People v. Leverson

2024 IL App (1st) 211083, 256 N.E.3d 1138

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 24, 2024
• Docket: 1-21-1083
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 211083

SECOND DIVISION December 24, 2024

No. 1-21-1083 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

) ) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 13 CR 20552/02 and v. ) 12 CR 20961 ) DARRELL LEVERSON, ) Honorable ) Michele McDowell Pitman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ) ) _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Over a few hours in early October 2012, several individuals engaged in a crime spree

through south suburban Dolton. By the end, several people had been robbed at gunpoint, another

had been shot at, and one person lay dead in his driveway. On October 10, 2012, police arrested

19-year-old Darrell Leverson after a car crash and brief chase as a suspect in the crime. He was

taken to the Dolton Police Department.

¶2 Over the next 72 hours, police interrogated Leverson a total of seven times, shuttling him

between a holding cell and an interview room. In the first six interviews, Leverson said nothing

incriminating. In many of those interviews, however, he unequivocally and repeatedly asked for No. 1-21-1083

a lawyer or for a phone call to contact one. For various reasons, none of which were remotely

valid, the police refused to allow him access to an attorney and permitted only one phone call

over a three-day period. Simply put, short of physical torture, the Dolton police violated Miranda

and the fifth amendment in just about every way they are capable of being violated.

¶3 As his detention at the police station stretched into the final hour of a third straight day,

Leverson agreed to talk with the police. During this seventh interview, he made several

inculpatory statements that were later used against him at trial. After asking to read a transcript

of the interview during deliberations, a jury convicted Leverson of first-degree murder,

attempted first-degree murder, and several armed robberies and other felonies.

¶4 On appeal, as in the trial court, Leverson claims his confession was involuntary. He

points out that police lied to him about his rights to speak with counsel or make a phone call,

disregarded his repeated requests to speak to a lawyer, and interrogated him seven times over

three days, at one point threatening him with the death penalty and suggesting he would be

sexually assaulted in jail.

¶5 The State “does not in any way condone the actions taken by the detectives in this case”

but claims that Leverson nevertheless voluntarily waived his rights before his seventh

interrogation. Alternatively, the State claims that any error in the admission of the confession

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶6 We reverse and remand for a new trial. Leverson’s admissions came at the culmination of

a series of coercive tactics orchestrated by investigators over three days. We cannot look the

other way when the police flagrantly disregard a defendant’s rights when he asserts them and

then badger him into waiving those rights. And though the State’s case was built on more than

his statement, Leverson’s self-incriminating words were the cornerstone of many charges and the

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consistent thread that tied the State’s case together. The error in admitting this confession was

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶7 BACKGROUND

¶8 The following facts come mainly from two hearings: a pretrial hearing to suppress

Leverson’s statements to police, in which videos of all his interviews were entered into evidence,

and Leverson’s subsequent jury trial. The State charged Leverson, Kevin Eason, and Eddie

Fleming with multiple crimes in connection with the following spree of crimes committed in the

south suburbs of Cook County in early October 2012.

¶9 I. Robbery of Gregory Harris

¶ 10 On October 9, 2012, Gregory Harris was off to see a friend, Tisha Prince, who lived in

Dolton near Blouin Drive and Ellis Street. At around 10 p.m., Harris took a bus toward 154th

Street and Cottage Grove Avenue, then began to walk toward Prince’s house.

¶ 11 As he was walking on Ingleside Street, two men with handguns jumped out of nowhere.

One man, taller than the other, went behind Harris, put his gun on him, and took Harris’s coat,

watch, some cash, a wallet, his cell phone, and a PlayStation 3 video game machine. The shorter

man stood in front the whole time, his gun fixed on Harris.

¶ 12 The taller man fled south with Harris’s possessions. The shorter man told Harris to turn

around or he would get shot; Harris ran off in the opposite direction.

¶ 13 Harris walked to his friend’s house. As he arrived, he heard gunshots coming from the

east down Blouin Drive. Harris and Prince walked together down the street toward the gunshots,

where Harris saw a person lying on a driveway. Police eventually arrived on the scene.

¶ 14 Harris spoke with Dolton police officer Curtis Rentson but said he did not want to file a

report. Harris did tell officers that he had been robbed, however, and thought it might be related

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to the shooting. He said only one or two minutes passed between the time he was robbed and

when he heard the gunshots. He told Rentson that the robbers left the scene in a gray Ford SUV

and that one was approximately 5 feet, 11 inches, while the other was 5 feet, 6 inches.

¶ 15 II. Murder of Derrick Hampton

¶ 16 The gunshots Harris heard around 10:30 p.m. occurred near a house on the 1000 block of

Blouin Drive in Dolton. Derrick Hampton was getting ready to go to work. While Hampton was

in his driveway, someone shot him, killing him. There were no eyewitnesses. Hampton’s

daughter, who was home at the time, heard gunshots and went outside. She found her father

lying on the ground next to some pieces of wood. Two 9-millimeter shell casings were found on

the driveway. Officer Rentson was dispatched to the scene and arrived shortly thereafter. When

Officer Rentson arrived, he saw Gregory Harris standing across the street.

¶ 17 III. Robbery of Ravetta Moore

¶ 18 Now around 10:50 p.m., Ravetta Moore was driving toward Calumet City to visit a friend

for her birthday. Along the way, she came to an intersection at the same time as a Jeep Liberty

SUV; the driver of the Jeep waved her through the intersection, and Moore continued to her

friend’s house.

¶ 19 She reached the house, in the 200 block of Hoxie Avenue in Calumet City, and pulled

into her friend’s driveway. Moore was busy on her phone for a moment, then looked up to see a

man with a gun standing by her car window. Moore later identified the man as Kevin Eason.

