Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Lewis CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083806
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV024397)
ERIC CHARLES LEWIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
1 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora
S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The trial court found defendant and appellant Eric Charles Lewis ineligible for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75 because the sentencing
enhancement imposed for his having suffered two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b))
were imposed and stayed during his initial sentencing proceedings.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his
section 1172.75 petition for resentencing and thereby violated his due process rights
because section 1172.75 applies to defendants who have prior prison term enhancements
that were imposed but stayed. We agree. The California Supreme Court so held in
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). We therefore reverse the trial
court’s order denying relief and remand for the trial court to recall defendant’s sentence
and resentence him under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2002, a jury convicted defendant of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1),
torture (§ 206; count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4).
The jury acquitted him of the charge of attempted forcible oral copulation (§§ 664/288a,
subd. (c)(2); count 2). The jury found true an allegation that a principal was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)) as to count 1. The trial court found true two allegations that
defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole in state
prison for count 3, a consecutive term of five years for count 1, plus two years for the
firearm allegation, and three years for count 4 to run concurrently to count 1. For each of
the two prior prison term enhancements, the trial court imposed and stayed a one-year
prison term. Thus, defendant’s aggregate sentence was seven years-to-life in prison. In
June 2004, this court affirmed the judgment in a published decision. (People v. Lewis
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 882, 885.)
Defendant apparently filed a resentencing memorandum pursuant to
section 1172.75. At some point, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as a person currently serving a prison term
that included a prior prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b) as required by section 1172.75, subdivision (b).
2 The underlying factual background is not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We therefore dispense with a statement of facts.
3 On April 23, 2024, the trial court held a hearing at which counsel for defendant
and the People were present. The court found defendant ineligible for relief because the
prior prison term enhancements had been stayed or stricken and denied the motion for
resentencing pursuant to People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 40, review granted
February 21, 2024, S283169. Defendant timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75 regardless of whether the prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)) were imposed and stayed or imposed and executed. Pursuant to the California
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050, we agree with
defendant that he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75,
subdivision (d).
Before January 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), permitted enhancements for
any prior prison term for a felony. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) Effective January 1,
2020, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) to limit prior prison term enhancements to
sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The Legislature made this change
retroactive by adding section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), which was later
renumbered to section 1172.75 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
Under section 1172.75, “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5,” except for enhancements
4 for certain sexually violent offenses, “is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 also provides that, if a prior prison term enhancement becomes invalid
under the section, a trial court “shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)), and, in doing so, “shall apply . . . any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Here,
defendant’s judgment included two stayed prison priors.
Hence, a defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid
enhancement is entitled to resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).) To facilitate the
process, the statute directs the CDCR to “identify those persons in their custody currently
serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).”
(Id., subd. (b).) Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must “review the
judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement
described in subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.) The statute provides separate deadlines
for identification, review, and resentencing of “individuals . . . currently serving a
sentence based on the enhancement” and “all other individuals.” (Id., subds. (b)(1), (2),
(c)(1), (2).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing
once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies:
5 “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
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Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Lewis CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083806
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV024397)
ERIC CHARLES LEWIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
1 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora
S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The trial court found defendant and appellant Eric Charles Lewis ineligible for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75 because the sentencing
enhancement imposed for his having suffered two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b))
were imposed and stayed during his initial sentencing proceedings.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his
section 1172.75 petition for resentencing and thereby violated his due process rights
because section 1172.75 applies to defendants who have prior prison term enhancements
that were imposed but stayed. We agree. The California Supreme Court so held in
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). We therefore reverse the trial
court’s order denying relief and remand for the trial court to recall defendant’s sentence
and resentence him under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2002, a jury convicted defendant of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1),
torture (§ 206; count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4).
The jury acquitted him of the charge of attempted forcible oral copulation (§§ 664/288a,
subd. (c)(2); count 2). The jury found true an allegation that a principal was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)) as to count 1. The trial court found true two allegations that
defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole in state
prison for count 3, a consecutive term of five years for count 1, plus two years for the
firearm allegation, and three years for count 4 to run concurrently to count 1. For each of
the two prior prison term enhancements, the trial court imposed and stayed a one-year
prison term. Thus, defendant’s aggregate sentence was seven years-to-life in prison. In
June 2004, this court affirmed the judgment in a published decision. (People v. Lewis
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 882, 885.)
Defendant apparently filed a resentencing memorandum pursuant to
section 1172.75. At some point, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as a person currently serving a prison term
that included a prior prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5,
subdivision (b) as required by section 1172.75, subdivision (b).
2 The underlying factual background is not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. We therefore dispense with a statement of facts.
3 On April 23, 2024, the trial court held a hearing at which counsel for defendant
and the People were present. The court found defendant ineligible for relief because the
prior prison term enhancements had been stayed or stricken and denied the motion for
resentencing pursuant to People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 40, review granted
February 21, 2024, S283169. Defendant timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75 regardless of whether the prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)) were imposed and stayed or imposed and executed. Pursuant to the California
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050, we agree with
defendant that he is entitled to a full resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1172.75,
subdivision (d).
Before January 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), permitted enhancements for
any prior prison term for a felony. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65.) Effective January 1,
2020, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) to limit prior prison term enhancements to
sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) The Legislature made this change
retroactive by adding section 1171.1 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), which was later
renumbered to section 1172.75 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
Under section 1172.75, “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5,” except for enhancements
4 for certain sexually violent offenses, “is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 also provides that, if a prior prison term enhancement becomes invalid
under the section, a trial court “shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)), and, in doing so, “shall apply . . . any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Here,
defendant’s judgment included two stayed prison priors.
Hence, a defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid
enhancement is entitled to resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).) To facilitate the
process, the statute directs the CDCR to “identify those persons in their custody currently
serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).”
(Id., subd. (b).) Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must “review the
judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement
described in subdivision (a).” (Id., subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.) The statute provides separate deadlines
for identification, review, and resentencing of “individuals . . . currently serving a
sentence based on the enhancement” and “all other individuals.” (Id., subds. (b)(1), (2),
(c)(1), (2).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing
once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies:
5 “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) The trial court must
“apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council” as well as “any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) In addition, the
court may “consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary
record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration
is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Recently, the California Supreme Court resolved the question of whether
section 1172.75 applies to prior prison terms which were imposed and stayed. (Rhodius,
supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050.) After analyzing the text and legislative history of
section 1172.75, the Supreme Court concluded that section 1172.75, subdivision (a)
applies “to enhancements that were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment,
regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed. If the enhancement is no
longer authorized under the current version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a)
6 renders the enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the previously
imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing under section 1172.75, according
to the procedures set forth therein.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying relief under section 1172.75 is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to recall defendant’s sentence and
resentence him under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON Acting P. J. We concur:
FIELDS J.
RAPHAEL J.