People v. Machuo

Opinion

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SUPER OU T

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I 201,4VIAR19 PH 2: 55

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5 IN TH E S UP E R IO R C O UR T O F GUAM 6

7 PEOPLE OF GUAM C R I M I N AL C AS E N O . C M 0 7 5 4 -1 3

8 DE C IS ION AN D OR D E R DE N Y IN G V.

9 D E FE N D AN T'S M O T IO N T O D IS M IS S SERENI MACHUO, to

II D efendant.

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14 IN TR O D U C T IO N

15 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on the 12th day of March,

16 2 0 1 4 , for hear ing o n the D e fe n d a n t 's Mot ion to D ismiss. Assistant Atto rney General 17 Christopher R. Odoca represented the People, and Attorney Douglas B. Moylan represented the 18 D efendant.

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20 FAC TUA L AN D P R O C E D UR AL H IS TO R Y

21 T h e D efendant is charged wi th crimina l mischief, disorderly conduct, a n d public

22 drunkenness, stemming from events that occurred on August 24, 2013 with two co-defendants.

23 At the arraignment on October 9, 2013, the Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial and 24 form a lly requested discovery, a nd the Sched uling Ord er for th is case wa s established. T h a t 25

26 Scheduling Order specified December 11, 2013, as the Motion Cut Off date.

27 B y D e c e m b e r 1 1 , the P e o p l e h a d not provided discovery, a nd t he D efendant filed a 28 M o t i o n to D ismiss, a rgu ing that the la ck o f discovery provi sion constituted a fa ilu re to

ORIGINAL 0

Decision and Order C M 0 7 5 4 -13; Pe ople vs. Sereni Machuo

prosecute. On December 16, the People turned over the discovery materials to the Defendant, I

2 and on January 2, 2014 filed an Opposition to the Defendant ' s Motion to Dismiss.

3 DISCUSSION 4 8 G C A § 70.45 sets forth the reme dies available to the court whe n a party fail s to 5 comply with a discovery obligation. The statute reads:

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If at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the attention of the 7 court that a party has failed to comply with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter, 8 the court may order such party to comply with the prior order, grant a continuance, or issue such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

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8 GCA § 70.45 (2005).

to

11 The dismissal of criminal complaint with prejudice is considered a severe remedy. "The

12 terminatesofcriminal dismissal a criminal case is a remedy proceedings." Co m m ofnwe last resort

a lth because

v. Cro 4 precludes

nk 4 8it N . E.2d 1330 ( 198an , 1334trial a public d

5).

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14 H o we v e r, there are circumstances where such a remedy is appropriate . If either 1) the delay i 15

due to the prosecution ' s deliberate and egregious action; or 2) the delay, though unintentional 16

17 results in irremediable harm to the defendant, then the harshness o f t h e dismissal remed y

18 matches the severity of the prosecution ' s violation. See Cronk, 484 N .E.2d at 1334. 19 The Defendant cites two cases in support of the proposition that a court may dismiss th e 20 complaint for discovery violations, Mathis v. State a n d Commonwealth v. Cronk. Mathis v. State, 21

22 819 P.2d 1302 (N.M. 1991); Commonwealth v. Cronk, 484 N.E.2d 1330 (Mass. 1985). However

23 the Defendant does not discuss the facts of the two cases he cites . In Mathis , the trial c o

24 initially denied the motion to dismiss and reordered the discovery. Instead of providing it, th e 25 State engaged in a series of obstructionist tactics and repeated bad faith efforts to evade or ignore 26

the cour t order, and only after a year and a half of such obstructionism was a new motion t 27

28 dismiss granted. See Mathis , 819 P . 2d at 1303 - 04. In Cro nk , the Commonwealth did not compl y

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Decision and Order CM0754-13; People vs. Sereni Machuo

with discovery orders throughout the discovery period, and the trial court issued a new order t 1

2 comply with the previous discovery order, and specifically stated that a further failure to compl y 3 would lead to dismissal with prejudice, and even then the trial court later changed its mind upo n 4 a finding that the delay had not harmed the defendant. See Cronk, 484 N.E.2d 1330.

5 The present case is dissimilar to either Mathis or Cro nk . A s t he People point out, the 6

Defendant does not allege that the delay of five days between the Motion Cut Off Date and th e 7

8 eventual disclosure was the result of any deliberate or egregious action. Nor does the court find

9 that the five day delay resulted in irremediable harm to the Defendant. What harm occurred from 10 non-provision of discovery materials could be remedied by providing them , and has be e n. The 11

Defendant will still be able to receive a fair trial , notwithstanding the late provision of discovery.

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13 Nor is the Defendant's citation of the Superior Court's time standards persuasive. The

14 Defendant is correct to note that as a case already in existence on September 1, 2013, the ol d

15 time standards apply to this case. Administrative Rule 13-003 (keeping Administrative Rule 06- 16 001 in place for cases in existence on September 1, 2013). Rule 06 -001 contemplates that fift y 17 percent of a Judge ' s criminal misdemeanor cases will be completed within six months, and on 18

19 hundred percent of them within twelve months. However, the Defendant misunderstands wha

20 exactly the time standards are. 21 "The purpose o f this Rule is to provide . . . a procedural frame work for the efficien t 22 dispatch of the Superior Cou rt' s business." Administrative Rule 06-001 . The statute under whic 23

the time standards are promulgated, 7 GCA § 4101( e) Enactment of Rules on Case Managemen 24

25 and Disposition , empowers the Supreme Court to exercise a supervisory power over the Superioi

26 Court' s docket management. In short , the time standards are internal administrative instruction 27 designed to facilitate efficient judicial branch operations.

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• Decision and Order • CM0754-13; People vs. Sereni Machuo

What they are not, and what the Defendant treats them as, is a hard and fast deadline tha 1

2 binds the People to dispose of a criminal case or face its dismissal. They are not akin to a statut e

3 of limitation s wh ere, in stead of tollin g wh en p roceed in gs b egin , th e clock k eep s tick in g unti l

4 final disposition. They a re no t a right to ha ste that m a y b e enforced b y a defendant. T h e 5 Defendant has waived his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and has not reasserted it.

6 N evertheless, the Cou rt is trou bled b y the P eop le's failure to provide manda tory 7

8 discovery in accordance with the Scheduling Order. Defendants have a constitutional right to

9 potentially exculpatory evidence. Brad y v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The timely provision 10 of that evidence is necessary for the efficient disposition of the Court's business, which weighs 11 on the Court's ability to do justice to all the other litigants before it. Although the Defendant has 12 specifically moved for dismissal, the statute enables the Court to "issue such other order as it 13

14 d e e m s j u st under the circumstances." 8 G C A § 7 0 .4 5 (2005). Thu s, the Cou rt m a y , a t its

15 discretion and in the interest of justice, impose a remedy that is less severe than the remedy 16 requested by the Defendant.

17 CONCLUSION

18 For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. T h e 19

20 Attorney General's Office is sanctioned in the amount of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars and

21 NO/100, to be paid to the Superior Court of Guam on or before April 2, 2014.

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23 IT IS SO ORDERED

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27 SERVICE VIA COURT BOX RECEIVED FOR s' RRI O aN O RABLE AR TH UR R. BARCIN AS I acknowledge that a copy the original hereto was placed in the Date: Judge, Superior Co ur t o f Gua m 28 court box of. 3 � °I b. Noyt.11J

Time: 3 ( I p\

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Date: ! T i m e r ( s M

Deputy Clerk, S 'or Court of Guam Marshal, Superior Court of Guam