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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF '" ,~, <;; II L-' ?!l l,.-..
2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM 0652-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 WILLY WILTON MACKWELUNG, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on April 9, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court now DENIES this motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On May 31 st, 2011, at approximately 5 :09 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident report on Route 15, Dededo. Officers met 16 with the Defendant (hereinafter "Mackwelung") near his vehicle, a Nissan Frontier, which was 17 15 feet off the roadway into the jungle. The Officers observed a strong intoxicating odor 18 emitting from Mackwelung as well as glassy blood shot eyes. At approximately 5:44 p.m. 19 Mackwelung was arrested and transported to the Dededo Precinct. At 5:57 p.m., Officers 20 administered a Standardized Field Sobriety Test, which Mackwelung failed. Mackwelung 21 submitted to a breath test and had a reading of .205% BAC. There is no dispute as to these facts. 22 On June 1, 2011, Mackwelung was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of 23 Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; 2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a 24 misdemeanor (BAC); and 3) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 25
26 DISCUSSION 27 Mackwe]ung moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a 28 result of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guan1 Code Annotated § 30.10-
lof5 30.60, Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained 2 under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 3 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Mackwelung 4 argues that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the 5 remedy for violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Mackwelung cites 6 the Court to an earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam 7 July 2, 2010), wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant 8 longer than lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is 9 abandoning its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 10 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 11 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 12 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 13 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 14 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 15 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 16 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 17 At 5 :09 p.m. on May 31, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident on Route 16, 18 Dededo. At the scene of the crime, Officer observed Mackwelung's vehicle to be in the jungle 19 and Defendant to have bloodshot watery eyes and strong intoxicating odor of alcohol from his 20 person. Sometime between 5:09 p.m. and 5:44 p.m. probable cause was formed based on the 21 above facts. Mackwelung was arrested at 5:44 p.m. At 6:25 p.m. Mackwelung submitted to a 22 breath test which administered a reading of .205% BAC. Once probable cause is formed during 23 the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no 24 longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass 25 constitutional muster against umeasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 26 Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of5 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate thcir 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.l0 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Defendant reminds the Court an individual can voluntarily consent to an extended 9 detention beyond the fifteen (15) minute period for investigatory stops allowed on Guam. In the )0 present case, Mackwelung argues that he did not consent to the extended detention because he II was not informed by Officers that he either had the right to refuse to take the SFST or that he 12 had the right to terminate the encounter and walk away. See, Declaration of Willy Mackwelung. 13 This statute, however, is only applicable in circumstances without probable cause. When 14 probable cause is found, a Defendant's consent I is not required for an extended detention. In the 15 present case, probable cause was formed based on the fact Officers found 1) Mackwelung's 16 vehicle fifteen (15) feet from the roadway into the jungle and 2) Mackwelung being observed 17 to have bloodshot glassy eyes coupled with a strong intoxicating odor emitting from his person. 18 The existence of probable cause does not require Mackwelung's consent for his extended 19 detention. The Officers did not violate Mackwelung's Fourth Amendment right against 20 unreasonable searches by exceeding the fifteen (15) minute period. 21 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 22 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 23 not address the suppression issue, the Kebekol court will. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 24 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 25 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 26
27 1 Only under circumstances in absence of probable cause, is Defendant's consent an issue. In People vs. Melvin 28 Rosario Santos, the Guam Supreme Court found since probable cause was not established and Defendant's consent was questionable, the evidence from the search was to be suppressed based on the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Page 3 of5 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 2 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 3 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 4 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 5 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 6 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terrv, and more importantly, 7 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF '" ,~, <;; II L-' ?!l l,.-..
