2016 IL App (3d) 140124
Opinion filed March 23, 2016
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-14-0124 ) Circuit No. 10-CF-719 KEITH LITTLE, ) ) Honorable Stephen Kouri Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Carter and Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant filed a “Motion in Limine/Motion to Suppress Statements” on the grounds that
all of defendant’s self-incriminating statements should be presumed inadmissible as evidence
because the homicide detectives did not strictly comply with the requirements for electronically
recording his custodial interrogation as required by section 103-2.1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1 (West 2010)). In addition, the motion to
suppress requested suppression of defendant’s statements due to a violation of his Miranda
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A jury found defendant guilty of murder and
the court sentenced defendant to serve 75 years in prison. ¶2 On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to admit the videotaped portion
of his custodial interrogation by homicide detectives and his sentence.
¶3 We reverse and remand.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 On May 3, 2010, defendant was a passenger in a PT Cruiser that Marcus Alexander was
driving at the time of a crash. Officer Corey Miller was near the site of the crash and observed
defendant and the driver flee from the PT cruiser. Officer Miller unsuccessfully attempted to
catch defendant during a foot chase but, after losing sight of defendant, the officer discovered a
discarded revolver in a front yard of a residence in the vicinity where defendant had been
running. Meanwhile, Officer Marilyn Robinson successfully apprehended defendant as he was
running out of bushes approximately three blocks from where Officer Miller recovered the gun.
Defendant admitted to Officer Miller that he personally discarded a revolver as he fled from the
officer that day. Defendant was charged with the criminal offense of aggravated unlawful use of
a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2010)) in case No. 10-CF-423. Defendant’s
jury trial for the AUUW charge was scheduled for Monday, July 19, 2010.
¶6 On Wednesday, July 14, 2010, the State crime lab completed ballistic testing on the gun
recovered by Officer Miller on May 3, 2010. According to this ballistic report, the gun was the
same weapon that was previously used to murder a convenience store owner, Abdallah Kattoum
(victim), on March 30, 2010.
¶7 On July 16, 2010, defendant was transported from the Peoria County jail to the Peoria
police department where two homicide detectives, Aaron Watkins and Keith McDaniel, jointly
interviewed defendant. Defendant made several incriminating statements and, on July 19, 2010,
the State charged defendant with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2010)) in case
No. 10-CF-719.
2 ¶8 I. Pretrial Proceedings
¶9 On March 1, 2013, defendant filed a “Motion in Limine/Motion to Suppress Statements”
(2013 motion to suppress). The 2013 motion to suppress asked that all statements relevant to the
murder prosecution be suppressed pursuant to section 103-2.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1
(West 2010)) because defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation as part of a homicide
prosecution and the initial custodial interrogation was not properly electronically recorded. In
addition, the 2013 motion to suppress requested suppression of defendant’s statements in both
cases due to a violation of his Miranda rights.
¶ 10 The hearing on the 2013 motion to suppress began on June 20, 2013. Judge Kouri, the
trial judge, considered the transcripts from a previous motion hearing in the murder case that was
conducted before Judge Lucas in 2012. 1 The transcripts from the 2012 motion to suppress
hearing are summarized below.
¶ 11 Officer Kris Kampas testified at the 2012 motion to suppress hearing that he transported
defendant from the Peoria County jail to the Peoria police station at 3:50 p.m. on July 16, 2010,
at Watkins’ request. Officer Kampas later transported defendant back to the Peoria County jail
from the Peoria police station at 8:25 p.m. on the same day. According to the officer, it was a
10-minute drive from the Peoria County jail to the Peoria police station.
¶ 12 Detective McDaniel testified that he and Watkins were assigned to investigate the murder
of the victim that took place on March 30, 2010. After a few days, all leads dried up and the case
became a cold case until Watkins contacted McDaniel around 5:20 p.m. on July 16, 2010, after
receiving the ballistics report, and requested McDaniel to assist Watkins with an interview.
1 On February 23, 2012, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the detectives on July 16, 2010. On June 28, 2012, Judge Lucas received the sworn testimony of Officer Kris Kampas, Detective McDaniel, Detective Watkins, and defendant. On December 3, 2012, Judge Lucas entered a written order denying the 2012 motion to suppress. This ruling is not at issue on appeal. 3 McDaniel arrived at the police station at approximately 5:30 p.m. on July 16, 2010. Watkins
first updated McDaniel on the details surrounding defendant’s arrest for AUUW on May 3, 2010.
