People v. Little

2025 IL App (5th) 250145-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 5-25-0145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250145-U NOTICE Decision filed 12/24/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0145 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-939 ) MARCUS D. LITTLE JR., ) Honorable ) Matthew D. Lee, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s order revoking defendant’s probation is affirmed where defendant failed to show plain error.

¶2 Defendant, Marcus D. Little Jr., appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation and

argues that insufficient evidence was submitted to affirm the order. For the following reasons, we

affirm defendant’s probation revocation.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 6, 2021, defendant was charged, by information, with one count of unlawful

possession with intent to deliver cannabis, in violation of section 5(c) of the Cannabis Control Act

(720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 2020)). On February 16, 2022, a plea agreement in which defendant

would plead guilty to the charge and receive 24 months of probation was presented to the trial

1 court. After admonishments were administered regarding defendant’s rights and the potential

extended term sentencing related to the charge, the factual basis was provided, and the court

accepted the plea. The court then sentenced defendant to serve “a period of 24 months of probation

subject to the standard rules and conditions of probation.”

¶5 On September 13, 2023, a probation violation report was filed with the court alleging that

defendant reported for the initial intake appointment but failed to report for scheduled visits on

July 20, 2022, October 20, 2022, and November 10, 2022. The probation officer recommended

that defendant’s probation be revoked.

¶6 On September 15, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke probation based on the

probation violation report. Defendant was arraigned on the petition to revoke charges on December

21, 2023, at which time defendant advised the court that he preferred to represent himself in the

proceedings. Following admonishments addressing defendant’s request to proceed pro se, the

court granted defendant’s request.

¶7 A hearing on the State’s petition to revoke probation was held on November 22, 2024. The

State requested the court take judicial notice of the February 16, 2022, sentencing order which set

forth the terms of defendant’s probation, and it agreed to take judicial notice. Sophia Taylor, who

worked as a court services officer for 10 months in Champaign County, testified that her primary

responsibilities as a court services officer involved guiding clients through their probationary

conditions to ensure court order compliance. Ms. Taylor further testified that the probation office

kept records of every client as required by law, defendant’s records were kept, and she reviewed

them prior to the hearing.

¶8 Ms. Taylor explained defendant’s probation requirements stating that he needed to report

to Champaign County court services at least twice a month. He reported for his initial intake on

2 March 7, 2022, and was directed to report at a moderate level, which involves reporting “for in-

person office visits alternating with field service or home visits.” Ms. Taylor explained that home

visits were when field services went to the probationer’s home to make contact with them if they

did not report in person. She confirmed that home visits were scheduled in advance.

¶9 Ms. Taylor testified that defendant was advised of a home visit scheduled for July 10, 2022.

However, defendant was not present for the home visit. Defendant was then scheduled to report to

court services on October 20, 2022, but failed to report. A letter was then mailed to defendant’s

residence on November 1, 2022, instructing him to report on November 10, 2022, but defendant

failed to report on that date as well. She testified that defendant never reported to court services

after his initial intake appointment.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Ms. Taylor explained that the initial intake was the very first

scheduled office visit. She confirmed that defendant appeared for that visit. The court asked

defendant if he had any other questions for the witness. Defendant advised the court that he had a

letter “on the reason” and then stated, “But honestly, Your Honor, I didn’t. I didn’t, honestly.” The

court inquired further, “You didn’t report, you mean?” Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”

¶ 11 The State rested and defendant confirmed he had no evidence for this stage of the

proceedings. The State argued that it met its burden that defendant failed to report to probation as

directed. It relied on the testimony of Ms. Taylor as well as defendant’s admission saying, “he has

failed to do so, *** as you’ve heard from the Defendant’s own mouth.” Defendant declined the

opportunity to provide a closing argument. The court found defendant failed to report to probation

as directed and ruled in favor of the State. The sentencing hearing was held on January 27, 2025.

Following the hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years’ imprisonment with six

months of mandatory supervised release. Defendant appeals.

3 ¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s order revoking his probation should be

reversed because the State provided insufficient evidence of the probation violations where the

State’s witness lacked personal knowledge of defendant’s probation violations. Defendant also

argues, in the alternative, that the court committed reversible error based on the improper evidence

under plain error review.

¶ 14 “[A] probation revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding.” People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d

460, 467 (2002). A challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence at a probation revocation hearing

“will succeed only if the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 158 (2007) (citing People v. Houston, 118 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (1987);

People v. Cooper, 66 Ill. 2d 509, 514 (1977); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451-52 (1973)).

“ ‘A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is

apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.’ ” People

v. Colquitt, 2013 IL App (1st) 121138, ¶ 28 (quoting Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215

(1995)).

¶ 15 Defendant contends that the testimony of the State’s witness was hearsay, that hearsay

evidence cannot be used to sustain the State’s burden, and therefore, the trial court’s decision

should be reversed. He concedes that no objection was raised during the hearing and that the issue

was not properly preserved. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (requiring both a

trial objection and a written posttrial motion to preserve an issue). Defendant acknowledges this

failure and therefore seeks plain error review which is also allowed in probation revocation

proceedings. See People v. Turner, 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 452 (1992).

