People v. Lindemann

2026 IL App (5th) 250820-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250820-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/16/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0820 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Effingham County. ) v. ) No. 24-CF-121 ) HEATHER M. LINDEMANN, ) Honorable ) Bryan M. Kibler, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vaughan and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s orders granting the State’s motion to revoke defendant’s pretrial release and denying defendant’s motion for relief where the record contained convincing evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance at future hearings or prevent her from being charged with subsequent felonies or Class A misdemeanors.

¶2 Defendant, Heather M. Lindemann, appeals orders of the Effingham County Circuit Court

granting the State’s motion to revoke pretrial release and denying her subsequent motion for relief.

We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 3, 2024, the State filed a two-count information charging defendant with unlawful

possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a)(1) (West 2022)) and

resisting a police officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2022)). The charges stemmed from a search 1 of defendant’s vehicle during an April 6, 2024, traffic stop. Defendant’s first court appearance on

the charges was on May 6, 2024. Although the record does not contain a transcript of that hearing,

the State did not file a petition to deny pretrial release at that time, and defendant later alleged that

the issue of pretrial release was not addressed. On May 15, 2024, a grand jury returned a bill of

indictment on the methamphetamine charge.

¶5 On February 6, 2025, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the search

of her vehicle was not consensual, contrary to the statement of the officer involved. She failed to

appear for a status hearing held that day, and her attorney indicated that he did not know why she

was not present.

¶6 On March 10, 2025, the matter came for a scheduled hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress. However, defendant again did not appear. The court continued the matter with the

agreement of defense counsel.

¶7 On June 30, 2025, the State filed a verified petition to revoke pretrial release. In it, the State

asserted that defendant was subject to statutory conditions of pretrial release, including a condition

that she refrain from violating any criminal statutes. See 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a)(4) (West 2024).

The State alleged, however, that while this matter was pending, defendant was charged with

methamphetamine trafficking and unlawful possession of methamphetamine (both Class X

felonies) in Effingham County case No. 25-CF-175 and with theft (a Class 2 felony) and criminal

damage to property (a Class 4 felony) in Effingham County case No. 25-CF-177. 1 The State further

alleged that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure

On July 1, 2025,, the State filed an additional information in case No. 25-CF-177, charging 1

defendant with cruel treatment of animals (a Class A misdemeanor). 2 defendant’s appearance at subsequent hearings or prevent her from being charged with additional

felonies or Class A misdemeanors.

¶8 The circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition that day. The State first noted that

defendant had been released with statutory conditions, including a requirement that she not violate

any criminal statutes. The State asserted, however, that while defendant was on pretrial release,

two new cases had been filed against her involving multiple charges.

¶9 The State then proffered the factual bases underlying the new charges. The first case (No.

25-CF-175) involved a January 2025 traffic stop. The State informed the court that during the

course of the stop, defendant and her co-defendant were given Miranda warnings and subsequently

admitted that they went to Missouri to purchase approximately 109 grams of methamphetamine.

¶ 10 With respect to the charges involved in the second case (No. 25-CF-177), the State told the

court that an individual named Tami Hutchison reported the theft of Madame Alexander dolls

valued at approximately $100,000 from a storage unit and that two anonymous callers to Crime

Stoppers reported that defendant and Cody Sapp were seen stealing items from storage units in the

Altamont area. The callers also mentioned that defendant and Sapp attempted to sell items stolen

from the storage units, including porcelain dolls. The State told the court that when officers

executed a warrant for defendant’s arrest, they saw dolls in plain view. After being arrested and

read her Miranda rights, defendant provided officers with the locations of additional dolls.

Subsequently, officers executed a search warrant and discovered “hundreds” of dolls, some of

which had “significant damage.” The State argued “that there is no set of conditions that can assure

that she will not continue to violate the criminal statutes of any jurisdiction.”

¶ 11 In response, defendant acknowledged that the first condition for revocation of pretrial

release was satisfied because “possibly new charges” were filed while she was on pretrial release.

3 She argued, however, that there was no evidence suggesting that she was a flight risk or a violent

person. She argued that she had always been cooperative with police and that “substance abuse

[was] at the root of the issue here.” Defense counsel stated as follows: “I would suggest that placing

her on electronic home confinement, GPS monitoring, substance abuse evaluation with subject to

any treatment recommended therein would mitigate any fear that this Court had.”

¶ 12 Ruling from the bench, the circuit court first found that defendant was on pretrial release

when the offenses at issue in the new cases were committed. The court next found that the State

proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would

prevent defendant from committing additional Class A misdemeanors or felonies.

¶ 13 In a June 30, 2025, docket entry, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) defendant committed the offenses charged in case Nos. 25-CF-175 and 25-CF-177, (2) no

condition or combination of conditions would prevent her from committing new felonies or Class

A misdemeanors, and (3) “Defendant also presents a threat to the public.” The court therefore

ordered her detained.

