~ --~-~-~~~~ 1 IN_THE-SUPERIORCOUR1'OF GUA-l\tl-- TRAFFIC DIVISION 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Traffic Case No. lC00768098 4 ) vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER VICTORIANO C. LO, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7 ) 8
10 This matter came for bench trial before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino, Magistrate Judge, 11 on May 7,2012. Defendant Victoriano C. Lo appeared pro se. Emesto G. Rios, a volunteer member of 12 the Community Assisted Policing Effort (hereinafter "CAPE"), appeared and presented testimony of 13 the facts and circumstances of the issuance of the citation before the Court. After the bench trial, the 14
15 Court took the matter under advisement. After having reviewed the evidence and the applicable law, the
16 Court now issues its Decision and Order. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On or about March 4,2012, at approximately 8:37 a.m., CAPE Volunteer Rios was conducting 19 disabled parking enforcement at the Dededo Flea Market. He observed a white-colored Honda Accord 20 (Guam License Plate AHT 6021) parked within an area described as an access aisle for a disabled 21
22 parking. The vehicle was unoccupied but displayed a removable windshield placard evidencing
23 authorization to use a designated accessible parking space. A citation was issued for blocking an access 24 aisle and registered owner responsible for illegal parking, which are violations of Title 16 Guam Code 25 Annotated sections 3401.1(b)(2) and 3404, respectively. 26 At trial, Mr. Rios offered a photograph of the scene where and when the citation was issued. 27
28 The Defendant also submitted a photograph he had taken but with a wider perspective of the
1 ..~...~~l- surmunding area. BQtlLphotQgraJlhs-wer.e~Ol.llliilO.b.eiaiLan~accllfate representations of the.~vehicle..
2 and area where it was parked at the time the citation was issued. They depicted the Defendant's vehicle
3 in an area about the size of a "standard" parking slot painted with bright blue diagonal lines and 4 immediately adjacent to another slot with faded blue diagonal lines. That slot was adjacent to another 5 slot with painted bright blue diagonal lines. The Defendant admitted he was the owner and operator of 6 the vehicle and that it was parked in the manner described by the CAPE volunteer. 7
8 The Defendant, however, pointed out that the sign designating an accessible parking area was
9 erected between the slot he was occupying and the slot with the faded blue diagonal stripes immediately 10 adjacent thereto. The Defendant argued that he was parked in a slot designated for accessible parking 11 and that he was authorized to utilize that parking slot. 12 The Defendant also submitted for the Court's consideration a photograph of the disabled 13
14 parking area at the Micronesia Mall at the Payless-Denny's side of the mall (the Defendant is employed
15 at the Micronesia Mall as a Vice-President, Operations Manager) and of the disabled parking area of
16 the Judicial Center Building in Hagatfia. The Defendant noted that each of the designated parking slots 17 had the accessible parking signs erected at the head and center of each of the slots. He asserted that, in 18 contrast to the designated parking area at the Dededo Flea Market, the disabled parking areas at the 19 Micronesia Mall and Judicial Center were in compliance with the statute governing the proper 20
21 designation of accessible parking spaces. He essentially argues that the Dededo Flea Market's non-
22 compliance with the statute governing the designation of disabled parking spaces and access aisles 23 excused the instant violation or warrants dismissal of the case. 24 DISCUSSION 25 Defendant was issued a citation for violating certain provisions of 16 GCA § 3401.1 which 26 state that "[a]ny person: ... (2) blocking access to aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) on 27
28 public or private property made available for public use, is guilty of a violation." 16 GCA §
2 1340L 1(b )(2)(2010)_1nadditio~he waS-citedfot:violating 16GCA-~3404which provide~:"[ i}nany-
2 prosecution charging a violation of any regulation governing the standing or parking of a vehicle under
3 this Title, proof by the Government that the particular vehicle described in the complaint was parked in 4 violation of any provision of this Title, together with proof that the defendant named in the complaint 5 was at the time of parking the registered owner of the vehicle, shall constitute in evidence a prima facie 6 presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle was the person who parked or placed the vehicle at 7
8 the point where, and for the time during which, the violation occurred." 16 GCA § 3404.
