NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 240401-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/16/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0401 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Clark County. ) v. ) No. 22-TR-734 ) AUSTIN S. LOWRY, ) Honorable ) Tracy W. Resch, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HACKETT * delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cates and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident is affirmed where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to six months of conditional discharge.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Austin S. Lowry, was found guilty of failure to
reduce speed to avoid an accident (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020)). The trial court then entered
a judgment on the conviction and sentenced the defendant to conditional discharge for six months.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
* Justice Welch was originally assigned to the panel prior to his death. Justice Hackett was later substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to oral argument. 1 and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to conditional discharge. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 26, 2022, Illinois State Police (ISP) trooper, Timothy Moore, issued a citation
to the defendant for “driving too fast for conditions or failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident”
after a vehicle the defendant was driving struck the rear of a motorcycle, causing injury to its driver
and killing the passenger. The matter proceeded to bench trial on the charge of failure to reduce
speed to avoid an accident.
¶5 At the December 2023 bench trial, the following testimony was presented. Robert Ryan, a
correctional officer with the Clark County Sheriff’s Department, testified that at approximately 5
p.m. on August 26, 2022, he was traveling west when he saw that a motorcycle accident had
occurred at the intersection of Route 40 and Baystown Road. Officer Ryan explained that there
was a downhill slope on that section of Route 40. When Officer Ryan was at the “crest of the hill
coming down,” he observed a “cloud of dust” in front of him. Upon his arrival at the accident
scene, he noticed a motorcycle lying in the road and an unresponsive male under the guardrail.
The male was later identified as Joseph Roseberry. Officer Ryan also observed a female, who
appeared to be deceased and was later identified as Tasha Davis, lying in the roadway. Officer
Ryan was the first person on the scene.
¶6 Jeremiah Hanley, a deputy sheriff at the Clark County’s Sheriff’s Department, testified that
he was dispatched to the crash site at approximately 5:07 p.m. Deputy Hanley noted that Baystown
Road was a public county road, and Route 40 was a U.S. highway. As he approached the accident
scene from the west, he observed a passenger car with extensive front-end damage facing west on
the north side of the road, a motorcycle lying on its side, and pieces of the motorcycle in various
2 places. Deputy Hanley also observed an unresponsive female lying on the ground next to the
guardrail; and to the east, a male lying on the ground, partly under the guardrail. The male, who
was identified as Roseberry, was the driver of the motorcycle, while the female, who was identified
as Davis, was the motorcycle passenger.
¶7 Deputy Hanley observed that there was extensive damage to the front of the vehicle, which
included damage to the front bumper, grill, hood, and windshield area. He did not remember the
make of the vehicle but noted that it was a small, four door passenger car. Deputy Hanley noted
that the motorcycle’s gas tank and seat were no longer part of the motorcycle, and the rear end was
“tore up pretty bad.” He noted that motorcycle debris was “everywhere.” While at the scene,
Deputy Hanley spoke with the defendant, and the defendant admitted that he was the driver of the
car. Deputy Hanley overheard the defendant tell Officer Ryan that the sun was in the defendant’s
eyes when the defendant came over the hill, and he could not see. Deputy Hanley confirmed that,
at that time of day and during that time of year, the sun would be in a driver’s eyes when driving
over that particular hill. Deputy Hanley attempted to speak to Roseberry at the scene, but Deputy
Hanley noted that Roseberry was in a lot of pain and was in and out of consciousness.
¶8 Timothy Moore, who was employed as an ISP trooper at the time of the accident but was
employed as a traffic crash reconstruction officer at the time of the trial, testified that he arrived at
the crash site shortly before 6:30 p.m. At the crash site, Officer Moore observed that the front,
middle bumper area of the red Chevrolet Impala was pressed into the engine compartment area,
indicating an “extensive collision.” Officer Moore spoke with the defendant about how the
accident occurred, and Officer Moore noted that the defendant stated as follows:
3 “The Defendant *** was traveling westbound on Route 40. Just as he crested over the hill,
he observed the motorcycle. He knew the motorcycle was there. As it continued
westbound, he’s not sure why, but the motorcycle was in the front of his vehicle.”
Officer Moore indicated that the speed limit on Route 40 was 55 miles per hour. When asked to
describe the section of Route 40 where this accident occurred, Officer Moore indicated that for a
driver traveling west over the hillcrest, there would be a “straight downgrade for approximately a
quarter mile or a little longer” until the driver reached the intersection. Officer Moore also noted
that, other than the sunlight, there were no obstructions in the road that would have kept the
defendant from seeing the motorcycle, as it was a straight road. Officer Moore asked the defendant
if, prior to striking the motorcycle, the sun impaired the defendant’s vision, and the defendant
responded that he did not know.
¶9 On cross-examination, Officer Moore indicated that his in-car vehicle recording was
activated and recording video and audio for the majority of the time that he was at the scene.