¶ 14 Scheduled hearings on defendant’s motion to suppress were continued multiple times while

the parties engaged in plea negotiations. Meanwhile, on August 8, 2025, defendant was transported

from the Effingham County jail to St. Anthony’s Memorial Hospital for emergency medical

treatment. 2 The circuit court granted her a medical furlough allowing her to be transferred to a

facility in Peoria for further treatment. On August 11, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion for the

appointment of a psychiatrist in one of defendant’s other pending cases. The motion alleged that,

2 According to a subsequently filed psychiatric report, defendant required emergency care after a suicide attempt. 4 at that time, defendant was confined to a psychiatric hospital in Peoria and that counsel had a

bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial. The court appointed Dr. Jerry Boyd.

¶ 15 On August 14, 2025, defendant was discharged from the hospital in Peoria. Staff advised

her that she was required to report to the Effingham County jail immediately and arranged cab

service to transport her there. However, she did not report to the jail as required. Defendant’s

failure to return to jail after her furlough led to a charge of escape (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West

2024)) in Effingham County case No. 25-CF-270.

¶ 16 The circuit court held a status hearing on several cases pending against defendant on

September 18, 2025. Defendant appeared by Zoom, and the court noted that her location was

unknown. The State requested a bench warrant for her arrest, which the court granted. The

following day, officers arrested defendant pursuant to that warrant. She resisted arrest, leading to

a charge of resisting a police officer in case No. 25-CM-172.

¶ 17 On September 22, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on petitions to revoke pretrial

release in case Nos. 25-CF-175 and 25-CF-177 and a petition to deny pretrial release in case No.

25-CF-270. During that hearing, the State provided the court with the factual basis underlying the

charge of escape in case No. 25-CF-270, noting in particular that defendant did not return to the

Effingham County jail upon her discharge from the hospital even though hospital staff provided

her with transportation there by cab. In addition, the State told the court that when officers arrested

defendant pursuant to a bench warrant on September 19, 2025, defendant attempted to pull away

from the officers and told them she could not return to jail. The court granted the State’s motions

in all three cases.

¶ 18 On October 2, 2025, this matter came for a scheduled hearing on defendant’s motion to

suppress. The State conceded “that the motion is well taken.” The court asked if the State intended

5 to nolle prosequi the case, to which the prosecutor replied, “Not as of yet.” He explained that the

charge of resisting a police officer “would actually be potentially unaffected by the motion to

suppress.” He also noted that at the time of the hearing, defendant was detained on charges in

multiple cases.

¶ 19 Defense counsel indicated that he was working on a written motion for relief but explained

that it was taking some time due to the complicated procedural history of defendant’s pending

cases. He informed the court that while receiving treatment for the injuries she sustained in jail,

defendant was diagnosed with cranial aneurysms, and she had a surgical consultation for this

condition scheduled in Champaign County on October 9. Counsel asked that the court grant

defendant pretrial release to allow her to deal with her medical condition. He further stated as

follows: “If the Court is not prepared to do that for today, I would ask for a setting for the written

motion that I intend to file in the next couple of days/early next week.”

¶ 20 The court asked the State’s position on two possible options: (1) placing defendant on

pretrial release with conditions, or (2) giving her a furlough for her October 9 appointment,

possibly with GPS monitoring. The State objected to both options.

¶ 21 In support of its objection, the State asserted that defendant was facing several sentences

with a minimum of 20 years in each case and argued that defendant demonstrated she was

incapable of refraining from committing Class A misdemeanors or higher offenses. The State

emphasized that defendant did not return from her previous medical furlough, and noted that under

the County Jail Act, jail personnel were required to transport her to any necessary medical

appointments.

¶ 22 Defendant argued in response that because she was never subject to GPS monitoring or

other conditions of pretrial release previously, her response to such conditions was unknown. In

6 addition, she asserted that she was afraid that the stress of remaining in jail would aggravate her

medical condition, possibly leading to her death.

¶ 23 In ruling from the bench, the court noted that defendant did not return from the furlough

she was previously granted and that the court had found probable cause on charges of “numerous

felonies.” The court therefore found that defendant was a flight risk. The court stated, “I don’t

think there’s a less restrictive alternative short of detention.” In addition, the court found that, due

to the lengthy sentences defendant faced, “the incentive to run would be great.” The court thus

denied defendant’s request for release.

¶ 24 The court entered a continuing detention order that day. In a docket entry, the court granted

defendant’s motion to suppress and ordered the Sheriff’s Department to take defendant to her

October 9, 2025, medical appointment.

¶ 25 On October 6, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). She alleged that she was arrested on the two charges at issue

on April 6, 2024, but released with a notice to appear. She appeared pro se at a May 6 hearing

pursuant to the notice to appear, and she was again released. Defendant asserted that the court did

not address conditions of pretrial release at that time. She alleged that while she was hospitalized

in August 2025 a scan of her cervical spine revealed the presence of brain aneurysms, a potentially

life-threatening condition. She stated that she had an appointment scheduled with a neurosurgeon

in Champaign on October 9, 2025. Finally, defendant alleged that she had substantial connections

to the community, “including family ties,” and that she was not convicted of any previous felony

or violent crime.