¶ 20 The man with the gun ordered her out of the car. As she complied, Moore saw a taller

man, clothed in a hoodie and mask, whom she could not identify. This man pulled Moore from

her car and snatched her designer purse before pushing Moore to the ground. The men

rummaged through Moore’s car before fleeing. Moore later realized that her iPhone was missing.

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¶ 21 Police found Gregory Harris’s state ID card not far from where Moore was robbed.

¶ 22 IV. Carjackings of Robert Hopkins and Joyce Johnson

¶ 23 Meanwhile, at about 11 p.m., Robert Hopkins and his then-girlfriend, Joyce Johnson,

were wrapping up an evening at Hopkins’s house in the 14000 block of South Woodlawn

Avenue in Dolton. They had parked their cars—a blue Lexus GS and a Chevy Equinox—next to

each other in Hopkins’s driveway and were walking toward them when two men approached.

¶ 24 One of the men walked up to Hopkins, who was at the side of his house, stuck a gun in

his face, and said “give me the money.” Another man appeared and searched Hopkins’s pockets.

They took his keys and phone, then told him to lie down.

¶ 25 The men then went over to Johnson, who was sitting in her car. One of the men, armed

with a gun, told Johnson to get out. She then gave him her debit and credit cards and some cash.

One man then drove off in Hopkins’s Lexus, while the other got into Johnson’s Chevy and took

it. Both began to follow a Jeep that had been parked in the street.

¶ 26 A few days later, Hopkins identified Eason as one of the robbers. He could not identify

the other assailant. Hopkins told police that both robbers were about the same height.

¶ 27 V. Robbery of Willie Douglas

¶ 28 Shortly thereafter, at about 11:15 p.m., Willie Douglas was in his parked car with his

girlfriend in Riverdale. A dark-colored car pulled up, and two men jumped out. One approached

with a gun, opened the driver’s door, and ordered Douglas out and to the ground. The men then

went through his car, and the armed assailant rummaged through Douglas’s pockets. The men

took Douglas’s bank card, cell phone, and leather jacket.

¶ 29 Douglas identified Kevin Eason as the man with the gun. Douglas told the police that

night that he did not get a good look at the passenger in the Lexus and could not identify him.

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Some 20 days later at the police station, however, Douglas identified Leverson as the passenger

in the Lexus who rummaged through his car.

¶ 30 VI. Attempted Robbery of Angela Feaster

¶ 31 As the clock inched closer to midnight, Angela Feaster was parked in front of her house

in Chicago, her child asleep in the back. She was speaking on her phone when a dark blue Lexus

pulled up beside her. Two people were inside; Feaster later identified Eason as the driver. The

Lexus then backed up and blocked her car. The passenger was tall, had a light complexion and

“pretty eyes” in Feaster’s words, and was clad in a hoodie. He jumped out of the Lexus and

pulled a silver semiautomatic pistol from his pocket. He approached Feaster on the driver’s side

and tried to get into her car.

¶ 32 Feaster, fixated on the barrel of the gun, thought she was going to die. As the man

reached for the door, Feaster put her car in reverse and heard the gun go off. She sped off with

the Lexus in pursuit and drove to the Harvey police station. Somewhere along the way, the Lexus

broke off. There were no bullet holes in Feaster’s car.

¶ 33 VII. Robbery of Phillip Neal

¶ 34 The calendar flipped over to October 10, 2012. At approximately half past midnight,

Phillp Neal was getting home. As he pulled into his driveway, he saw a dark Lexus driving down

the street. It stopped in front of his driveway, and a man wearing a black hoodie got out. The

man approached Neal, who was still in his car, and rapped a gun on the window, telling Neal to

open his door. When Neal obeyed, the man put the gun to Neal’s head and demanded money.

That man then ordered Neal out of the car and on his knees.

¶ 35 Another, shorter man, whom Neal later identified as Eason, came up to him and searched

through his pockets. They took Neal’s money, keys, phone, a Blackberry, and a military-style

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bag with Neal’s laptop inside. The men drove off in the Lexus.

¶ 36 At trial, Neal identified a backpack, computer, and Blackberry recovered from the Lexus

as his.

¶ 37 VIII. Police Pursuit and Investigation

¶ 38 Still early into October 12, at roughly 12:30 am, Officer Clarence Ayers responded to a

call of an armed robbery, looking for a dark-colored Lexus. He found the Lexus and gave chase.

The Lexus sped off, and a high-speed chase ensued. Eventually, the Lexus crashed into the side

of a building. Two people, neither whom Ayers could identify, jumped out and dashed off in

opposite directions. Police did not catch either individual at the time.

¶ 39 Inside the Lexus, police found a Smith and Wesson semi-automatic pistol near the front

passenger seat. Later ballistics testing concluded that the gun matched a bullet taken from

Hampton’s body, as well as shell casings found on the scene of his murder. Feaster, Harris, and

Douglas all recognized the gun as the one used by the men who robbed them.

¶ 40 The gun was tested for DNA. There was a mix of DNA profiles on the gun, and Leverson

could not be excluded as a contributor to that mixture. That said, the State’s expert could not tell

when the DNA was deposited on the gun.

¶ 41 In addition to the gun, police found Douglas’s identification card, his debit card, and an

ATM receipt. Neal’s backpack, computer, and leather jacket were also in the Lexus. Police also

found a single shoe in the car; they later found its likely counterpart in Eason’s room.

¶ 42 Finally, a DNA profile taken from the passenger-side airbag of the Lexus matched

Leverson’s profile.

¶ 43 IX. Arrest of Defendant

¶ 44 At 4:45 p.m. on October 10, 2012, police were involved in another high-speed chase, this

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time with a Jeep. Like the earlier one, the chase ended when the Jeep crashed. Officers

responding to the chase saw Leverson running from the area and pursued him to a house on the

14500 block of South Emerald Street, where they arrested him on the front porch. One man,

Phillip McNulty, told officers later that he, Eason, Leverson and Flemming were all in the Jeep

together. Investigators later found Eason and Flemming’s fingerprints inside the jeep, and

Leverson’s prints on a water bottle inside.