Watkins told McDaniel that defendant and another person “got stopped after a high speed chase
and that the gun was in the car.” Watkins explained to McDaniel that defendant was
incarcerated in the Peoria County jail due to the gun case. Watkins did not tell McDaniel that
Watkins had spoken to defendant before McDaniel arrived at the police station on July 16, 2010.
¶ 13 According to McDaniel, at 6 p.m. on July 16, 2010, Watkins took McDaniel into the
interrogation room and introduced McDaniel to defendant. McDaniel agreed that defendant was
in custody at the time they spoke to defendant, but they did not record the interview and did not
Mirandize defendant. McDaniel explained, “[A]t that point in time Mr. Little was not a suspect
in this case [the murder case] and we weren’t required to video at that time.” McDaniel testified,
“[W]e were under the impression or from prior experience that because you are in mere
possession of a gun that is involved in a murder, you are not a suspect in the case.” McDaniel
stated, “Questioning is asking mere questions. An interrogation, I believe, is accusing him of
something.” McDaniel clarified, “Asking a question would be, do you have knowledge of the
murder? An interrogation would be, we know you were there, tell us what was going on.”
¶ 14 McDaniel and Watkins told defendant they “wanted to talk to him about a key piece of
evidence that he was arrested for.” McDaniel testified at the 2012 hearing, “After Mr. Little said
he didn’t know anything about the homicide, I believe that’s when I came in and started talking
about the severity of the case and his importance of his cooperation in this case.” According to
McDaniel, this discussion lasted for 7 to 10 minutes before defendant admitted he had some
knowledge about the homicide, but defendant said he was afraid to say anything because the
murder involved a family member.
4 ¶ 15 After defendant told the detectives about his cousin, Marcus Alexander, McDaniel said
he directly asked defendant if defendant witnessed the murder, stating, “That’s important. That
goes to credibility and things that we could use when we talk with Marcus.” Defendant
affirmatively responded that he was present at the Peoria Food Mart at the time of the murder.
McDaniel testified, “After he told us that he was present in the store and that his cousin was
involved, yes, he was deemed a suspect at that time.”
¶ 16 However, McDaniel stated the detectives spoke with defendant for another 5 to 10
minutes before suspending the questioning to move defendant to a different interrogation room
where defendant smoked a cigarette. The detectives also ordered some food for defendant.
¶ 17 At approximately 6:35 p.m., the detectives returned defendant to the first interrogation
room where the video recording equipment was activated. As defendant was eating the food
provided by the detectives, Watkins provided defendant with his initial Miranda warnings.
Defendant then gave a detailed statement of what occurred at the Peoria Food Mart on March 30,
2010.
¶ 18 Detective Watkins testified that he was new to the detective bureau. When he was
assigned to investigate the victim’s murder on March 30, 2010, McDaniel provided some
guidance and “was walking [Watkins] through the process of investigating that type of case.”
¶ 19 Watkins advised the court that Sergeant Boddie notified Watkins, on July 14, 2010, that
there had been a “hit” on a murder case from March 30, 2010. Watkins learned that a gun
recovered from defendant on May 3, 2010, was determined to be the murder weapon used on
March 30, 2010. Consequently, Watkins made arrangements to interview defendant on July 16,
2010, and contacted McDaniel.
5 ¶ 20 On July 16, 2010, Watkins said he waited for defendant to arrive at the police station and,
once he arrived, Watkins said he and McDaniel both talked to defendant at the same time.
Watkins denied talking with defendant before McDaniel arrived at the police station.
¶ 21 According to Watkins, the unrecorded segment of the interview with defendant began at
6 p.m. Watkins said the detectives were just trying to determine if the gun “changed hands”
during those 30 days between the date of the murder and the date of defendant’s AUUW arrest.
Watkins said the first interview with defendant lasted about 5 to 10 minutes until defendant
admitted he was present during the murder on March 30, 2010. Watkins said the videotaped
segment of the interview began at 6:35 p.m.
¶ 22 Finally, defendant testified, for purposes of the 2012 motion to suppress, that he was 18
years old on July 16, 2010. At that time, defendant said he was in custody at the Peoria County
jail because he could not post bail to be released on his AUUW charges. On July 16, 2010,
defendant said someone from the jail staff came to his “pod” in the jail and escorted him to the
front office where Officer Kampas was waiting. According to defendant, Officer Kampas
handcuffed defendant at the jail and transported him directly to the Peoria police station. At the
police station, Officer Kampas took defendant to a room and left him in the handcuffs for 5 or 10
minutes until Watkins came into the room and removed defendant’s handcuffs.
