People v. Linton

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Linton

139 A.D.3d 416, 29 N.Y.S.3d 165

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 3, 2016

Docket1032 5532/10

StatusPublished

This text of 139 A.D.3d 416 (People v. Linton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Linton, 139 A.D.3d 416, 29 N.Y.S.3d 165 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

*417 Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Patricia M. Nunez, J.), rendered October 6, 2011, as amended November 10, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth and fifth degrees, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s mistrial motion, made after a police witness revealed uncharged crime evidence that the court had precluded. The court sustained defense counsel’s objection, struck the response, recalled the witness to give clarifying testimony favorable to defendant and twice provided curative instructions which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1104 [1983]). These curative actions were sufficient to prevent any possible prejudice (see People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865 [1981]).

The court also properly exercised its discretion in permitting a police witness to provide background evidence, based on his experience, concerning “lush workers” and police lush worker operations (see People v Bright, 111 AD3d 575 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1137 [2014]). This testimony tended to explain the actions of both defendant and the police surveillance team throughout the course of events, and it was not unduly prejudicial.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Andrias, Moskowitz and Kahn, JJ.

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*417 Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Patricia M. Nunez, J.), rendered October 6, 2011, as amended November 10, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth and fifth degrees, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s mistrial motion, made after a police witness revealed uncharged crime evidence that the court had precluded. The court sustained defense counsel’s objection, struck the response, recalled the witness to give clarifying testimony favorable to defendant and twice provided curative instructions which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1104 [1983]). These curative actions were sufficient to prevent any possible prejudice (see People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865 [1981]).

The court also properly exercised its discretion in permitting a police witness to provide background evidence, based on his experience, concerning “lush workers” and police lush worker operations (see People v Bright, 111 AD3d 575 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1137 [2014]). This testimony tended to explain the actions of both defendant and the police surveillance team throughout the course of events, and it was not unduly prejudicial.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Andrias, Moskowitz and Kahn, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

139 A.D.3d 416, 29 N.Y.S.3d 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-linton-nyappdiv-2016.

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