charged before the court and a jury and was sentenced to pay a fine of $1000 and to serve a term of one year in the penitentiary. The judgment of the criminal court was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and this writ of error has been sued out to review the judgment.

In the fall of 1920 Marshall & Fox, architects and engineers, were building the Drake Hotel, in Chicago, for the Whitestone Company. Foster was superintendent of construction in the employ of Marshall & Fox. Mader was at that time the business agent of the Fixture Hangers’ Union. The contract under which the building was being constructed provided for the employment of union labor. The Woman’s Exchange.of Chicago is a charitable organization, of which Mrs. Narcissa Thorne was vice-president, and was given the contract to furnish about 2000 lamps, with shades, for the hotel. Of those lamps about 609 were bedside lamps. The Woman’s Exchange had the lamps manufactured by a company which employed non-union labor, and the shades were made for all the lamps by the Woman’s Exchange by the employment of women, who made the shades at their homes. Complaint was made on behalf of the union that the lamps were “unfair,” — that is, were manufactured by non-union labor, — and on November 2, 1920, a strike of the Fixture Hangers’ Unión was called by Mader on account of these lamps. The work of the installation of the lamps was suspended until November 22, 1920, on which date that work was resumed and completed after the adjustment of all disputed matters, as hereinafter related.

In view of our conclusion in this case it will only be necessary to determine two questions on this record: (1) How and by what means and for what purpose the defendant obtained the money that was paid him by the Woman’s Exchange of Chicago; and (2) does the proof show that he obtained the money by a conspiracy with Foster or with any other person or persons unknown to the grand jury, as charged in any count of the indictment, — that is, is he guilty of the crime of conspiracy as charged?

The evidence in the record is in substance the following: Some time before November 2, 1920, Mrs. Thorne was called on the telephone and informed by Foster that the bedside lamps were faulty in construction and did not conform to the requirements of the fire regulations of the city of Chicago, and that complaint had been made that all the lamps were “unfair” and that a strike would be called on that account. Foster was in no way connected with the Fixture Hangers’ Union and had no power to call a strike of that body of workmen. He made it known to Mrs. Thorne that he wanted to come over and talk the matter over with her, and did so, taking two of the lamps with him. He explained to her why the bedside lamps were faulty in the matter of wiring, and she told him that she would have the lamps re-wired by union labor at her expense. She had another talk with him at the construction shack near the Drake Hotel, where she also met Mader and one or two of his associates. She told Mader just what she told Foster previously, that she would like to re-wire the lamps and get somebody to get union men to do it. She also told him that the lamp shades were made by the labor of women, and that any fine or anything that had to be paid would be a hardship on the Woman’s Exchange; that the Woman’s Exchange could not afford to pay a $2000 fine, but was willing to, and would, pay out money for the actual work of rewiring the lamps. Mader said nothing and walked away. Foster made every effort to help her get the matter adjusted. He told her that the strike was called and that the work had been stopped on the entire construction of the Drake Hotel on account of the lamps and shades. She distinctly stated in her testimony that Foster stated and explained to her that it was only the bedside lamps, about 612 in number, that were faulty in construction, and that the defect in construction was that the wiring passed through a wood portion of the lamps, and because of that fact the lamps were objectionable under the fire ordinance. These lamps, and all the other lamps, had shades that were manufactured by women, but only 612 were faulty, as aforesaid. Neither Foster nor the defendant at any time demanded of Mrs. Thorne any money or fine because the lamps were "unfair” or manufactured by non-union labor. The record clearly shows that Mader did call the strike. Mrs. Thorne further stated that she employed or asked assistance of George Durgan, an attorney at law for Montgomery Ward & Co., who was also a friend of her husband, to help her get the matter adjusted, and that the matter was finally adjusted by her paying the sum of $1418 for the Woman’s Exchange to the Henkle & Best Company, and that she paid the money to Adolph Henkle, of that company, and got a receipt for the money, which was dated November 22, 1920, and was signed “Henkle & Best Co., by H. A. Best, Pres.,” which receipt is in this language: “Received from Woman’s Exchange, Chicago, fourteen hundred and eighteen dollars, in full payment for re-wiring, with union help, 612 electric lamps, and for clearance of 1460 lamps from union labor prohibition.” The evidence shows that Durgan was with Mrs. Thorne when this money was paid and receipted for and that the receipt is in his handwriting.

In the interest of Mrs. Thorne and the Woman’s Exchange Durgan had several conversations with Foster, and also enlisted the services of A. G. DeClercq, construction superintendent of the Commonwealth Edison Company. DeClercq called the defendant to his office about November 15, 1920. The defendant told DeClercq that he called the strike on account of the lamps furnished by the Woman’s Exchange being manufactured by non-union labor, and in answer to a query by DeClercq as to why he pressed this case against the Woman’s Exchange, a charitable organization, said that the matter had been brought up on the floor of the organization and that he could not call the strike off. After some further conversation the defendant agreed that the strike would be called off if the lamps were re-wired by .a contractor who employed union labor, and he asked De-Clercq to let him know who did the work of re-wiring. A few days later the defendant came to DeClercq’s office with one Hogan and suggested that Hogan do the work on the lamps. DeClercq informed the defendant that he had already made arrangements with Harry A. Best, of the Henkle & Best Company, to re-wire the lamps .at 90 cents per lamp, except a few which he was to re-wire and repair at $1.10 per lamp.

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Bluebook (online)
145 N.E. 137, 313 Ill. 277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-mader-ill-1924.