People v. London

2026 IL App (1st) 240100-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-0100
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 240100-U No. 1-24-0100 Order filed March 12, 2026 Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 CR 821 ) EDDIE LONDON, ) Honorable ) Carol M. Howard, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and possession of a stolen motor vehicle are affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Eddie London was found guilty of first degree murder

and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 30 years

and 5 years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt No. 1-24-0100

of either offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim’s statements identifying him, made

before the victim died, were unreliable and uncorroborated. We affirm.

¶3 London was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2020)) alleging that, without lawful justification, he struck and killed

Dominique Boone with a motor vehicle intentionally or knowingly (count I) and knowing that

such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (count II). London was also

charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)) alleging

that he knew the vehicle to be stolen or converted (count III).

¶4 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit statements and other-crimes evidence. The

State requested the admission of testimony from five witnesses who would state that, before Boone

died, she told them that London struck her with a vehicle. See Ill. Rs. Evid. 803(2) (eff. Sept. 28,

2018), 804(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (hearsay exceptions for excited utterance and statement made

under belief of impending death). The State also sought the admission of an emergency order of

protection that Boone obtained against London on July 16, 2020, arguing that it was admissible to

show London’s motive and intent.

¶5 London filed a motion in limine requesting, inter alia, that the State be precluded from

admitting Boone’s statements where no hearsay exception applied.

¶6 Following a hearing, the trial court allowed the testimony of three witnesses regarding

Boone’s statement. The court also allowed the admission of the emergency order of protection for

“the weight that [the court felt] that it deserved,” which was “very limited.”

¶7 At trial, Kenyotta Boone, Boone’s sister, testified that in July 2020 Boone worked at SCR

Medical Transportation (SCR). (Because Kenyotta Boone shares the same last name as the victim,

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we refer to Kenyotta by her first name.) Boone and London, whom Kenyotta identified in court,

were in a relationship for a “couple months,” and Boone obtained an emergency order of protection

against London on July 16, 2020.

¶8 Michael Zuniga, a claims manager at SCR, testified that Boone had worked as a driver for

SCR for three years. London, whom he identified in court, had previously worked at SCR but was

not employed there on July 29, 2020. Zuniga did not testify to when London was last employed

by SCR.

¶9 Alexander Persu, a call center manager at SCR, testified that the vehicles used at SCR had

interior and exterior video cameras. There were also surveillance cameras outside of the SCR

building.

¶ 10 Persu testified that SCR vehicles were stored in a gated parking lot inside the premises. On

the night of July 29, 2020, one of the vehicles, van 3109, was missing. London, whom Persu

identified in court, was not authorized to operate a SCR vehicle on that date.

¶ 11 The State published video footage from van 3109, which was admitted at trial. The footage

comprises two frames that play simultaneously in split-screen; one frame shows video filmed by

the interior camera and the other frame shows video filmed by the exterior camera.

¶ 12 The footage was provided on appeal and this court has viewed it. In the footage, the frame

depicting video from the interior camera is obstructed and no picture is seen. (Persu testified that

this camera would usually depict the driver.) The frame depicting video from the exterior camera

shows the vehicle driving on the street alongside the SCR building and stopping near the entrance

for slightly over a minute. A woman exits the building and walks along the street. The vehicle

accelerates and swerves toward her. She looks toward the vehicle as it swerves toward her, then

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turns to run across the street as she is run over. The incident lasts three seconds. The vehicle leaves

the scene and continues driving for nearly a minute before stopping in a residential area. A man,

wearing a white shirt and dark-colored pants, exits the vehicle from the front driver’s side, tosses

something onto the sidewalk, and walks down the sidewalk. The man then runs back and turns into

an alley located to the left of the vehicle.

¶ 13 The State also published surveillance footage from the SCR building, which was admitted

at trial. The footage was provided on appeal and this court has viewed it. The camera points toward

the middle of the street running alongside the entrance of the SCR building. In the footage, a

woman walks along the street. A white van comes from the opposite direction, runs her over, and

continues driving. The woman lays in the street and a few moments later, multiple individuals

respond to aid her until the fire department arrives.

¶ 14 Brandon Cannon, a driver coordinator supervisor at SCR, testified that on July 29, 2020,

he was working the 3 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift. That evening, he received a call from dispatch,

exited the SCR building, and observed Boone on the ground. She was bleeding from her leg, and

her chest was swollen. Boone told Cannon, “Eddie did it.”

¶ 15 Cannon testified that Kanisha Roberson was assigned to van 3109 on the morning of July

29, 2020, and had parked the van on the premises after she returned around 4 or 5 p.m. that day.

No one else was authorized to operate the van that evening. Cannon was present when the fire

department and ambulance arrived.