9 1. Registered Owner Responsible 10 Preliminarily, the Court notes that 16 GCA § 3404 attaches liability to the registered owner of a 11 vehicle found in violation of a non-moving traffic offense by erecting an evidentiary presumption that 12 the registered owner is the person who operated the vehicle when the violation occurred. Because the 13
14 Defendant admitted that he was the registered owner of the vehicle and that he himself had parked the
15 vehicle at the time the alleged violation occurred, the Court does not believe that additional sanction
16 under section 3404 is warranted or is what the Legislature had contemplated when the actual operator 17 and registered owner of the vehicle were one in the same. Consequently, the Court dismisses this 18 charge of the citation. 19
20 2. Blocking Access Aisle
21 Prior to its repeal and re-enactment by Public Law 30-229, 16 GCA § 3401.1(b) stated: "[a]ny
22 person who parks in a designated accessible parking space, or who blocks access to aisles adjacent to 23 an accessible parking space, on public or private property available for public use, with a vehicle that 24 does not have a special license plate, a removable windshield placard, or a temporary removable 25 windshield placard is guilty of a violation." 16 GCA § 340 1. 1(b)(added by Public Law 23-1:4 26
27 (4/26/95». By its terms, a violation occurs if a person parks in a designated accessible parking space or
28 blocks access to aisles adjacent to an accessible parking space with a vehicle that does not have a
3 .. ~....l. ~.s peciaLlicense.pla~a.re1l1O.vable.windshieldplacard.ora.temporary removable windshield placard.
2 However, the antithetical to this provision can also fairly be implied, ie., a violation does not occur if a
3 person parks in a designated accessible parking space or blocks access to aisles adjacent to an 4 accessible parking space with a vehicle that has a special license plate, a removable windshield placard, 5 or a temporary removable windshield placard. 6 In 2010, the Legislature repealed and re-enacted 16 GCA § 3401.1 (b). It separated a violation 7
8 for parking within a designated accessible parking space(s) without a special license plate, removable
9 windshield placard, or a temporary-windshield placard on public or private property made available for 10 public use from a violation for blocking access to aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) on 11 public or private property made available for public use. See 16 GCA § 3401.1(b)(l) and (2). 12 The plain language of the statute indicates that when the Legislature divided subsection (b) into 13
14 two separate violations it determined that use of a parking slot designated as accessible parking was
15 dependent upon the possession of the special license plate, removable windshield placard, or a
16 temporary-windshield placard.
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~ --~-~-~~~~ 1 IN_THE-SUPERIORCOUR1'OF GUA-l\tl-- TRAFFIC DIVISION 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Traffic Case No. lC00768098 4 ) vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER VICTORIANO C. LO, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7 ) 8
10 This matter came for bench trial before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino, Magistrate Judge, 11 on May 7,2012. Defendant Victoriano C. Lo appeared pro se. Emesto G. Rios, a volunteer member of 12 the Community Assisted Policing Effort (hereinafter "CAPE"), appeared and presented testimony of 13 the facts and circumstances of the issuance of the citation before the Court. After the bench trial, the 14
15 Court took the matter under advisement. After having reviewed the evidence and the applicable law, the
16 Court now issues its Decision and Order. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On or about March 4,2012, at approximately 8:37 a.m., CAPE Volunteer Rios was conducting 19 disabled parking enforcement at the Dededo Flea Market. He observed a white-colored Honda Accord 20 (Guam License Plate AHT 6021) parked within an area described as an access aisle for a disabled 21
22 parking. The vehicle was unoccupied but displayed a removable windshield placard evidencing
23 authorization to use a designated accessible parking space. A citation was issued for blocking an access 24 aisle and registered owner responsible for illegal parking, which are violations of Title 16 Guam Code 25 Annotated sections 3401.1(b)(2) and 3404, respectively. 26 At trial, Mr. Rios offered a photograph of the scene where and when the citation was issued. 27
28 The Defendant also submitted a photograph he had taken but with a wider perspective of the
1 ..~...~~l- surmunding area. BQtlLphotQgraJlhs-wer.e~Ol.llliilO.b.eiaiLan~accllfate representations of the.~vehicle..