¶ 45 On October 12, 2012, the first robbery victim, Gregory Harris, went to the Dolton Police

Department to view two lineups.

¶ 46 At trial, Harris said that he viewed the two lineups but did not identify anyone in either

lineup. Then, someone else came into the room and identified Leverson in one of the lineups,

Harris said. He testified that police told him he had to sign a statement to get his property back;

but Investigator Cindy Tencza testified that nobody forced Harris to sign a statement to get his

belongings. Investigator Tencza testified that Harris viewed both lineups and identified Leverson

as the man who went through his pockets (the taller man).

¶ 47 After procuring a warrant, police searched Eason’s bedroom. There, they found the

aforementioned shoe, a 9-millimeter round of ammunition, an empty box formerly holding 9-

millimeter Luger ammunition, Moore’s Coach purse, Harris’s watch, and Johnson’s keys.

¶ 48 X. Interrogations of Defendant

¶ 49 After police arrested Leverson in the early afternoon on October 10, 2012, they took him

to the Dolton Police Department. Over the next three days, officers would question him a total of

seven times. Until the seventh interrogation, Leverson denied having any role in the crime spree.

Videos of those interrogations and transcripts of them were entered into evidence during the

motion to suppress Leverson’s confession, and they are part of the record on appeal. We take the

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facts from our review of those videos and transcripts.

¶ 50 A. First Interview

¶ 51 Sergeant John Daley and Investigator Richard Belcher first interviewed Leverson at

approximately 8:45 p.m. on October 10. Daley read Leverson his Miranda warnings, and

Leverson told the investigators that he had been sick with the flu and was not feeling well.

During this interview, Leverson asked to call his mother, but police ignored his request:

“A. Can I call, can I call my mom?

Q. In a little while.

A. ’Cause [inaudible]—

Q. You’re an adult right now so we’re talking to you now.”

¶ 52 Leverson was not given access to a phone.

¶ 53 B. Second Interview

¶ 54 Leverson spent roughly the next 19 hours in a holding cell. The next day, at about 12:15

p.m. and about 20 hours after his arrest, police interviewed Leverson again. This time, Detective

Darryl Hope and Investigator Belcher conducted the interrogation. They first gave Leverson

Miranda warnings again, then asked him what he had been doing the previous few days.

Leverson denied involvement in the crime spree or knowing the participants. Both officers

eventually left briefly before returning.

¶ 55 Leverson asked Detective Hope, “Can I have my phone call so I can call my lawyer?”

Leverson told the detective he felt he was in a “bad situation” and still had not been allowed to

make a phone call. Detective Hope denied Leverson’s request, lying to him about his rights:

“Q. When you’re under investigation you don’t get a phone call.

A. You don’t get a phone call under investigation?

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Q. No.”

¶ 56 Detective Hope eventually left the interrogation, prompting Leverson to yell out that he

was “ready to like just go on ahead and tell you whatever.”

¶ 57 Detective Hope returned a short while later and told Leverson that “we really gonna talk

this time” before re-reading his Miranda warnings and asking more questions. Leverson

continued to answer questions but began to visibly grow frustrated, putting his hands on his head

and then later laying his head down on the table. After a few more exchanges, Detective Hope

left Leverson alone in the interrogation room for 40 minutes.

¶ 58 Leverson eventually called out to use the restroom. When he returned, he asked the

officer who escorted him, “Can I call my lawyer?” The unknown officer said, “Sure.” Leverson

followed up, “Can I use the phone?” The unnamed officer said, “Sure.” But Leverson was never

given access to a phone or provided an attorney.

¶ 59 Detective Hope returned a short while later and began questioning Leverson again.

Leverson again asked Detective Hope if he could call his mother so that “she can call my

lawyer[.]” Detective Hope asked Leverson if he wanted a lawyer present, to which Leverson

replied that he did not need one, as he had done nothing wrong. Leverson later asked, “After I

talk to you I can get my phone call?” Detective Hope replied, “After you talk to me I gotta go

talk to my people, then we decide to give you the phone call.”

¶ 60 In total, Leverson asked Detective Hope at least 16 times for a phone call during the

second interview, the last time all but begging the officers:

“I just want my one phone call. That’s all I ask for is my one phone call. *** And I told

you I—I’ll let you know, I’ll tell you whatever you want to know. I’ll tell you shit. I just

need my one phone call. That’s all I ask for is my one, I’m not asking for none of this

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shit, I don’t care about no food nothing, I will be hungry. I just want my one phone call. I

just want my one phone call. My one phone call that’s all I ask here.”

¶ 61 Hope responded that “I’m gonna talk to my people” and “I’ll see what I can do.”

¶ 62 C. Third Interview

¶ 63 The third custodial interrogation began a few hours later, at 4:15 p.m on October 11, now

24 hours after police arrested Leverson. Again, Detective Hope led the questioning but did not

give Leverson new Miranda warnings. As before, Leverson asked him numerous times if he

could make a phone call, including near the beginning of this interview:

“Q. Before all that like what they said about my phone call?

A. They still working on that. They gotta talk to a state’s attorney [inaudible].

Q. They gotta talk to a state’s attorney just for me to make a phone call?

A. Yeah. Yeah.”

¶ 64 Leverson was eventually allowed to call his sister and left the interrogation room for a

short time to do so. After the call, police returned him to the interrogation room and resumed

questioning him. Leverson told them, however, that his sister told him to “get something in

writing or get a lawyer.” Detective Hope then left the room, ending the interrogation.