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Cannon stated that he “physically” observed Roberson park the van.

He remembered this because van 3109 was missing after the incident and Cannon verified in the

computer system who was assigned the van. After vehicles were returned to the lot, the employees

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left the vehicles unlocked so that other individuals could wash and clean the vehicles prior to next

use.

¶ 17 Tomika Stewart, a security guard at SCR, testified that the company’s work uniform was

a white button down shirt, blue pants, and black shoes. On July 29, 2020, Stewart was a driver and

worked an 11:15 a.m. to 9:45 p.m. shift. Stewart was driving back to the SCR building after her

shift when she saw another SCR van driving at “a high speed” with no lights on. When Stewart

turned onto the street that the other van came from, she observed Boone laying in the street.

Boone’s left leg was cut and the bone was exposed. Stewart stayed with Boone until paramedics

arrived.

¶ 18 Chicago Fire Department lieutenant Romeo King testified that on July 29, 2020, he

responded to the scene and observed Boone laying on the street. Boone had a crushed pelvis, chest

trauma, and severe injuries “pretty much all over her body.” Boone stated that “her boyfriend,

Eddie London, ran her over.” Boone was transported to the University of Chicago hospital where

she died from her injuries.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, King testified that the general report he generated omitted Boone’s

statement implicating London, but the EMS report generated by the paramedic would include more

detail.

¶ 20 Dr. Ponni Arunkumar, chief medical examiner at the Cook County Medical Examiner’s

Office, testified that she reviewed the report of the autopsy performed on Boone and noted that the

internal and external examinations of Boone’s body exhibited multiple injuries. Dr. Arunkumar

concluded that Boone’s cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma due to being struck by a

motor vehicle and the manner of death was homicide.

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¶ 21 Chicago police detective David Cavazos testified that London was arrested in Lebanon,

Indiana, pursuant to a warrant. Cavazos learned from arresting officers that London’s personal

vehicle was recovered, and Cavazos obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. From the vehicle,

Cavazos recovered proof of ownership of the vehicle, documents pertaining to London, blue work

pants, black gym shoes, surgical masks, a pair of black latex gloves, and a pair of white gloves.

¶ 22 Chicago police officer John Kill testified that on July 30, 2020, at around 1 a.m., he located

an SCR van bearing number 3109 “a couple blocks” from the scene of the incident.

¶ 23 Chicago police officer Kamal Judeh testified that he processed the van and found cracks

on the driver’s side lower bumper, the “rear driver [side] of the vehicle,” and the rear bumper.

¶ 24 Chicago police detective Douglas Livingstone testified that a fingerprint was recovered

from the inside of the van’s driver’s side door window. Also recovered was a piece of black tape,

which was covering the lens of the interior camera pointed toward the cabin of the van.

¶ 25 Chicago police sergeant Patrick Kenah testified that he found a mask on the sidewalk half

a block south of the van and gloves in an alley 30 feet south of the van.

¶ 26 Carl Weatherspoon, an investigator for the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, testified

that he took a buccal swab from London.

¶ 27 Jennifer Bell-Schoon, a forensic science administrator at the Illinois State Police Crime

Lab, testified that the DNA profile identified from London’s buccal swab was compared to major

male DNA profiles found on the face mask and gloves. According to Schoon, London “could not

be excluded” from either, “which is a positive association so he was included.” Regarding the

mask, Bell-Schoon stated that “[a]pproximately 1 in 51 octillion unrelated individuals could [sic]

be excluded from having contributed to that profile.” Regarding the gloves, Bell-Schoon stated

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that “[a]pproximately 1 in 93 septillion unrelated individuals can [sic] be excluded from having

contributed to that profile.”

¶ 28 Bell-Schoon testified that DNA analyses of swabs taken from the interior driver

compartment of the vehicle and the black tape were inconclusive, and therefore, London’s DNA

was not compared to the vehicle interior swabs or the tape.

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Bell-Schoon testified that DNA could transfer from one surface or

object onto another.

¶ 30 Cynthia Prus, a forensic scientist at the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center,

testified that the fingerprint lift recovered from the van was not “suitable for comparison.”

¶ 31 The court found London not guilty of count I for (intentional) first degree murder and guilty

of count II for (strong probability) first degree murder and count III for possession of a stolen

motor vehicle. In ruling, the court found that the “key evidence” was the video from the van, which

depicted the van parked for a “long time waiting for someone,” hitting Boone “at a very fast

speed,” and continuing to drive, suggesting that the driver intended to hit Boone. Moreover, the

court noted that the fact that London’s “DNA was found both on the mask and the gloves

suggests *** that Mr. London was in fact the driver of the van,” which he did not have permission

to operate given that he no longer worked at SCR. Lastly, the tape over the interior camera went

“to the issue of intent.”