¶ 23 Defendant testified that, other than the time he was arrested for the AUUW charge in
May of 2010, he had never been questioned by police officers in an interrogation room.
Defendant testified that he asked to speak to his lawyer and his father. In response, Watkins told
defendant he was going to be questioned as a witness and it was not necessary for defendant to
speak to either his lawyer or his father at that point in time.
¶ 24 Defendant said Watkins spoke to him alone for “close to an hour.” During this time,
Watkins raised his voice and used profanity. Watkins asked defendant if he knew Deangelo
6 Lindsey, and told defendant that “Deangelo Lindsey had an armed robbery and a murder on a
store clerk” and he got “somewhere around 50 years or something like that.”
¶ 25 Watkins told defendant if he did not implicate himself in this murder case, Watkins was
going to talk to the State’s Attorney and told defendant he could “get the electric chair for being
in possession of the gun” because defendant was the only link to that gun and the murder.
Defendant said he believed Watkins, so defendant “just started making up a story about the
crime.” Defendant stated he made up the story about Alexander committing the murder because
Watkins said he knew Alexander was with defendant when defendant was arrested for the gun
charges on May 3, 2010.
¶ 26 At some point Watkins left the room, but returned with Detective McDaniel about 10
minutes later. Watkins introduced McDaniel to defendant and told defendant to tell the story
again in front of McDaniel. According to defendant, the interview with both detectives in the
room lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. After defendant told the story to McDaniel in Watkins’
presence, the detectives stopped the interview and left the room. Defendant requested a cigarette
and the detectives took him to a different room where he smoked his cigarette. According to
defendant, after smoking his cigarette, the detectives brought him back to the original room
where the detectives read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant then repeated the fictitious
story about witnessing Alexander commit the murder.
¶ 27 In addition to considering the transcripts of the testimony from the 2012 motion to
suppress hearing, as summarized above, the trial court also received the testimony of Watkins,
McDaniel, and defendant during the 2013 motion to suppress hearing. The detectives’ testimony
during the hearing on the 2013 motion to suppress was substantially similar to the testimony
contained in the transcript of the 2012 motion hearing.
7 ¶ 28 However, during the 2013 motion to suppress hearing, Watkins also testified to the
details of the general partial descriptions, that he and other police officers received from two
witnesses on March 30, 2010, of two suspicious black individuals who were in the store just
prior to the shooting, and who ran from the store after shots were fired. These descriptions did
not rule out defendant as one of the two men in the store.
¶ 29 In addition, during this 2013 motion to suppress hearing, McDaniel added that he was
also aware of the witnesses’ descriptions of the two black men in the store just prior to the
shooting. Although the detectives did not consider defendant a suspect, McDaniel agreed with
the question that defendant was a “person of interest with regard to this homicide investigation”
when they interviewed defendant on July 16, 2010.
¶ 30 Defendant’s testimony was also consistent with his testimony from the 2012 motion to
suppress hearing. For purposes of the 2013 hearing, defendant described his conversation with
Watkins before McDaniel entered the interrogation room. Defendant said Watkins said if
defendant told him what happened, “the State would just frown on me for being there for an
armed robbery, but they really just need me to point the finger at the murderer.”
¶ 31 The trial court took the matter under advisement on October 10, 2013. On October 14,
2013, the court entered a written Order that granted the 2013 motion to suppress regarding
statements “up to the point that Miranda is read [to defendant].” However, the court found there
was enough disconnect between the statement given before Miranda warnings and the statement
given after the Miranda warnings to distinguish defendant’s case from the holding in Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The written order also provided, “State can use any statement
made after Miranda warning is read.” The court did not address or make any findings pertaining
to the videotaping issues raised in the 2013 motion to suppress pursuant to section 103-2.1 of the
Code. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1 (West 2010).
8 ¶ 32 II. Jury Trial
¶ 33 The jury trial for defendant’s charge of first degree murder, case No. 10-CF-719, started
on October 15, 2013, and concluded on October 17, 2013. 2 The evidence established Peoria
police officer Derek Harwood responded to a silent alarm at the Peoria Food Mart on March 30,
2010. Harwood first spoke to two individuals in front of the store and then entered the store
where he found the store owner dead on the floor behind the cash register counter. Harwood
stated he drove past the store approximately 15 minutes earlier and observed the victim alive and
standing right inside the doorway of the store.
