Filed 8/13/26 P. v. Lockhart CA2/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B335012A
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA069600)
v.
JAMES HOLLOVER LOCKHART,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather J. Manolakas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Scott A. Taryle and Melanie Dorian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Pursuant to an order by the California Supreme Court, we vacate our original opinion and issue this opinion instead.
After being convicted of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2))1 and several other offenses, defendant and appellant James Hollover Lockhart was sentenced to 106 years to life in state prison, in part based on multiple serious felony convictions he sustained in 1993 (the 1993 convictions). In 2023, defendant was resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75; the trial court reduced his total sentence to 105 years to life.
On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court’s failure to strike both a five-year sentence enhancement for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and any of the 1993 convictions, which the trial court deemed prior “strike” convictions under California’s “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)). We affirmed, in part based on our rejection of defendant’s contention that the court erred in ascribing 11 prior strikes to him based on the 1993 convictions. (People v. Lockhart (Feb. 11, 2025, B335012) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. On April 23, 2025, the Court granted review in this case, and, in an order filed March 25, 2026, transferred the case back to us with directions to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089 (Shaw).
We remain convinced that defendant is not entitled to resentencing relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3
BACKGROUND
I. The 1993 Convictions2 In February 1993, defendant was charged with 11 counts of robbery. The information alleges that defendant robbed one victim on November 17, 1992 (count 12); one victim3 on November 27, 1992 (counts 1–2); three victims on December 19, 1992 (counts 8–10); and five victims on December 29, 1992 (counts 3–7). He was also charged with assaulting one of the December 29 victims with a stun gun (count 11).
A contemporaneous probation report describes the robberies as follows:
1. On November 17, 1992, defendant robbed a dry cleaners.
“[A] clerk[] reported defendant enter[ing] [the store] holding a handgun which he pointed at her. He walked behind the counter and told her to ‘give the money.’ In fear for her life she removed her money from her pocket which she gave the defendant. He then ordered her to walk to the back of the store . . . . He demanded more money and the victim opened the register from which she removed money which she gave to the defendant . . . . Defendant demanded her ring which she gave [him]. He also picked up her purse . . . before he left[.]”
2 On May 21, 2026, defendant filed an unopposed motion to augment the record with the information and probation report from his 1993 convictions. We hereby grant the motion.
3 The probation report describes two victims of the November 27 incident.
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2. On November 27, 1992, defendant robbed a second dry cleaners. “The [store] owner . . . reported that [defendant] entered the location and pointed a gun at [the owner] and [an employee]. [¶] While pointing a gun at them the defendant reportedly ordered both to lay on the floor. He then removed money and jewelry from both and ordered the owner to open the cash register from which he removed money and then fled the location.”
3. On December 19, 1992, defendant robbed a store.
Defendant followed “the owner . . . to the rear [of the store] . . . and started to walk into the office where he was told he could not enter. At that time she saw the defendant holding a small automatic gun in his right hand. Defendant ordered [the owner and two customers] to the office area and told them to lie face down on the floor and empty their pockets and remove their jewelry . . . . The defendant then told the owner to get up and to give him all the money from the cash register . . . . He then said that he knew she had more than that and [she] told him that he could get the money out of her tote bag which was in the office. They went back to the office, defendant again told her to lie down and . . . picked up [her] stun gun. When [one of the customers attempted to] overpower the defendant[,] the defendant activated the stun gun which he placed against the right side of [the customer’s] head several times[,] . . . said ‘somebody is going to die here tonight[,]’ . . . picked up the owner’s tote bag[,] . . . then maced everyone and ran out of the front door.”
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4. On December 29, 1992, defendant robbed a restaurant.
After speaking to the owner, defendant briefly exited the restaurant only to return “[a] few minutes later . . . armed with a gun and told all [four] customers [present] to lie on the floor. They complied, and he took victims’ jewelry and money. The defendant then told [the owner] to stand up. When she did so he placed her in a choke hold, placed the gun against her neck and walked her to the rear of the restaurant and told her to give him all the money in the cash register. After she complied he again told her to lie on the floor and left locking the front doors.”
Defendant was convicted of 10 counts of robbery and one count of assault with a stun gun, and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was paroled on December 8, 2002. II. The 2003 Conviction and Sentence In 2003, a jury convicted defendant of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), criminal threats (§ 422; count 2), false imprisonment (§ 236; count 3), assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4), and forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 5).4 The events underlying these convictions took place on or about April 16, 2003.