4 ¶ 16 The plain error doctrine “is a narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” with

a purpose to protect a defendant’s rights and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005). The plain error

doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error in two situations. People v.

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). Under first-prong plain error, a clear or obvious error and

evidence that is “ ‘so closely balanced that the error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of

justice against’ ” the defendant must be shown. Id. at 565 (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87).

Under second-prong plain error, a clear and obvious error that is “ ‘so serious that it affected the

fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process’ ” must be

shown. Id. (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87). “Under both prongs, the burden of persuasion

rests with the defendant.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 190 (2010) (citing People v. Naylor,

229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008)). Defendant contends that both prongs are applicable.

¶ 17 “The first step of plain-error review is determining whether any error occurred.” People v.

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010) (citing People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124-25 (2009)).

“We review, de novo, questions of whether testimony constitutes hearsay, and we review the

court’s decision to admit the evidence for an abuse of discretion.” People v. Gladney, 2020 IL App

(3d) 180087, ¶ 20. “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.” People v. Broches, 2022 IL App (2d) 200001, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Caffey,

205 Ill. 2d 52, 88-89 (2001); Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015)). “Due to its lack of reliability,

hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.”

Id. (citing Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 88-89).

¶ 18 Indubitably, Ms. Taylor’s testimony was hearsay. She testified about defendant’s actions,

or more specifically his lack of action, during a period of time when she was not employed with

5 the court services department and therefore had no personal knowledge of the matter for which

she was providing testimony. While the State contends that her testimony was harmless because it

was based on records that would be admissible under the business record exception, it is undisputed

that those records were not introduced at the hearing. Accordingly, we agree with defendant that

error occurred.

¶ 19 As such we consider whether the error rises to the level that requires this court to avoid the

procedural default. First-prong plain error is relevant only where the evidence is closely balanced,

and the error tended to tip the balance against the defendant. People v. Radford, 2020 IL 123975,

¶ 23. Here, the only evidence presented by the State was the testimony of Ms. Taylor, which if

eliminated, could require us to find the evidence was closely balanced since there would be no

evidence on the underlying issue from either side.

¶ 20 However, Ms. Taylor’s testimony was not the only evidence of defendant’s probationary

violations presented at the hearing. After defendant’s cross-examination of Ms. Taylor, the court

asked defendant if he had any other questions for the witness. Defendant responded by saying,

“No sir. I just had a letter that I wrote on the reason. But honestly, Your Honor, I didn’t. I didn’t

honestly.” The court then asked defendant, “You didn’t report, you mean?” Defendant then replied,

“Yes, sir.”

¶ 21 Recognizing the dilemma associated with his statements, defendant argues, citing People

v. Steele, 283 Ill. App. 3d 413, 415 (1996), that his statements were elicited by the court and

therefore cannot be used against him. In Steele, the trial court directly asked the defendant if he

reported to the probation department and the defendant would not respond to the repeated

questioning on the advice of counsel. Id. at 414-15. Thereafter, the trial court found the defendant

in violation of his probation. Id. at 415. The appellate court found the trial court interpreted the

6 defendant’s silence as an admission of a probation violation and “surrendered its responsibility as

the trier of fact” based on the “improper” conduct. Id.

¶ 22 We find the exchange here easily distinguishable from Steele. First, the court’s initial

question asked defendant if he had additional cross-examination questions for the witness.

Defendant responded in the negative and then provided a statement that voluntarily admitted the

probation violations. The court’s inquiry was neither an attempt to bolster the State’s case, nor a

surrender of the trial court’s responsibilities as the trier of fact. It was a request of clarification

based on defendant’s prior statement that voluntarily admitted the probation violation.

¶ 23 While the testimony from the State’s witness was an erroneous admission of hearsay,

defendant’s admission of the probationary violations quashed any possibility of finding the

evidence closely balanced. As such, we hold that defendant failed to meet his burden for first-

prong plain error review and honor the procedural default.

¶ 24 Second-prong plain error review requires this court to determine if the error was “so serious

that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the juridical

process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Radford, 2020 IL 123975, ¶ 23. Second-

prong plain error is equated with structural error. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)

(quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186). “An error is typically designated as structural only if it

necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable means of determining

guilt or innocence.” Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 609. Errors previously recognized as “structural”

involve a “very limited class of cases,” none of which are found here. Id.

¶ 25 Defendant argues that finding guilt, based solely on hearsay, is a structural error that would

be proper under the second prong of plain error. However, we need not consider the issue because

hearsay was not the only basis to find defendant’s guilt. As noted above, defendant voluntarily

7 admitted the probationary violations in the middle of the hearing and when asked to clarify the

statements, defendant again admitted the violations. Under these facts, we hold that defendant

failed to meet his burden under second-prong plain error and, therefore, we will honor the

procedural default. Since defendant failed to meet his burden under either prong of plain error

review, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking defendant’s probation.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking defendant’s

probation.

¶ 28 Affirmed.