However, Officer Moore deactivated his microphone while he was sitting in his squad car working
on the crash report and waiting on the traffic crash reconstruction officer. When he spoke with the
defendant, he had not reactivated his microphone, so it was not recording. Officer Moore
acknowledged that, on the traffic crash report, he indicated that it was unknown whether the
defendant’s vision was obstructed. However, Officer Moore also acknowledged that, before
completing the report, Deputy Hanley told him about overhearing the defendant say that the
defendant could not see because of the sun. Officer Moore explained that he had entered unknown
on the report because he was not able to verify whether the sun had actually impaired the
defendant’s vision.
4 ¶ 10 Officer Moore also testified that the defendant was taken to the hospital to be examined
and to obtain blood and urine testing for alcohol and drugs, but Officer Moore did not know the
results of the blood and urine testing. However, Officer Moore noted in the accident report that the
defendant appeared to be unimpaired. Officer Moore indicated that there were no witnesses to the
accident. He acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of what the motorcycle was doing
at the time of the accident. He also acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of the
location or the speed of the motorcycle and the defendant’s vehicle, or the distance between the
two, at the time that the defendant’s vision was impaired by the sun. Officer Moore could not
ascertain whether the defendant had reduced the speed of his vehicle prior to approaching the hill.
¶ 11 Joseph Roseberry testified that on August 26, 2022, the date of the accident, he was
working remotely from his camper that was located about one mile from the accident, down
Baystown Road. At around 10:30 a.m. or 11 a.m., he picked up Davis at her residence, and they
went to lunch. However, he had no recollection of the events that occurred after they departed the
restaurant.
¶ 12 Ryne Brieseacher, an ISP traffic reconstruction officer, testified about the damage to the
defendant’s vehicle and the motorcycle. With respect to the defendant’s vehicle, Officer
Brieseacher indicated that the “centroid of damage” was toward the center of the vehicle and that
the front area bumper was pushed rearward toward the engine compartment with damage also to
the hood and the windshield. Officer Brieseacher observed that the motorcycle had rear damage to
the fender and to the wheel and tire combination and that the fuel tank was dislodged from the
motorcycle. He also observed that the taillight and the turn signal on the motorcycle were broken,
and it appeared that the bulb was also broken. Officer Brieseacher observed a tire mark on the
road, but he did not observe any preimpact tire marks. He explained that when the defendant’s
5 vehicle struck the rear tire of the motorcycle, it caused the motorcycle wheel to bend and lock up
due to the damage, which then caused the tire mark on the road.
¶ 13 Officer Brieseacher testified that for westbound traffic, Route 40 in this area was a
downgrade toward the impact site. He did not measure the distance between the crest of the hill
and the impact site. Officer Brieseacher determined that the defendant’s vehicle was traveling
between 56 to 69 miles per hour at the time of impact, and the motorcycle was traveling between
8 and 20 miles per hour at that time. Based on the data retrieved from the event data recorder of
the defendant’s vehicle, Officer Brieseacher calculated the time between when the defendant
braked and the collision as approximately “[h]alf of one second.”
¶ 14 On cross-examination, Officer Brieseacher acknowledged that he was told that the
defendant informed the first two officers at the scene that the defendant’s vision was impaired
because of the sun. Officer Brieseacher spoke with the defendant at the accident location, but
Officer Brieseacher did not recall asking the defendant whether the sun impaired the defendant’s
vision. Officer Brieseacher acknowledged that he was unable to ascertain the location of the
defendant’s vehicle or the motorcycle at the time that the defendant was blinded by the sun. Officer
Brieseacher discussed the principles of perception, processing, and reaction upon perceiving a
threat. Specifically, he explained that it would take a driver about 1.5 seconds to perceive a threat,
decide how to react to it, and then act upon the threat. He acknowledged that, during that time, the
driver’s vehicle would presumably still be in motion. He also acknowledged that the perceived
threat could be sun blindness. Officer Brieseacher did not know whether, assuming that the
defendant’s vehicle was traveling the speed limit, the defendant had sufficient time to avoid the
collision once he observed the motorcycle right in front of him.
6 ¶ 15 At the close of the State’s evidence, defense counsel made a motion for directed verdict,
arguing that the State had failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. After
hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant then presented
the following testimony.
¶ 16 Officer Ryan testified that while he was at the scene, he noted that the defendant was
distraught, emotional, and in shock. The defendant also repeated three or four times that he could
not see the motorcycle because of the sun.
¶ 17 Deputy Hanley testified that he suggested to the defendant’s family members, who had
arrived at the scene following the accident, that they take the defendant to the hospital for a medical
assessment and for blood and alcohol testing. When Deputy Hanley asked the defendant about the
accident, the defendant indicated that he did not see the motorcycle because the sun was in his
eyes. Officer Ryan was also present during this conversation. After hearing the testimony and
closing arguments, the trial court took the case under advisement.
