People v. Lumpkin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Lumpkin

213 A.D.2d 269, 624 N.Y.S.2d 821, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3086

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 21, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 213 A.D.2d 269 (People v. Lumpkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Lumpkin, 213 A.D.2d 269, 624 N.Y.S.2d 821, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3086 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered August 5, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 2 to 4 years and 1 year, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly disallowed a peremptory challenge by the defense. After the People undisputedly made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the court found that defendant’s purported race-neutral explanation for his challenge of a juror was pretextual, and that factual finding is entitled to great deference (People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350, 356-357, affd 500 US 352).

The People’s summation was a proper response to defense arguments, and stayed within the broad bounds of permissible advocacy (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 399). In any event, nothing in the People’s summation could have deprived defendant of a fair trial, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, [270]*270particularly on the issue of knowing possession of stolen property (see, People v Galbo, 218 NY 283, 290). Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Asch, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.

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—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered August 5, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 2 to 4 years and 1 year, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly disallowed a peremptory challenge by the defense. After the People undisputedly made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the court found that defendant’s purported race-neutral explanation for his challenge of a juror was pretextual, and that factual finding is entitled to great deference (People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350, 356-357, affd 500 US 352).

The People’s summation was a proper response to defense arguments, and stayed within the broad bounds of permissible advocacy (People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 399). In any event, nothing in the People’s summation could have deprived defendant of a fair trial, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, [270]*270particularly on the issue of knowing possession of stolen property (see, People v Galbo, 218 NY 283, 290). Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Asch, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

213 A.D.2d 269, 624 N.Y.S.2d 821, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lumpkin-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

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