¶ 65 D. Fourth Interview

¶ 66 The fourth interview, some 26 hours after the arrest, was uneventful. Police gave

Leverson new Miranda warnings, and Leverson did not ask for an attorney, but he did not

incriminate himself, either.

¶ 67 E. Fifth Interview

¶ 68 The calendar turned to October 12, and at 1:20 p.m., police interviewed Leverson for a

fifth time, nearly 48 hours after his arrest. Detective Hope and Investigator Belcher were once

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again present; Detective Hope read Leverson his Miranda warnings once again. Ten minutes into

questioning, the following exchange occurred between Leverson and the two officers:

“A: Okay, before I tell y’all names I just want a lawyer on the side of me present

before I tell.

Q: All right, we’re done.

Q: That’s it.

Q: Call him up.

A: Call one up?

Q: Yeah.

A: Y’all can’t call one for me?

Q: No.

A: Ya’ll just said, you just said, read me my rights.

Q: You get a lawyer in court.

A: Oh only in court?

Q: You’re not—you’re not, yeah, you’re not that important to us that we gotta call a

lawyer and have him come here for you ***.”

¶ 69 When the interrogation ended, Hope returned Leverson to the holding cell and told him,

“You know you going to wind up being the shooter.”

¶ 70 F. Sixth Interview

¶ 71 The following morning, the police woke Leverson at 4 am, now some 60 hours after

police arrested him. Officer Jack Daley brought Leverson into the interrogation room from the

holding cell where Leverson had been sleeping. Officer Daley began by telling Leverson that he

understood that Leverson wanted to talk to someone but had requested a lawyer. Leverson

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responded, “I—I didn’t I was just there asleep, I was tired.” After a few more questions about

whether he wanted to speak, Leverson told Officer Daley, “I wanted to go to sleep, sir, I’m tired,

I’m hurt, and I’m very sick.”

¶ 72 Officer Daley told Leverson that he’d take him back to the cell, but Leverson then asked

the officer to just “read me my rights, I just want to know what’s going on right now.” Officer

Daley read Leverson his Miranda rights again, and Leverson continued to maintain his

innocence. Detective Hope returned to the room and joined in the questioning, but still, Leverson

denied being involved in the crime spree.

¶ 73 At this point, both investigators—and later Leverson—grew visibly frustrated and, at

various points, began yelling. Officer Daley told Leverson that his crimes were so serious that

Leverson would “be on the front page in the newspaper as the number one villain in Chicago and

the South Suburbs,” and that “[t]hey’re gonna say bring the death penalty back to Illinois this

guy is a menace.”

¶ 74 By now, the officers began to move physically closer to Leverson, still seated at one end

of the table in the interrogation room, and surrounded him. Officer Daley told Leverson that he

was going to Division 9 at the Cook County Jail—the maximum-security division—with other

violent inmates, all of whom would watch him “walk around a square room with eight other

motherf*** looking at you saying shake your ass.” Officer Daley also told Leverson that he

would be in prison for so long that his “dick won’t work” when he got out, and that Leverson

would never see his young son again.

¶ 75 The temperature continued to rise. Officer Daley insulted Leverson, telling him, “Don’t

act like a girl with that silly face *** you—you look like your [sic] gay right now that’s not

becoming to you.” By now, Detective Hope also joined in and put his face directly in front of

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Leverson’s, yelling at him while only standing a few inches away. Leverson boiled over and

began to yell back at the detectives. He shouted four times that he wanted a lawyer, and the

officers ended the interrogation and returned Leverson to his holding cell.

¶ 76 G. Seventh Interview

¶ 77 About six hours later, still on October 13, Leverson told Officer Sandra Bankhead, a

Dolton Police Department investigator (albeit not one working on this case) that he wanted to

speak with detectives.

¶ 78 At about 2:15 p.m., now about 72 hours after police first arrested Leverson, Torrence

Johnson, an investigator with the Illinois State Police, questioned Leverson with Hope present.

Investigator Johnson read Leverson his Miranda rights from a pre-printed form, then had

Leverson review, initial, and sign the sheet—something that had not happened up to that point.

¶ 79 In this interview, parts of which were played for the jury during Leverson’s trial,

Leverson admitted joining Eason and Flemming in the Jeep on Tuesday and Wednesday night.

He said that Eason and Fleming came by and told Leverson that something had gone wrong

when Eason and Fleming tried to rob someone named Chuck.

¶ 80 After Eason and Fleming picked Leverson up, they drove around until Eason found a

man in a Pelle brand coat (presumably Gregory Harris) and robbed him at gunpoint. Eason took

the man’s bag, while Leverson took the Pelle coat. Eason and Leverson got back into the Jeep, he

said, while Fleming drove them around the corner. There, they saw a man carrying lumber in his

driveway (presumably Derrick Hampton). Leverson told Johnson that he and Eason got out of

the Jeep and approached the man; when Eason threatened the man, the man responded, “You

gotta shoot me.” Leverson, realizing what was about to happen, began to run back to the Jeep.

¶ 81 Beyond that, Leverson admitted to being involved in the carjackings of the Lexus and

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Chevy Equinox. Specifically, he said he was driving the Jeep when Eddie Fleming robbed a man

and a woman, and that Fleming drove off in a truck (presumably the Equinox) while Kevin

Eason stole a Lexus. Later, after the trio had dropped off the Jeep, Leverson got into the Lexus

with Fleming and drove around until it crashed. Leverson later identified the gun police

recovered as Eason’s and admitted that, at one point during everything, Leverson had pointed it

at someone while Eason rifled through the person’s pockets.