¶ 18 On December 20, 2023, the trial court entered a written order, in which the trial court found
that the State had proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed
to avoid an accident (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020)). The trial court indicated that to prove
the defendant guilty of this offense, the State had to establish that the defendant drove carelessly
and also failed to reduce his speed to avoid colliding with the motorcycle. The trial court noted
that the testimony of the witnesses as well as the photographs of the scene depicted a violent
collision which occurred when the defendant’s vehicle rear-ended the motorcycle, which caused
severe damage to both vehicles, detached the gas tank from the motorcycle frame, compressed the
car’s front bumper into the engine compartment, and scattered debris. The trial court also noted
that the center of the car’s windshield had a large area of radial pattern damage likely caused by
7 the impact of Davis’s body. The trial court noted that both vehicles were traveling westbound on
Route 40, the speed limit was 55 miles per hour, and the road was straight between the hill crest
and the intersection with no physical obstructions. The trial court also noted that Officer
Brieseacher found no preimpact tire marks on the pavement, the absence of which created a
reasonable inference that the defendant did not brake before impact. Officer Brieseacher estimated
that, at the time of impact, the defendant’s vehicle was traveling between 56 and 69 miles per hour,
and the motorcycle was traveling between 8 and 20 miles per hour. The trial court indicated that it
was reasonable to infer from the circumstantial evidence that the motorcycle had slowed to execute
a right turn on Baystown Road.
¶ 19 The trial court indicated that the defendant was driving west into the evening sun, and the
defendant was aware that a motorcycle was in front of him because he told Officer Moore that he
had observed the motorcycle traveling ahead of him when he crested the hill. The defendant had
told Officer Ryan that he did not see the motorcycle because of the sun. The trial court then noted,
“[The defendant’s] statement connects a hazardous condition—the sun in his eyes—with impaired
vision that obstructed his observation of the motorcycle. That condition affected [the defendant’s]
ability to drive safely.” The trial court noted that section 11-601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Code) (id.) imposed a duty on drivers to decrease their speed when confronted with a “special
hazard” by reason of weather or highway conditions. The trial court found that the existence of the
hazardous condition required the defendant to reduce his speed to the extent necessary so as not to
endanger the person or property of others. Thus, the trial court found that the State had proven that
the defendant acted carelessly by failing to reduce his speed when confronted with the sun’s glare.
¶ 20 Also, the trial court noted that section 11-601(a) of the Code (id.) required a driver to
decrease speed as necessary in the exercise of reasonable and proper care when “approaching a
8 hill crest.” The trial court noted that a driver approaching a hill crest was unable to see the blind
side of the hill, and the driver’s visibility was not restored until the driver passed over the hill crest.
The trial court found that this was the situation that the defendant encountered on approaching the
hill crest while traveling westbound on Route 40. Thus, the trial court found that the defendant had
a legal duty to anticipate the risk that he would encounter a vehicle or obstruction on the blind side
of the hill. The trial court indicated that section 11-601(a) of the Code (id.) imposed a duty on the
defendant, when approaching the hill crest, to reduce his speed in anticipation of the heightened
risk presented by his inability to see the road on the other side of the hill with the attendant risk
that he might encounter a vehicle or obstruction that was previously outside his range of vision.
Thus, the trial court found that the State had proven that the defendant also acted carelessly by
failing to reduce his speed when approaching the hill crest.
¶ 21 The trial court then indicated that the vehicle crash reconstruction evidence, which revealed
that the defendant was traveling 56 to 69 miles per hour at the time of the collision, created a strong
inference that the defendant was driving at an unreasonable speed and that he had failed to reduce
his speed upon approaching the hill crest and upon being confronted with sun blindness that
impaired his vision. Based on the above, the trial court found that the State had proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the offense of failure to reduce speed to avoid an
accident.
¶ 22 On January 10, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for entry of judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had acted
carelessly and failed to reduce his speed to avoid the accident. After a hearing on February 14,
2024, at which the trial court heard arguments on the motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial
court denied the motion.
9 ¶ 23 On March 13, 2024, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing,
the State presented victim impact statements from Roseberry and Cassie Bumba, Davis’s daughter.
Roseberry read his victim impact statement to the trial court, in which he discussed the extent of
the injuries he had sustained in the collision; the lengthy recovery process; and the impact the
accident had on his life as well as on the lives of his family, which included the financial burden
caused by extensive medical bills and missing work during recovery. Roseberry also expressed his
frustration that the defendant was able to continue living a normal life after the accident and that
the only offense the defendant was charged with was failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.
Roseberry further expressed his frustration with the defendant pleading not guilty to the offense,
which resulted in 18 months of court proceedings. Specifically, Roseberry said as follows: “[The
defendant] is worried about being inconvenienced for a year when [Davis] was killed and my life
was completely altered. This is unforgiveable and cruel. There are no words to describe the cruelty
in that.”
