Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Lovett CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFO
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.RNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, F089560
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF197910A)
v.
JORDAN DERRICK LOVETT, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Andrew Kendall, Judge.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and Rosanne Rust, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Guerra, J.
INTRODUCTION
After pleading no contest to one count of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18 years of age (Pen. Code, §§ 261.5, subd. (d), 664),1 defendant Jordan Derrick Lovett was sentenced to two years of formal probation under terms and conditions attached to his probation report, which included, among other things, obeying the directives of his probation officer and not frequenting locations where minors congregate without a probation-approved responsible adult.
About three months after the sentencing hearing, defendant attended a basketball game on a kids appreciation day where the majority of spectators were minors; he also failed to comply with various directives given by his probation officer in the subsequent months. The court found defendant had violated his probation terms, revoked probation and imposed a one-year prison sentence.
On appeal, defendant argues the circumstances do not support the trial court’s finding he willfully violated his conditions of probation such that revocation was warranted. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In June 2024, defendant pled no contest to one count of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18 years of age (§§ 261.5, subd. (d), 664), with dismissal of the other two felony counts, which included arranging a meeting with the intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.4, subd. (b)) and contacting or communicating with a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3). On September 10, 2024, defendant was sentenced to two years of formal probation; defendant appeared remotely for the sentencing hearing as he was living in South Carolina at the time.
Among other probation conditions, defendant was prohibited from “knowingly associat[ing] with minors under the age of 18, []or frequent[ing] places where minors
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
congregate, unless in the presence of a responsible adult approved by Probation”; he was required to “[o]bey all reasonable instructions of the probation officer”; register as a tier 1 sex offender under section 290; and he was required to “successfully complete [a] sex offender management program and abide by all conditions of the program .…”
After sentencing, at a hearing on a defense motion regarding the conditions of probation, the court ordered defendant to appear personally on November 18, 2024. Subsequently, on November 1, 2024, defense counsel filed another motion to modify the terms of probation to allow defendant to remain in South Carolina pending the transfer of probation pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS; § 11180 et seq.). According to the motion and supporting documentation, defendant had registered as a sex offender in South Carolina immediately after he was sentenced, and he then called Kern County Probation Department about the transfer of probation to South Carolina. The Kern County probation officer informed defendant that he had to return to California. However, a sheriff’s deputy in South Carolina informed defendant that, as a registered South Carolina sex offender, he was not allowed to leave South Carolina without permission—defendant was also told by the deputy that if he had to make a court appearance in California on November 18, 2024, he would have to return to South Carolina within three days. With these conflicting requirements from different law enforcement agencies, defendant filed the motion for an order allowing him to remain in South Carolina pending transfer of probation pursuant to the ICAOS.
On November 18, 2024, after a hearing on the ICAOS issue, the court ordered that defendant was “allowed to remain in South Carolina pending the transfer of probation process, which includes a 45-day investigatory period by the receiving state of South Carolina, with the understanding he will report monthly and as directed.” The order further provided the “Probation Office is ordered to allow [defendant] to leave Kern County and the state of California as stated above effective immediately.” Finally, the court indicated the travel permit was issued under ICAOS Rules, rule 3.102(c).
Defendant met with his probation officer (Pimentel) immediately after the hearing.
According to Pimentel, he told defendant that he could remain in South Carolina for 45 days pursuant to the court’s order, but he had to come back to California by January 2, 2025 (the end of the 45-day period), and defendant would have to remain in California for seven to 10 days while a request for transfer of supervision was made pursuant to ICAOS. Pimentel indicated that he had spoken with California ICAOS personnel in Sacramento who had explained that defendant was required to be in California when the transfer request was submitted and, while there was an expedited process for the request, defendant would have to remain in California while the request was pending. Pimentel gave defendant the name and number of the California ICAOS agent Pimentel had spoken with and told defendant he could follow up with his attorney regarding this issue.
On December 1, 2024, defendant went to a women’s college basketball game in South Carolina, which was held at noon on a Saturday—a kids appreciation event where more than half of the attendees were minors. Defendant apparently said something upsetting to a college player, security was called, and defendant was asked to leave by campus police. When he gave responding officers his identification, they discovered he was a registered sex offender. On December 7, 2024, a campus police officer notified Pimentel about the basketball game. Pimentel received video from the game, showing it was attended by about 150 people, with many minors in attendance.