¶ 26 The circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for relief that day. Asked if he had

any proffers, defense counsel replied, “Just to say, Judge, that Ms. Lindemann did not intentionally

7 escape from jail. She is—received very startling and grave health news while she was

hospitalized.”

¶ 27 The State proffered additional facts concerning the events of August 14, 2025, noting that

when defendant was discharged from the hospital that day, hospital staff called the Effingham

County Sheriff’s Department to inform them of defendant’s release. The caller indicated that

hospital staff provided defendant with a cab, gave her cab fare, told her she was required to return

to the jail, and gave the cab driver the address of the jail. The State argued that, in light of these

facts, defendant’s failure to return to jail indicated that “she had to have intentionally told the cab

driver not to go to the jail, and to change the destination that he was given.”

¶ 28 The State emphasized that defendant was facing numerous additional charges. The State

proffered additional facts concerning two of those charges. Specifically, with respect to the theft

charge at issue in case No. 25-CF-177, the State indicated that the estimated value of the stolen

dolls was $60,000. As to the charge of cruel treatment of animals, the State asserted that

defendant’s dogs were all “extremely underweight” with sores all over their bodies, including near

their eyes. In addition, they were found in a pen covered in feces. In conclusion, the State argued

that no conditions of release would prevent defendant from committing additional felonies or Class

A misdemeanors.

¶ 29 In ruling from the bench, the court noted that its primary concern was defendant’s failure

to return to jail following her medical furlough even though she knew she was required to do so.

In addition, the court emphasized that defendant was facing a possible sentence of between 18 and

80 years on the most serious of the pending charges (methamphetamine trafficking), giving her

“every incentive to not come back to court and face that charge.” The court further noted that

defendant committed an additional offense. The court stated, “So I think both sections apply, not

8 likely to appear, and she will likely commit further Class A or greater offenses while this case—

while all these cases continue to wind its way through the system.” Finding that less restrictive

alternatives to continued detention did not exist, the court denied defendant’s request for release.

¶ 30 The court entered a written order for continued detention the same day. On October 10,

2025, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant filed a notice in lieu of memorandum. As such, her motion for relief

serves as her argument on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 33 All criminal defendants are presumptively eligible for pretrial release, even those charged

with violent offenses. People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 20; see also 725 ILCS 5/110-

2(a) (West 2024). Pretrial release may only be denied “in certain statutorily limited situations.”

Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 15 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)). The circuit

court may deny pretrial release if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the

proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense,

(2) defendant poses either a flight risk or a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community, and (3) conditions of pretrial release would not prevent defendant’s willful flight from

prosecution and/or mitigate the threat. People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 16.

¶ 34 After a defendant has been granted pretrial release, the circuit court may revoke release if

defendant is charged with a felony or a Class A misdemeanor based on conduct alleged to have

occurred while defendant was on pretrial release. People v. Davis, 2024 IL App (5th) 240120, ¶ 14

(citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022)). Although the court may consider revocation of release

either sua sponte or upon verified petition filed by the State, the court must hold a hearing at which

9 the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or

combination of conditions of release will reasonably ensure that defendant will appear for future

hearings and/or will not commit subsequent felonies or Class A misdemeanors. Id. (citing 725

ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West 2022)).

¶ 35 Our standard of review on appeal depends on the nature of the evidence presented at the

hearing. Where the parties present the testimony of live witnesses, we review the circuit court’s

decision to determine whether it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morgan,

2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. However, where the parties proceed by proffer, as they did in this case, the

appellate court “stands in the same position as the circuit court and may therefore conduct its own

independent review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” Id.

¶ 51. Our review is thus de novo. Id. ¶ 54; see also People v. Rios, 2025 IL App (1st) 250950, ¶ 25

(applying this standard of review to an appeal from a decision to revoke pretrial release). This

means we conduct the same analysis the circuit court would conduct, and we are not bound by its

findings. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 18.

¶ 36 Here, the evidence showed that defendant was charged with several additional felonies and

one Class A misdemeanor while on pretrial release in this case. Specifically, she was charged with

methamphetamine trafficking, theft, criminal damage to property, and cruel treatment of animals.

Further, even after her release was revoked, she was charged with escape (a Class 3 felony) and

resisting a police officer (a Class A misdemeanor). In the face of these numerous charges, we agree

with the circuit court that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably

prevent defendant from committing additional Class A misdemeanors or felonies.

¶ 37 In addition, the charge of resisting a police officer in this case and the subsequent charges

of escape and resisting a police officer likewise support the court’s finding that defendant was a

10 flight risk and that no conditions of release would reasonably ensure her appearance at future court

hearings. We find no error in the circuit court’s decision.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the circuit court revoking defendant’s

pretrial release and denying her petition for relief.

¶ 40 Affirmed.