People v. Lindsay

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Lindsay

61 A.D.2d 992, 402 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10615

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 6, 1978

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 61 A.D.2d 992 (People v. Lindsay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Lindsay, 61 A.D.2d 992, 402 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10615 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered May 7, 1975 (the date on the clerk’s extract is July 15, 1975), convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second, degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree and assault in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. The prosecutor elicited, and emphasized on summation, the fact that the sole defense witness had not reported to the police the fact that appellant allegedly had not been at the scene of the crime on the night in question. Such conduct has been held to be error and has been strongly condemned (see People v Mims, 59 AD2d 769; People v Hamlin, 58 AD2d 631). That fact was utilized by the prosecutor as a springboard for his improper accusation that the defense witness was a liar (see People v Burnside, 52 AD2d 626). At the close of his summation, he stated: "I will leave you with one parting shot: Why would an innocent man put a liar on the stand on his own behalf?” The sufficiency of proof on the issue of the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime was a close question, as it was in People v Mims (supra). Since the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, these errors require reversal. Shapiro, J. P., Cohalan, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered May 7, 1975 (the date on the clerk’s extract is July 15, 1975), convicting him of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second, degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree and assault in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. The prosecutor elicited, and emphasized on summation, the fact that the sole defense witness had not reported to the police the fact that appellant allegedly had not been at the scene of the crime on the night in question. Such conduct has been held to be error and has been strongly condemned (see People v Mims, 59 AD2d 769; People v Hamlin, 58 AD2d 631). That fact was utilized by the prosecutor as a springboard for his improper accusation that the defense witness was a liar (see People v Burnside, 52 AD2d 626). At the close of his summation, he stated: "I will leave you with one parting shot: Why would an innocent man put a liar on the stand on his own behalf?” The sufficiency of proof on the issue of the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime was a close question, as it was in People v Mims (supra). Since the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, these errors require reversal. Shapiro, J. P., Cohalan, Margett and Hawkins, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

61 A.D.2d 992, 402 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1978 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10615, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lindsay-nyappdiv-1978.

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