2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM 0652-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 WILLY WILTON MACKWELUNG, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on April 9, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court now DENIES this motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On May 31 st, 2011, at approximately 5 :09 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident report on Route 15, Dededo. Officers met 16 with the Defendant (hereinafter "Mackwelung") near his vehicle, a Nissan Frontier, which was 17 15 feet off the roadway into the jungle. The Officers observed a strong intoxicating odor 18 emitting from Mackwelung as well as glassy blood shot eyes. At approximately 5:44 p.m. 19 Mackwelung was arrested and transported to the Dededo Precinct. At 5:57 p.m., Officers 20 administered a Standardized Field Sobriety Test, which Mackwelung failed. Mackwelung 21 submitted to a breath test and had a reading of .205% BAC. There is no dispute as to these facts. 22 On June 1, 2011, Mackwelung was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of 23 Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; 2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a 24 misdemeanor (BAC); and 3) Reckless Driving, as a petty misdemeanor. 25
26 DISCUSSION 27 Mackwe]ung moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a 28 result of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guan1 Code Annotated § 30.10-
lof5 30.60, Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained 2 under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 3 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Mackwelung 4 argues that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the 5 remedy for violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Mackwelung cites 6 the Court to an earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam 7 July 2, 2010), wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant 8 longer than lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is 9 abandoning its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 10 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 11 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 12 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 13 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 14 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 15 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 16 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 17 At 5 :09 p.m. on May 31, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident on Route 16, 18 Dededo. At the scene of the crime, Officer observed Mackwelung's vehicle to be in the jungle 19 and Defendant to have bloodshot watery eyes and strong intoxicating odor of alcohol from his 20 person. Sometime between 5:09 p.m. and 5:44 p.m. probable cause was formed based on the 21 above facts. Mackwelung was arrested at 5:44 p.m. At 6:25 p.m. Mackwelung submitted to a 22 breath test which administered a reading of .205% BAC. Once probable cause is formed during 23 the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no 24 longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass 25 constitutional muster against umeasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 26 Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of5 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate thcir 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.l0 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Defendant reminds the Court an individual can voluntarily consent to an extended 9 detention beyond the fifteen (15) minute period for investigatory stops allowed on Guam. In the )0 present case, Mackwelung argues that he did not consent to the extended detention because he II was not informed by Officers that he either had the right to refuse to take the SFST or that he 12 had the right to terminate the encounter and walk away. See, Declaration of Willy Mackwelung. 13 This statute, however, is only applicable in circumstances without probable cause. When 14 probable cause is found, a Defendant's consent I is not required for an extended detention. In the 15 present case, probable cause was formed based on the fact Officers found 1) Mackwelung's 16 vehicle fifteen (15) feet from the roadway into the jungle and 2) Mackwelung being observed 17 to have bloodshot glassy eyes coupled with a strong intoxicating odor emitting from his person. 18 The existence of probable cause does not require Mackwelung's consent for his extended 19 detention. The Officers did not violate Mackwelung's Fourth Amendment right against 20 unreasonable searches by exceeding the fifteen (15) minute period. 21 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 22 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 23 not address the suppression issue, the Kebekol court will. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 24 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 25 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 26
27 1 Only under circumstances in absence of probable cause, is Defendant's consent an issue. In People vs. Melvin 28 Rosario Santos, the Guam Supreme Court found since probable cause was not established and Defendant's consent was questionable, the evidence from the search was to be suppressed based on the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Page 3 of5 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 2 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 3 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 4 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 5 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 6 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terrv, and more importantly, 7 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 8 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 9 1,16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 10 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long II in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 12 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 13 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 14 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santos. CM 0332-11, 15 Superior Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santoi wherein it 16 concluded police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of 17 probable cause following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to 18 such analysis. People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People 19 v. Tedtaotao CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 20 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppreSSIOn IS not an 21 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 22 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 23 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b( c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 24 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 25 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 26
27 2 More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 '12. "The
28 existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G .c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. If probable cause is found during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
Page 4 of5 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 2 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 3 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 4 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 5 Suppress is DENIED. 6 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE 4,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 7 SO ORDERED 8
12 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 13
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