People v. Mack

2024 IL App (4th) 240483-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 25, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-0483
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240483-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 25, 2024 NO. 4-24-0483 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County MICHAEL ANTHONY MACK, ) No. 24CF234 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Scott Kording, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, Michael Anthony Mack, appeals the trial court’s order denying him

pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725

ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255 and

102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In March 2024, for events occurring on March 7, 2024, the State charged

defendant with multiple offenses. Six of the charged counts stemmed from his alleged possession

of a weapon, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(2)). Defendant was also

charged with one count of domestic battery, a subsequent offense felony (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)), and

two counts of resisting a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)(1)).

¶5 On March 8, 2024, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release.

The State averred defendant should be detained, as he posed a real and present threat to the

safety of a person or persons or the community and that threat could not be mitigated by any

condition of pretrial release.

¶6 That same day, a hearing was held on the State’s petition. The hearing began with

a determination of probable cause. The State reported police were called to the residence of

Marsha Thomas. Upon their arrival, officers observed Thomas had a bloody lip and her face was

cut. Thomas stated defendant, the father of her children, had taken her phone. As defendant was

leaving Thomas’s residence, she confronted him. He struck her face, causing injury. Officers

observed defendant outside Thomas’s residence. There, they attempted to arrest defendant.

Defendant pulled away from the police, ran, and tried to climb a fence. After defendant was

apprehended, the officers noticed an object on defendant’s person. Defendant admitted he was

carrying a firearm. He stated he ran from the police because he was carrying that firearm. The

manufacturer’s serial number “had been removed or obliterated.” In 2018, defendant was

convicted of felony retail theft, which resulted in the prohibition of his possessing a firearm and

ammunition. Defendant also had a domestic-battery conviction in McLean County case No. 15-

CM-4.

¶7 After the trial court found probable cause, the court heard the parties’ proffers on

the issue of defendant’s pretrial detention. The State began its proffer by asking the court to take

judicial notice of the information provided during the probable-cause portion of the hearing, and

-2- the court agreed to do so. The State then proffered the firearm found on defendant contained 1

round in the chamber and a fully loaded 14-round magazine. The State listed defendant’s

criminal history, which contains convictions for criminal damage to property (McLean County

case No. 09-CM-914), retail theft (McLean County case Nos. 09-CM-173, 09-CM-2133,

16-CM-1615, and 16-CF-1381), criminal trespass to real property (McLean County case Nos.

11-CM-1176, 14-CM-2155, 17-CM-1, and 17-CM-273), unlawful cannabis possession (McLean

County case No. 13-CM-2161), fleeing/attempting to elude a police officer (McLean County

case No. 16-TR-18369), and resisting a peace officer (16-CM-1799).

¶8 Defense counsel proffered defendant had strong ties to the community, residing in

McLean County for at least 18 years. He was a concerned father of five young children.

Regarding the domestic-battery charges, defense counsel stated defendant was trying to leave but

was stopped by Thomas. Defendant denied striking Thomas. Thomas was in his way. As he was

trying to leave her residence, Thomas struck her head on the door, and her injuries were minor.

Regarding the dangerousness assessment, Thomas answered no to all five questions. She did not

call the police. It was a neighbor who called the police. Defendant was forthright about the

firearm in his possession and he gave officers his passcode so they could search his phone.

Defense counsel further emphasized the length of time since defendant’s other criminal offenses

and stated defendant reported he and his family’s lives had been threatened multiple times.

¶9 On rebuttal, the State provided an additional proffer regarding defendant’s

domestic-battery conviction. He was originally granted conditional discharge and sentenced to

14 days, with credit for time served, and 106 days, stayed from January 22, 2015. In the same

matter, an additional 70 days’ imprisonment was ordered on November 17, 2016.

¶ 10 The trial court granted the State’s petition to detain defendant. The court did so

-3- upon concluding, in part, based on the number of offenses in 2009, 2016, and 2017, defendant

committed offenses while on bond, as they were different offenses in the same year. The court

found clear and convincing evidence defendant committed one or more qualifying offenses. The

court found the State sufficiently established defendant possessed the firearm, was aware he was

not allowed to do so, and did not have a valid firearm owner’s identification card. The court

further found the evidence established a domestic battery occurred and, after examining the

statutory factors, defendant posed a real and present threat to Thomas and the community. The

court noted Thomas, when completing the “5 questions,” did not report “a major long history” of

domestic violence and did not call the police. The court did not believe defendant’s version of

the events. The court further found the State established by clear and convincing evidence

defendant was a threat to the community and to Thomas. The court highlighted defendant carried

a fully loaded weapon, resisted arrest and committed domestic battery while doing so, and had a

history of not complying with rules and conditions while out on bond. The court expressly

weighed pretrial conditions such as pretrial supervision and home confinement and found no

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate that threat.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On March 13, 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the order

denying him pretrial release under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

Defendant’s notice of appeal is a completed form from the Article VI Forms Appendix to the

Illinois Supreme Court Rules (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023)), by which he asks this

court to release him from custody with conditions. The form lists several possible grounds for

appellate relief and directs appellants to “check all that apply and describe in detail.” Defendant

-4- checked three grounds for relief and provided additional support on the lines beneath the

preprinted text of those grounds. Defendant did not file a supporting memorandum.