At a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found that the 1993 convictions constituted serious felonies and prior strikes
4 The jury acquitted defendant of another count of forcible oral copulation (count 6) and found not true the allegation that he committed the rape with a knife.
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under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)–(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 106 years to life. This aggregate sentence included a consecutive five-year enhancement for defendant’s prior “strikes” per section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant also received a consecutive oneyear enhancement for the 1993 convictions pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b); a second enhancement under that statute was stayed. III. Resentencing; Appeal; Subsequent Events A. Senate Bill No. 483 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) created section 1172.75 (former section 1171.1),5 which rendered “legally invalid” any section 667.5, subdivision (b) sentence enhancement imposed prior to January 1, 2020, “except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense[.]” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
B. Recommendation and defendant’s motion for full resentencing
In November 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended defendant’s case for resentencing per section 1172.75.
In October 2023, defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to “apply[] now-current[] California sentencing law” at his resentencing hearing. Among other things, defendant asked the
5 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1171.1 was renumbered section 1172.75, with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.
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trial court to dismiss his section 667, subdivision (a)(1) sentence enhancement pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c).
Defendant’s brief also included a variety of supplemental exhibits, all of which showcased various personal and educational development programs he completed while incarcerated.6 C. Resentencing hearing On December 18, 2023, the matter proceeded to a resentencing hearing. The trial court indicated that it had reviewed all the papers submitted in the case, including defendant’s motion and supplemental exhibits.
The trial court then recalled and resentenced defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a). The court struck both section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements. In all other respects, the court reimposed defendant’s original sentence, resulting in a total sentence of 105 years to life.
Although “[t]he [trial] [c]ourt [wa]s aware of its discretion to dismiss the allegation pursuant to [§] 667[, subd. (a)(1)] and the strike prior allegations[,]” it “cho[se] not to exercise [that] discretion in this case.” The court explained that it “[did not] believe the interest of justice in this matter would be served by doing so[,]” even after “taking into consideration what [defendant] has done . . . [and] how he’s progressing within” prison.
The trial court found that although “the strike priors occurred in one particular case[,]” they were committed “as separate acts[.]” Moreover, defendant was paroled on the 1993 convictions in December 2002, and committed the rape and other current offenses just four months later. Accordingly, the court
6 The following month, defendant submitted a second group of exhibits further attesting to his progress in prison.
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found that the prior convictions fell “within the spirit of the strike law[,]” and declined to exercise its discretion to strike defendant’s prior serious felony enhancement or any of his prior strike convictions under section 1385.
Defendant timely appealed, and we affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Lockhart (Feb. 11, 2025, B335012) [nonpub. opn.].) Following remand from the Supreme Court, the parties filed supplemental briefs regarding the application of Shaw, supra, 18 Cal 5th 1089.
DISCUSSION
I. Background Legal Principles A. Scope of resentencing under section 1172.75 “In general, ‘ “once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 329 (Cota).) One exception to this rule is section 1172.75, which “requires a full resentencing” at which the trial court may reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe).)
The statute provides “specific instructions” for the trial court to exercise broad resentencing authority. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.) Among other things, section 1172.75 requires the trial court to “apply any . . . changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Moreover, in resentencing a defendant, the court “may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
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reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
B. Section 1385 “[S]ection 1385, subdivision (c)(1) . . . provides that ‘the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,’ and subdivision (c)(2) states that ‘[i]n exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence’ of nine listed ‘mitigating circumstances,’ any ‘one or more’ of which ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 443–444.)
The enumerated mitigating factors include, as relevant here, that (1) “application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years[,] . . . . [i]n [which] instance[] the enhancement shall be dismissed” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)) and (2) “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).
C. The Three Strikes law “The Three Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme that prescribes longer sentences for felony convictions when the defendant has previously been convicted of one or more felony offenses designated as serious or violent—otherwise known as ‘strikes.’ ” (Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1094.) “Under current law, defendants with two or more prior strikes are subject to a third strike, indeterminate life sentence . . . under certain
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circumstances, including if their current offense is: serious or violent; . . . one of various enumerated sex offenses; or one in which the defendant used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1095; see also § 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), (C).)