On December 20, 2024, Pimentel reminded defendant by email that defendant was required to report to probation in California on January 2, 2025, so the transfer request could be processed. To do that, Pimentel reminded defendant that he had to stay in California for seven to 10 days. Defendant responded that he was unaware that he had to return on January 2, 2025, and the notice was too short for him to accomplish flying back to California.
On December 23, 2024, defendant filed a motion for status, explaining he had been told by Pimentel that the transfer of probation process had not been started, and the officer would not start that process unless defendant personally appeared in his office on January 2, 2025, and remained in California for seven to 10 days. By declaration supporting the motion, defense counsel asserted the issue of the transfer process had already been resolved at the November 18, 2024, hearing without any objection. A hearing was set for January 9, 2025.
In the meantime, defendant did not report to Pimentel on January 2, 2025.
Pimentel emailed defendant, directed him to report personally on January 7, 2025, but defendant again did not do so. Pimentel filed a compliance declaration with the trial court on January 7, 2025, indicating defendant had violated his probation conditions, which included failing to report as directed and attending a basketball game without a suitable adult where minors were congregating. Pimentel also sought a bench warrant for defendant’s arrest, and recommended defendant serve 180 days in jail and for reinstatement of probation.
On January 7, 2025, defendant filed a motion to recall the bench warrant. On January 9, 2025, the court recalled the bench warrant for defendant’s arrest, and a status and probation violation hearing was set for January 29, 2025.
Defendant personally appeared at the January 29, 2025, status hearing, and the matters were set for a formal hearing on March 24, 2025. Defendant met with Pimentel after the hearing. They discussed his return to South Carolina and that probation would approve the travel. Pimentel provided defendant with a list of places sex offenders could reside, provided him with financial assistance applications for counseling so he could sign up and remain in compliance with his probation conditions, and gave him instructions to register as a sex offender with bus passes to accomplish this. According to Pimentel, however, defendant refused to tell Pimentel when he would return to California to complete the transfer process, and defendant asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege. Pimentel told defendant if he wanted a travel permit, he needed to give a date for his return, but still defendant declined to do so. After defendant spoke with his counsel,
Pimentel then told defendant he was not going to give permission to return to South Carolina, and defendant would not be allowed to leave the state of California. He instructed defendant to report again in two days, but he did not do so. Defendant continued to report his location to the probation department, however, and Pimentel ultimately determined defendant went back to South Carolina.
Pimentel filed a supplemental declaration on March 21, 2025, alleging additional probation violations, including that (1) defendant failed to provide a current residence; (2) he had absconded; (3) he failed to report in person as directed; (4) he failed to register pursuant to section 290; (5) he failed to follow a probation directive within the time limit imposed; (6) he left Kern County without permission of his probation officer; and (7) he failed to enroll in counseling. Pimentel recommended revoking probation, and that defendant be sentenced to the low term of one year in prison.
At an evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2025, two witnesses gave testimony regarding defendant’s alleged probation violations. Adam Kirchenbauer, a police officer at Woodland College in Charleston, South Carolina, testified regarding his encounter with defendant at the college basketball game where he was working to provide security for the game.
Pimentel also testified about the events leading to the hearing. Pimentel acknowledged defendant was living in South Carolina at the time of sentencing, and defendant had registered as a sex offender in South Carolina. Pimentel also acknowledged defendant had told him South Carolina law enforcement had informed defendant he could not leave South Carolina for more than three days. Pimentel knew where defendant was living and working in South Carolina, and defendant allowed Pimentel to search his phone and his person on January 29, 2025.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the following probation violations: defendant failed to report to the probation officer as directed on January 2, 2025; he failed to follow probation directives within the time limit imposed, including remaining in California after January 29, 2025, enrolling in counseling, and registering as a sex offender in California; and defendant’s presence at the basketball game violated the condition that he not frequent places where minors congregate without a suitable responsible adult. The court further found defendant was not amenable to treatment on probation, the court revoked defendant’s probation, and sentenced defendant to one year in prison.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards and Standard of Review “In conducting a probation revocation hearing, a trial court exercises its discretion to ‘revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interest of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of their supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses.’” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 163, quoting § 1203.2, subd. (a).) “The facts supporting a probation revocation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gray, supra, at p. 163, citing People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 447 (Rodriguez).) Trial courts have “very broad discretion” in determining whether a probationer has violated probation. (Rodriquez, supra, at p. 443.) “However, the evidence must support a conclusion the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.)
“The terms ‘willful’ or ‘willfully,’ … imply ‘simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act …’ .… Stated another way, the term ‘willful’ requires only that the prohibited act occur intentionally.” (In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.)
