People v. Lopes

2025 IL App (5th) 250080-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 5-25-0080
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250080-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/12/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0080 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 16-CF-1066 ) JAMES LOPES, ) Honorable ) Neil T. Schroeder, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HACKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The State established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant remained a sexually dangerous person, and nothing in the record on appeal supports a contrary argument or otherwise raises an issue of arguable merit.

¶2 On January 19, 2017, a jury found the defendant, James Lopes, to be a sexually dangerous

person (SDP) pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq.

(West 2016)). The defendant filed two motions for release, and a jury found that he remained an

SDP during both trials in 2021 and 2024. The defendant now appeals the September 11, 2024,

order. The defendant’s appointed attorney on appeal filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on the

ground that the appeal lacks merit. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Defense counsel

provided the defendant with a copy of her Anders motion and brief.

1 ¶3 This court provided the defendant with ample opportunity to file a pro se brief,

memorandum, or other document explaining why counsel should not be allowed to withdraw or

why this appeal has substantial merit. The defendant did not file a response with this court. This

court has examined counsel’s Anders motion and brief, as well as the entire record on appeal, and

has concluded that the instant appeal does indeed lack merit. This court grants counsel’s Anders

motion to withdraw as counsel and affirms the trial court’s order.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On April 27, 2016, the defendant was charged by information with three counts of

grooming, Class 4 felonies, in violation of section 11-25 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS

5/11-25 (West 2014)), and three counts of disorderly conduct, Class C misdemeanors, in violation

of section 26-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (id. § 26-1(a)(1)). The same day, the State filed

a petition to declare the defendant a sexually dangerous person. The petition alleged that, pursuant

to the Act, the defendant suffers from a mental disorder which has existed for a period of more

than one year prior to filing the petition, and that he demonstrated criminal propensities to commit

sex offenses, and toward acts of sexual assault, due to the same events in the information.

¶6 The information and petition both allege that the defendant committed the offenses of

grooming in that he approached four minor children, girls aged 3, 4, 5, and 12, and provided a card

to their guardians that included a website that contained information regarding his teachings on

sexual conduct between adults and minors. For the offenses of disorderly conduct, the information

and petition allege that the defendant approached (1) a five-year-old girl and told her guardian that

he was on a “mini date” with the child; (2) a seven-year-old girl and said, “Hi Princess. Are you

looking for your Prince? I’m right here”; and (3) a nine-year old girl and said, “Hi Princess,”

waited for her to leave, then said, “Bye Princess.”

2 ¶7 On May 13, 2016, the trial court appointed two experts to evaluate the defendant, Dr. Mark

Carich and Dr. Kimberly Weitl. Both experts attempted to interview the defendant, but he refused

to participate unless the evaluation was recorded, which was not permitted. The experts reviewed

all available records to complete their evaluations, including the defendant’s criminal record, his

mental health history, substance abuse history, and the information included in police reports and

interviews. The experts also used actuarial tools to assess the defendant’s current and future risk

of committing a sex offense.

¶8 Dr. Weitl diagnosed the defendant with pedophilic disorder, delusional disorder, and other

specified personality disorder with antisocial traits. Dr. Carich diagnosed the defendant with

pedophilia, other specified personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features, and

schizophrenia. Both experts opined that the defendant was an SDP pursuant to the statute.

¶9 The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found the defendant to be an SDP. The

defendant was then committed to the care of the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) until he was recovered from being an SDP, pursuant to section 8 of the Act (725 ILCS

205/8 (West 2016)). The defendant directly appealed, and this court affirmed the finding. People

v. Lopes, 2019 IL App (5th) 170258, ¶ 29.

¶ 10 The defendant previously filed a “motion to file writ of recovery,” which the trial court

interpreted as an application to show that the defendant has recovered, pursuant to section 9(a) of

the Act (725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2018)). The defendant attached a “Rise Star Church

Constitutional Writ” to his motion, which describes his “church” and religious beliefs about

engaging in sexual conduct with children. Dr. Kristopher Clounch evaluated the defendant, based

solely on the available records, on November 14, 2019. Dr. Clounch diagnosed the defendant with

pedophilic disorder and schizophrenia. Dr. Clounch found that the defendant remained an SDP

3 because he “failed to recover or diminish his risk for re-offense through his participation in

treatment.” This motion again went to a jury trial, at which the jury found the defendant remained

an SDP. The defendant did not appeal this finding.

¶ 11 The defendant filed his second writ of recovery on April 6, 2023, seeking his release.

Attached to the writ was an updated “Rise Star Church Constitutional Writ.” Dr. Clounch filed an

updated recovery report on January 8, 2024, which is discussed below in Dr. Clounch’s testimony.

¶ 12 The matter proceeded to a jury trial on September 10, 2023. The State called Dr. Clounch,

who testified to the procedure of completing the evaluation, its contents, and his findings. The

State questioned Dr. Clounch on his qualifications as an SDP evaluator, then tendered him as an

expert in the area of clinical psychology, specifically in the area of evaluation and risk assessment

of sex offenders. Defense counsel had no objection, and the trial court qualified the witness.