Additionally, defendants who are “convicted of a serious felony [and] previously ha[ve] been convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive . . . a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.” (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) II. Standard of Review A trial “court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony); see also People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857 [same, as to a resentencing court’s decision not to reduce a defendant’s sentence under section 1172.75].)
“To establish an abuse of discretion, [a] defendant[] must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous that it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ [Citations.] A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be ‘established by “a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390 (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler).)
Related questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
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III. Analysis A. The trial court did not err As required by section 1172.75, once notified of defendant’s eligibility for recall and resentencing, the trial court held a full resentencing hearing, giving defendant the opportunity to argue that other sentencing reforms should also reduce his sentence. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
At defendant’s request, the trial court applied section 1385, declining to strike defendant’s five-year sentence enhancement for a serious prior felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) or any of his prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law. Our question thus becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike those sentencing elements.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court stated that it had read and considered defendant’s briefing which, inter alia, argued that two mitigating factors enumerated in section 1385—namely, subdivisions (c)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(H)—were present in his case. Because the court did not “find[] that dismissal of the [challenged] enhancement[s] would endanger public safety[,]” it was tasked with weighing “[p]roof of . . . these [mitigating] circumstances . . . greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
However, the trial court ultimately found that strong countervailing factors, including defendant’s extensive criminal history, negated the available mitigating factors. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036 (Walker) [at resentencing, a trial court may reimpose a challenged enhancement upon “find[ing] substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that . . . ‘neutralize . . . the great weight of the mitigating
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circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice’ ”].) The court did not reduce defendant’s sentence beyond striking the statutorily invalidated section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements, concluding that “the interest of justice in this matter would [not] be served by” any further reduction.
On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s resentencing decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd[.]” (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.)
B. Defendant’s counterarguments Defendant raises what boil down to five counterarguments.
First, he contends that section 1385 entitles him to “a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing the enhancement,” since the trial court did not find that dismissal “would endanger the public safety.” Not so; as defendant recognizes in his reply brief, our Supreme Court recently held that “section 1385 . . . does not erect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) Instead, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains [its] discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the [statutorily] enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (Id. at p. 1029, italics added.)
Second, defendant disputes whether the trial court actually “assign[ed] significant value to the . . . mitigating circumstances” present in this case. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)
Defendant first focuses on subdivision (c)(2)(C), which provides that “[i]n th[e] instance” that “the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years[,]” “the
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enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Defendant insists that the plain text of this subdivision requires dismissal of the challenged enhancement; since the trial court failed to enter an automatic dismissal, it must not have adequately considered this element.
Assuming arguendo that the five-year sentence enhancement provided for in section 667, subdivision (a) “could result” in defendant’s sentence being over 20 years long (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)),7 we would still disagree with defendant’s interpretation of the statute. Despite its facially mandatory language, all appellate courts to consider the issue have concluded that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) permits, but does not require, a court to dismiss an enhancement that could result in a sentence of over 20 years. (See Mazur, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 445; Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 337; People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1284–1290; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294–297; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21.)
This court came to the same conclusion regarding similar language in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B),8 and we abide by that reasoning here: “The phrase . . . [‘]shall be dismissed’ is not a standalone mandate of section 1385. Instead, it appears in the statute appended to [two] of the nine [enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . . Section 1385 explicitly instructs that the
7 Defendant’s sentence totaled 100 years to life before applying the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement.
8 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) states that “in th[e] instance” that “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case[,]” “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
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existence of a[ny of those] . . . circumstance[s] . . . ‘weighs greatly in favor of dismiss[al]’ of an enhancement as the court . . . exercis[es] its discretion . . . to evaluate whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice . . . . If we were to read the phrase appended to the [two facially mandatory] mitigating factor[s] as automatically mandating dismissal of all but one enhancement whenever multiple enhancements exist, then the existence of multiple enhancements would not ‘weigh greatly’ in favor of dismissal—it would weigh dispositively. But that is not what the statute says, and we are not allowed to rewrite the statute. [Citation.]” (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 397, overruled on other grounds by Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024, italics in original.)
Anticipating our rejection of his automatic dismissal argument, defendant alternatively contends that both subdivisions (c)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(H) of section 1385 warrant dismissal of the challenged enhancement. Defendant points out that “absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement[.]” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.)