2 and area where it was parked at the time the citation was issued. They depicted the Defendant's vehicle
3 in an area about the size of a "standard" parking slot painted with bright blue diagonal lines and 4 immediately adjacent to another slot with faded blue diagonal lines. That slot was adjacent to another 5 slot with painted bright blue diagonal lines. The Defendant admitted he was the owner and operator of 6 the vehicle and that it was parked in the manner described by the CAPE volunteer. 7
8 The Defendant, however, pointed out that the sign designating an accessible parking area was
9 erected between the slot he was occupying and the slot with the faded blue diagonal stripes immediately 10 adjacent thereto. The Defendant argued that he was parked in a slot designated for accessible parking 11 and that he was authorized to utilize that parking slot. 12 The Defendant also submitted for the Court's consideration a photograph of the disabled 13
14 parking area at the Micronesia Mall at the Payless-Denny's side of the mall (the Defendant is employed
15 at the Micronesia Mall as a Vice-President, Operations Manager) and of the disabled parking area of
16 the Judicial Center Building in Hagatfia. The Defendant noted that each of the designated parking slots 17 had the accessible parking signs erected at the head and center of each of the slots. He asserted that, in 18 contrast to the designated parking area at the Dededo Flea Market, the disabled parking areas at the 19 Micronesia Mall and Judicial Center were in compliance with the statute governing the proper 20
21 designation of accessible parking spaces. He essentially argues that the Dededo Flea Market's non-
22 compliance with the statute governing the designation of disabled parking spaces and access aisles 23 excused the instant violation or warrants dismissal of the case. 24 DISCUSSION 25 Defendant was issued a citation for violating certain provisions of 16 GCA § 3401.1 which 26 state that "[a]ny person: ... (2) blocking access to aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) on 27
28 public or private property made available for public use, is guilty of a violation." 16 GCA §
2 1340L 1(b )(2)(2010)_1nadditio~he waS-citedfot:violating 16GCA-~3404which provide~:"[ i}nany-
2 prosecution charging a violation of any regulation governing the standing or parking of a vehicle under
3 this Title, proof by the Government that the particular vehicle described in the complaint was parked in 4 violation of any provision of this Title, together with proof that the defendant named in the complaint 5 was at the time of parking the registered owner of the vehicle, shall constitute in evidence a prima facie 6 presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle was the person who parked or placed the vehicle at 7
8 the point where, and for the time during which, the violation occurred." 16 GCA § 3404.
9 1. Registered Owner Responsible 10 Preliminarily, the Court notes that 16 GCA § 3404 attaches liability to the registered owner of a 11 vehicle found in violation of a non-moving traffic offense by erecting an evidentiary presumption that 12 the registered owner is the person who operated the vehicle when the violation occurred. Because the 13
14 Defendant admitted that he was the registered owner of the vehicle and that he himself had parked the
15 vehicle at the time the alleged violation occurred, the Court does not believe that additional sanction
16 under section 3404 is warranted or is what the Legislature had contemplated when the actual operator 17 and registered owner of the vehicle were one in the same. Consequently, the Court dismisses this 18 charge of the citation. 19
20 2. Blocking Access Aisle
21 Prior to its repeal and re-enactment by Public Law 30-229, 16 GCA § 3401.1(b) stated: "[a]ny
22 person who parks in a designated accessible parking space, or who blocks access to aisles adjacent to 23 an accessible parking space, on public or private property available for public use, with a vehicle that 24 does not have a special license plate, a removable windshield placard, or a temporary removable 25 windshield placard is guilty of a violation." 16 GCA § 340 1. 1(b)(added by Public Law 23-1:4 26
27 (4/26/95». By its terms, a violation occurs if a person parks in a designated accessible parking space or
28 blocks access to aisles adjacent to an accessible parking space with a vehicle that does not have a
3 .. ~....l. ~.s peciaLlicense.pla~a.re1l1O.vable.windshieldplacard.ora.temporary removable windshield placard.