¶ 13 Dr. Clounch testified that the defendant was initially committed as an SDP in 2017, and

Dr. Clounch completed an evaluation on the defendant in 2019. Dr. Clounch completed the

updated evaluation in the present case as well in 2024. Dr. Clounch stated that to evaluate an

individual, he reviews their past criminal and sexual offenses, their corresponding court and police

reports, prior evaluations, mental health records, current medical records, and any treatment

records. Dr. Clounch was unable to review any SDP treatment records, as the defendant refused to

do any treatment since his commitment. An interview of the individual is typically conducted as

well, but the defendant did not participate in an interview for the evaluation. Dr. Clounch testified

that the documents he reviewed are the type of documents that experts in his field reasonably rely

upon when conducting evaluations. Dr. Clounch’s report was entered into evidence without

objection.

4 ¶ 14 Dr. Clounch recounted the defendant’s criminal history, which included two earlier

offenses in Oregon of (1) unlawful urination or defecation in a public park and indecent exposure

and (2) sexual abuse in the first degree and one count of harassment. The defendant wrote about

the incidents in Oregon in both writs of “Rise Star Church.” Dr. Clounch described the content of

the writs, stating that, “[The defendant] describes the church was established to provide a safe area

that he refers to or defines as the green field as an area in which intimate relations can occur

between children and adults, and that those acts inside of that green field would be legal.” The

lengthy document also includes a “well,” which Dr. Clounch described as, “The public well or

offering [the defendant] indicates is an offering of children who are sexually active being brought

to him to be working with the church for other individuals to engage in sexual activity with those

children and to place bids on them for sexual contact.” As the main priest, the defendant would

get to go first in the offering process. The writs contain many definitions and procedures for Rise

Star Church, and the defendant indicates that he is seeking a child/adult relationship or marriage

with a young female under the age of 12.

¶ 15 Dr. Clounch testified to the charges in the present case of grooming and disorderly conduct,

described above. All the instances involved minor female children wearing green who the

defendant approached and directly addressed. In the grooming charges, the defendant handed cards

to the children’s guardian with information about his website, including sexual relations between

children and adults. In the disorderly conduct charges, the defendant approached children and

called them “princess.” Dr. Clounch also viewed a recorded police interview with the defendant.

During the interview, when the officer asked the defendant if he ever engaged in sexual contact

with a child, the defendant denied that he had but “reported that if he did in the future that he would

5 televise it or make sure other people were able to see it.” Further, the defendant told officers that

he was using his religious beliefs to prey on children.

¶ 16 Dr. Clounch testified that he attempted to interview the defendant, but was unable to do so

because the defendant would not sign the consent form since the interview could not be recorded,

as per the defendant’s request. The defendant told Dr. Clounch that any information that he would

provide during the interview could be obtained from the writs. Dr. Clounch completed his

evaluation without the interview and diagnosed the defendant with pedophilic disorder, which is a

mental disorder within the meaning of the Act. When asked how Dr. Clounch knows that the

defendant still suffers from pedophilic disorder, he said:

“We can see from his most recent Constitutional Writ that it continues to express sexual

interest and desire for a relationship with a young female child. As well when we are

diagnosing Pedophilic Disorder we understand at this time that the sexual urges and

fantasies and arousal continue throughout the life span for the individual. So an individual

can ultimately put in necessary mechanisms and/or tools to avoid offending in the future;

however, [the defendant] has not participated in treatment to learn any of those skills and

tools. And so at this time I would consider that he’s still suffering from Pedophilic

Disorder.”

¶ 17 Dr. Clounch then described the actuarial tools he utilized when determining the defendant’s

risk factors of offending. With these tools, Dr. Clounch determined that the defendant posed a

well-above-average risk of offending. Dr. Clounch described the types of treatments available to

the defendant while committed, including group therapy, but the defendant refused to participate

in any treatment. Dr. Clounch opined that the defendant still meets the criteria to be found an SDP

6 and that the defendant is substantially probable to engage in the commission of sex offenses in the

future if he is not confined.

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Dr. Clounch testified that he reviewed all the records available to

him, including reports from other experts as to the defendant’s mental fitness and diagnoses. Dr.

Clounch said that the defendant did not have any rule violations from IDOC while committed that

were sexual in nature. Dr. Clounch explained the actuarial tools and data he utilized to determine

risk. Dr. Clounch stated that he did not interview any of the victims and proceeded with police

reports available to him to address the defendant’s previous sex offenses, which defense counsel

stated was all “hearsay.”

¶ 19 Neither party presented any further witnesses or evidence. The parties presented closing

arguments, the trial court gave jury instructions, and the case was sent to the jury. The jury found

that the defendant was still an SDP. The defendant filed posttrial motions, which were denied.

¶ 20 The defendant filed his notice of appeal on February 4, 2025. The trial court appointed

Donna Polinske as the defendant’s counsel on appeal.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the defendant on the grounds

that this appeal lacks merit. See Anders, 386 U.S. 738. The defendant did not file a response to the

motion. In the brief that accompanies the motion, defense counsel raised one potential issue on

appeal: whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant remained an SDP

pursuant to the Act.

