People v. London

38 A.D.3d 570, 830 N.Y.S.2d 783
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 6, 2007
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 38 A.D.3d 570 (People v. London) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. London, 38 A.D.3d 570, 830 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

[571]*571Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Weinberg, J.), rendered October 8, 2004, convicting her of assault in the second degree and resisting arrest, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, she was provided with meaningful representation of counsel (see People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563 [2000]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]). The defense counsel, an experienced attorney, was vigorous in his representation of the defendant. He pursued both a justification defense and a battered woman’s defense. The defense counsel’s choice of expert, a tactical decision, did not constitute ineffective assistance. Furthermore, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s application to adjourn the trial (see People v Spears, 64 NY2d 698 [1984]; People v Coward, 292 AD2d 630 [2002]).

The defendant’s Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]) was properly denied, as she failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of discrimination. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jurors under Batson, a defendant asserting a claim must show that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution removes one or more members of a cognizable racial group from the venire and that facts and other relevant circumstances support a finding that the use of these peremptory challenges excludes potential jurors because of their race (see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 507 [2002]). The mere fact that the prosecutor exercised 5 out of 12 peremptory challenges against Hispanic or African-American women was insufficient to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see People v Brown, supra at 507; People v Fryar, 29 AD3d 919, 920 [2006]; People v Stanley, 292 AD2d 472, 473 [2002]; People v Harrison, 272 AD2d 554 [2000]; People v Phillips, 259 AD2d 565 [1999]). Since the defendant did not establish the requisite pattern of discrimination, the burden never shifted to the prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for her peremptory challenges (see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 507 [2002]). In several instances where the prosecutor did provide an explanation, although not required, the reasons proffered were race-neutral.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit. Mastro, J.E, Dillon, Garni and Balkin, JJ., concur.

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Related

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98 A.D.3d 533 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012)
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57 A.D.3d 695 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
People v. Quito
43 A.D.3d 411 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)
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41 A.D.3d 742 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 A.D.3d 570, 830 N.Y.S.2d 783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-london-nyappdiv-2007.