2 However, the antithetical to this provision can also fairly be implied, ie., a violation does not occur if a
3 person parks in a designated accessible parking space or blocks access to aisles adjacent to an 4 accessible parking space with a vehicle that has a special license plate, a removable windshield placard, 5 or a temporary removable windshield placard. 6 In 2010, the Legislature repealed and re-enacted 16 GCA § 3401.1 (b). It separated a violation 7
8 for parking within a designated accessible parking space(s) without a special license plate, removable
9 windshield placard, or a temporary-windshield placard on public or private property made available for 10 public use from a violation for blocking access to aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) on 11 public or private property made available for public use. See 16 GCA § 3401.1(b)(l) and (2). 12 The plain language of the statute indicates that when the Legislature divided subsection (b) into 13
14 two separate violations it determined that use of a parking slot designated as accessible parking was
15 dependent upon the possession of the special license plate, removable windshield placard, or a
16 temporary-windshield placard. In contrast, the provision making it a violation to block access to aisle(s) 17 adjacent to accessib Ie parking space( s) makes no reference to whether the violator possessed the special 18 license plate, removable windshield placard, or a temporary-windshield placard. In other words, by 19 making specific reference of parking within an accessible parking space(s) without a special license 20
21 plate, removable windshield placard, or a temporary-windshield placard but not making the same
22 reference when proscribing blocking access to the aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) the 23 Legislature is clearly expressing its intent that no one can block access to the aisles. 24 In further support of this interpretation it is observed that the Legislature repealed and reenacted 25 subsection (e) which permits the court to dismiss a citation issued for a violation of subsection (b)(l) 26
27 upon presentation of a special license plate or a removable windshield placard obtained pursuant to
4 §7120~L of-Title 16r GCA. SeeJ6GCA §- 3401.1 (e). Howevcf, thi&same provision doesnof include
2 violations pursuant to 16 GCA § 3401.1(b)(2). 3 Also, the Legislative Record discloses written testimony in support of the bill on the basis that: 4 Bill 486 will clearly delineate the usages for the parking spaces specified by the 5 Americans with Disability Act for the purpose of accessible parking for persons with disabilities and individuals who are blind. The proposed amendments makes clear in 6 Sub Sections b(2) that "Any person: .,. blocking access to aisle(s) adjacent to 7 accessible parking space(s) on public or private property made available for public use is guilty of a violation.". Currently individuals with special license plates or placards 8 may park in the access aisles because there is no provision prohibiting them; as a result, Traffic Court Judges have dismissed numerous citations. It appears that this oversight 9 may have been a defect in statutory construction. 10 P. L. 30-229 (2010), COMMITTEE REPORT DIGEST, Bill No. 486-30 (COR), Written Testimony of 11 Ronald L.G. Taimanglo at pp. 1-2, dated Nov. 12, 2010 (emphasis and quotations in original) 12 (www.guamlegislature.com). Additionally, another supporter of the proposed legislation testified: 13
14 Bill 486, so rightly addresses the shortcomings of our present legislation and provides reasonable, corrective measures to ensure that eligible individuals can freely and 15 without encumbrance, utilize accessible and van-accessible parking stalls. The primary changes, which follow, improve the right to access public areas as guaranteed by the 16 Americans with Disabilities Act and its amendment. 17 1. New language incorporates a clear definition that the marked access area adjacent to 18 accessible parking space(s) is not to be utilized by any vehicle, including those bearing accessible placards or plates. For equal access, individuals must be guaranteed 19 access space when using personal assistants or mobility devices in order to either 20 embark or disembark their vehicle.