¶ 23 Under section 9(a) of the Act (725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2022)), a respondent who has been

found to be an SDP may submit an application to the trial court setting forth facts showing that he

has recovered. Section 9(a) of the Act states:

7 “An application in writing setting forth facts showing that the sexually dangerous person

or criminal sexual psychopathic person has recovered may be filed before the committing

court. Upon receipt thereof, the clerk of the court shall cause a copy of the application to

be sent to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The Director shall then cause to

be prepared and sent to the court a socio-psychiatric report concerning the applicant. The

report shall be prepared by an evaluator licensed under the Sex Offender Evaluation and

Treatment Provider Act. The court shall set a date for the hearing upon the application and

shall consider the report so prepared under the direction of the Director of the Department

of Corrections and any other relevant information submitted by or on behalf of the

applicant.” Id.

¶ 24 Once the respondent files an application, the court must hold a hearing, and the State has

the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent remains an SDP. Id.

§ 9(b); People v. Hancock, 2014 IL App (4th) 131069, ¶ 139. To find that a respondent remains

an SDP, the trial court must find that (1) respondent suffers from a mental disorder existing for at

least one year before the petition was filed, (2) the disorder is associated with criminal propensities

to the commission of sexual offenses, (3) the respondent has demonstrated such a propensity, and

(4) it is substantially probable that the respondent will commit future sex offenses if not confined.

People v. Donath, 2013 IL App (3d) 120251, ¶ 37 (citing 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2008)). At

issue in a recovery hearing is the respondent’s current psychological condition and whether he “is

presently a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the Act.” People v. Studdard, 82 Ill.

App. 3d 736, 740 (1980).

¶ 25 The jury’s finding and the trial court’s subsequent order that the respondent remains

sexually dangerous may not be disturbed on review unless that decision is against the manifest

8 weight of the evidence. People v. Houde, 2019 IL App (3d) 180309, ¶ 26. A decision is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. In

recovery proceedings, it is the State’s burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

defendant remains an SDP. 725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2022); People v. Bailey, 2015 IL App (3d)

140497, ¶ 12. The trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility

of the testimony and evidence presented. Houde, 2019 IL App (3d) 180309, ¶ 26 (citing In re

Commitment of Fields, 2012 IL App (1st) 112191, ¶ 62).

¶ 26 In this case, Dr. Clounch evaluated the defendant and opined that he remained an SDP.

Prior to this evaluation, Dr. Clounch held the same opinion in 2019. Drs. Weitl and Carich found

that the defendant was initially an SDP in 2016. Dr. Clounch considered all the available reports

when developing his opinion. As to Dr. Clounch’s report considered by the jury, defense counsel

states in her brief that any potential argument that the report is hearsay has no merit. The report

prepared by Dr. Clounch is required under the Act. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2022). This requirement

is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, which reasons that the report has inherent guarantees

of trustworthiness in the number and professional character of the persons involved in making the

report. People v. Sweeney, 114 Ill. App. 2d 81, 87 (1969). The findings and opinions of the

professionals, particularly those who have been in close contact with the defendant, are invaluable

when an expert completes the report. Id. Dr. Clounch appropriately relied upon the reports from

other parties and experts while evaluating the defendant. Dr. Clounch also utilized various records

and methodologies, in addition to the reports written by other parties, in forming his opinion that

the defendant remained an SDP.

¶ 27 The defendant filed a revised writ for his “church” in 2023, which updated the original writ

he submitted to the court. While the defendant did not participate in an interview, this document

9 provided Dr. Clounch with the defendant’s current beliefs and desires to engage in sexual activity

with a child as of 2023. In this lengthy, 250-page document, the defendant himself describes his

desire to engage in relationships with young girls throughout the entirety of the revised writ. The

defendant created a “church” which would allow him to pursue sexual relationships with young

girls, under the age of 12, to have as his “little wife.” As Dr. Clounch’s report states, “It is clear

from [the defendant]’s revised Writ, that he continues to support sexual contact and relationships

with young female children.” Further, the defendant chose not to engage in any forms of treatment

while committed. In sum, the State presented evidence to the jury that an expert found the

defendant to be an SDP, the defendant continued to present his desire for sexual contact with minor

female children, and that in the seven years of commitment as an SDP, he had not engaged in any

treatment whatsoever to recover.

¶ 28 It was for the jury to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the testimony and

evidence presented. Houde, 2019 IL App (3d) 180309, ¶ 26. Based upon the evidence presented,

the jury found that the defendant had not recovered and remained an SDP. We find nothing in the

record that would indicate any error in the jury’s determination and no evidence to support an

opposite conclusion. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s order that the defendant remained an

SDP was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 This court’s examination of the entire record makes clear that this appeal does not present

any issue of arguable merit. Therefore, the motion of appointed counsel to withdraw as counsel is

granted, and the judgment of the trial court of Madison County is affirmed.

¶ 31 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.