However, as stated above, Walker permits a trial court to reimpose an enhancement upon “find[ing] substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that . . . ‘neutralize . . . the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.)
Defendant contends that the trial court did not comply with Walker, but instead “merely . . . weigh[ed] . . . mitigating and aggravating [factors].” But the process described in Walker is,
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essentially, a weighing test: A trial court must determine whether “substantial, relevant, and credible evidence of aggravating [circumstances] . . . neutralize the ‘great weight’ of the mitigating circumstance[s]” at play. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036 [internal citations omitted].) As described above, that is exactly what the court did here.
Third, defendant contends that the trial court’s silence as to mitigation factors enumerated under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3)—namely his age, time served, and potential for future violence—suggests that the court failed to consider these factors or accord them the proper weight. Citing no supporting legal authority, defendant asserts that “the court’s disregard” of these factors, or its favoring “some factors related to recidivism and not others,” constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Defendant’s argument ignores the long-settled rule that “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) Absent an “affirmative[] demonstrat[ion] that the trial court was unaware of or misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion” (People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724), we instead presume that the court “ ‘ “acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review[]” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376– 377).
The trial court’s silence on the identified section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) factors is not enough to establish an abuse of
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discretion, particularly where, as here, the court indicated that it read and considered defendant’s briefing requesting consideration of each factor.
Fourth, defendant claims that “the trial court’s reliance on [his] prior criminal history as the leading cause for denying relief is an abuse of discretion.” But a court properly “g[i]ve[s] primary weight to [a] [d]efendant’s extensive criminal history” when his prior convictions “reflect a career criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years at a time.” (People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 857.) As the court noted at the resentencing hearing, here, defendant had been incarcerated since he was 22 years old, only lasting out on parole for four months before being arrested for his current convictions. The trial court properly considered this countervailing factor at defendant’s resentencing hearing.
Lastly, in his most recent supplemental brief, defendant argues that our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th 1089, warrants vacation of his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
In Shaw, the court held that “a trial court is required to dismiss a strike when two of a defendant’s prior strikes are the result of the same act[,]” including when the strikes arise from “the defendant’s single act [which] harmed multiple victims.” (Shaw, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1103, disapproving People v. Rusconi (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 273, 280.) Under Shaw, defendant suffered four—not eleven—strikes, because his eleven prior convictions arise from four separate acts.
Defendant concedes that “four prior strikes are still significant,” but contends that the trial court nonetheless erred by “rel[ying] on [the] improper premise” that defendant had
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eleven strikes, which “could have significantly impacted the court’s decision.” The record belies this assertion. The trial court “clear[ly] indicat[ed] that [it] would not have reduced [defendant’s] sentence even if[,] at the time of sentencing[,]” it had been aware that defendant suffered four, rather than eleven, prior strikes. (People v. Almanza (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1110 (Almanza); see People v. Gutierrez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894, 1896 (Gutierrez) [remand unnecessary where “the trial court indicated that it would not, in any event, have exercised its discretion to lessen the sentence”].)
In denying defendant’s request to strike either the prior serious felony enhancement or any of his prior strike convictions, the trial court did not rely solely on the number of defendant’s prior strikes. (See People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 993 (Carrasco) [“We view the totality of the trial court’s statement of reasons, not just one snippet.”].) The court explained that it “[did not] believe the interest of justice in this matter would be served by” further reducing defendant’s sentence, even after weighing the relevant mitigating factors. Moreover, the trial court found that defendant’s prior convictions fell “within the spirit of the strike law” because of the extremely short time—four months—between defendant’s release on parole for the 1993 convictions and his commission of the current offenses. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [in determining whether to strike a prior strike conviction, the court must consider the “circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions”]; Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 993–994 [no abuse of discretion in deciding not to strike the defendant’s one prior strike conviction because, among other things, he “did not remain
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free from further imprisonment for at least five years after his [initial] release” (italics added)].)
On this record, reducing defendant’s prior strikes to four would not affect the trial court’s decision regarding defendant’s prior strike convictions and the associated five-year enhancement. We decline to issue a futile remand. (Almanza, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110; Gutierrez, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1896.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J. GOORVITCH
We concur:
________________________, P. J. LUI
________________________, J. RICHARDSON