Appellate courts review a probation revocation decision for an abuse of discretion;
the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Rodriquez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 447; People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773; People v. Kelly
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.) “‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation.’” (Rodriquez, supra, at p. 443.) II. No Abuse of Discretion Established Defendant argues the trial court’s ruling is not supported by substantial evidence.
According to defendant, the evidence shows defendant was making efforts to comply with his conditions and his probation officer’s directives. He had reported his location to probation’s online check-in system, he had turned on his location for tracking, and probation knew he was living in South Carolina. As for the basketball game, defendant argues the evidence shows any violation of his conditions was not willful: he was by himself in the stands the entire time he was at the event; and the officer did not see him interacting with anyone else. Defendant also notes he is a regional center client with a documented learning disability diagnosis.
The People maintain that even if what defendant argues is true, it does not negate the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling that defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation. He was told twice he had to appear in person on January 2, 2025, at Kern County Probation, but he did not appear; he also failed to appear on January 7, 2025, and February 1, 2025. He did not comply with Pimentel’s directive that he enroll in counseling and register in California as a sex offender, and he left Kern County and California after January 29, 2025, against probation’s express direction. Finally, the People argue, he attended a basketball game where more than half of the attendees were minors, some of whom were seated near defendant, and he failed to leave the arena until he was asked to leave. According to the People, this violated the condition defendant was not to frequent locations where minors congregate without a suitable responsible adult.
The record reflects some confusion about the ICAOS Rules for transferring probation from a sending state (here, California) to a receiving state (here, South
Carolina) where the supervisee is a sex offender. Moreover, because defendant registered as a sex offender in South Carolina before the probation transfer to South Carolina was effected, this apparently put into question whether defendant was lawfully permitted to leave South Carolina for the number of days necessary for Kern County Probation to seek reporting instructions and transfer defendant’s supervision to South Carolina.
Notwithstanding these issues, however, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendant violated his probation terms and conditions. Entirely independent of the transfer process, defendant was found to attend an event under circumstances that violated one of his probation conditions. Specifically, defendant was prohibited, in the absence of a probation-approved responsible adult, from frequenting places where minors congregated. This condition was imposed at the sentencing hearing, and defendant signed and initialed a form on November 18, 2024, that set out the conditions of his probation—he had actual and ample notice of this condition. Although defendant may not have known before he arrived at the game on December 1, 2024, that it was a kids appreciation event, the evidence shows minors were the majority of spectators at the game, and the trial court was entitled to infer this would have been obvious to defendant as he sat in the stands. Defendant could have left the game when he observed how many minors were present, but he chose to stay until he was asked to leave.
Defendant argues Kirchenbauer testified defendant was seated by himself the entire time he was at the basketball game, and he did not see defendant interacting with anyone. This argument, however, points to evidence that, at best, might support a different conclusion, which does not undermine the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding, nor does it establish an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 883–884 [under substantial evidence review standard, reviewing court does not consider whether there is evidence to support a contrary finding, but whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s choice between conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences arising from such evidence]; see also People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655 [that another factfinder could view the facts differently establishes only the possibility of a difference of opinion, not an abuse of discretion].)
Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, while defendant was not seated directly next to any minors nor was he interacting with minors, the probation condition was broader than that—it prohibited defendant from being present in a location where minors congregate. This violation alone is sufficient to affirm the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation. (People v. Taylor (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 393, 395 [“probation may be revoked if there are reasons for the court to believe from the probation report that [the] defendant has violated any of the terms or conditions of probation”].)
Beyond this, the trial court also found defendant failed to follow probation’s directives, including within the time limit imposed by the directives. The trial court pointed out defendant had failed to report to Pimentel as directed on January 2, 2025, which was a violation of the condition that defendant obey all directives of his probation officer. Whatever conflict defendant faced in South Carolina by returning to California, the fact was his probation had not yet been transferred to South Carolina and defendant was bound to comply with his probation conditions (which included following the directives of his probation officer) while the parties sorted out their dispute over the process. Defendant knew as early as November 18, 2024, there was a conflict in interpretation of the trial court’s travel permit order and the ICAOS transfer process, and that Pimentel was requiring him to report in California on January 2, 2025. Yet, no request for judicial intervention was made by defendant until December 23, 2024—after Pimentel’s email exchange with defendant on December 20, 2024. Despite knowing the issue had not been resolved judicially, defendant did not report to Pimentel in person on January 2, 2025. Defendant’s failure to report on January 2, 2025, is substantial evidence defendant violated a condition of his probation.