¶ 24 Bumba also read her victim impact statement to the trial court. In her statement, Bumba
talked about the emotions that she felt upon learning of her mother’s death, how the loss impacted
the entire family, how she continued to grieve for her mother, and how she had relied on her mother
for support. Bumba described her feelings toward the defendant, stating as follows:
“I would also like to add how absolutely disappointing and difficult it’s been to
watch the person responsible for my mom’s death fail to take any responsibility for his actions
and fight a speeding ticket every step of the way *** dragging this out for over a year and a
half. He has shown zero sympathy for his actions to the point of having his attorney contact
our estate attorney who has nothing to do with this case more than once asking us to drop this
charge so he doesn’t lose his license.”
10 Bumba then stated that her mother’s life was worth a lot more than court supervision and asked
the trial court to impose a conviction that would permanently be on the defendant’s record.
¶ 25 The defendant then presented evidence in mitigation, which included testimony from
Megan Craig, one of the defendant’s sisters, who talked about how distraught the defendant was
following the accident and described how his personality had changed from happy and easygoing
to someone who rarely smiled and kept to himself. Craig also talked about how the defendant had
no previous criminal history; he was required to drive for his employment; and if a judgment of
conviction was entered against him, the defendant would lose his license. Doug Dahnke testified
that he had previously employed the defendant and talked about how the defendant was a
trustworthy employee and had integrity, about how the defendant was always willing to help out,
and about how it was important for the defendant to be able to drive to maintain his employment
and that the defendant’s employment options would be limited if he was unable to drive. William
Wofford, the defendant’s former coach and teacher, talked about how the defendant was a team
leader and how he never had any problems with the defendant. William Vincent, the defendant’s
neighbor, described the defendant as reliable, hardworking, responsible, empathetic, and kind-
hearted.
¶ 26 The trial court did not ask the defendant whether he wished to make a statement in
allocution before his sentence was pronounced. During arguments, the State sought a six-month
sentence of conditional discharge while the defendant’s counsel sought a disposition of
supervision. Following arguments, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced
the defendant to conditional discharge for a period of six months. The trial court indicated that in
making this decision, it had considered the testimony of the witnesses, the victim impact
statements, the exhibits entered into evidence, the circumstances of the offense, the relevant
11 statutory factors, and the arguments of counsel. The trial court stated that the harm, grief, and
misery caused by the defendant’s traffic offense was incalculable and that the defendant was
responsible for that harm, grief, and misery. The trial court noted that if the defendant lost his
driving privileges as a result of the conviction, that was a consequence of him violating the traffic
laws. The trial court stated that, “if [the defendant lost] his license—and that [would] be the
decision of the Secretary of State—[he had] choices to deal with his loss of driving privileges.”
The trial court noted that a sentence of supervision would not be in the interest of justice, and it
would denigrate the seriousness of the offense and its consequences. The defendant appeals his
conviction and sentence.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 The defendant contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident because there was insufficient evidence that he
drove carelessly and failed to reduce his speed. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). A reviewing court does
not retry the defendant and must accept all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. People v.
Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 26. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility
of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from the facts. People v. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 25. Thus, “a reviewing court will
not substitute its judgment for the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. On appeal, we will not
12 reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it
creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Id.
¶ 29 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction as long as the
evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the charged crime. Id.
However, the trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the
chain of circumstances. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 27. It is sufficient if all of the evidence taken
together proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 30 Here, the defendant was convicted of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in
violation of section 11-601(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020)). Section 11-601(a)
provided as follows:
“No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than
is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use of the highway, or
endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact that the speed of a vehicle does
not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty
to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, approaching and going
around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding
roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by
reason of weather or highway conditions. Speed must be decreased as may be necessary to
avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the highway in compliance with
legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.” Id.
Our supreme court has held that to prove a defendant guilty of failing to reduce speed to avoid an
accident under this provision, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
13 drove carelessly and that he failed to reduce his speed to avoid a collision. Galarza, 2023 IL
127678, ¶ 29.
¶ 31 The defendant here first argues that the State failed to prove that he drove carelessly
immediately prior to the accident. Specifically, the defendant contends that the mere fact that the
estimated speed of his car at the time of the crash may have been 56 miles per hour in a 55 miles
per hour zone was insufficient to prove that he was driving carelessly immediately before the
accident. In addition, the defendant notes that the State presented no evidence as to the specific
location where he was blinded by the sun or any evidence of the speed of, and the distance traveled
by, the defendant’s vehicle as it descended the hill before he was blinded by the sun and before
the motorcycle reduced its speed. Instead, the defendant contends that the only evidence relating
to speed presented by the State was the estimated speed ranges of the defendant’s vehicle and the
motorcycle at the time of the accident. The defendant also argues that the State failed to present
any evidence that the time between the defendant being blinded by the sun and the accident would
have afforded him sufficient time to perceive, and process, the unexpected sun blindness and then
react to avoid the accident. Thus, the defendant argues that the State was unable to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to use due care during the interim between being
blinded by the sun and the reappearance of the motorcycle, and the defendant applying his brakes.