¶ 82 XI. Pretrial and Trial Proceedings

¶ 83 Leverson challenged the use of his confession before trial. The trial court held a

comprehensive hearing on whether he voluntarily waived his rights and confessed. At the

hearing, the State entered into evidence video recordings of the seven interrogations. After

reviewing the videos and hearing live testimony from a number of officers involved in the case,

the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court ruled that Leverson had invoked his right

to speak to an attorney during his fifth interview but found that Leverson had initiated further

contact with police and then knowingly and intelligently waived his rights before speaking to

Investigator Johnson in the seventh and final interview.

¶ 84 Leverson later elected to have a jury decide his fate. During the jury trial, portions of this

seventh interrogation were played, and a transcript of those portions was admitted into evidence.

During deliberations, the first thing the jury requested was the transcript of Leverson’s

confession, which they were given. After further deliberations, the jury convicted Leverson of all

charges. The court sentenced him to 72 years in prison. Leverson now appeals.

¶ 85 ANALYSIS

¶ 86 On appeal, Leverson makes two arguments. First, he renews his challenge to the use of

his confession, arguing that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights

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before the seventh interview and that his confession was involuntary. Additionally, he argues

that his 72-year sentence is unconstitutional or, alternatively, excessive.

¶ 87 I

¶ 88 We begin with Leverson’s challenge to his confession. He raises two claims that overlap

and interrelate but, in fact, are distinct. First, his confession was the product of a Miranda

violation, in that he invoked his right to counsel and did not validly re-initiate conversation with

the police, and even if he did validly re-initiate communications with the police, his subsequent

waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligent. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.

1039, 1044-45 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 455-67 (1966); People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 198-202 (1997).

¶ 89 His second argument is that the conduct of the police was sufficiently coercive as to

render his ultimate confession involuntary, violating his due-process rights. It is on this ground

that we decide this appeal.

¶ 90 Leverson raised this challenge to the voluntariness of his confession pretrial and post-trial

and thus preserved it for our review. People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 59. As noted, the

court held an extensive suppression hearing with factual findings and legal conclusions. We

largely defer to the trial court’s factual findings; we will overturn them only if they are against

the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.L.H., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 46. But we reserve for

de novo review the ultimate question of whether the confession should be suppressed. Id.

¶ 91 The due-process and self-incrimination clauses of the fifth amendment to the United

States Constitution, applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment, prohibit the admission of

an involuntary confession. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV, § 1; Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 76.

The test for whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant made the statement freely

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and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or if the defendant’s will was overborne at

the time he confessed. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 160 (2008). Simply put, we ask whether

the confession is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).

¶ 92 Coercion by law enforcement is a prerequisite to finding a confession involuntary.

Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 83. Coercion can be psychological as well as physical. Id.; see

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. It may include

refusing to allow a suspect to contact family or an attorney; threatening a suspect with the loss of

custody of her children; and prolonged incommunicado interrogation. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722,

¶¶ 83, 103; People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 176 (2002).

¶ 93 Beyond that, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a

confession was voluntary. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 81. Relevant factors include the

defendant’s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical

condition at the time of questioning. Id. We consider the legality and duration of the detention,

the duration of the questioning, the provision of Miranda warnings, and any physical or mental

abuse by police, including the existence of threats, promises, or lies. Id.; People v. Willis, 215 Ill.

2d 517, 533 (2005); see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.

¶ 94 At the time of questioning, Leverson was 19 years old. He was born crack-addicted. His

mother spent time in prison when he was a child. He has largely untreated mental-health issues,

including diagnoses of bipolar disorder, manic depression, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, and schizophrenia, for which on occasion he received psychotropic drug therapy. He

dropped out of high school after the tenth grade.

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¶ 95 His personal background aside, we next consider the police conduct during the 72-hour

interrogation process. For the reasons we explain below, we have no hesitation in concluding that

Leverson’s confession was involuntary. We base our conclusion on three factors in particular.

¶ 96 A

¶ 97 We begin with the Miranda violations, a critical factor in a voluntariness analysis. See

Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 81; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. A brief review of that doctrine is

in order.

¶ 98 In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, the United States Supreme Court prohibited the use of

confessions in court unless the police had first warned the suspect that he had the right to remain

silent, that any statement he made may be used against him, and that he had the right to speak to

an attorney and have that attorney present during a custodial interrogation. See Salamon, 2022 IL

125722, ¶ 77. The warnings are meant to combat the “ ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ ” of an

interrogation, where the suspect is subjected to the “ ‘inherently compelling pressures which

work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not

otherwise do so freely.’ ” Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).

¶ 99 A suspect may waive his Miranda rights, as long as that waiver is knowingly and

intelligently made, with a basic understanding of those rights, what they encompass, and the

consequences of waiving them. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 514-15 (2003).

¶ 100 To invoke the right to counsel, “the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” Davis

v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). If the suspect does so at any time before or during a

custodial interrogation, all questioning of the suspect must cease. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. A

suspect may, of his own accord and not via coercion, re-initiate conversation with the police and

waive his Miranda rights—again, provided that waiver is knowing and intelligent. Id. at 484-85.

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¶ 101 In our view, Leverson unambiguously invoked his right to counsel at least four different

times during the seven custodial interrogations. The first was during the second interrogation,

almost 22 hours after Leverson’s arrest. Leverson asked Detective Hope, “Can I have my phone

call so I can call my lawyer?” See People v. Coleman, 2021 IL App (1st) 172416, ¶ 84

(defendant who asked, “Can I call my lawyer?” invoked right to counsel); People v. Schuning,

399 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1075, 1089 (2010) (defendant’s request to “use the telephone to call his

attorney” was unambiguous invocation of right to counsel); People v. Eichwedel, 247 Ill. App.

3d 393, 398 (1993) (defendant’s request to call his lawyer invoked right to counsel).

