People v. Lisk

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Lisk

76 A.D.2d 942, 428 N.Y.S.2d 729, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12055

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 5, 1980

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 76 A.D.2d 942 (People v. Lisk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Lisk, 76 A.D.2d 942, 428 N.Y.S.2d 729, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12055 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinion

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County, rendered January 29, 1979, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of robbery in the third degree. Defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery in the third degree in violation of section 160.05 of the Penal Law. The defendant was the driver of a white Mustang which picked up two men, Hazelton and Simmons, who had held up the motel clerk at the Holiday Inn in Vestal, New York, at about 1:00 a.m., Monday, July 13, 1978. The defendant was found to have aided and abetted the two men in the perpetration of the armed robbery. On appeal, defendant contends that it was reversible error to admit into evidence testimony as to the defendant’s involvement in two other uncharged crimes occurring in close proximity, both as to time and distance, to the crime under consideration. At issue at this trial was the state of mind of the defendant, that is, whether he knew that the two other men had intended to commit a. robbery in the Holiday Inn in Vestal and whether he knowingly acted as the driver [943]*943of the get-a-way car to assist them in the robbery. It was in this posture of the trial that the court admitted testimony concerning the prior robberies. As a general rule prior uncharged crimes of a defendant are inadmissible at trial. Among the exceptions to this general proposition is proof relevant to the defendant’s state of mind (People v Molineaux, 168 NY 264, 293). It is conceded in this trial that defendant’s state of mind was in issue. His guilt could only be established if the element of "guilty knowledge” were proven. He contends that the circumstantial evidence of his participation in the prior crimes, being inferential in nature, was so low in probative value that it should have been excluded because of its prejudicial effect. We disagree. Circumstantial evidence is competent so long as it is of such quality that it leads logically and irrevocably to the conclusion sought to be established. We conclude that the evidence of prior crimes taken together with the totality of the proof demonstrated defendant’s involvement in a pattern of conduct under circumstances which would render his lack of knowledge to be incredible. The record bears overwhelming evidence of complicity in the crime charged on the part of the defendant. Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.

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Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County, rendered January 29, 1979, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of robbery in the third degree. Defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery in the third degree in violation of section 160.05 of the Penal Law. The defendant was the driver of a white Mustang which picked up two men, Hazelton and Simmons, who had held up the motel clerk at the Holiday Inn in Vestal, New York, at about 1:00 a.m., Monday, July 13, 1978. The defendant was found to have aided and abetted the two men in the perpetration of the armed robbery. On appeal, defendant contends that it was reversible error to admit into evidence testimony as to the defendant’s involvement in two other uncharged crimes occurring in close proximity, both as to time and distance, to the crime under consideration. At issue at this trial was the state of mind of the defendant, that is, whether he knew that the two other men had intended to commit a. robbery in the Holiday Inn in Vestal and whether he knowingly acted as the driver [943]*943of the get-a-way car to assist them in the robbery. It was in this posture of the trial that the court admitted testimony concerning the prior robberies. As a general rule prior uncharged crimes of a defendant are inadmissible at trial. Among the exceptions to this general proposition is proof relevant to the defendant’s state of mind (People v Molineaux, 168 NY 264, 293). It is conceded in this trial that defendant’s state of mind was in issue. His guilt could only be established if the element of "guilty knowledge” were proven. He contends that the circumstantial evidence of his participation in the prior crimes, being inferential in nature, was so low in probative value that it should have been excluded because of its prejudicial effect. We disagree. Circumstantial evidence is competent so long as it is of such quality that it leads logically and irrevocably to the conclusion sought to be established. We conclude that the evidence of prior crimes taken together with the totality of the proof demonstrated defendant’s involvement in a pattern of conduct under circumstances which would render his lack of knowledge to be incredible. The record bears overwhelming evidence of complicity in the crime charged on the part of the defendant. Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

76 A.D.2d 942, 428 N.Y.S.2d 729, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lisk-nyappdiv-1980.

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