¶ 34 Peoria police officer Corey Miller testified to the circumstances leading to defendant’s
arrest for AUUW on May 3, 2010. According to Officer Miller, defendant told him that he was a
passenger in a car being driven by Marcus Alexander. When the car crashed, defendant fled on
foot and admitted discarding the revolver, later determined to be the murder weapon, as he was
running away from Officer Miller on May 3, 2010.
¶ 35 Dustin Johnson stated he worked at the Morton Forensic Science Laboratory as a forensic
scientist. On May 5, 2010, Johnson received a gun from the Peoria police department. Around
July 15, 2010, Johnson “test-fired” the gun to do ballistics testing on the bullet fired from that
gun. Johnson compared that bullet to those recovered as evidence in unsolved shooting cases
from the area. Johnson testified he positively identified the test-fired cartridge from defendant’s
gun to the bullet recovered from the unsolved murder of the victim, Kattoum. Johnson sent a
report to the Peoria police officers informing them of his findings.
¶ 36 Over the defense’s continuing objection, the court allowed the State to introduce
defendant’s videotaped statement, recorded on July 16, 2010, for the jury’s consideration.
2 Since the only issues on appeal relate to the court’s rulings on defendant’s 2013 motion to suppress statements, a condensed version of the evidence presented during the jury trial is included in this decision. 9 Defendant opted not to testify at his jury trial. After closing arguments, the jury found defendant
guilty of first degree murder on October 17, 2013.
¶ 37 Defendant filed a posttrial motion alleging the trial court erred by admitting defendant’s
videotaped statement. On December 19, 2013, the court denied defendant’s posttrial motion and
sentenced defendant to serve the maximum term of 75 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 38 Defendant appeals.
¶ 39 ANALYSIS
¶ 40 Defendant requests this court to reverse the trial court’s decision denying his 2013
motion to suppress the videotaped portion of his ongoing interrogation. In addition, defendant
submits the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to the maximum term of 75
years’ imprisonment for felony murder.
¶ 41 When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of a defendant’s
confession, we apply a two-part standard of review. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). Under
this standard, a circuit court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations are accorded great
deference and will be reversed only if the factual findings are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Id.; People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009). However, this court reviews
de novo the ultimate question of law regarding whether the suppression is warranted.
Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 251; People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).
¶ 42 I. Presumed Inadmissibility of Videotape
¶ 43 Defendant first argues the court erroneously failed to recognize that the videotaped
portion of his ongoing custodial interrogation was presumptively inadmissible against defendant,
as a matter of law, for purposes of his own prosecution for murder. Defendant submits the
detectives did not strictly comply with the statutory videotaping requirements required by section
103-2.1 of the Code by recording the entire custodial interrogation. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b)
10 (West 2010). In contrast, the State argues the videotaping provisions of the Code did not apply
because at the time of the interview: (1) defendant was not in custody for purposes of the murder
investigation, and (2) defendant was not yet a murder suspect.
¶ 44 The State correctly points out that the videotaping requirements only apply to custodial
interrogations. The statute provides:
“An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a
custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall
be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal
proceeding brought under Section 9-1, *** unless:
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.”
(Emphasis added.) Id.
The Code also defines “custodial interrogation” for purposes of the videotaping requirements to
mean “any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject’s position would
consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(a) (West 2010).
Section 103-2.1(a) of the Code mirrors and codifies “ ‘the common-law definition of custodial
interrogation developed in Miranda and [its] progeny.’ ” People v. Clayton, 2014 IL App (1st)
130743, ¶ 26 (quoting People v. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 100678, ¶ 52).
¶ 45 The trial judge ordered the suppression of defendant’s unrecorded and self-incriminating
statements that occurred “up to the point that Miranda is read.” Miranda applies to custodial
interrogations as well. Consequently, contrary to the State’s assertion on appeal, we agree with
the trial court’s finding that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation during the first
11 segment of the interview. We give great deference to this finding of fact by the trial judge. See
Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 251.