¶ 102 Detective Hope responded, “When you’re under investigation you don’t get a phone

call.” Obviously, that statement was false; Leverson had an unquestioned constitutional right to

counsel, not to mention a statutory right to a phone call to contact either counsel or family. See

725 ILCS 5/103-3(a) (West 2012). Nor did the detectives end their questioning at that moment;

they continued to interrogate him unabated, despite their obligations to cease the interrogation

immediately. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.

¶ 103 The second time occurred when Leverson spoke to an unidentified officer during a

break—perhaps hoping for more success with a new face—asking, “Can I have a lawyer?” That

is as unambiguous as a request can be. The officer responded, “Sure,” but nothing came of it.

The fact that this officer was not the one interrogating Leverson is of no constitutional import;

the knowledge of one officer is imputed to the other in this context. See Arizona v. Roberson,

486 U.S. 675, 687 (1988) (“we attach no significance to the fact that the officer who conducted

the second interrogation did not know that respondent had made a request for counsel”);

Schuning, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 1081 n.1 (2010).

¶ 104 The third unambiguous invocation occurred nearly 48 hours after his arrest, during the

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fifth interview, after Leverson had spent the last 18 hours in a holding cell. Leverson told the

detectives, “[B]efore I tell y’all names I just want a lawyer on the side of me present before I

tell.” A textbook invocation if there ever was one, as the State concedes (and conceded below).

The detectives denied the demand in two ways, telling Leverson that “[y]ou get a lawyer in

court” and “you’re not that important to us that we gotta call a lawyer.”

¶ 105 The detectives did cease questioning at that moment and for the next 12 hours. They did

not, however, make any effort to provide Leverson a public defender or a phone call to secure

counsel of his choice.

¶ 106 About 60 hours after Leverson’s arrest, detectives awoke Leverson at 4 am for his sixth

interview, where Leverson invoked his right to counsel for (at least) the fourth time. After a

heated exchange we detailed above, Leverson repeated four times, “I want a lawyer.”

¶ 107 The detectives ceased questioning at that moment; they were already terminating the

interview when Leverson demanded counsel. Another six hours passed—again, during which

time the detectives made no attempt to honor Leverson’s request for counsel.

¶ 108 Over the span of 66 hours, Leverson unequivocally requested counsel at least four

different times. The police wholly dishonored that right through lies, obfuscation, or delay, never

attempting to provide him counsel and continuing to question him throughout.

¶ 109 B

¶ 110 Even more frequent than his request for counsel was Leverson’s request for a phone call

to contact either counsel or his family. As we noted above, in Illinois, a suspect who is taken into

police custody “shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice and a

member of their family by making a reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other

reasonable manner. Such communication shall be permitted within a reasonable time after arrival

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at the first place of custody.” 725 ILCS 5/103-3(a) (West 2012).

¶ 111 The version of the statute in effect at the time did not define a “reasonable time.” Later

amendments to the statute have specified that an arrestee must be given an opportunity to make a

phone call no later than 3 hours after arriving at the first place of detention. 725 ILCS 5/103-

3.5(a) (West 2022). Regardless of what was in effect at the time of Leverson’s confession, our

supreme court recently noted that, even under the old version in effect here, “the legislature

intended that a suspect held in custody must be permitted to communicate with an attorney and

family members within a relatively short period of time—such as a couple of hours.” Salamon,

2022 IL 125722, ¶ 99.

¶ 112 Our supreme court in Salamon recently held that, though section 103-3(a) does not

specify a remedy for noncompliance, “an unwarranted delay in providing the simple expedient of

a telephone call takes on significant importance in evaluating the voluntariness of an inculpatory

statement made after an extended period of incommunicado detention.” Id. ¶ 128.

¶ 113 In that decision, Salamon, a murder suspect, demanded a lawyer when detectives picked

him up and repeated that demand at the station house. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Police held him in an

interrogation room for 24 hours without a phone call or counsel. After his requests for counsel

and a phone call were ignored, he waived his Miranda rights and submitted to questioning,

ultimately confessing. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Our supreme court, leaning heavily on the fact that the

defendant was held incommunicado for 24 hours after having asked to speak to an attorney and

denied his statutory right to a phone call, found his confession involuntary. Id. ¶ 119.

¶ 114 The officers’ violations of section 103-3(a) here are more egregious. Leverson repeatedly

asked—as many as 15 or 20 times—to make a phone call to his lawyer or family. The same 24

hours passed as in Salamon before Leverson was allowed a single phone call to his sister. For the

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remaining 48 hours, he was held incommunicado. His requests to the Dolton police were met

with lies and delay tactics. This persistent and blatant violation of section 103-3(a) weighs

heavily in favor of a finding of involuntariness.

¶ 115 C

¶ 116 The final factor we highlight is the length of Leverson’s overall detention. An arrest is a

seizure, as is detention in a police station. The fourth amendment requires a prompt probable-

cause hearing for a suspect arrested, as here, without a warrant. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,

114 (1975). The Supreme Court set an outer boundary for that prompt hearing at 48 hours.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Our state law in effect at the time

required that a suspect be taken before a judge “without unnecessary delay.” 725 ILCS 5/109-

1(a) (West 2012). “When a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours of arrest,

the burden shifts to the government to show the existence of a bona fide emergency or other

extraordinary circumstances to justify the delay.” People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 215

(2000); see McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57; People v. Mitchell, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049 (2006).

¶ 117 Detention in a station house beyond 48 hours does not result per se in the exclusion of a

confession but remains a factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. Willis, 215 Ill.

2d at 533; Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 214. Prolonged detention between arrest and confession

“ ‘ “may serve to amplify the coercion latent in a custodial setting, particularly when there are

other indicia of coercion.” ’ ” Mitchell, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 1054 (quoting People v. Ollie, 333 Ill.

App. 3d 971, 985 (2002), quoting People v. Lekas, 155 Ill. App. 3d 391, 414 (1987)).

