People v. Lumpkin

2019 NY Slip Op 628
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 30, 2019
Docket2016-02141
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 NY Slip Op 628 (People v. Lumpkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Lumpkin, 2019 NY Slip Op 628 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

People v Lumpkin (2019 NY Slip Op 00628)
People v Lumpkin
2019 NY Slip Op 00628
Decided on January 30, 2019
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided on January 30, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J.
MARK C. DILLON
HECTOR D. LASALLE
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

2016-02141

[*1]People of State of New York, respondent,

v

Todd Lumpkin, also known as Todd Lumpkins, appellant.


Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Meredith S. Holt of counsel), for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Jill A. Gross-Marks of counsel), for respondent.



DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (John B. Latella, J.), dated February 4, 2016, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Correction Law § 168-l(8) provides that a failure by a state or local agency to act or by a court to render a determination within the time period specified by the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA) shall not affect the obligation of a sex offender to register or verify under SORA, nor shall such failure prevent a court from making a determination regarding the sex offender's risk level.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the delay in holding a hearing to determine his risk level pursuant to SORA was not so " outrageously arbitrary'" as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority (People v Sprinkler, 162 AD3d 802, 802, quoting People v Gonzalez, 138 AD3d 814, 815; see People v Gallagher, 129 AD3d 1252, 1253; People v Wilkes, 53 AD3d 1073, 1074; cf. People v Gregory, 71 AD3d 1559, 1560).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

SCHEINKMAN, P.J., DILLON, LASALLE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court



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Related

People v. Gallagher
129 A.D.3d 1252 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
People v. Gonzalez
138 A.D.3d 814 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2016)
People v. Wilkes
53 A.D.3d 1073 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
People v. Gregory
71 A.D.3d 1559 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2019 NY Slip Op 628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lumpkin-nyappdiv-2019.