21 P. L. 30-229 (2010), COMMITTEE REPORT DIGEST, Bill No. 486-30 (COR), Written Testimony of
22 Ginger S. Porter, M.Ed. at p.l, dated Nov. 16,2010 (emphasis in original) (www.guamlegislature.com). 23 Thus, the issue before the Court is whether the Defendant's vehicle was parked within a 24 designated accessible parking space or blocking an access aisle. However, given the arguments made by 25 the Defendant, the more specific issue is whether the failure to properly place signage in accordance 26
27 with the statute and ostensibly creating an ambiguity as to the nature and purpose of the particular area
28 requires dismissal of the instant action.
5 2 Title 16 GCA section 3401.1 contains provisions governing the manner, location and other
3 particularities of parking spaces reserved for people with disabilities. These provisions state: 4 0) Accessible Parking spaces serving a particular building shall be located on the 5 shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance and comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Building 6 and Facilities (ADAAG) technical specification § 4.6.2. 7 U) As to parking lots constructed or repaved after the effective date of this Act, 8 accessible parking spaces shall be at least 96 inches wide and 228 inches long with a minimum 60 inches-wide adjacent access aisle. Access aisles shall be identified and 9 painted with diagonal stripes and a part of an accessible route to the building or facility entrance. Vehicle standing spaces and adjacent access aisles shall be level with 10 surface slopes not exceeding 1:50 (2%) in all directions. Access aisles and parking 11 spaces shall comply with ADAAG technical specifications § 4.3 and § 4.6.3.
12 (k) Accessible parking spaces shall be designated as reserved by a sign showing 13 (i) the International Symbol of Accessibility commonly known as 14 the wheelchair symbol and specified in § 4.30.7 of the ADAAG; (ii) below the symbol, a statement that violators will be fined not 15 less than $300 and not more than $500, and the vehicle may be towed; 16 (iii) a reference to 16 GCA § 3401.1; and 17 (iv) a statement that access aisles must not be blocked.
18 Spaces complying with ADAAG technical specification § 4.1.2(5)(b) shall also have an additional sign Van Accessible mounted below the symbol of accessibility. All signs 19 referred to in this subsection (k) should be a maximum of 12 inches wide with edges having rounded comers. All signs shall be mounted on a post centered at the head of 20 the parking space with the center of the International Symbol ofaccessibility seven (7) 21 feet above the parking surface.
22 16 GCA § 3401. 1(i)(j)(k) (emphasis added). 23 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Defendant's vehicle is parked within an area painted 24 with blue-colored diagonal stripes; however, he argues that because of the placement of the disabled 25 parking sign, to wit: directly between two slots, was not in compliance with the statutory requirements 26
27 for erecting these signs and that the case should be dismissed because he was entitled to and did park in
6 ~...... 1..aspac.ereser.yedioLdisabledparking.Defendant has presented.evidence. that. the- presGriptions of. l6