Moreover, Pimentel directed defendant on January 29, 2025, that he was to stay within California, he was required to register as a sex offender in California, and defendant was to sign up for the required counseling. Despite this, defendant did not comply and instead returned to South Carolina. Pimentel testified he was initially willing on January 29, 2025, to allow defendant to return to South Carolina until defendant refused to give him a date when he would come back to California to process the transfer. Due to this refusal, Pimentel testified he would not give defendant a travel permit, and directed defendant not to leave the state.
While it is not difficult to imagine a probationer living in South Carolina would find it difficult (if not impossible) to comply, on a moment’s notice, with a directive to remain in California, defendant’s refusal to give Pimentel a date he would be back in California to process the transfer was itself a violation of a probation directive and led Pimentel to decline to give defendant a travel permit. Defendant knew what the probation officer had asked him and declined to comply by refusing to respond. In addition to providing a responsive answer to his probation officer, defendant also could have sought shortened-notice judicial intervention of Pimentel’s subsequent directives to stay in California. Instead, defendant simply became noncompliant—he refused to answer, and did none of the things Pimentel instructed without seeking any judicial intervention to potentially countermand Pimentel’s directives. That constituted a willful violation of his probation conditions, and it supports the trial court’s finding of a violation in this regard. (§ 7, subd. (b)(1) [the word “‘[w]illfully,’ when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to”]; see In re Rolando S. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 936, 941 [willfully is generally used in law as a synonym for intentionally].)
Moreover, while there is evidence defendant and his sister were told by a sheriff’s deputy in South Carolina that defendant could not leave that state for longer than three days, defendant was not a South Carolina probationer at the time, and defendant has not identified what law prohibited him from leaving South Carolina’s jurisdiction under these circumstances. The record on appeal is insufficient to conclude South Carolina’s laws definitively precluded defendant’s lawful ability to stay in California for the time necessary to satisfy his probation obligations regarding the transfer process. In other words, the record is insufficient to show circumstances beyond defendant’s control precluded him from staying in California to comply with Pimentel’s directives such that his failure to do so was not willful. (Cf. People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 [violations due to circumstances beyond the probationer’s control are not willful]; see People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362, 379 [based on parental responsibilities “common to virtually every family,” the defendant’s tardy appearance in court was the result of last-minute circumstances, not the result of “irresponsibility, contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and expectations of the court”; such tardiness was not a basis to revoke probation and to do so constituted an abuse of discretion].)
Defendant points to evidence that he was making an effort to comply with probation even after January 29, 2025: he was reporting his location to the online check- in system, and he had turned on his location for tracking; he had a court order allowing him to travel to South Carolina, and the probation department knew he was living there. Defendant maintains that, under Rodriguez, a clear and convincing showing is required to establish a violation of probation, which cannot be established in light of these attempts at compliance with his probation conditions.
Rodriguez does not aid defendant. In Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held the standard for establishing a probation violation is preponderance of the evidence—the court declined to impose a clear and convincing standard. (Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 441 [“[c]onsiderations of both law and policy dictate that the facts in a probation revocation hearing be provable by a preponderance of the evidence”].) Moreover, attempts or successful compliance with some conditions do not mitigate other willfully violated conditions—a probationer cannot pick and choose with which conditions he or she will comply.
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant willfully violated his conditions of probation, and defendant has not met his burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation as a result.2 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. We direct the Clerk/Executive Officer of this court to serve this opinion on the Chief Probation Officer of the Kern County Probation Department, the Kern County Public Defender, and the Kern County District Attorney.
2 Regrettably, it seems clear in hindsight that the ICAOS transfer process should have been ironed out prior to or at the time of sentencing. Although the ICAOS transfer dispute is not presented for adjudication in this appeal, the parties’ different understandings of the transfer terms may have created an additional legal problem for defendant related to his (perhaps premature) registration as a sex offender in South Carolina. There is no information in the record regarding whether defendant actually incurred legal consequences by leaving South Carolina, or whether he might be required to retain counsel in South Carolina to resolve any outstanding issue in that regard. Should that be the case, we respectfully urge the Kern County Probation Department, the Kern County Public Defender’s Office, and the Kern County District Attorney’s Office, in the interests of justice, to voluntarily provide any affirmative assistance that reasonably can be supplied to aid defendant in resolving outstanding legal repercussions in South Carolina stemming from his probation and the transfer dispute.