¶ 32 The defendant makes similar arguments with regard to the trial court’s finding that he also
acted carelessly by failing to reduce his speed when approaching the hill crest. The defendant notes
that the only evidence of his speed was in regard to the estimated speed ranges of his vehicle and
the motorcycle at the time of the accident, which was over a quarter mile from the hill crest. The
defendant also notes that the State did not present any evidence of the speed of his vehicle before,
and as, it approached the hill crest.
14 ¶ 33 Section 11-601(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020)) imposes a duty on
motorists to exercise due care. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 33. The supreme court has defined
“due care” as the degree of care that ordinarily prudent persons are accustomed to exercising under
the same or similar circumstances. Id.
¶ 34 Construing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the State, we find that the State here provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude
that the defendant drove carelessly. The defendant observed the motorcycle traveling in front of
him as he crested the hill, but the defendant lost sight of the motorcycle due to his vision being
impaired by the sun. Other than the sun’s glare, which, at certain times of the day, would restrict
a driver’s vision, there were no other obstructions on that portion of Route 40. The speed limit on
Route 40 was 55 miles per hour; and at the moment of impact, the defendant’s vehicle was
estimated to be traveling between 56 to 69 miles per hour while the motorcycle was estimated to
be traveling between 8 to 20 miles per hour. Given that Roseberry’s camper was located down
Baystown Road, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that Roseberry had slowed to execute
¶ 35 In addition, Officer Brieseacher testified that he did not observe any preimpact tire marks
on the road, and he calculated the time between when the defendant braked and the collision as
approximately “[h]alf of one second.” According to Officer Moore, the front, middle bumper area
of the defendant’s vehicle was pressed into the engine compartment area, which indicated to him
that an “extensive collision” had occurred. Officer Brieseacher observed that the motorcycle had
rear damage and that the fuel tank was dislodged from the motorcycle. Deputy Hanley noted that
the motorcycle was in pieces, the gas tank and seat were no longer part of the motorcycle, and the
rear end was “tore up pretty bad.”
15 ¶ 36 As found by the trial court, the existence of the hazardous condition, i.e., the defendant
being blinded by the sun, required the defendant to reduce his speed to the extent necessary so as
to not endanger the motorcycle that he knew was traveling in front of him. Given the totality of
the evidence and the reasonable inferences that could be made from the circumstantial evidence,
the trial court could have reasonably found that the defendant, despite knowing that the motorcycle
was traveling in front of him, that his vision was impaired due to the sun, and that he had lost sight
of the motorcycle, did not exercise due care in continuing to travel on the downgrade without
reducing his speed to the extent necessary to avoid the collision. Thus, we conclude that the trial
court’s finding that the defendant acted carelessly by failing to reduce his speed when confronted
with the sun’s glare was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
¶ 37 In making this finding, we acknowledge that Officer Brieseacher was unable to ascertain
the location of the defendant’s vehicle or the motorcycle, or the speed at which the defendant’s
vehicle or the motorcycle was traveling, at the point when the defendant’s vision was impaired by
the sun. We also acknowledge Officer Brieseacher’s testimony that he could not ascertain whether
there was sufficient time or distance for the defendant to avoid the collision. However, this
testimony was presented to, and considered by, the trial court when the trial court found that the
defendant drove carelessly. As previously noted, it is the trier of fact’s responsibility to weigh the
evidence, and the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
questions involving the weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 Moreover, we find that this case is distinguishable from People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d
847 (1980), which was cited by the defendant. There, the Fourth District Appellate Court reversed
the defendant’s conviction for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, finding, in part, that
16 the State had failed to prove that the defendant drove carelessly prior to the accident. Id. at 852. In
making this decision, the appellate court noted that the salient facts in evidence with regard to the
collision were that the defendant struck a car parked on a portion of the street where all parking
was prohibited, and the car was partially obscured from view by the shade of trees. Id. at 851.
There was also evidence presented that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision.
Id. The appellate court found that, based on these facts, the only possible way to infer carelessness
was to assume that because the defendant was intoxicated, he was careless. Id. The appellate court
noted that, in light of the other facts, the evidence of the defendant’s intoxication, without more,
could not support an inference of carelessness sufficient to prove that the defendant drove
carelessly prior to the accident. Id. at 851-52.
¶ 39 However, unlike in Brant, where, because of the tree, defendant could not see and thus
could not know that the vehicle was parked ahead of him, the defendant here knew that the
motorcycle was traveling ahead of him and that he had lost sight of the motorcycle while he was
traveling on the downgrade. Accordingly, when we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, we find that the State provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the
defendant drove carelessly.