¶ 118 Leverson does not raise a Gerstein violation here but does argue that the unreasonable

delay was a factor contributing to his involuntary confession. Leverson was held for over 72

hours without an appearance before a judge. The State has offered no justification, and the record

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admits of none, for holding Leverson well beyond 48 hours. This alone is not a dispositive fact,

as we have emphasized, but rather a factor contributing to a finding of involuntariness.

¶ 119 D

¶ 120 All these factors led up to the moment, 66 hours after his arrest, that Leverson informed

an officer in the Dolton Police Department that he was ready to talk. The trial court found that, in

doing so, Leverson reinitiated contact with the police, thus allowing the police to interrogate him

again, notwithstanding his invocation of the right to counsel six hours earlier. See Edwards, 451

U.S. at 484-85. We defer to the trial court’s factual finding that Leverson reinitiated contact; that

finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is likewise true that the police then

gave Leverson fresh Miranda warnings and that he verbally and in writing waived those rights.

¶ 121 But we wholly disagree that anything Leverson did at that point was voluntary. By then,

nearly three calendar days since his arrest, the police had made it clear to him that he would not

be given counsel, he would not be allowed access to his family, and he would remain in the

Dolton police station until he confessed. They might give him Miranda warnings again, but they

had already done so several times, and those prophylactic words had proven meaningless. As in

Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 104, on facts less egregious than here, “the police demonstrated to

[Leverson] that they could hold him incommunicado for as long as it took for him to confess.”

¶ 122 The right to phone calls may be statutory, but our supreme court emphasized the link

between the right to phone calls in section 103-3(a) and the constitutional right to counsel:

“The State also argues that the failure to comply with section 103-3(a) does not

require suppression of a custodial statement because the statute does not impose any

consequence or remedy for violation of its terms. But such a rule would undermine the

purpose of the provision and nullify the legislature’s intent to enable a suspect in custody

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to exercise the right to counsel while in custody. Acceptance of the State’s argument

would create the anomalous situation where police officers are required by Miranda to

warn a suspect of the right to counsel but then could prevent the suspect from exercising

that right by denying him access to a telephone—which is precisely what occurred in this

case.” Id. ¶ 115.

It is precisely what occurred in this case, too, except on a far larger scale than in Salamon.

¶ 123 We would also respectfully submit that what was lost in the trial court’s analysis is that,

in addition to the three other times he did so, Leverson unequivocally invoked his right to

counsel in his sixtieth hour of detention during the fifth interview—shouting four times, “I want

a lawyer”—which both the State and the trial court acknowledged as a valid invocation. Yet

nothing happened for the next six hours. The police easily could have given him access to a

phone at any point. Or they could have provided him a public defender, who for all we know was

already stationed there in Dolton or, if not, could have been summoned. If Leverson were not

already convinced that the police would not honor his right to counsel after denying it on three

previous occasions, what was he to think as he sat in his holding cell for the next six hours after

demanding a lawyer repeatedly?

¶ 124 The repeated violations of Miranda, the denial of his repeated requests for phone calls,

and the length of time during which these violations occurred lead us to find Leverson’s

inculpatory statement to the police to be involuntary, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth

amendments. His confession should have been suppressed. Its admission at trial was error.

¶ 125 II

¶ 126 To convince us to uphold Leverson’s convictions despite this constitutional error, the

State carries the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 327-38 (1992). It is no small burden, as our supreme court

has long recognized that “ ‘a confession is the most powerful piece of evidence the State can

offer, and its effect on a jury is incalculable.’ ” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 36

(quoting People v. R.C., 108 Ill. 2d 349, 356 (1985)); see People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414,

436 (1992) (“a confession may be the most probative and damaging evidence that can be

admitted against a defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 127 For this reason, our supreme court recently reminded us that the “ ‘admission of an

unlawfully obtained confession rarely is harmless error.’ ” Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 122

(quoting People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95, 114 (1988)).

¶ 128 The State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result would have been the

same absent the error. Id. ¶ 123. The reviewing court must review the facts of the case and the

evidence and determine the effect that the unlawfully obtained evidence may have had on that

evidence and the conduct of the defense at trial. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 114. In doing so, courts

(1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction,

(2) examine the other evidence in the case to see if it overwhelmingly supports the conviction,

and (3) determine whether the improper evidence is merely cumulative of other properly

admitted evidence. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 121.

¶ 129 Under a deferential sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, where the burden is on the

defendant and we interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we would find

that the evidence was sufficient to convict Leverson of each crime. But the State has not carried

its burden of showing that the evidence was overwhelming absent the confession; it has not

shown that the confession did not contribute to the convictions; it has not shown beyond a

reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same absent the confession.

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¶ 130 The first of the series of crimes, occurring in rather rapid succession, were the armed

robbery of Gregory Harris at roughly 10 pm, followed quickly by the murder of Derrick

Hampton very close in proximity, followed closely in time and proximity by the armed robbery

of Ravetta Moore. These three crimes were linked not only in time and proximity but by the fact

that they were perpetrated by two men, one of whom was Kevin Eason; they all involved the use

of a Jeep; and one of the fruits of the first armed robbery (Gregory Harris’s stolen ID card) was

found at the scene of the later (Ravetta Moore) armed robbery.

¶ 131 But the State’s evidence that this other man was Leverson was not overwhelming.

Ravetta Moore did not identify him. There were no eyewitnesses to the murder of Derrick

Hampton, only surveillance video that did not conclusively show Leverson as the accomplice.

¶ 132 As for the Gregory Harris robbery that began the crime spree, Harris himself did not

identify Leverson in court as the perpetrator. True, he identified Leverson at the station house as

the unarmed man who robbed him and who got into the passenger side of the Jeep afterward. But

he recanted at trial, testifying that his station-house identification was invalid, that he only made

the identification because the police would not release his property to him until he did so. (An

investigator with Dolton denied Harris’s account of the events at the station house.)