¶ 14 The first ground for relief checked by defendant in his notice of appeal is the State

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he

committed the offense charged. In support, defendant wrote two sentences regarding the “ ‘clear

and convincing evidence’ *** quantum of proof.” Defendant then argued the State failed to meet

its burden as to the domestic-battery offense, as he was acting justifiably because he needed to

escape an unlawful detention.

¶ 15 Under the Code, all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release.

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). To secure the pretrial detention of a defendant, the State

must prove multiple factors. One is to prove by clear and convincing evidence “the proof is

evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an offense” described in

section 110-6.1(a) (id. § 110-6.1(a)). Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1). “[A] trial court’s decision and findings

on issues of pretrial detention are appropriately reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”

People v. Morgan, 2023 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 35. An abuse of discretion will be found only if

we find the decision of the trial court to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful or we find no

reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s decision. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App

(4th) 230864, ¶ 10.

¶ 16 Here, defendant was charged with not only domestic battery, but also five

weapons-related offenses. On appeal, defendant only challenges the proof related to the

domestic-battery offense. He leaves unchallenged the weapons offenses, which are also

detainable offenses under section 110-6.1(a)(1). The State proffered defendant admitted carrying

the firearm despite having been convicted of a felony and was found by officers with that

-5- firearm. Defense counsel did not deny these facts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding the proof evident or the presumption great he committed an offense in section 110-6.1(a).

¶ 17 The next checked box on defendant’s notice of appeal is the State did not prove

by clear and convincing evidence defendant poses a real and present threat to the community or

to Thomas. In support, defendant added the following to the preprinted form, in relevant part:

“[T]he State failed to meet its burden for the following reasons: defendant[’s] statements and

cooperation show that he is not a threat, the gun has been seized and defendant has no interest in

obtaining another, thereby removing any threat the defendant formerly imposed [sic], if any.”

¶ 18 To detain a defendant under the dangerousness standard, as the State sought here,

the State must also prove by clear and convincing evidence “the defendant poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

articulable facts of the case.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (e)(2). The Code gives the trial

court broad discretion in choosing what factors to consider in making this determination. See id.

§ 110-6.1(g) (setting forth factors a trial court may consider when considering dangerousness).

These factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged including whether the

offense is a crime of violence (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)); defendant’s history and characteristics,

including whether there is evidence of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior (id. § 110-

6.1(g)(2)(A)); and whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to a weapon or

weapons (id. § 110-6.1(g)(7)).

¶ 19 In this case, the trial court weighed the statutory factors before finding the State

sufficiently proved defendant to be a threat to Thomas and the community. The court found

convincing defendant’s lengthy criminal history, the facts and circumstances of the offenses,

including the fact defendant carried a fully loaded firearm while committing domestic battery

-6- and fleeing from the police, and defendant’s history of domestic abuse. The court did not abuse

its discretion finding the State proved defendant a threat by clear and convincing evidence.

¶ 20 The third ground defendant checked in his notice of appeal is the State did not

prove by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions would

reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance for later hearings or prevent him from being

charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. Defendant wrote the following, in

part, under the preprinted text: “The court erred in its determination because jailing until a case

[is] resolved is the most extreme situation[;] here home confinement and/or monitoring would

alleviate any threat as defendant has no recent priors.”

¶ 21 This checked box does not apply to petitions to deny pretrial release. There is no

requirement under the dangerousness standard of section 110-6.1 that the State prove no

condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance for

later hearings or prevent him from being charged with a later Class A misdemeanor or felony.

This requirement is found in section 110-6(a) of the Code, which applies to petitions to revoke

pretrial release. See id. § 110-6(a).

¶ 22 A similar requirement is a prerequisite for detaining a defendant pretrial under the

dangerousness standard: the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence no condition or

combination of conditions would mitigate the defendant’s real and present threat. See id.

§ 110-6.1(e)(3). This box remains unchecked on his notice of appeal. Defendant’s written

argument, however, demonstrates he intended to challenge this finding by the trial court. As we

are to liberally construe notices of appeal and, when considered as a whole, defendant’s notice of

appeal “fairly and adequately identifies the complained-of judgment” (see People v. Lewis, 234

Ill. 2d 32, 37, 912 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (2009)), we may consider whether the court abused its

-7- discretion in finding the State met the requirements of section 110-6.1(e)(3).

¶ 23 The record reveals the trial court did not err in finding the State clearly and

convincingly proved this ground. The court expressly considered the proffers, the nature and

circumstances of the offense, defendant’s history that included violent offenses, defendant’s

failures to comply with court conditions and the law, and the possible conditions before finding

this factor proved by clear and convincing evidence. The court’s decision was not “arbitrary,

fanciful, or unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)

230864, ¶ 10.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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