¶ 40 The defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he failed to reduce his
speed to avoid colliding with the motorcycle. The State is not required to prove that the defendant
exceeded the speed limit to establish the offense of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident
because the offense can be committed regardless of the speed of the defendant’s vehicle or the
relevant speed limit. 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020); Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 39. Instead,
the State must prove that the defendant failed to decrease his speed as necessary to avoid colliding
17 with another person or vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2020); Galarza, 2023 IL 127678,
¶ 39.
¶ 41 The defendant here again contends that the State failed to present any evidence at trial of
the speeds and locations of, and distances between, the defendant’s vehicle and the motorcycle at
the point when the defendant’s vision was impaired by the sun. The defendant argues that the State
did not present any evidence as to whether the pre-accident reduction, if any, of the speed of the
motorcycle was gradual or rapid. In addition, the defendant contends that the inference by the trial
court that the defendant did not brake before the collision was unfounded, as Officer Brieseacher’s
testimony indicated that the defendant braked immediately before the accident.
¶ 42 In support of his arguments, the defendant again cites Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 852, which
held that the failure to reduce speed element cannot be inferred merely from the fact that there was
a collision. In Brant, the Fourth District rejected the argument that the fact of a collision standing
alone is sufficient evidence to prove the offense of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Id.
“Based on the logic of that argument, anyone involved in an accident could properly be convicted
for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident.” Id.
¶ 43 When viewing the evidence in its entirety, and construing all reasonable inferences from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the trial court’s finding that the
defendant failed to reduce his speed to avoid the accident was not so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory that it justifies reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. Again, the defendant’s
vehicle at the moment of impact was estimated to be traveling between 56 to 69 miles per hour in
a 55 miles per hour speed zone. The evidence also showed that there was extensive damage
sustained by both the defendant’s vehicle and the motorcycle, there were no preimpact tire marks,
the defendant first activated his brakes approximately “[h]alf of one second” before the collision,
18 and the defendant’s statements following the accident indicated that he was aware that the
motorcycle was ahead of him but that he was blinded by the sun. Given this circumstantial
evidence, which is more than just the mere fact that a collision occurred, the trial court could draw
reasonable inferences in favor of finding that the defendant failed to reduce his speed before hitting
the motorcycle. See Galarza, 2023 IL 127678, ¶ 41 (finding that the trier of fact could draw
reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence—heavy front-end damage to defendant’s
vehicle and airbag deployment on defendant’s vehicle—that defendant failed to reduce his speed
before hitting a tree). Accordingly, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we find a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of failure to reduce
speed to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 44 The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying both his motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the State’s case and his written motion for entry of judgment of
acquittal filed after the trial court found him guilty. In response, the State argues that the defendant
has forfeited these arguments on appeal because the defendant presented evidence after his oral
motion for a directed verdict was denied and did not renew the motion at the close of all the
evidence. “It is well settled that a defendant who chooses to present evidence after the denial of
his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case waives any error in the trial court’s
ruling on the motion unless he renews the motion at the close of all the evidence.” People v. Carter,
2022 IL App (1st) 210261, ¶ 123. The defendant, however, argues that the State has forfeited its
forfeiture argument where the State did not raise this argument either in its written motion for
denial of the defendant’s motion for entry of judgment of acquittal or during the hearing on the
defendant’s motion for acquittal. The defendant also contends that, regardless of whether the
argument regarding the ruling on the motion for directed verdict was preserved for review on
19 appeal, his argument concerning the denial of the motion for entry of judgment of acquittal was
preserved.
¶ 45 Forfeiture aside, we reject the defendant’s arguments and conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. A motion for directed verdict or motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) should be granted only where all of the evidence,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing side, so overwhelmingly favors the movant
that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. Harris v. Thompson, 2012 IL
112525, ¶ 15. An adverse ruling on a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is reviewed
de novo. Id.
¶ 46 A motion for a directed finding asserts that, as a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient
to support a finding of guilty. People v. Reinking, 2024 IL App (4th) 230486, ¶ 97. The trial court
must determine, after considering the evidence most strongly in the State’s favor, whether a
reasonable mind could fairly conclude the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. A
motion for directed verdict asks whether the State’s evidence could support a verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether the evidence does support that verdict. People v. Connolly,
322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 915 (2001). Similarly, a motion for judgment n.o.v. should be granted where
the State’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is insufficient to support
a finding of guilty. People v. Robinson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 24, 38 (1989). The standard for granting
a motion for judgment n.o.v. is high, and a judgment n.o.v. should not be entered if reasonable
minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the presented facts. Lawlor v.
North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37.
20 ¶ 47 As we have already found that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, we
also find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction under either of the
above standards. In other words, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we find that the evidence does not so overwhelmingly favor the defendant that either the
entry of a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. would be proper.