¶ 32 London filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel also argued that the court

should change its ruling from first degree murder to reckless homicide. The court denied the

motion, noting that London disabled the van’s interior camera and “sat there, waited until [Boone]

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left work, ran her over, did not render aid at all, drove a short distance away, [and] discarded the

mask and gloves that he was wearing on the ground,” proving that he “intended to *** cause great

bodily harm.”

¶ 33 London was subsequently sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 30 years for murder and

5 years for possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

¶ 34 On appeal, London argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt because Boone’s statements identifying him were unreliable and uncorroborated.

¶ 35 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is “ ‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in

original.) People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)). This court will not retry the defendant. People v. Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 69. The

trier of fact’s role is to “assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence presented,

resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.” People v.

Daniel, 2022 IL App (1st) 182604, ¶ 102. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for

that of the trier of fact as to those issues. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009).

¶ 36 The trier of fact need not “disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence before

it” or “search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of

reasonable doubt.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 70. Therefore, we “must allow all

reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d

311, 334 (2010). A conviction will not be set aside unless “the evidence is so unreasonable,

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improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People

v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12.

¶ 37 To prove London guilty of first degree murder, the State needed to prove that he struck and

killed Boone knowing that “such act[ ] create[d] a strong probability of death or great bodily harm

to” Boone. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2020). To prove London guilty of possession of a stolen

motor vehicle, the State needed to prove that he was in possession of the SCR van knowing it to

be stolen or converted. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020). The State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the identity of the person who committed the crimes. People v. Tomei, 2013 IL

App (1st) 112632, ¶ 36. A single eyewitness’s identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain

a conviction provided the identification is reliable. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.

¶ 38 In this case, Boone identified London by name to different people on scene as the person

who struck her with the van. Video from the van showed Boone looking toward the van and the

driver swerving toward and striking Boone. It showed the driver then driving away, exiting the

van, dropping something onto the sidewalk, and entering an alley near the vehicle. London’s DNA

profile had a “positive association” with the profile from a mask found on the sidewalk close to

the abandoned van and gloves found in a nearby alley. Evidence also established that Boone had

an order of protection against London, her ex-boyfriend, and that London formerly worked at SCR

but was not employed there on the date of the incident and was not authorized to operate the van.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it was reasonable for the trier of

fact to infer that London stole the van and struck and killed Boone with the vehicle. See People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004) (all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution).

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¶ 39 London nevertheless argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove either offense

because Boone’s brief opportunity to view the driver and her prior relationship with London

increased the possibility of misidentification, and other evidence failed to corroborate the

identification.

¶ 40 Courts rely on the factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), to determine

the reliability of an identification. These include: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the offender

during the offense; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior

description; (4) the witness’s level of certainty at the time of the identification procedure; and (5)

the length of time between the offense and identification. Tomei, 2013 IL App (1st) 112632, ¶ 37.

“None of these factors, standing alone, conclusively establishes the reliability of identification

testimony; rather, the trier of fact is to take all of the factors into consideration.” People v. Joiner,

2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 47. While “a positive identification by a single witness who had an

ample opportunity to observe a crime is sufficient to support a conviction, a conviction cannot be

sustained beyond a reasonable doubt if the identification of the accused is vague or doubtful.”

(Internal citations omitted.) People v. Rodriguez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 920, 934 (2000).

¶ 41 Here, immediately after Boone was run over, she told multiple witnesses that London

struck her. Boone knew London well, no witness testified that Boone seemed uncertain in her

identification, and the time that elapsed between the incident and Boone’s identifying statements

was brief. Thus, those Biggers factors weigh in favor of the accuracy of her identification of

London. On the other hand, although the video shows Boone looking toward the van, her

opportunity to view the driver and her degree of attention to the driver rather than the van is

unclear.

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¶ 42 Looking beyond the Biggers factors, however, the State presented ample evidence to

corroborate Boone’s identification of London as the driver of the stolen van. As noted, London’s

DNA profile had a “positive association” with the profile found on the mask and gloves found near

the abandoned van. Further, similar items, including a surgical mask and black latex gloves, were

found in London’s personal vehicle, along with blue work pants like those that were part of the

SCR uniform. Video evidence showed that the driver of the stolen van was wearing a white shirt

and dark-colored pants. Given this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that

London struck and killed Boone with the van. Thus, taking all of the evidence together, the State

proved London’s guilt of first degree murder and possession of a stolen motor vehicle beyond a

reasonable doubt.

¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 44 Affirmed.

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