¶ 46 Here, the record supports the trial court’s factual finding on the issue of whether the
unrecorded interview constituted a custodial interrogation. First, Officer Kampas transported
defendant from the Peoria County jail to the Peoria police station in handcuffs. Once present at
the police station, defendant remained in handcuffs in the interrogation room. Although Watkins
removed defendant’s handcuffs, defendant was not able to leave the interrogation room or move
about at the police department without the detectives’ direct supervision. After a short break, the
detectives escorted defendant back to the original small, locked interrogation room for further
questioning. The defendant was not free to leave the interview at any point and return to the
Peoria County jail. Based on these facts, the court’s finding supports defendant’s argument that
the first segment of defendant’s unrecorded interview with both detectives qualified as a
custodial interrogation for purposes of both the Miranda warnings and section 103-2.1(b) of the
Code. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2010).
¶ 47 We next turn to the State’s argument that defendant was not a murder suspect in the
detective’s eyes when the interview began at 6 p.m. Consequently, the State submits the
detectives were not required to videotape the custodial interrogation of a non-suspect during an
ongoing murder investigation. When considering the State’s argument, we revisit the precise
language of the statute, which states:
“An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a
custodial interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention shall
be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and
12 (2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.”
(Emphases added.) Id.
The relevant language set forth above does not make any reference to the status of the declarant
as a “suspect” at the time of the custodial interrogation. Similarly, the statutory language does
not limit the videotaping requirements to investigations solely related to murder cases. Rather,
the statutory language set forth above reveals that any unrecorded and self-incriminating
statement by a declarant, during a custodial interrogation conducted at a police station, will be
presumed inadmissible against the accused in criminal proceedings involving murder charges.
¶ 48 We conclude the status of the declarant as an “accused” must be measured by two
objective factors to be considered by a neutral judge. First, and perhaps foremost, the declarant
must be facing murder charges as part of a criminal proceeding when the State seeks to introduce
the declarant’s self-incriminating statements as evidence against the declarant. Second, the
declarant’s self-incriminating statement or confession must have resulted from a custodial
interrogation that took place at a police station or other place of detention. Hence, the subjective
beliefs of the detectives regarding the declarant’s status as a witness or a murder suspect at the
time of the unrecorded custodial interrogation is irrelevant and not determinative of the
statement’s presumed inadmissibility where the detectives have not strictly complied with the
videotaping requirements. See Clayton, 2014 IL App (1st) 130743, ¶ 37.
¶ 49 Turning to the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude defendant was “accused” of
murder when the court was called upon to determine the admissibility of the recorded second
segment of the interview that began at 6:35 p.m. on July 16, 2010. Next, we return to the
language of the Code to determine whether the court properly allowed the State to introduce
evidence of the second recorded segment of the custodial interrogation.
¶ 50 Section 103-2.1(d) of the Code provides:
13 “If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was
subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this Section, then any statements
made by the defendant during or following that nonrecorded custodial interrogation,
even if otherwise in compliance with this Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in
any criminal proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of
impeachment.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(d) (West 2010).
Simply stated, the preponderance of the evidence in this case establishes the recorded segment of
the interrogation followed the unrecorded segment of the custodial interrogation and therefore, is
presumed inadmissible.
¶ 51 Hence, the detectives’ decision not to record the first segment of the custodial
interrogation has significant negative consequences on the prosecutor’s ability to introduce
compelling evidence of guilt at trial; specifically, defendant’s own incriminating admissions to
felony murder. Based on this record, we hold the trial court erred by failing to recognize the
second portion of the custodial interrogation in this case was presumptively inadmissible, as a
matter of law, because the detectives did not record the preceding segment of the interrogation as
required by section 103-2.1(b) of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b) (West 2010). Therefore, we
reverse the trial court’s ruling and hold the recorded custodial interrogation that began at
approximately 6:35 p.m. was inadmissible as a matter of law.
¶ 52 II. Violation of Miranda Rights
¶ 53 Alternatively, defendant challenges the court’s finding that there was “enough
disconnect” between the statement given by defendant pre-Miranda and the statement given after
Miranda. This case is controlled by well-established case law based on the holding in Missouri
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
14 ¶ 54 The Supreme Court, in Seibert, discussed the police procedure of engaging in a “question
first and warn later” approach to obtaining a defendant’s incriminating statements. Id. at 611-12.