¶ 48 Lastly, the defendant challenges his sentence of six months of conditional discharge. In
challenging his sentence, the defendant complains about certain deficiencies that occurred during
the sentencing hearing as well as the trial court’s ultimate sentence decision. The defendant, in his
initial brief, did not acknowledge that he failed to make these arguments in the trial court and thus
did not argue plain error. Consequently, in its appellee brief, the State contends that the defendant
has forfeited these arguments because he failed to make the necessary objections at the sentencing
hearing and failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence. However, in response, the defendant
raises plain error for the first time in his reply brief, which is sufficient to allow us to review his
claims for plain error. See People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 348 (2000). The defendant then
argues that we may review the claimed sentencing errors under either prong of the plain-error
doctrine.
¶ 49 “It is well settled that, to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous
objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.” People v. Hillier,
237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). Thus, when a defendant fails to preserve a claim of sentencing error,
we may review the claim only if the defendant establishes plain error. Id. at 545. The plain-error
doctrine is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture applicable to
unpreserved claims. Id. Under the plain-error rule, a reviewing court will review an unpreserved
21 sentencing error when a clear or obvious error occurs and: (1) the evidence at the sentencing
hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the alleged error was so serious as to deny the defendant a fair
sentencing hearing. Id. The first step in plain-error review is to determine whether there was clear
or obvious error. People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 22.
¶ 50 Section 6-601(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6-601(a) (West 2022)) states that a violation of
the provisions of chapter 625 is a petty offense unless otherwise designated as a misdemeanor or
felony. The available sentencing options for a petty offense include, inter alia, a period of
probation or conditional discharge not to exceed six months as well as supervision. 730 ILCS 5/5-
4.5-75 (West 2022). Thus, in this case, the defendant’s sentence of six months of conditional
discharge was within the statutory sentencing range. However, the defendant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing that sentence for the following reasons: the impact
statements offered by Roseberry and Bumba exceeded the permissible scope of an impact
statement; the trial court did not give the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in
allocution; the trial court improperly considered, as a factor in aggravation, carelessness, which
was a fact implicit in the criminal offense; and the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
give due consideration to a disposition of supervision.
¶ 51 A trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d
407, 448 (2005). The reviewing court gives the trial court great deference when reviewing a
sentence because the trial court, having observed the proceedings, is generally in a better position
than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149,
154 (1977). The trial court has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility,
demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. Id. Thus, a
reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would
22 have weighed these factors differently. People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 280 (1980). When a sentence
falls within the statutory guidelines, the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of discretion. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1995). A trial court abuses its sentencing
discretion when the penalty imposed “is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law,
or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210
(2000).
¶ 52 In determining an appropriate sentence, the relevant factors that should be considered
include the nature of the crime, the protection of the public, deterrence, punishment, and the
defendant’s rehabilitative potential. People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 14. “The weight
to be attributed to each factor in aggravation and mitigation depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case.” People v. Garibay, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 1109 (2006). “The existence
of mitigating factors does not obligate the trial court to impose the minimum sentence.” Id. A trial
court is presumed to have considered all the relevant factors, which includes the mitigating
evidence presented, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. Id.
¶ 53 We will first address the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to give due consideration to a disposition of supervision, so that the defendant could retain
his driver’s license. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant’s counsel argued that if a judgment
of conviction were entered against the defendant, his driver’s license would be revoked. In
addition, counsel presented evidence showing that, for the defendant to maintain his employment,
it was important for him to be able to drive and that his employment opportunities would be limited
if his driver’s license were revoked. However, the trial court concluded, even after hearing the
witnesses’ testimony and defense counsel’s arguments, that a sentence of supervision would not
be in the interest of justice, and it would denigrate the seriousness and the consequences of the
23 offense. Thus, the record refutes the defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to give due
consideration to a disposition of supervision. Moreover, given the seriousness of the offense and
the harm to the victims as a result of the defendant’s conduct, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of conditional discharge, rather than supervision. The
revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license would be a collateral consequence of his conviction,
not a consequence imposed by the trial court.
¶ 54 The defendant also argues that, when imposing the sentence, the trial court erred in
considering the defendant’s carelessness, which was already an element of the charged offense of
failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. A trial court is prohibited from considering, as a factor
in aggravation, a fact implicit or inherent in the offense for which the defendant is convicted.
People v. Larson, 2022 IL App (3d) 190482, ¶ 26. However, a trial court may consider the manner
in which the victim’s death was brought about, along with the seriousness, nature, and
circumstances of the offense, which includes the nature and extent of each element of the offense
committed by the defendant. People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009). Also, the
severity of the sentence depends on the degree of harm caused to the victim and may be considered
as an aggravating factor in determining the sentence, even in cases where serious bodily harm was
arguably implicit in the offense for which a defendant was convicted. Id.