2 GCA § 3401.1(i) through (k) can be and are scrupulously complied with.
3 In a case involving a citation that was issued for illegally parking in a designated handicapped 4 accessible parking space, it was argued that the case should be dismissed because the parking sign 5 failed to meet the height requirements in the statute. People v. Pierson, Superior Court of Guam Traffic 6
7 Case No. lC00715853 (Feb. 18,2010). The court held that dismissal was not warranted even though
8 the sign was erected over the seven foot requirement of the statute. People v. Pierson, Superior Court of
9 Guam Traffic Case No. 1C00715853, Decision and Order at pp. 5-6 (Feb. 18, 2010). The court 10 reasoned that the purpose of the signage requirements, in particular the height requirement, was that the 11 sign should be high enough above the ground and located at the front of a parking space so it can be 12 seen from a driver's seat; and that the facts of the case adequately demonstrated that the Defendant had 13
14 seen the sign and was aware that her vehicle was in a designated accessible parking space. [d. The
15 court also found that minor deviations from the statutory procedure or technical violations may be
16 excused if there is substantial compliance thereto and that because the sign at issue had substantially 17 complied with the requirements of the statute the minor deviation of three inches over the height 18 requirement was excusable. [d. (citation omitted). 19 The conclusion drawn from this case is that so long as there had been substantial compliance 20
21 with the statute governing the dimensions and designations of disabled parking and access aisles for
22 disabled parking; a person can be cited for and convicted of a violation of the disabled parking laws. 23 However, such an inquiry raises the possibility of the unintended consequence that, in some cases, the 24 purpose and intent of the disabled parking law may be frustrated. 25 4. Substantial Compliance Analysis Inappropriate 26
27 As averred and demonstrated by the Defendant, there may exist numerous ways that the
28 statutory requirements regarding signage, dimensions, slope and location may be non-compliant. The
7 1 disabled parking areas of the Micronesia_MalL Payless-Denny'ssideC1nd .the Jucli(;iaryI11(lyb~. in
compliance with the requirements; however, as shown by the evidence, the disabled parking area of the 3 Dededo Flea Market may not be. Is the Court here to determine whether placement of the disabled 4 parking sign at least two feet off-center from the parking space is still substantially compliant with 16 5 GCA § 3401.1? 6
7 Additionally, judicial notice of other areas surrounding the Dededo Flea Market sheds further
8 light on the troublesome lack of consistency in compliance with the requirements of the statute. Across
9 from the Flea Market, the disabled parking sign in front of a restaurant is markedly left of center of the 10 disabled parking space it is supposed to identify. A little further up the street in front of a fabric store, 11 the disabled parking space is identified with a sign positioned directly centered in the slot; however, 12 that space has diagonal blue-colored stripes and is the only parking space there. At a hotel in Harmon, 13
14 the disabled parking sign is well below the seven foot height requirement and merely contains the
15 International Symbol of Accessibility, commonly known as the wheelchair symbol, with the words 16 "PARKING ONLY" but properly posted at the head and center of the space. In front of the Dededo 17 Mayor's Office, the designated parking areas and access aisles are colored yellow. Even at the 18 Defendant's place of employment, the south parking structure of the Micronesia Mall has the disabled 19
20 parking signs posted on cement columns not centered in the designated disabled parking spaces.
21 Given the wide disparity of the appearance, dimensions, and signage in areas ostensibly
22 reserved to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act it would seem to be an unwise endeavor to 23 engage in a substantial compliance inquiry especially if it is not within a defendant's control whether or 24 not the parking space is a disabled parking space or an access aisle for a disabled parking slot. In any 25 particular case, a defendant may be invited to discover and claim that a variance in degree nullifies the 26
27 intended use of the designated area.
8 ~~1 ~~~~__ . The COl 1rt does belieYe.thaLasubstantialcomptianreaJlatysi&~would--oomofe.appfepfiate if if.