The Supreme Court held, under the facts in Seibert, “the question-first tactic effectively
threaten[ed] to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be
admitted.” Id. at 617. Further, the Seibert court held the facts did not reasonably support a
conclusion that the Miranda warnings given could have served their purpose after the defendant
already made an unwarned statement to the police. Id. Therefore, the court held that Seibert’s
postwarning statements were procured by law enforcement officers in violation of Miranda and
were inadmissible. Id.
¶ 55 In People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 358 (2008), our supreme court adopted the Seibert
holding and followed the new test announced in Seibert to determine whether Miranda warnings,
delivered after initial questioning, could be effective enough to protect a suspect’s rights. The
Lopez court acknowledged that police officers might not generally admit that they deliberately
withheld a Miranda warning to obtain a confession. Id. at 361. Further, there might be
situations where an officer might mistakenly rather than deliberately withhold Miranda
warnings. Id. at 364. Therefore, to determine whether postwarning statements were admissible,
our supreme court examined “ ‘the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting
of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.’ ” Id. at 358
(quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615).
¶ 56 The facts in Lopez involved a juvenile who spoke to police without a parent and without
the benefit of Miranda warnings. Even though the second interview occurred two hours later,
after Miranda warnings and after the juvenile spoke to his father who was present during the
15 second interview, the Lopez court suppressed the contents of the second interview. In Lopez, our
supreme court discussed and applied the rationale used in Seibert as illustrated by the language
from Lopez set forth below:
“The plurality looked to the passage of time between the unwarned and warned
statements, the location where those statements were taken, whether the same person
questioned the suspect during the unwarned and warned statements, whether details
obtained during the unwarned phase were used during the warned phase, and whether
the suspect was advised that the unwarned statement could not be used against the
suspect. [Citation.] The plurality also considered whether ‘[i]t would have been
reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a continuum, in which it would have
been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage what had been said before.’ ”
Id. at 364-65 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17).
¶ 57 Here, although defendant was 18 years old, the Lopez case is instructive. In this case, the
unwarned custodial interrogation began at 6 p.m. Using McDaniel’s timeline, this portion of the
interrogation lasted approximately 15 minutes. Both detectives and defendant agreed that
defendant smoked a cigarette in another room before the second custodial interview with
Miranda warnings began at 6:35 p.m. on the same date, in the same interrogation room, with the
same detectives present. It is undisputed that defendant had enough time to smoke a cigarette
between the first and second interview, but he did not leave the police station and remained in
custody at all times from 3:50 p.m. until he was transported back to the jail at 8:25 p.m. Unlike
Lopez, this defendant did not speak to anyone during the short break between interviews.
Further, defendant did not have an opportunity to telephone his lawyer or his father between
interview segments. We conclude a cigarette break is not a sufficient amount of time to remove
the taint of the original Miranda violation.
16 ¶ 58 The trial court’s finding that there was “enough disconnect” between the statement given
before Miranda and the statement given after Miranda making Seibert inapplicable is contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence discussed above. Therefore, we conclude that defendant’s
videotaped portion of the custodial interview also should have been suppressed due to the
Miranda violation that occurred at 6 p.m., even though Miranda warnings were provided by the
detectives at 6:35 p.m.
¶ 59 III. Excessive Sentence
¶ 60 Having concluded that the trial court erred by admitting defendant’s videotaped statement
based on the violation of sections 103-2.1(b) and (d) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b), (d)
(West 2010)) and the violation of defendant’s Miranda rights, we refrain from addressing
whether the sentence imposed by the court was excessive.
¶ 61 IV. Double Jeopardy
¶ 62 Defendant, on appeal, asks this court to reverse the court’s order denying the motion to
suppress the videotaped statement and to remand this case for a new trial. However, we are
bound to consider the double jeopardy implications of a new trial. Thus, even though defendant
did not raise concerns regarding the sufficiency of the evidence or ask this court to vacate his
conviction outright, we are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence against defendant
for double jeopardy purposes. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 366-67 (citing People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d
467, 483 (1992)). The Lopez court instructs us to consider whether all of the evidence presented
at trial, including the now-suppressed statement, was sufficient to convict. Id. at 367 (quoting
People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995)). The relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d at
396.)
17 ¶ 63 In the case at bar, looking at all of the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable
to the State, including defendant’s now-suppressed statements and defendant’s unexplained
recent possession of the murder weapon, we conclude the evidence would have been sufficient to
convict. Therefore, retrial is not barred by double jeopardy.
¶ 64 CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to
suppress his videotaped statement and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with
this order.
¶ 66 Reversed and remanded.