¶ 55 Here, when imposing the sentence, the trial court noted that the harm, grief, and misery
caused by the defendant’s traffic offense was incalculable and that the defendant was responsible
for that harm, grief, and misery. The defendant, thus, argues that the trial court’s decision to
sentence him to conditional discharge was “premised upon the ‘harm, grief, and misery’ allegedly
caused by [the defendant’s] carelessness.” However, based on our review of the record, we find
that there is no indication that the trial court considered an element inherent in the offense when
24 determining the sentence. Instead, the trial court properly considered the serious harm to the
victims and the “grief and misery” that was suffered as a result of the collision and found that a
sentence of supervision would denigrate the seriousness of the offense and its consequences.
¶ 56 The defendant further contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him an opportunity
to make a statement in allocution at the sentencing hearing where the trial court never asked the
defendant if he wished to make a statement before the sentence was announced. Section 5-4-1(a)(6)
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(6) (West 2022)) provides that, at the
sentencing hearing, the trial court must afford the defendant the opportunity to make a statement
on his own behalf. However, in People v. Miller, 72 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419-20 (1979), the Second
District Appellate Court found that the trial court’s failure to ask a defendant whether he wished
to make a statement on his own behalf before the sentence was pronounced was not an error of
such magnitude to warrant summary reversal of the imposed sentence. Instead, a trial court’s
failure to specifically invite a defendant to address the court at sentencing is only a technical error.
Id. Thus, while we do not condone the trial court’s action, we are satisfied that, under the
circumstances, the error does not require the vacation of the defendant’s sentence where, at the
sentencing hearing, the trial court heard the mitigating evidence presented by the defendant as well
as defense counsel’s arguments and then considered that mitigating evidence when making the
decision to sentence the defendant to six months of conditional discharge.
¶ 57 Lastly, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing victim impact statements
that were impermissibly prejudicial to be read at the sentencing hearing. “Victim impact statements
concerning the effects upon the victim’s family are both relevant and admissible during the
sentencing phase of a trial.” People v. Gonzales, 285 Ill. App. 3d 102, 104 (1996). Section 6(a-1)
of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/6(a-1) (West 2022)) provides
25 that, where a defendant is convicted of a motor vehicle offense resulting in great bodily harm or
death,
“a representative of the deceased person shall have the right to address the court regarding
the impact that the defendant’s criminal conduct has had upon them. *** [T]he court has
discretion to permit one or more of the representatives to present an oral impact statement.
*** The court shall consider any impact statement presented along with all other
appropriate factors in determining the sentence of the defendant.”
However, the presentation of the victim impact statements “does not serve as an invitation to rail
against the defendant or to recommend a certain sentence to the court.” Larson, 2022 IL App (3d)
190482, ¶ 37. The trial court is obligated to limit any victim statements made to the impact of the
offense upon the person giving the statement. Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 58 In the present case, the defendant argues that the statements from Roseberry and Bumba
exceeded the scope of a victim’s impact statement because, in their statements, they “rail[ed]
against the judicial process,” “demonize[d]” the defendant, and demanded a sentence that was
more than court supervision. In Roseberry’s statement, he talked about the injuries that he
sustained and the suffering and personal losses that he experienced as a result of the collision,
which included the suffering that he experienced knowing that Davis had lost her life while the
defendant was able to continue living a normal life and was only charged with the offense of failure
to reduce speed to avoid an accident. He also described the defendant’s decision to proceed to trial
as unforgivable and cruel, stating that the defendant was “worried about being inconvenienced for
a year when [Davis] was killed, and [Roseberry’s life] was completely altered.” Also, Bumba, in
her statement, described the ongoing emotional effects of losing her mother. However, she also
described her feelings toward the defendant, noting that the defendant failed to take any
26 responsibility for his actions, that he dragged the case out for over a year, and that he had zero
sympathy. She stated that her mother’s life was worth more than court supervision and that the
defendant should have a conviction that would permanently be on his record.
¶ 59 Although some portions of these statements may have exceeded the proper bounds of a
victim impact statement, there is no indication in the record that the trial court was unduly
influenced by those statements. Other than the trial court’s general comment at the outset that it
had considered, among other things, the victim impact statements, at no point in its pronouncement
of the sentence did the trial court refer to the contents of any of the victim impact statements. The
mere fact that the trial court allowed the statements does not establish that it was particularly
influenced by those statements. To the extent that the trial court relied on the victim impact
statements, we presume that it did not consider the portions of the statements that may have been
improper. See People v. Ashford, 168 Ill. 2d 494, 508 (1995) (it is well established that where a
sentencing hearing is conducted before the trial court, the trial court is presumed to consider only
competent and relevant evidence in determining the sentence). Therefore, we find that, if any of
the above allegations raised by the defendant are considered error, any such error was not of such
magnitude as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing. In addition, we find that, based on
our above analysis, the evidence at the sentencing hearing was not closely balanced. Accordingly,
we conclude that the defendant failed to establish plain error under either the first or second prong.
¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Clark County is affirmed.
¶ 62 Affirmed.