2 was conducted to test a property owner's compliance with the ADA and the local statutes enacted by
3 the Legislature to implement its mandates. See e.g., Taijeron v. Kim, 1999 Guam 16 (landlord's 4 compliance with Guam Business License Law to maintain action against tenant); Castino v. G. C. 5 Corporation, 2010 Guam 3 (mechanics' lien statute); Quan Xing He v. Government of Guam, 2009 6 Guam 20 (Government Claims Act). However, it should not be used to determine if a person is guilty 7
8 of illegally parking in a disabled parking space or blocking and access aisle for a disabled parking
9 space. 10 S. Non-compliance of the Signage Requirements Does Not Excuse Illegal Parking 11 While non-compliance with the signage requirements of the statute may be a problem for the 12 owners of the public or private property available for public use; it cannot provide a shield against 13
14 liability for an un-qualified person who parks in a reserved area for disabled parking or for the person
15 who blocks an access aisle for disabled parking. See City of Wichita v. Basgall, 894 P.2d 876, 880
16 (Kan. 1995). 17 The Americans with Disabilities Act provides: "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against 18 on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 19 advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases 20
21 (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 V.S.c. § 12182(a)(1990). The intent of
22 the Americans with Disabilities Act is to prevent discrimination against qualified people with 23 disabilities in public accommodations. The mandates of 16 GCA §3401.1(i) through (k) are obviously 24 directed at the owners of public or private property made available for public use. Accessible parking 25 spaces serving a particular building must comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act 26
27 Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) for buildings and facilities. See 16 GCA § 3401.1 (i). Parking lots
28 must contain accessible parking spaces of certain dimensions complying with the ADAAG. See 16
9 1 GCA§140Ll(j)TFinally,accessibleparking-spaccs-must~designatedas-reserved by-asign;See-16
2 GCA § 3401.1(k). 3 The remainder of section 3401.1 deals with fraudulent conduct viz. the procurement or 4 possession of an authorization to use disabled parking, see 16 GCA § 3401.I(a)(d); the instances of 5 misconduct regarding the unauthorized use of disabled parking spaces or the obstruction of the access 6 aisles, see 16 GCA § 3401. 1(b)(c)(d); the enforcement of its provisions, see 16 GCA § 3401. 1(f)(h)(l); 7
8 the penalties for violating its provisions, see 16 GCA § 3401. 1(e)(g); and the education of the persons
9 entitled to use disabled parking spaces, see 16 GCA § 3401.I(m). 10 The overall purpose and intent ofthe provisions of the statute then is to not only provide public 11 accommodations for disabled persons but to also forbid the unauthorized use of a parking space 12 reserved for people with physical disabilities or to block the access aisles serving these spaces. 13
14 Allowing a person to park in such a reserved area merely on the premise that a defect exists in the
15 dimensions of the spaces, or that the spaces are not colored blue, or that the sign reserving the parking
16 space and access aisle for disabled individuals is placed in contravention of or variance with the 17 statute's requirements would be to deny a disabled person from possibly using parking spaces or access 18 aisles that were reserved for them. 19 Thus, while owners of public accommodations who are not in compliance with the signage 20
21 requirements of the statute may be liable for the violations and cited by the appropriate agencies; a
22 person who otherwise impermissibly parks in a reserved area for disabled parking or who blocks an 23 access aisle for disabled parking cannot obtain refuge because of the property owner's misconduct. 24 Therefore, the Court holds that so long as there is some indication that the area in question is 25 designated and reserved as a parking space and/or access aisle for the use of disabled persons, then no 26
27 person may park within the designated accessible parking space(s) without a special license plate,
28 removable windshield placard, or a temporary-windshield placard on public or private property made
10 1 available for public use or block access to aisle(s) adjacent to accessible parking space(s) on public or
2 private property made available for public use.
3 In this case, there was a sign clearly reserving an area of the Dededo Flea Market as parking 4 spaces and access aisles for disabled patrons of the Flea Market. The Defendant, although authorized to 5 utilize a disabled parking space, instead parked in an area that was clearly identified as an access aisle. 6 As explained above, this is proscribed by 16 GCA § 3401.1 (b )(2) and the Defendant is therefore guilty 7
8 of its violation.
10 Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the Defendant of a violation of Title 16 GCA § 11 3401.1(b)(2) and dismisses the remaining charge. 12 (0'iJv SO ORDERED thisj.5th day of June, 2012. 13
17 ALBERTO E. TOLENTINO, Magistrate Judge, 18 Superior Court of Guam