¶ 133 In the context of sufficiency challenges, we have often noted that the law views recanted

identifications with a skeptical eye. But this is not a sufficiency challenge. Harris’s recanted

station-house identification was the only untainted evidence that Leverson played any role in

these three crimes. That is not enough to constitute overwhelming evidence of guilt.

¶ 134 In his confession, however, Leverson implicated himself in those crimes. He admitted to

participating in the armed robbery of Gregory Harris and in the murder of Derrick Hampton. He

put himself inside the Jeep and put himself next to his accomplice, Kevin Eason, from the start.

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¶ 135 That brings us to the carjacking of the Lexus and Chevy Equinox at around 11 pm. The

carjacking victim testified that he and his girlfriend were accosted by two men—one was Kevin

Eason, the other unidentified. And the Jeep was involved as well. One assailant drove away the

Chevy Equinox, another the Lexus, and a third drove away the Jeep—for the first time

conclusively showing that there were at least three people involved in the crime spree.

¶ 136 There was no particular evidence linking Leverson to those carjackings. But again, he

confessed to his role in those crimes. He confessed to driving the Jeep away from the crime

scene. As the State said in rebuttal closing argument: “[H]e puts himself there [at the carjacking].

He gets everything right.” And Leverson confessed to later getting into the Lexus with Kevin

Eason and remaining inside the Lexus until the car crash following the police chase.

¶ 137 Then there was the series of crimes that were committed by the assailants while driving

the Lexus. Those included the armed robbery of Willie Douglas, the attempted armed robbery of

Angela Feaster, and the armed robbery of Phillip Neal, followed by the police chase that resulted

in the crashing of the Lexus and the escape of the two individuals inside that vehicle.

¶ 138 Both Angela Feaster and Phillip Neal identified Kevin Eason as one of the two offenders,

but neither identified Leverson as the other offender. At the time of the incident, Willie Douglas

told the police that he did not see the face of the passenger in the Lexus well enough to make an

identification. Three weeks later, he identified Leverson in a photo array as the passenger in the

Lexus who had robbed him. Notably, for reasons unclear to us, Douglas was not asked to make

an in-court identification of Leverson at trial.

¶ 139 Two pieces of forensic evidence were recovered at the scene of the Lexus crash. One

concerned the weapon used in each of these offenses, which the police recovered inside the

Lexus. The State’s DNA expert testified that Leverson could not be excluded as a source of the

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DNA. The expert also conceded that it was impossible to know when a person’s DNA is

deposited on an object.

¶ 140 The other was the passenger airbag in the Lexus that would have deployed at the time of

the crash following the police chase. In the DNA expert’s opinion, the major male DNA profile

on the passenger airbag was a match to the DNA profile of Leverson. That DNA evidence was

the State’s strongest evidence, as it put Leverson in the Lexus at the time of the crash. What was

less clear (absent the confession) is when Leverson got inside that Lexus; the evidence showed

that three individuals were participating at that point in the crime spree, with three separate cars.

¶ 141 Perhaps the fact that Leverson was in the Lexus at any time that night would be enough,

by itself, to convict him on an accountability theory of some of these crimes—the ones

committed while driving the Lexus. But the DNA evidence from the airbag would have done

nothing to prove Leverson’s guilt regarding the crimes committed before the Lexus carjacking

while driving the Jeep; absent Leverson’s confession, the State had only a recanted confession

from Harris to prove that initial string of crimes. The DNA evidence related to the gun was

certainly evidence that Leverson, at some point during that night, may have handled the weapon.

Relevant and helpful to the State, absolutely—but overwhelming by itself, no.

¶ 142 The confession, on the other hand, put Leverson in the Jeep and in cahoots with Kevin

Eason from the start—the only evidence, other than Harris’s recanted identification, that did so.

And the confession did more than establish that Leverson was inside the Lexus at some point in

the evening—it placed him in the Lexus at the beginning of that portion of the crime spree and

then throughout the remainder of it.

¶ 143 That was undeniably of great value to the State in convicting Leverson of all eight crimes

in the spree. In a case where one of the offenders appeared to be involved throughout, based on

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witness identifications (Kevin Eason), but the victims mostly struggled to identify a second

offender—which could have been either Leverson or Flemming, if not someone else—

Leverson’s confession wrapped up this loose end in a tidy bow. Whether he physically

participated in each and every crime, Leverson’s confession put him in the Jeep at all times

during that portion of the crime spree and in the Lexus throughout the remainder of the spree,

rendering him guilty under a theory of accountability for all eight crimes.

¶ 144 The State did not carry its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State

could have obtained all these convictions absent the tainted confession. The confession

unquestionably contributed to the verdicts in a meaningful way. This is not the “rare” case where

the admission of an involuntary confession was harmless error. Id. ¶ 122; St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d

at 114. Leverson’s convictions must be reversed.

¶ 145 III

¶ 146 We understand that the Dolton police were trying to solve a series of violent crimes, and

that they had reason to believe that Leverson was one of the offenders. Their ends were

commendable, but their means were anything but. If the fifth amendment and Miranda do not

apply to everyone, they do not apply to anyone.

¶ 147 As we remand this case for a new trial, we need not address Leverson’s argument that his

sentence is excessive. Nor is there a double-jeopardy bar to retrial, as the evidence, taken in the

light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 148 CONCLUSION

¶ 149 Defendant’s convictions are reversed. The cause is remanded for a new trial.

¶ 150 Reversed and remanded.

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People v. Leverson, 2024 IL App (1st) 211083

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 12-CR- 20961, 13-CR-20552(02); the Hon. Michele McDowell Pitman, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Kelly Anne Burden, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Joseph A. Alexander, John E. Nowak, and Noah Appellee: Montague, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

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